

The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Transatlantic Leadership Network

Editors
Sławomir Dębski and Daniel S. Hamilton

EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE: VISION AND REALITY

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Praise for *Europe Whole and Free: Vision and Reality*

"The goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace remains as vital today as it did in 1989. This important book brings together policymakers and experts from both sides of the Atlantic for a timely discussion of how to achieve that goal for the 21st century."

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Former Secretary of State between 1997–2001

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Warsaw and Washington, D.C. 2019

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Sławomir Dębski and Daniel S. Hamilton (eds.), *Europe Whole and Free: Vision and Reality*

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The Polish Institute of International Affairs
ul. Warecka 1a
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www.pism.pl

Transatlantic Leadership Network
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Preface

In his May 1989 speech in Mainz, Germany, U.S. President George H.W. Bush announced that Europe and the world faced a great opportunity. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, there was a chance to end political and ideological rivalry, remove the Iron Curtain, unify Germany, and restore freedom to the peoples of Central Europe:

> In Poland, at the end of World War II, the Soviet Army prevented the free elections promised by Stalin at Yalta. And today Poles are taking the first steps toward real elections, so long promised, so long deferred. (...) As President, I will continue to do all I can to help open the closed societies of the East. We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax, and we must not waver. Again, the world has waited long enough.

Indeed, Europe had been waiting for this moment since the end of World War II. 1945 brought freedom and peace to the peoples of Western Europe. However, the eastern part of the continent was choked with the iciness of the Cold War, cut off from the free part of Europe by an Iron Curtain, and incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence. As the Hungarian poet Sándor Márai wrote about Central Europe's experience:

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Soviet soldiers freed our lands, but they could not give us freedom because they themselves did not have it.

Europe had been divided because of divisions about Germany; the Iron Curtain was built as an outcome of the German problem. Therefore, the future of Europe, the dreams of its unification, and the freedom of nations left in the Soviet sphere of influence after Yalta were all associated with the need to overcome the division of Germany.

On the 40th anniversary of the Yalta conference, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote:

> Yalta is unfinished business (...) Thoughtful Europeans realize that the future of Europe is intertwined with the future of Germany and of Poland. Without spanning, in some non-threatening fashion, the division of Germany, there will not be a genuine Europe, but continuing Russian domination of Poland makes Russian control over East Germany geopolitically possible. Thus the relationship between Russia on the one hand and Germany and Poland on the other must be peacefully transformed if a larger Europe is ever to emerge.[1]

In May 1989, the president of the United States invited all political forces in Europe, including former rivals from across the Iron Curtain, to build a new community: *Europe whole and free ... whose creation was to guarantee peace and optimal conditions for development.*

Thirty years after presenting this vision, it is worth considering the significance of Bush's vision for the history of transatlantic relations, for Europe and for the whole world. Only from the perspective of time can we assess how prophetic it was, what it really changed and to what extent it could be realised.

The reality is that 30 years on, despite tremendous progress, Europe as a continent is not entirely whole, free, or at peace. Some parts of the continent are more secure than at any time in the previous century. Others face conflict or are war zones. European borders have once again been changed by force. Vast parts of the continent are no longer under the thumb of domestic autocrats or foreign overseers, but Europe is not fully

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free. Europe is no longer divided as it had been, but new divisions have emerged, which means the continent is not entirely whole.

Is the vision of a united Europe still attractive? For whom? What else should be done to bring it closer to fruition? What does it depend on today? To address these questions, we turned to a group of several dozen outstanding American and European experts dealing with European issues, transatlantic relations, strategic problems and security. Some are practitioners, people who at various stages and in different capacities participated in attempts to implement the vision of Europe whole and free. Others constantly deal with issues that interest us and often face challenges associated with implementing Bush's vision. Some authors are rising stars, experts who may in the future be responsible for the shape of the Old Continent, may influence the policy direction of their own countries and may participate in global debates on the nature and condition of peace and the means of its defence.

The authors we invited represent very different political perspectives and viewpoints. Everyone, however, is without exception bound by the conviction that overcoming divisions in Europe is a path toward the security of the continent and one worth seeking in the name of peace.

We thank our authors for their contributions and their insights. The views and opinions they express are their own and do not reflect or represent those of any institution or government.

To assist the reader, our authors' answers have been grouped into three thematic sections: Roots, Institutions, and the Future. Citations are found in the endnotes, along with an index and short biographies of the authors. We also include as a key reference George H.W. Bush's original Mainz speech.

This project was initiated and completed with the support of The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) and the Transatlantic Leadership Network. Special thanks go to Andrzej Dąbrowski of PISM, who put a tremendous amount of work into coordinating this project. And a thank you to Dorota Dołęgowska, who heads the PISM publishing house, for watching over the publishing process.

We hope you enjoy the book.

Sławomir Dębski, Daniel S. Hamilton

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CHAPTER ONE
ROOTS

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Sławomir Dębski

Peace without Victory

When Stalin broke the Yalta Accords and "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic" an Iron Curtain fell across Europe, the United States assumed responsibility for the fate of a free and democratic Europe. In March 1947, President Harry Truman proclaimed in Congress:

> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.[1]

European security and prosperity demanded American engagement to create a community capable of collective defence, to raise the

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Old Continent from economic ruin, and to guarantee conditions for development. This conviction led to the Marshall Plan, the institutionalisation of mutual transatlantic defence, the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, and initiated a process of European integration. Soon, NATO and the European community became institutional emanations of cooperation among the most developed nations of the world.

Truman borrowed the understanding of "free people" from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who, before a joint session of Congress on 26 December 1942 rhetorically asked: "What kind of people do they think we are?" Here, "they" referred to Hitler and Mussolini. By replying to his question, Churchill defined the identity of the Grand Coalition: "we" meant the free nations striving for the liberation of Europe from the bondage of German Nazism and Italian fascism.

Forty years later, President Ronald Reagan spoke before a sitting of both houses of parliament in London and intoned Churchill's question to define "we" in the context of the Cold War. For him, it meant a community united over the goal of liberating Europe from communism: "Free people, worthy of freedom and determined to not only remain so but to help others gain their freedom as well." Here, Reagan proclaimed the crusade for freedom—a political strategy going beyond containment of the imperial aspirations of the Soviet Union. It was no longer just about publicly expressing solidarity with the nations to the east of the Iron Curtain (John F. Kennedy, Ich bin ein Berliner speech, 26 June 1963). Reagan mobilised European allies and increased political pressure on the civilisation of enslavement. On the one hand, the U.S. strove to weaken communist regimes and undermine their legitimacy. On the other, they offered to cooperate with the Soviet Union for global security and Europe.

The new period of technological rivalry initiated by Reagan, along with increased political pressure and economic sanctions that cut the USSR off from advanced Western technology, led to a situation in which Soviet communism was able neither to keep pace with the U.S. in technological development nor to offer its own society an alternative to the Western way of life. It was thanks to these politics that the U.S. succeeded in reaching a series of disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union, such as the limitation of strategic weapons (START 1) or the liquidation of intermediate-

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range rocket arsenals (INF); something that contributed to withdrawing them from Europe also.

Mikhail Gorbachev—as it turned out, the last leader of the Soviet Union—attempted to salvage the authority of the Communist Party and maintain its legitimacy to govern. However, the glasnost and perestroika policies he initiated led to the democratisation of social relations, first in the Soviet Union and, subsequently, with the satellite states. In this way, the communist parties in Central Europe gradually lost an important element that secured their power—the threat of Soviet intervention.

Standing before Reagan's successor in the White House was the task of setting a new aim around which a pan-European community and their interests could be shaped. And here again, the U.S., just as 40 years earlier, assumed the responsibility for fashioning a new peaceful order and defining the political "we."

In April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson presented to Congress his vision of order intended for Europe after World War I:

> Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only a new balance of power? … Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not only a balance, but a community of power, not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace … It must be peace without victory … [as] only peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit.[2]

In proposing an end to the Cold War, George H.W. Bush alluded to this American tradition of contemplating the European order and, in a certain sense, put forward his own vision of "peace without victory." During his Europe Whole and Free speech, he avoided antagonising the now former Soviet adversaries by inviting them to join in commonly defining the understanding of "we" by creating a community joined in "the vision, concept of free people in North America and Europe working to protect their values." The road to achieving this goal was through cooperation over the unification of Germany (which led to the 2+4 conference in 1990 and the ultimate reunification of the German Democratic Republic with the Federal Republic of Germany), accepting free, democratic elections as

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a pan-European systemic standard, and in cooperation in technological advancement and significant restrictions on military potential.

In response to this American vision, Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, announced an end to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which limited the sovereignty of Central European states, and invoked the image of "a common European home." In his speech before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, he accepted the American offer of "peace without victory." He ruled out the eruption of armed conflict on the continent and "the very possibility of the use or threat of force, above all military force, by an alliance against another alliance, inside alliances, or wherever it may be."[3] This vision provided the impetus for harmonising a continent-wide developmental model and, after several years, led to the gradual enlargement of NATO and the European Union. The combined nullification of the Brezhnev Doctrine and denunciation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact by the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies in December 1989 were important Soviet contributions toward the newly formed European order. A new spectre was haunting Europe—the spectre of the collapse of communism, of peace without victory, without vanquished or victors but with a common triumph over the Cold War division of the continent.

Unintended Consequences of Systemic Transformations

One element of America's policy toward dismantling the Yalta division of Europe was creating the conditions that would allow communist elites in Central Europe to peacefully relinquish and hand over power to democratic movements. Here too the notion of peace without victory was applied. The U.S. supported the democratic transformations in Central Europe and the new democratic authorities there supported American policies of overcoming the Cold War division of Europe and basing continental security on mutual cooperation. One example is Poland, whose neighbours all changed after the Cold War. To the west emerged a reunited Germany. To the south, the Czech and Slovak Republics replaced Czechoslovakia. To the east, instead of one neighbour—the Soviet Union—Poland shared its

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borders with four new states: Russia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. With all its new neighbours Poland signed treaties of friendship and cooperation and became the epicentre of political stability in the new post-Yalta Europe. Through this, Poland also became an important ally to Washington in realizing the vision of Europe whole and free.

New social, political, and economic elites were shaped under American patronage in Central Europe. In essence, these were a synthesis of former communist elites and dissidents. In many instances, the synthesis demanded America's protection for former communist authorities or members of the communist security apparatus. This was a rather standard element of American politics toward systemic transformations, but for the idea of creating a united, free and democratic Europe, it had a few important negative, unintended consequences.

First, American protection of former communist elites was, in essence, a form of external intervention in the democratisation process. Democracy is a self-regulating system of government. Every form of external interference that favours a certain political side—for example, by guaranteeing political inviolability—always threatens the possibility of the oligarchisation of social relations, limiting democratic controls and, in the long term, social tensions. The repercussion of this sort of American intervention in all Central European states severely delayed the processes of de-communisation and lustration. Without any doubt, the delays negatively impacted the quality of democratic systems in Central Europe.

Second, the American umbrella over the systemic transformations in Central Europe was incorrectly interpreted in Russia as a geopolitical action intended to expand America's sphere of influence. The misinterpretation stemmed from the old tendency to view the world in geopolitical terms. In turn, this old viewpoint often ignored the actual political aspirations of Central European societies toward integration in transatlantic and European structures. With the exception of Slovakia after 1989, no political power came to office in the other Central European states advocating an alternative to NATO and EU membership. Social aspirations were a major regional political power harmonising with the vision of Europe whole and free, which nevertheless broke with the paradigm of geopolitical rivalry.

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During the Cold War, the free world proved the superiority of its development model. Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, and the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe who emerged from communism with aspirations of sovereignty did not feel that they had lost. Rather they rejected their developmental aberrations—communism and the Soviet command economy—and regarded this as their own success. In 1990, 90% of Russians correlated "normalcy" with accepting the Western lifestyle and 32% believed that state reformers should imitate the U.S. (32% said the same about imitating Japan). Only 17% named Germany as an example to follow, 11% cited Sweden, and 4% favoured the Chinese example.

The negative experiences associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia's systemic transformation under President Boris Yeltsin contributed to a change in social attitudes. Vladimir Putin exploited this situation by transforming the weak, corrupt Russian democracy he inherited into an authoritarian system. In 2005, Putin announced that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." Under the influence of this and similar assessments, over half of Russians began negatively evaluating the fall of the USSR and conveying a positive attitude toward totalitarian, Soviet symbols.

Gleb Pavlovsky, one of the ideologues responsible for transforming the Russian political system into an authoritarian one, once proposed the thesis that for Russia, the Cold War ended differently than for the Western world. According to him, Francis Fukuyama's famous essay best conveyed the mood of the post-1989 era by claiming that after the end of the Cold War came "the end of history." Liberal democracy was victorious over the communist ideology but, at the same time, the West lost its last ideological opponent. But the Russians did not consider themselves to be defeated. They saw the bankruptcy of communism as the beginning of a new era of nihilism in which no norms applied.[4]

Against this backdrop, social acceptance of the facade of democracy in Russia was born. New Russian elites convinced the society of how further democratisation threatened disintegration and how this process could only be stopped by imperialistic methods, which began re-emerging in foreign and domestic politics. At the same time, it became impossible to

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collectively create a new pan-European "we" with a Russia headed toward authoritarianism.

Here, it is worthwhile to remember that even during the Gorbachev period, the vision of Europe whole and free did not apply to the territory of the Soviet Union, for no one envisioned the possibility of its disintegration. Gorbachev's attempts to forcefully contain the Soviet republics' independence aspirations, for example in Vilnius and Tbilisi, ended in fiasco and contributed to the collapse and later decision to dissolve the Soviet Union.

Geopolitics Strikes Back

The vision of Europe "whole and free" was conditional. Achievement of the idea was based on the assumption that all peoples of the new community, including Russia, would fundamentally obey the norms of international law and political obligations stemming from membership in the UN or OSCE, including the 1990 Paris Charter. This meant, first and foremost, renouncing one-sided use or the threat of force in international relations, respecting the sovereign equality of states, the inviolability of state borders, and refraining from intervening in states' internal affairs.

Only for a short period of time were Moscow's elites forced to regard these principles as also applying to the former Soviet republics and their independence aspirations. The reason for this was quite prosaic. In order to speak of an end to the Cold War through the idea of peace without victory, Russia could not feel defeated. A defeat would mean the loss of global power status as well as its legal-international attributes, especially permanent-member status in the UN Security Council. From a formal perspective, the Russian state that emerged after the dissolution of the USSR was a new entity. Whether it would be recognised internationally as the legal successor of the Soviet Union was left to the goodwill of the members of the international community. In order to gain a positive decision, Russia had to accept the existing territorial order.

If in 1991, for example, Russia had announced territorial claims against Ukraine or any of its other neighbours, it would not have been recognized

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as the USSR's legal successor and would have lost its place on the UN Security Council. For Russia to assume the rights associated with the USSR in the UN, all remaining members of the UN would have to consent, including Ukraine. All that would be needed was one dissenting vote to prevent Russia from having veto power in the Security Council. It is difficult to imagine Kyiv accepting Russia's proposal while at the same time being under Russian pressure over territorial claims.

When Russia was recognised as the successor to the USSR, the imperialist tradition of viewing relations with former Soviet republics as internal Russian affairs was revived in Moscow. Consequently, the Western-supported emancipationist aspirations of new states within the post-Soviet space were seen in Russia as a violation of the principle of cooperation based on the Europe whole and free vision. Russia's political about-face began in September 1993. During his visit to Poland in August of that year, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared his recognition of Poland's aspiration for NATO membership as understandable: "in perspective, the decision of sovereign Poland aiming for European integration is not contradictory with the interests of other states, including Russia."[5]

Three weeks later, Yeltsin issued a letter to the leaders of the United States, France, the UK, and Germany in which he rescinded his Poland position. "In general, we prefer a situation where the relations between our country and NATO are by several degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe."[6] Russia proposed also that NATO and Russia jointly extend security guarantees to the countries of the region, instead of them joining NATO. This was a critical moment. Despite Western efforts, Russia rejected the principle of sovereign state equality. At the same time, it also rejected cooperation for European political democratisation in the spirit of the "peace without victory" idea offered in the Europe whole and free vision. Instead Russia, for the first time, demanded a return to the old geopolitical, imperial schemes, reintroducing the Concert of Europe and recognising the inequality of European states.

This is how Krzysztof Skubiszewski, former Polish foreign minister and a leading architect of the post-Cold War European order, read Russia's intentions. On 4 October 1993, he commented on Russia's new postulates as such:

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> Poland's pursuit to join NATO is part of our policy … It is a policy of linking with Western defence and security organisations, making them to a larger extent European through Poland's participation, instead of—as thus far—maintaining only their Western character. The division of Europe will be different. This policy corresponds to the most vital interests of Poland, to maintaining its hard-won independence—we will not give up this policy. … Just as we will be opposed to isolating Russia, we equally reject the placement of Poland in a buffer or grey zone between West and East. The idea of Russian guarantees leads to such a zone, one of imminent dependence. There is no mention of them in the Wałęsa-Yeltsin declaration. We already had bad experiences with such guarantees—in the 18th century before the partitions, and in the 20th century in Tehran and Yalta. Our policy is an independence policy within the framework of Euro-Atlantic security.[7]

From then on, Russia has made conscientious attempts to abate the integration processes of European states by demanding differentiated membership status for new members. It demanded that NATO refrain from deploying more serious forces in new member states. It attempted to gain "compensation" from the EU in exchange for eastern expansion. It opposed the pro-European aspiration of elites in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Finally, in order to halt the aspirations of former Soviet republics from gaining the full-fledged community status of a member building Europe whole and free, Russia used military strength against Moldova in 1992, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2014. By these actions, Russia broke fundamental European peace norms agreed upon in the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE in 1975, the 1990 Paris Charter for the New Europe, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, and a whole series of bilateral understandings.

After the aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Putin openly declared that Russia finds itself in a war with the West. During his remarks at a 2014 conference in Valdai, he blamed the West for forcing upon Russians their values "instead of establishing a new balance of power, essential

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for maintaining order and stability, they took steps that threw the system into sharp and deep imbalance."[8]

What Kind of People Do We Think We Are?

Politics based on the vision of Europe whole and free has proved to be one of history's most effective instruments for spreading freedom and prosperity. Today, the states of Central Europe constitute the fastest-developing part of the continent. As long as Russia will continue to use its strength to contain democracy from expanding and curb freedom on the entire continent, however, European security and prosperity will remain in jeopardy. This is especially true today as Europe finds itself in a more difficult situation than in 1919 or 1989.

American leadership in the free world is not only weaker, it must also compete with autocratic developmental models in Europe—Russia—as well as in Asia. China, the largest autocratic power in the world, is competing with the democratic world not only economically but also ideologically. The West, which transgressed an ideological demobilisation after 1989, made a strategic error by accepting the Chinese developmental "one state, two systems" model as good enough to accept China into the WTO. Meanwhile, one of China's systems is based on freedom, the other on unfreedom. A synthesis of both systems is not possible since authoritarianism, supported by the power of the state, will always dominate over freedom devoid of such support. In this way, China, by assuming to be a free market economy, gains an advantage over the free world. Moreover, they are exporting their developmental model abroad.

One of the most important lessons from the fall of communism was the empirical experience of millions that showed how democracy and the free market determine successful development and prosperity. By accepting the Chinese "one state, two systems" approach, the West seriously weakened the strength of its lesson. Today, the autocratic developmental model, supported by China and Russia, is becoming more and more popular not only among developing states but also among democratic elites in many countries. To successfully counter this trend, the West must once

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again reintegrate itself, redefine its political community and the term “we.” Paradoxically, this will be most easily achieved within Europe by utilising the aspirations of societies in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans to actively take part in the Europe whole and free vision. By returning to the road of NATO and EU political enlargement, free nations can regain their identity.

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Kori Schake

The Vision Thing

President George H.W. Bush's 1989 "Europe whole and free" speech is a landmark at the end of the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the West. It is that moment in time when the Free World begins to imagine a Europe of genuine cooperation and inclusion, moving past the generational tasks of preserving Western Europe from the Soviet menace, and sustaining West Germany's voluntary allegiance to the West. Its purpose was to consolidate the gains achieved by the defence of Western Europe during the Cold War and those made newly possible by the people of Eastern Europe and some former Soviet states liberating themselves.

To President Bush's enduring credit, he seized that moment with seriousness and creativity, offering policy initiatives that invited the former Soviet states into security cooperation, balancing former Eastern European states' desire for protection, prosperity, and incorporation into the West with concern for Russian sensitivity to how much their power had diminished.

For all the derision cascaded on President Bush for "the vision thing" domestically in the U.S., he had a clear, resonant idea for what Europe after the Cold War could be. His administration crafted policies and fostered NATO alliance unity and international acceptance to enact the vision.

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Whereas his successors mistakenly assumed that the arc of history bends toward freedom, Bush understood freedom had to be fought for, worked for, and nurtured. Perhaps the most important passage from the "Europe whole and free" speech was that "weaving together the slender threads of freedom in the East will require much from the Western democracies."

Why didn't it work? During the Bush administration, it did. Subsequently, it faltered, predominantly due to decisions made by the Russian government: Yeltsin's choice of Vladimir Putin as successor, Putin's charade of relinquishing power in 2008, closing down political opposition and civic space, efforts to disrupt and subordinate neighbouring states. Russia under Putin's rule rejected not only the offer of participating in security cooperation on terms equal to other European states but the very concept that Russia benefits from secure and prosperous states on its borders. And that concept is fundamental to achieving a Europe whole and free.

The Speech

It's hard to read the text of Bush's speech without being overwhelmed by nostalgia for all that seemed possible in 1989, for an American government that understood the majesty of what had been achieved and the gravity of the decisions they were making. Bush's speech accomplished four crucial things: it affirmed NATO's continuing purpose; celebrated the prospect of German unification; provided concrete, practical policy initiatives to reduce tensions and build common security; and, committed to support legitimate Soviet security interests.

NATO. Bush starts the speech in gratitude: "the generation coming into its own in America and Western Europe is heir to gifts greater than those bestowed to any generation in history: peace, freedom, and prosperity. This inheritance is possible because 40 years ago the nations of the West joined in that noble, common cause called NATO." Grounding the future in appreciation of the efforts that brought the West its success was graceful. It also made clear that the U.S. was, and intended to remain, a European power.

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The Soviet Union had proposed a "common European home" excluding the U.S., and Bush's speech did a masterful job succinctly weaving together NATO's accomplishments in ways that made a powerful case for sustaining the alliance—a case that needed to be made in the West as well as in Moscow:

> First, there was the vision, the concept of free peoples in North America and Europe working to protect their values. And second, there was the practical sharing of risks and burdens and a realistic recognition of Soviet expansionism. And finally, there was the determination to look beyond old animosities. The NATO alliance did nothing less than provide a way for Western Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, to begin an era of reconciliation and restoration. It has been, in fact, a second Renaissance of Europe.

The German Question. Bush chose to give his major speech about ending the Cold War in Germany with Chancellor Kohl by his side. He extolled Germany's strength during the Cold War, calling it courageous and magnificent. Without any hesitation about what Germany might become, he called out "Let Berlin be next—let Berlin be next!" But he also used Germany's experience as an example of what was possible in the present: "If ancient rivals like Britain and France, or France and Germany, can reconcile, then why not the nations of the East and West?"

Bush understood better than most leaders that a unified Germany would be the anchor of a post-Cold War Europe, and fostered rather than attempted to prevent it (as other Western leaders did), lending American support to achieve terms favourable to Europe's security and sustaining of the transatlantic relationship. His encouragement of a unified Germany, his gentle insistence that neither we in the West nor those in the East had anything to fear from a strong, prosperous, united Germany was essential in setting the conditions for the post-Cold War order.

Constructive Policies. Proposals in the speech incentivised Soviet cooperation in moving beyond the Cold War. It offered waiving Jackson-Vanik penalties and ending sanctions that had been put in place against the Soviet Union, expanding the Helsinki Accords, cooperating on environmental issues (this coming after the Chernobyl reactor crisis),

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limits on military personnel and equipment (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, combat aircraft, combat manpower outside national territory) in the region from the Atlantic to the Urals, greater transparency for military exercises, and an accelerated timetable for achieving all these U.S.-Soviet agreements. It provided an ambitious agenda incorporating issues of concern to the Soviets (ending sanctions, limits on U.S. forces in Europe, funding and technology for environmental cleanup and prevention).

Bush's policy initiatives gave concrete form to the speech's promise that legitimate Soviet security concerns would be respected. They removed sanctions that inhibited the Soviet economy and stigmatised it diplomatically, limited NATO—and particularly U.S.—military forces both numerically and in the categories of the West's comparative advantages (combat aircraft), and accelerated the timetable to demonstrate the seriousness of the Western intent.

The Russian Problem. Bush's "Europe whole and free" speech sought to reassure the Soviets that the U.S. would not take advantage of their retreat—but he did so without accepting the Soviet approach to making themselves secure by denying security to others. "Let the Soviets know that our goal is not to undermine their legitimate security interests. Our goal is to convince them, step-by-step, that their definition of security is obsolete, that their deepest fears are unfounded."

Gorbachev's proposal in 1987 for a "common European home" was, and clearly remains, Russia's preferred European security architecture, principally because it excludes the United States. Russia's problem, then and now, is that other European states want American participation, want promises of American protection because they don't trust Russia.

The Soviet leader's public comments at the Malta summit in December of 1989 seemed to accept the terms on offer by the West: "The world is leaving one epoch and entering another. We are at the beginning of a long road to a lasting, peaceful era. The threat of force, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle should all be things of the past." What Gorbachev permitted to occur, allowing former Warsaw Pact states their freedom and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are the difference between a Europe soaked in blood to attain its freedom, and the memories of Berlin's wall being smashed to pieces by its exultant people. We should look on the

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events from 1989 to 1991 and marvel so much was achieved with so little bloodshed.

But even Gorbachev sent tanks into Lithuania and Latvia in 1991 to quell democratic movements (something President Bush resolutely condemned); German Chancellor Helmut Kohl feared the window for German unification could close quickly. Peoples that had suffered under Soviet dominion were not wrong to fear Russian recidivism.

It is hard now to reconjure just how tentative progress felt in the time of transition, how much might have been different if the coup attempt in August 1991 had not been quashed by Boris Yeltsin and democratic forces in Russia. Removal of Russian troops from occupied countries would likely have stopped, hopes for freedom crushed, Germany forced to accept the hard choice of unification or continued NATO membership (and Germany would almost certainly have chosen unification), the West disentangling Germany from NATO's integrated military command and withdrawing troops westward, subsequent arguments over where to station the 325,000 American troops that had been in Germany, debates within the U.S. about why so prosperous a Europe could not marshal the forces for its own defence.

There has been a major effort by the Russian government to blame the West for the deterioration of relations. In particular, they argue NATO's incorporation of new members from those states that had been subject to Soviet occupation took advantage of Russia at a time of weakness, encroaching on its sphere of influence and increasing the threat of attack by hostile states and military forces on its borders.

And there is some truth to the Russian recrimination: NATO would not have admitted Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic in the 1990s—much less Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania in 2004, Albania and Croatia in 2009, and Macedonia in 2019—if the alliance thought the Russian response would be to invade those countries or further westward. But the alliance thought Russia, too, was becoming Western.

NATO moved very slowly and worked very hard to reassure Russia in order to ascertain that the expansion would not provoke an attack by the Soviet Union. NATO resisted for years the clamouring by the newly independent states to be admitted to the alliance, created the Partnership

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for Peace to forestall pressure for quick admission and make transparent the process and terms countries needed to meet to qualify, established a NATO-Russia Council to give Russia a stature distinct from other non-NATO states. The alliance eagerly entered into arms-limitation treaties to reduce forces and increase the transparency of military activities, even unilaterally reducing alliance nuclear forces by 90% (Russia made no corresponding reductions). In order to signal to Russia that it posed no threat by expanded membership, NATO pointedly did not station troops in those countries admitted to membership or increase the military capabilities of the alliance commensurate with the additional obligation of defending its expanded territory. Russia's resentment that countries that had been forced into Soviet dominion yearned so ardently for inclusion in the West is the wages of Russian and Soviet oppression of them; it is Russia's fault, not ours.

We in the West ought not to accept the argument that Russia should dictate the terms of sovereign countries' foreign policies. We have never believed Russia's claims deserve greater weight than those countries' claims for themselves. But we ought also to admit that throughout the Cold War we conceded the practice—the countries of the Warsaw Pact, the Baltic States, and even Finland had their sovereign right to choose their security arrangements infringed by the Soviet Union and we did not prevent it. So, Russia is not wrong to say that we indulge our principles now that we have the power relative to Russia to enforce them.

Russia is also not wrong that we in NATO delude ourselves when we claim we are a solely defensive alliance. Our decision to deploy outside of NATO territory in support of the UN in Bosnia negated that claim because we elected to become an organisation that seeks to provide security on our periphery—if there were a moral equivalence between NATO and Russia, it could be argued that Russia's intervention in Chechnya is comparable. But, of course, there is no moral equivalence—Russia had no UN Security Council resolution and committed war crimes in its conduct of operations.

Russia is also not wrong in its grievance about the 1999 NATO war in Kosovo, which was entered into without benefit of a UN Security Council resolution. NATO used military force on its own authority to protect people from their government. That does make NATO a different kind of alliance—one not limiting itself just to the defence of its territory or to international

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action under the authority of the UN, but justifying its use of military force as a humanitarian intervention. NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya, justified under the UN's "responsibility to protect" further alarmed Russia that international support was coalescing around Western attitudes. But we thought Russia, too, was coalescing around Western attitudes; slowly, grudgingly, but ultimately.

Even without paranoid theories that the U.S. is fomenting "colour revolutions" intending to build to a crescendo with regime change in Russia, a Russia that is not becoming Western does have a basis for concern about NATO ballooning into an all-purpose, self-justifying force hemming in Russian influence. And Russia is simply not going to countenance an international order in which the advance of democracy and human rights supersedes the state's sovereignty to do whatever it chooses within its territorial boundaries.

But even conceding all those arguments, what has gone wrong is not NATO responding to new challenges in creative ways that expand the zone of peace in Europe. It is Russia choosing not to be part of that expansion. Russia's narrative erases from the story their choices that increasingly persuaded Western governments that Russia was becoming an authoritarian state that did not respect the rule of law or the sanctity of international borders or the sovereignty of other states or acknowledge that humans have inherent rights. Nor did Russia believe in the principle of state sovereignty it demanded for itself since it sought to intimidate or corrupt other societies.

What has gone wrong that has prevented a Europe whole and free is the strangulation of political representation and civil society in Russia as Putin consolidated power. His Russian government prefers to stand outside Europe and threaten it than join Europe and participate in it. It has chosen to be a spoiler rather than a beneficiary, and that is likely to remain true for as long as Putin remains in power.

Russia poses a direct military threat to the free countries of Europe, as demonstrated by their reckless challenges to Western airspace and destabilising short-notice large-scale military exercises at NATO's borders. They are in violation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and many others.

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They surreptitiously participate in our domestic debates to exacerbate our divisions and interfere in our elections. They foster corruption and recidivist tendencies. Russia's invasions of Georgia and Ukraine have succeeded in driving up the cost to NATO of admitting new members, as demonstrated by the ebbing of support for Georgia's and Ukraine's bids since Putin's 2007 Munich Security Conference speech described NATO expansion as a "serious provocation."

Russia is not Europe's only challenge: creeping recidivism corroding the rule of law, political turbulence resulting from migration and economic crises, Britain consumed with an internal discussion about whether to leave the EU. But these are the continual challenges of free societies to find solutions to perturbations. Russia's actions have clarified our current challenge by reminding us of both the value and the vulnerability of free societies. We need not wonder what the Russian government's intentions are. We need to protect ourselves against them, strengthen our resilience in responding to them, and continue our devotion to the five principles Bush's Secretary of State James Baker outlined in 1991 to make Europe truly whole and free: self-determination consistent with democratic principles, recognition of existing borders, support for democracy and rule of law, preservation of human rights and rights of national minorities, and respect for international law and obligations.

And Europe should do more of this work itself. As Jim Goldgeier has persuasively argued, "the more time, energy, and resources America focuses on the China challenge, the more it requires a Europe capable of managing threats and challenges in its own neighbourhood."[1] Russia is not so powerful that Europe cannot contain its malevolent actions.

But what yet needs doing should not obscure all that has been achieved since Bush's 1989 speech—it is no less than the elimination of Eastern Europe. There is now just Europe. It isn't completely whole, it isn't completely free, but it is so much better, so much safer, so much more prosperous, and so much freer than it was before President Bush called on those of us in the West to support the brave men and women in the East yearning to share in the truths we hold to be self-evident. The countries of Europe can now choose their governments and their security arrangements.

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Russia causes the West serious problems but should be thanked because it did not prevent by force the independence efforts of Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The U.S. and Canada should be thanked for their long-standing commitment to Europe's security and willingness to extend their commitment to additional countries in Europe. The bureaucrats of NATO should be thanked that they found creative initiatives to buy time and set standards to make members into contributors for our common security. The governments, Commission, bureaucrats, and people of the European Union should be thanked for their neighbourhood policy, legal, and regulatory obstinacy and oversight, and financial generosity that pulled Eastern Europe West and have been a magnet for Ukraine and other states in transition. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe should be thanked for its dedication to mediating and bearing witness during conflicts. The people of what used to be Eastern Europe should be thanked for reminding us that the yearning for liberty and human dignity are universal and for their courage in claiming those things for themselves.

And George Herbert Walker Bush should be thanked for having the vision, generosity of spirit, and determination to reach across the Cold War divide.

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Ulrich Speck

Making Plan A Work: For Europe, the American Presence Remains Essential

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George H.W. Bush's speech in Mainz on 31 May 1989 remains a document of extraordinary foresight. With it, the U.S. strategy for dealing with the coming revolution of the European order was largely set. The overall goal was a Europe "whole and free and at peace with itself." The historical change in Europe to which America responded was driven by political liberalism: "The momentum for freedom comes from a single powerful idea: democracy." Bush laid out two major directions for U.S. strategy for Europe. The first is self-determination: "We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe." The second is close cooperation: "The path to freedom leads to a larger home, a home where West meets East, a democratic home, the commonwealth of free nations."

With this blueprint for change, Bush remained true to America's 20th-century vision for Europe: a closely cooperating configuration of free,

democratic, and sovereign nation-states. That was Wilson's vision after the First World War, and it was the American vision for Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. This vision failed spectacularly the first time, with weak, vulnerable new nation-states in the eastern part of the continent and with a system of collective security—the League of Nations—that lacked the commitment of the power that had shaped the new order, and that since 1917 Europe's reserve-hegemon, the United States. Wilson's promise of a whole and free Europe, at peace with itself, remained unfulfilled, leaving Europe in a state of disorganisation and turmoil, without a power able and willing to shape the order. It was Hitler and Stalin who filled the vacuum, only to destroy what was left of Wilson's vision.

The second time, after World War II, the United States resisted the pressure to withdraw from Europe. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor forced the U.S. to stay in Europe, to become a European power, and to fight what became the Cold War. Western Europe now became, under U.S. leadership, an exemplary incarnation of the liberal order: free, democratic societies cooperating closely in international (and even supranational) organisations. NATO and European integration were the two pillars of the liberal order; both made possible by U.S. engagement in Europe as well as by American willingness to set up and maintain a larger trade and security order with global ambition and increasingly global reach. Wilson's vision finally became a reality—first in Western Europe then after 1989 also in Central Europe.

An American Vision for Europe

For Bush, who had experienced the Cold War in various high positions (as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, director of the CIA in the 1970s, and as a U.S. two-term vice president in the 1980s) the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the years 1989–1991 was a correction of a historic detour on the long road of human progress towards a democratic liberal order. Those Central European countries prevented from participating in the Marshall Plan in 1947, subjugated by the Soviet Union, which considered them mere objects

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of its will, putting them under the direct control of Moscow, were finally coming in from the cold. For Bush, the implosion of the Soviet Union wasn't a moment to fundamentally rethink the European order. Instead, it was a moment to enlarge the Western order, to bring others into the "commonwealth of free nations" built by the U.S. and its European allies for decades.

There were good reasons not to see this turn of history as a zero hour, an "architectural" moment that would bring fundamental change not only to the East but also to the West. The Western economic and political system had turned out to be stronger and better, much more successful in providing freedom, prosperity, and security than its communist competitor. Crucially, the Western liberal order had gained legitimacy in the eyes of the people, unlike the political order imposed by communist party elites in the East. Communism had its short-term achievements, with forced modernisation, technological advancement, and by setting free the energies of many by appealing to visions about emancipation and a more just world. Yet, over the years, communism had become an instrument of a new class of privileged rulers, using ideology as a cover and mainly concerned with keeping their power. The idealism of the early years had vanished, intellectuals were losing faith in the vision of an equal society pushed through by an almighty state. The liberal system of the West, with individual freedoms at its core and a state devised as an instrument to serve the society, had won the systemic competition. If the Western system had won the competition, why change it at the moment of the breakdown of its communist competitor?

A second reason to design, in 1989–1990, Europe's future as an enlargement of the liberal order, with the U.S. in a leadership position, was the fact that the years after 1989 were only a triumph in hindsight; there were extraordinary dangers and risks. What had been achieved could easily be reversed. In 1989–1990, a Europe whole and free and at peace with itself was a rather distant vision. A lot could go wrong. German unification might have brought back the "German question"—an overly powerful country in the centre of the continent scaring its neighbours, unsettling the balance, and leading to the return of exactly the kind of power politics the liberal order implemented after World War II was designed to overcome. And the

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Soviet Union and its empire in dissolution presented all kinds of risks, not least a power vacuum in Central Europe that could be filled by destructive forces.

In 1989–1990, Europe was "unfinished business." What had been achieved in Western Europe had to be protected and saved, and transformed into a new era. Meanwhile the eastern part of Europe was in vital need of support: it needed practical help, but even more a vision of a post-communist order, a new regional order after the authoritarian *Pax Sovietica*. And Europe needed a strategic leader with enough power to guide the continent through the transformations: strong enough to manage intra-European relations in the sensitive phase of German unification and to provide Central Europe with enough breathing space to get on its feet after decades of Soviet rule, developing the institutions and mindsets needed for a liberal-democratic order and for the introduction of market economies.

American Strategic Leadership in Europe after 1989

America did not just deliver the vision of a "Europe whole and free and at peace with itself," it also provided some of the means to turn this vision into reality. Washington's presence, guided by this vision, was key in the crucial moments of the transformation to a post-Cold War Europe.

It all started with Germany. For Bush, there was no reason to deny to Germans what was at the heart of his vision for free people: national self-determination, in other words, reunification. Bush's unwavering support for German reunification from early on overcame resistance in Paris, London, and Moscow. By making membership of a united Germany in NATO the non-negotiable condition of reunification, Washington at the same time signalled to Germany's neighbours that America's overwhelming power would remain present in Europe, making any potential German ambition to become Europe's new hegemon pointless. Continued American presence in Germany would also make sure that the country would remain firmly anchored in the West, not moving into a geopolitical grey zone, potentially inviting Moscow to try to bring it into its own sphere of influence. In other

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words, by sticking to the Cold War transatlantic configuration, Bush paved the way to German unification on the international level.

The second pillar of U.S. policy was support for Russia. Washington accepted Russia's claim to be the successor of the Soviet Union, entitled to the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the UN Security Council and to its nuclear arsenals. And it tried to help Russia on its path towards democracy and market economy, a path upon which Boris Yeltsin seemed intent to go. Russia as a key player received most of the American attention; with the exception of intense efforts to withdraw nuclear weapons and materials from Ukraine and Belarus, other successor states of the Soviet Union were largely ignored by the West, becoming geopolitical grey zones. Only the Baltic states managed to get out of the twilight, pushing their way into the incorporation of the new Europe emerging after the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

The third pillar of American strategic leadership in post-1989 Europe was directed towards Central Europe. Its main element was the (not uncontroversial) decision to open NATO's door to these countries that had been largely the object of imperial policies for centuries and whose ambition after the Cold War was to become much more like their West European neighbours: as free, safe, and prosperous as they had been for decades, under the U.S. security umbrella. NATO enlargement also served as a further incentive to introduce liberal-democratic political and economic frameworks in Central European countries, which in turn helped these countries to enter the EU. The decision to enlarge NATO in the 1990s and early 2000s took place during a historic window of opportunity: Russia wasn't yet the revisionist power it would become under Putin's rule. Yet, it was exactly the fear of such a neo-imperialist turn in Russia that was the primary driver of Central European countries towards NATO. Overall, NATO enlargement provided the security dimension to Europe's reunification: with the U.S. largely in charge of security and geopolitical strategy, Europeans could focus on the softer socio-economic dimension of the post-communist transformation through EU accession.

The fourth pillar of U.S. leadership was America's readiness to use—after considerable hesitation—its overwhelming hard power to enforce peace in Europe. In the Balkans, the liberation from communist and

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centralist domination led to war—a clash between nations competing for primacy and struggling for independence. Western European countries were unable to overcome their divisions and develop a joint, forceful approach to the Balkans; instead, they were sending mixed signals to the parties in conflict. Only when the U.S. took over the strategic lead, after having watched many tragedies unfold, and used its military powers, could these wars be ended.

In hindsight, it becomes evident that the U.S. grand strategy in Europe in the 1990s was "enlargement"—the sphere of the Wilsonian liberal order that the West had built under U.S. leadership during the Cold War would be enlarged, not substantially altered, or modified, or completely redefined. The geopolitical earthquake that followed the breakdown of the Soviet Union would be absorbed into the institutional framework that had been developed in the Western part of the European continent in the previous decades. In the American view, this was not the moment to construct something new; the best way to overcome the fragility and risks of transition would be to use well-tested ideas and institutions.

While there was some grumbling in some European capitals over German unification and about the eastern enlargement of NATO and the EU, Europeans largely agreed with U.S. leadership; German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Defence Minister Volker Rühe were actively promoting enlargement. For Western Europe, continued U.S. presence in Europe was reassuring: a guarantee against all kinds of risks that might emerge from all these breathtaking changes in the East. Western Europe was used to U.S. leadership, which had been accepted as beneficial, even vital (even if there was a constant unease in some quarters), while Central Europe was keen to move as quickly as possible under the U.S. security umbrella in order to protect itself against a potentially revisionist, neo-imperialist Russia—and in order to "return to Europe," in a political and cultural context to which they felt they belonged.

Under U.S. leadership, Europe indeed became largely whole, free, and at peace with itself—Bush's vision from 1989 became largely true. Grey zones remain, where the transformation process has stalled, namely in the Balkans, in Eastern Europe, and in the South Caucasus. And Russia has skipped the transformation paradigm of the 1990s and appears, at least on

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the level of elites, to be plagued by neo-imperialist visions meant to heal the emotional wounds inflicted by the loss of imperial grandeur. Unlike Europe, Russia does not want to be part of a U.S.-led global order, it rather considers itself as a counter-pole on its own. Russia's failure to transform, however, means that it doesn't have the economic means to project influence in a broad, comprehensive way. Instead, the Kremlin falls back on the use of the only power dimension it has left, military power, including nuclear blackmailing.

The Weakening Transatlantic Link

Russian aggression has also ensured that NATO has not become anachronistic, even 30 years after 1989. Russian military aggression against Georgia (2008) and especially Ukraine (2014) has reminded Europeans and Americans of the need to continue to deter a neo-imperialist Russia. The Cold War-like mindset of Russia's autocratic leader has forced the West back into a Cold War-like military posture.

And yet at the same time, the glue that held the West together during the Cold War has become much weaker. While Russia is perceived as a threat on the Eastern Flank of NATO, the challenge it poses is obviously different and less fundamental than the challenge the Soviet Union once posed during the Cold War. Russia is much weaker, economically and militarily, and it largely fails to attract others through a systemic alternative. Most of Western Europe, therefore, does not consider Russia a major threat or challenge, despite occasional Russian meddling into internal affairs. And the growing scepticism of Russia in the U.S. may be less driven by fear of Russia as a military or systemic threat to America, and more with its attempts to influence the presidential elections in 2016.

In other words, the geopolitical constellation that forced the U.S. to stay in Europe after the Second World War—the existential, vital competition with a systemic rival that had the potential to dominate Eurasia—disappeared in 1989-92. Russia remains challenging in many respects, as it still refuses to respect the sovereignty of smaller countries in

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its neighbourhood and is trying to build influence across Western Europe with Cold War-like means, but this is a threat on a very different scale.

Europe on the Path to Independence?

Why stick together if the former rationale for close transatlantic relations appears to be gone? This is the question the Trump administration has put on the American and European agenda. The current U.S. president's reluctance to put his full weight behind NATO, his sceptical views of the EU, and his occasional rants against Europeans are challenging the transatlantic status quo. In some European countries, they have led to a rethink of the transatlantic relationship. France has taken the lead in pushing for European "strategic autonomy," an ambiguous term that many read as the ambition to build a French-led European defence that would no longer rely on the U.S.

A Europe without the U.S.—without American military and strategic leadership—is no longer unthinkable. Some consider this a liberation, others a nightmare.

There is a school of thought in Europe—mainly in Western Europe—that considers Europe to be on the way towards "ever closer union," finally leading to the founding of a state-like entity, the "United States of Europe." EU-federalists usually consider Anglo-American influence as an obstacle on the path towards European power. For this school of thought, "Europe whole and free and at peace with itself" is something Europeans can build and sustain by themselves—if only they somehow manage to overcome nationalism and the nation-state as the primary vessel of politics. In this narrative, a growing distance towards America, and its close ally Britain, is a precondition for Europe's own transformation toward becoming a united and coherent actor.

Pragmatists and realists, however, usually consider the U.S. presence and engagement in Europe beneficial for the continent. On the one hand, only the U.S. has the power and credibility to deter Russia from trying to re-establish a sphere of influence and control in Central Europe. On the other hand, only the presence of America with its overwhelming power

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can prevent the return of distrust among European countries, leading to power competition and potentially to conflict in Europe. For this school of thought, a "Europe whole and free and at peace with itself" needs American leadership.

What is certain is that the U.S. has played this role in the past. It was Washington that pushed for European integration in the first place, making close cooperation a condition for the Marshall Plan aid in the late 1940s. In the early 1950s, America backed French plans for a European Defence Community—which did not fail because of U.S. opposition but because of French unwillingness to sacrifice sovereignty (and because France ultimately saw West German membership in the U.S.-led NATO as a better deal). All in all, U.S. military presence and strategic leadership provided the space for West Europeans to overcome their differences and build a unique system of deep cooperation and integration. And it was U.S. leadership that allowed East and West to smoothly reunite after the Cold War.

Towards a New Transatlantic Deal

Taking the U.S. out of the European equation would fundamentally alter the continent's strategic configuration. A complete U.S. withdrawal would lead to a vacuum in terms of security and strategic leadership, and there is no player in Europe who could pick up the baton. EU institutions in Brussels remain dependent on Member States, especially Germany and France. And the members are unwilling to hand over true power to the presidents of the Commission or the European Council. As the efforts to manage the many crises in the last years have demonstrated, (big) Member States remain very much the masters of the Brussels game. And of course, neither Berlin nor Paris can replace Washington as a strategic leader of Europe. Individually, they lack weight, power, and legitimacy, and as a couple, they remain far too divided in their outlook, priorities, and interests.

Seen through a *Realpolitik* lens, the alternative to U.S. leadership in Europe is no leadership: a Europe divided, perhaps only partly free, and not fully at peace with itself. And a Europe that is too weak and too disunited to assert itself in the emerging great power competition—an order in which

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the bigger European powers are striking deals with the U.S., China, and Russia and the smaller countries at risk of becoming the playground of great power competition.

Europe, therefore, has a vital interest in keeping the U.S. engaged, as a benign outside pacifier and protector. That requires Europeans to step up, as countries and collectively, and take on a much bigger role in foreign and security policy. And it requires the U.S. to recognise that it needs allies and to accept that those allies must have some say over key decisions.

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Julie Smith

Europe: From Division to Unity and Back Again?

George H.W. Bush's Mainz speech could scarcely have been more prescient. A continent and a country had been divided for 40 years and could have remained so. But just six months after Bush spoke, the divisions began to recede as the Berlin Wall came down, in the most symbolic expression of the collapse of communism in Europe. By 1989, the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and grassroots movements for democracy across Central and Eastern Europe were paving the way for the transformation of the European continent. Neither president could have predicted how profound such changes would be, but Bush's clear-sighted vision of a Europe "whole and free" resonated with the demands of many citizens of Central and Eastern Europe seeking a "return to Europe," as well as those in a partitioned Germany who sought reunification.

Three decades on, it is hard to recall the context of Bush's words: those under 40 have little or no recollection of the Cold War or the stark divisions that it engendered. For two generations or more, the Cold War is simply past history. Nevertheless, questions persist about whether, and to what extent, ambitions of a Europe "whole and free" can ever be fulfilled. How distant they

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can seem in a continent that has seen deep economic and political divisions in the decade since the financial crisis, against a backcloth of Russian interest in states that it believes to be its "near abroad." This contribution seeks to put Bush's speech into context before showing how the EU responded to the dramatic changes just months later. It argues that while the collapse of communism in Europe was indeed treated by some as providing a way to reunite the continent, the reality has been somewhat different, as attempts to bind the new EU Member States into the European project have been challenged by those keenest to join Western institutions.

A Divided Country on a Divided Continent

Europe was divided for 40 years by an invisible "Iron Curtain," but the wall that divided Berlin, the once and future German capital, was a visible (and tangible) sign of such division. That Germany should be reunited was initially supported by the Federal Republic's European allies. That prospect seemed to fall off the agenda when Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* (1969–1972) finally acknowledged the existence of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), reflecting a recognition that the division was likely to endure. When the Wall came down, change occurred more rapidly in Germany than in other formerly communist countries, but the transformation also highlighted some of the wider problems that would face the European Community as it prepared to face a new international order. Overturning the legacy of four decades during which the two parts of the continent had evolved in quite different directions politically, economically, and socially was to prove more challenging than anticipated.

If their rhetoric had been supportive of German (re-)unification when it seemed an impossibility, European leaders swiftly showed their reluctance when the prospect looked set to become a reality. While the reaction of President Bush was positive, those of Germany's nearest neighbours was less than fulsome. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's response was to encourage Helmut Kohl to talk to Gorbachev while her Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, said: "reunification was not on the agenda now because the people pressing for reform in East Germany have not put it on the

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agenda."[1] Meanwhile, French President François Mitterrand swiftly visited East German leader Hans Modrow and met with Gorbachev in Kiev (Kyiv), then still part of the Soviet Union, where he "stressed the importance of keeping stability or balance in Europe, a code word for status quo: a divided Germany."[2] The hostile reaction of Ruud Lubbers so offended Kohl that he subsequently blocked Lubbers' appointment as European Commission president. One visionary was the incumbent Commission president, Mitterrand's former finance minister, Jacques Delors, who persuaded his former boss that German unification would happen regardless of his views. Rather than be on the wrong side of history, it would be better to accept the inevitable while taking the opportunity to bind Germany more deeply into the European Community—through economic and monetary union. Delors' suggestion benefited from the fact that Kohl himself recognised the possible danger of a united Germany becoming, or being perceived as, a hegemon in Europe. He thus accepted Delors' proposal, in line with Thomas Mann's dictum that it was better to have a "European Germany" than a "German Europe." The path was created for the uniting of Germany and thereafter the continent.

Reuniting Europe

The route to East German transformation and integration into the European Community was relatively straightforward. Unification occurred within a year of the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the "*neue Länder*" were welcomed into the Community within three months, in marked contrast to all other enlargements before or since that were subject to protracted negotiations lasting not months but years. The concerns of West European leaders reflected a worry that a united Germany could become a dominant player in Europe. In reality, the impact of economic and monetary union between the two Germanies and the need to rebuild the economy of the East German *Länder* would set the German economy back for many years and also rendered citizens of the old West Germany more reluctant than previously to act as the chief financial contributor to the Community, as they were required to pay a "solidarity tax" at home.

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Despite growing reluctance to bankroll the process of European integration, Germany was committed to enlarging the European Community, or Union as it was soon to become, thanks to the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. In this it found common cause with the United Kingdom, which under successive leaders advocated enlargement, hoping to bring more "like-minded" countries into the Community/Union. Speaking in Bruges just weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Thatcher outlined her view of Central Europe's role in language redolent of Bush's Mainz speech: "We must never forget that east of the Iron Curtain, people who once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity have been cut off from their roots ... We shall always look on Warsaw, Prague and Budapest as great European cities."[3]

Thatcher was certainly content to work with European states further afield. As she noted in her memoirs:

> Having democratic states with market economies, which were just as "European" as those of the existing Community, lining up as potential EC members made my vision of a looser, more open Community seem timely rather than backward. It also became clear that the courageous reforming leaders in eastern Europe looked to Britain—and to me because of my anti-socialist credentials—as a friend who genuinely wanted to help them, rather than exclude them from markets (like the French) or seek economic domination (like the Germans). These eastern European states were—and are—Britain's natural allies.[4]

The UK and Germany were both early advocates of enlargement, albeit for somewhat different reasons. Thatcher's motivations seemed pragmatic, even utilitarian. For Germany, as a country wedded to the ideals of European integration and led by a Christian Democrat chancellor, there was a sense of moral responsibility towards neighbouring states that had endured decades in the Soviet sphere of influence.[5] Her successor John Major's support for enlargement chimed rather closely with the motivations of Germany: "I was a convinced advocate of enlargement as a historic obligation to nations we had left on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain."[6]

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The UK, always more ambivalent about European integration, was enthusiastic about enlargement, which led to suspicions that it was a ruse to weaken the integration process, a suspicion that Thatcher's memoirs do little to assuage. Whatever, the motivation, the UK's support for the emerging democracies was evident during both Conservative and Labour governments. In 1993, Prime Minister John Major told the party faithful:

> And we must shape a wider Europe. That's what we decided in Edinburgh—to bring in new member nations, first from Scandinavia and later from central Europe. And we won agreement—against all expectations—that our old friends, the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Czechs would eventually join us.
>
> Do you remember how as the Iron Curtain fell we welcomed them to our Party conference two years ago? Well, we are still working on their side. And now—in time—we look forward to them joining the European Community, too—as a result of our influence.

The present Community is but a fragment of Europe. Our long-term vision is a Europe without trade barriers, a vast continent of free democracies, from the Urals to the Atlantic and from the Baltic to the Mediterranean.[7]

Major never explained how he envisaged persuading the Russians that their country should be divided with the western part inside the European Union and the part east of the Urals remaining outside. Yet, his words reflected the prevalent British view that the EU should be expanded as far as possible—a vision which near three decades on seems implausible, as Vladimir Putin's Russia engagement with its European neighbours, most notably Ukraine and the Baltic states, has been through military actions or cyberthreats rather than peaceful economic and diplomatic interactions, which have been key to successful European cooperation.

The UK and Germany were not alone in seeking to welcome the emerging democracies from Central and Eastern Europe, but their EU partners were more reluctant. The EU committed itself to enlargement in the early 1990s but initially made few changes to prepare itself for such enlargement.[8] As Grabbe and Hughes noted, "the EU moved relatively slowly in the first years after 1989 before committing itself even in

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principle"[9] to eastward enlargement. This reflected differences among the Member States, with some more sceptical about the merits of early, or extensive, enlargement.

The Union's eastward enlargement commenced under Major's premiership, although it would not be completed for another decade. The UK held the rotating Presidency of the European Community (as it still remained until November 1993) in the second half of 1992 and it was "John Major's Edinburgh European Council text, which produced the Copenhagen criteria, which produced the drive, strongly supported and led by the United Kingdom with the Danes and the Dutch to bring in the countries of eastern Europe as soon as possible."[10] The Copenhagen criteria for accession were ostensibly put in place to ensure that would-be new Member States emerging from decades of communism would be able to meet the rigours of European integration, that they would be able to thrive economically within the Union and would meet the norms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law expected of members. The Twelve who agreed the Copenhagen criteria were swiftly joined by Austria, Finland, and Sweden, but it was for the eastward enlargement that the rules were intended.

The Copenhagen criteria were also intended to ensure that the resilience of the EU and its institutions would not be put under undue pressure following enlargement from 12 to 15 and then 25 or more states. The criteria were asymmetric, putting the onus on would-be members to reform; they were not initially met with an equivalent set of reforms by the existing member states.

The Treaty on European Union had been agreed before the flurry of applications from Central and East European states had arrived and had thus focused on deepening the integration process rather than on questions of widening. A dozen states now sought membership, each claiming to be undertaking the necessary reforms. By the mid-1990s, there was already a degree of frustration among states impatient to join all manner of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Yet, it was not clear they were ready to undertake the rigours of membership. In Hungary, or so I was told in a private conversation in 1996, the traditional communist-era adage of "we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us" had been adapted for the new post-Cold War era to: "we pretend we are ready and they pretend they want

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us." Nor did the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, intended to prepare the Union for enlargement, provide for the requisite institutional reforms, further reinforcing the perception that the EU was not wedded to expansion.[11]

Only in June 1999 did the Member States, meeting under the German Presidency in Cologne, agree that "to ensure that the EU's institutions can continue to work efficiently after enlargement, the European Council confirms its intention of convening a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the Member States early in 2000 to resolve the institutional issues left open in Amsterdam that need to be settled before enlargement."[12] The European Commissioner responsible for ensuring the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), Michel Barnier (who would later be the Commission's chief negotiator for the UK's departure from the Union), observed that it would have been a mistake to assume that institutional reforms that the 15 could not make ahead of enlargement could subsequently be made in a Union of "18, 20, or 27."[13]The Nice Treaty did provide sufficient reform to enable the "big bang" enlargement of 2004 to go ahead—eight new Central and East European democracies plus Malta and Cyprus finally joined the European club, to be joined three years later by Bulgaria and Romania.

A Divergent Europe?

Barnier was clearly right in that the arrival of a dozen new Member States would dramatically increase the competing national interests within the Union, each seeking to put their own priorities onto the agenda. Yet, two decades ago, one thing seemed certain: new Member States would have to abide by the rules of the game. The intention, as least as conceived by the European Commission, was that enlargement would serve as a tool of Europe's normative power, ensuring would-be Member States would have to conform to EU rules. It was a pattern first conceived at the 1969 Hague Summit ahead of British accession. Newcomers were seen as *demandeurs* and thus expected to adapt to suit the EU rather than vice versa. Through the 1990s and beyond the turn of the century, the new democracies seemed willing to follow the established practices, each pledging to meet the

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membership criteria. All 10 Central and East European Member States had undergone profound transformations towards market liberalisation and functioning democracies; all were committed to these (West) European values, or so they claimed.

Fifteen years on, the situation seems a little different, the apparent transformations less engrained than the EU had intended. Where democracy, the rule of law, press and judicial freedoms had been the norm in Western Europe for several decades, certain newcomers, notably Hungary and Poland, began to challenge them. To date, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been most vocal in his hostility to the expected European norms. Subtly at first, his reforms to the constitution and restrictions on press freedom went almost unnoticed in the EU, with then-Commissioner Viviane Reding among the rare voices raising concerns. Emboldened by the reluctance of fellow European leaders to censure his behaviour, Orbán confronted the EU, speaking overtly of his desire not for liberal democracy, but "illiberal democracy." The Union seemed powerless to act, not least against a leader whose relations with Putin ensure he has extra-EU allies, in contrast to other Member States, notably Poland and the Baltic states, who value their EU membership precisely as a guarantee *against* Russia. There is a certain irony that the leader of the first state to throw off the shackles of communism, thanks to "the frontier of barbed wire and minefields" between his country and Austria "being removed," (as President George H.W. Bush remarked in his May 1989 speech in Mainz), should put up a fence to keep out would-be asylum-seekers. While Orbán claimed this was to ensure the integrity of Schengen in line with his duties as prime minister of a country with an external EU border, the optics were quite different: rather than open, Hungary—and by extension Europe—seemed closed. As Bush reminded us in 1989, "glasnost may be a Russian word, but 'openness' is a Western concept."

Three decades on, the reuniting of Europe has begun, but the continent does not meet Bush's vision. The Union has grown but its values are under strain: Europe is not yet whole nor entirely free.

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James Jay Carafano

Democracy's Journey East Continues

Writing history from the present looking back is deeply satisfying. The present provides a comforting perspective, much surer footing for making sense out of what went before. That, however, is an injustice to the past—and the present. The better perspective is to look forward from history rather than the other way around. That's particularly important for assessing President George H.W. Bush's landmark 1989 speech in Mainz, Germany.

Contrasting Visions

A Europe "whole, free, and at peace" has become a modern-day mantra, as frequently repeated by American leaders as Europeans. For example, in June 2017, former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden tweeted, "A Europe whole, free, and at peace remains vital to U.S. security—as it has been for the past seven decades." It is a statement he has repeated often, including most recently in a February 2018 address to the Munich Security Conference.

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More than a joint transatlantic vision, for many in Europe, "whole and free" has become synonymous with the fulfilment of the European project. For instance, in a speech for a Washington, DC, event in 2017, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen declared the "U.S.-E.U. partnership is indispensable to ensuring a Europe whole, free, and at peace." For some, like the senator, the European Union (EU) is an essential contribution to a successful Europe.

To others, the EU is the goal in and of itself, an essential consolidation of economic, social, foreign, and security policy. That is what some European leaders have been lecturing Americans for years. A case in point, when in 2002 the Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller spoke at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative think tank in Washington, DC, he defined constructive U.S. engagement with Europe as "clear American support for the European integration process …" The distinction makes a difference. One interpretation argues that the future of Europe is about the transatlantic community. The other suggests it is about the future of the EU.

When Møller addressed the audience at AEI, the title of his address was "united we stand." He foresaw a community "bolstered by a strong partnership across the Atlantic, united by common values and beliefs." His remarks, however, were almost two decades ago. Times have changed. Increasingly, the next steps in European integration have been described as European autonomy.

In a *Foreign Affairs* article in October 2018, Benjamin Haddad and Alina Polyakova bluntly discussed the notion of Europe going it alone. They described this independent path as "rooted in the ideal of multilateralism and peaceful cooperation, embodied in the EU's aspiration of an 'ever closer union.'" In short, what is needed is a Europe no longer dependent on American power to realize the goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

Haddad and Polyakova are not just making academic arguments. In June 2016, the EU published *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*, a global strategy for foreign and security policy. It was arguably the first EU document to see strategic autonomy as a policy objective. President of the European Council Donald Tusk, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, and prominent

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European heads of state and government officials have promoted the concept.

As a result, today there are two very different visions for a Europe "whole and free," one within the context of the traditional transatlantic community and the other not. One arguably can trace a linkage to President Bush's historic speech. The other not. The answer to what Europe and American can do to deliver on the 30-year-old promise depends on which ideal Europe chooses to follow.

America's Europe

For sure, when Bush made his remarks at the Rheingoldhalle he was not foreshadowing an autonomous European security identity. To suggest otherwise would be making history fit the worldview from present-day Brussels.

Bush's Mainz address presaged the president's 11 September 1990 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress when he introduced the proposal of a "new world order … a new era, freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony." In many ways, the "Europe whole and free" speech was a first draft of this broader geo-strategic formulation.

Actually, the "New World Order" was in its conception not an "order." Rather, Bush's objectives were more limited, laying the groundwork for a soft landing for the collapse of the Soviet empire. Chief among the concerns in Washington was what role America would play in determining the governance of the post-Soviet space.

Washington's answers were reasonable and wholly unremarkable—the United States looked for the clearest path to stability as quickly as possible. Here, there was no practical option other than the reunification of Germany and the gradual reintegration of Central Europe. Moscow could barely manage its homeland. Leaving Central Europe to navigate through the chaos of the post-Soviet era without a guiding lifeline made no sense.

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Bush's speech signalled the U.S. would provide one. Democracy marched east and with it NATO enlargement and an emphasis on good governance.

Bush's primary goal was peace and stability. That was reflected in his well-intentioned, but disastrous August 1991 “Chicken Kiev” speech that he delivered in Ukraine. The president dampened rather than encouraged the country's shift towards Europe and away from the Russian Federation. Many critics pointed out the obvious. A Europe whole and free that didn't include space for all of Europe to be free didn't sound very whole.

Rather, the president's Ukraine speech reflected the modest ambitions of the New World Order. His vision was constrained in other ways as well. Nowhere, for example, in the Mainz, Germany, speech of two years earlier did Bush mention the EU as the end state for new Europe. On the other hand, throughout his presidency he did emphasize the centrality of NATO and the transatlantic community.

Bush's policies reflected an element of continuity that threaded through subsequent presidencies. While the U.S. was never hostile to the concept of the European Union, America was not the chief cheerleader for the European project in the manner promoted by integrationists like Møller. The U.S., for example, always remained sceptical of proposals for a stronger independent European security identity.

In this respect, not that much has changed from Bush's initial concept of a Europe whole and free. The idea was a gradual expansion of liberty, good governance, economic freedom, and collective security that would provide something Europe lacked for centuries—a common space for nations to live together. Bush's concept was never about the European project as the embodiment of Europe's future.

The U.S. presidents who succeeded Bush followed his lead. That's why the U.S. fought in the Balkans under President William J. Clinton. That's why the second Bush wanted to deploy missile defences to Europe. Every president in his own way engaged—and, to be fair, also sometimes ignored—Europe.

Haddad and Polyakova, however, were wrong in their 2018 article when they painted Trump's latest grumpiness towards Europe as reflective of a larger pattern of U.S. disengagement from Europe that had been going on for decades. For every evidence they can cite of the U.S. losing its sight on the

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importance of Europe, there are contrasting examples of the transatlantic community pulling together and getting things done, from the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty after the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 11 September 2001, to joint operations in Afghanistan and Libya.

Even Obama and Trump are variations on a relatively consistent theme. During his presidency, President Obama overtly supported European integration more vocally than any U.S. leader in recent memory. The president, for example, famously encouraged British voters to reject the referendum on leaving the European Union (Brexit). And, there were times when the U.S. and EU worked in concert, most noticeably in imposing the sanctions regime on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine.

On the other hand, transatlantic relations have never been completely sanguine. As Anne Applebaum wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in October 2015, Obama "failed to take European security seriously for most of his presidency, and his administration's complacency paved the way for renewed Russian aggression ...." This is a criticism shared by many staunch supporters of the transatlantic community and those who are pro-EU, including Haddad and Polyakova (writing three years after Applebaum reached the same conclusion). The truth was that when it came to Europe, Obama had his ups and downs.

In contrast, President Trump supported Brexit. He has done nothing to promote the cause of European integration and, in fact, wonders why more countries don't want to leave the EU. He has also badgered Europeans on trade, burden-sharing, and energy policy. He gained Europe's ire in pulling out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran.

On the other hand, U.S. actions with regard to Europe have largely followed the prescriptions laid out in the December 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, which views the stability of Western Europe as a vital U.S. interest. The U.S. has strongly supported the security and independence of Ukraine and Georgia. Washington has held firm to its commitments to Russian sanctions. The U.S. has increased deployments to Europe, exercises and bilateral and multilateral defence planning. It has expanded its military footprint in Central Europe, including basing in Romania and Albania, as well as negotiating new basing in Poland. The U.S. continues to support robustly the European Deterrence Initiative. European capitals

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backed U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement after it was clearly demonstrated that the Russians were cheating and refusing to come back into compliance with the arms control treaty. Finally, at the end of a contentious NATO meeting in April 2018, President Trump reaffirmed U.S. support for the alliance, an affirmation that has been repeated by the president and senior cabinet officials many times before and since.

Rhetoric aside, the reality is U.S. attention to Europe has its ups and downs. Thus, in recent years we have seen American presidents less enthusiastic about Europe than popularly assumed (Obama) and contrastingly much better on supporting peace and security in Europe than one might think (Trump). In practice, both Obama and Trump fit within the normal bandwidth of American foreign policy towards the transatlantic community. There are highs. There are lows. Still, the transatlantic community stands.

In this respect, there is an argument to be made that Bush's vision was realized and complete. The U.S. sustained its commitment to the transatlantic community and, in turn, the peaceful expansion of that community achieved a soft landing for most of the post-Soviet space in Europe.

Fighting the Future

There is a question over whether the first Bush's vision is relevant any longer. It is not. The world has changed. Bush saw a Russia in retreat that he hoped over time would stabilise and become a "normal" nation. In Bush's time, the problems of the Middle East (from terrorism to Iran to migrants) were not threatening to overflow and wash across Europe. China was a faraway land about which Europe cared little, not an aggressive rising power with a big chequebook and greedy designs. Finally, alas, the age of innocence is over. A Europe whole and free won't be achieved by the gentle spill of democracy across Europe.

Further, even if Bush's vision had been seeing the EU as the key to the future of Europe (which it was not), it would be the wrong vision for

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our times. The chief external destabilising threats to a Europe whole and free are Russia, the spillover of problems in the Middle East, and the encroachment of Chinese influence. Europe lacks the capacity to deal with any one of these on its own, let alone all three. Europe's only real promise of stability and security is as part of NATO and the transatlantic community.

Arguing Europe whole and free is not inconsistent with Bush's prescription. The Mainz speech is just not enough of an idea for our times. During Bush's presidency, democracy was pushing on an open door. That is no longer the case. The future of the transatlantic community requires a more muscular vision. Here are some ideas of what the refurbishment of the way ahead might look like.

Guard the Gate

Putin was the problem. Putin is the problem. Putin will continue to be the problem because he is an authoritarian leader who suppresses democracy, not only in his own country and in Russia's so-called "near abroad" but also in the West. There is little likelihood that Russia's leaderships or tactics will change anytime soon. Further, there are good prospects that Putin can sustain *Putinism* into the foreseeable future. There is already a transatlantic cottage industry arguing that pushing back on Putin isn't working. There are already calls for yet another "reset" with Russia. Some want to end sanctions. Others want to kill further NATO enlargement. Still, others want more arms control, less missile defence, or a weaker, tamer NATO. All these proposals suffer the same fundamental flaw: they think there is something the West can do to make Putin change. That is not likely. Rather, the transatlantic community must continue to be prepared to push back, block out, and protect itself from the destabilising effects of Russian meddling, and the West must be prepared to sustain that strategy for a long time.

Add to the Community

There is an important continuing role for NATO enlargement. Small states matter. In some cases, their geography is important. They hold a place in

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Europe that could contribute to collective security. Small states can also be net contributors to security. Case in point: many small nations have played an outsized role in training-and-support missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most important, it is vital that NATO uphold the principle that every nation has a right to determine how to exercise self-defence and collective security.

Georgia is well on the path to qualifying for NATO membership. In 2018, my colleague at The Heritage Foundation Luke Coffey argued that alliance members should hasten Georgia's admission by temporarily amending a small section of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. This would address the territorial disputes that currently thwart Georgia's path forward. If the formula works for Georgia, then one could envision the day when Ukraine could follow that path as well. Another important future candidate is Kosovo. Kosovo's entry into NATO would be a game-changer in regional security. A NATO member in the middle of the Western Balkans would serve as a virtual firebreak against the likelihood of a broad regional conflict ever happening again.

Protect the Flank

Peace and stability in the Greater Middle East ought to be a top interest for the U.S. and Europe. Neither benefits by big problems from the south coming north. There are areas where we clearly ought to pull together with greater efficiency. Cooperating on Libya is one such area. A stable Libya would make a vital contribution to shoring up the flank of the Greater Middle East.

The transatlantic community should also come to terms with Iran. It is time to put the bitterness of JCPOA in the past. It was an honest try, but the agreement failed to constrain Iran. It is time to acknowledge that and move on and craft a common solution for dealing with the chief source of destabilisation in the region.

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Police China

There is a growing transatlantic consensus that China is more than just a big chequebook. China's rise has been destabilising and the troubles have not been confined to the Indo-Pacific. China is a global challenge. Why? Because it opposes freedom. We wouldn't have had problems with Huawei, for instance, if China was a democratic, free-market country.

The current debate over Huawei and the company's involvement in the development of 5G telecommunications networks is a case in point. There is widespread recognition that Huawei represents a real national-security challenge, allowing the Chinese government and intelligence services access to infrastructure and data that could compromise the national integrity of any country where they operate.

Crafting a solution for Huawei is just emblematic of the broad range of challenges the West will have to address to ensure the expanding power of China does not come at the expense of a Europe whole and free.

Forward Together

None of this to-do list is to suggest that there is no role for the EU in a Europe free, whole, and at peace or that the EU is an impediment to the future of Europe. On the contrary, the EU can bring together the collective will of the member states and that is a powerful force to be reckoned with.

For starters, the U.S. and the EU need to look for opportunities to work together to lead the transatlantic community. There are many places where that can be done, from trade to energy policy to dealing with hot button issues like the Western Balkans and Libya.

In addition, NATO and the EU need to work together in trust and confidence to ensure that they are adding to, not squabbling over, the security of the transatlantic community. Their efforts should not be duplicative. EU security initiatives should not seek to decouple European security from the transatlantic community. Finally, EU initiatives should not exclude non-EU members (particularly members of NATO). The EU and NATO should be looking for opportunities to collaborate, not to exclude.

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Finally, the EU needs to get its own house in order. Some in the EU continue to embrace a European project that culminates in full integration and subsumes nation-states. Others have a different vision for the EU. They see the Union as the enabler of the state, not its master. Only the member states of the EU can reconcile these visions. That is unlikely to happen in a winner-take-all-struggle where one side wins and the other loses. Rather, the EU will have to find a balanced path that contributes to a Europe whole and free rather than side-tracking the journey in a power struggle.

In the end, the vision of a Europe whole and free and at peace is as important as ever. It can only survive if democracies continue to march. The big difference today is the path is all uphill. The obstacles are great. The exertion required to move forward is significant.

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Robin Niblett

A Europe Whole and Free: 30 Years On

The term "a Europe whole and free" was coined for President George H.W. Bush in 1989 by Harvey Sicherman, an experienced member of his State Department's Policy Planning Staff. In a summer 2011 article in *Orbis*, the Foreign Policy Research Institute's journal, recollecting his long and close friendship with Sicherman, Walter A. McDougall observed that "High Conservatives" such as they, "abominate utopian schemes that rely on the ability to improve human nature" and "respect the law of unintended consequences."[1] So, after considering what has and has not been achieved in making President Bush's invocation for Europe real over the past 30 years, this essay guards against utopianism by also considering what being "whole" means today in Europe, and what are Europe's prospects for remaining free.

What Has Been Achieved

Much has been achieved towards President Bush's goal since 1989. Most countries in Central Europe and the Balkans previously within the Soviet

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sphere of influence are now members of NATO and the European Union (EU). This is a huge and important achievement, which was not inevitable. Moreover, the process of enlarging both organisations is still ongoing—Croatia became the 28th and newest member of the EU in 2013 while Montenegro acceded to NATO as its 29th member in 2017. The Prespa agreement struck in 2019 between Athens and Skopje on re-naming the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the Republic of North Macedonia could lead to the imminent ratification of its long-pending NATO membership.

As intended, membership of these organisations has underpinned the spread of liberal democratic systems and market economies from the West to Central Europe. Although incomplete, the prospect of EU and NATO membership continues to influence the political and economic evolution of aspirant European countries. Most European states that are interested in being members of the EU are in some form of pre-accession status. Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of North Macedonia are enrolled in NATO Membership Action Plans while NATO maintains close bilateral relations with other former communist countries, including Georgia and Ukraine, leaving open the door to potential future membership.

New Central and Eastern European country entrants to NATO and the EU started out, *de facto*, as second-class members, as reflected in French President Jacques Chirac's observation in February 2003 that these countries' leaders "*auraient du se taire*" during the debate over the Iraq invasion. Central and East European countries were also excluded initially from the EU's Schengen free-travel area and from the eurozone and its single currency. These distinctions are gradually eroding; Schengen now includes all former communist countries except Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. The three Baltic states plus Slovakia and Slovenia have joined the eurozone, while other recent EU entrants, like Poland and the Czech Republic, appear not to be interested in joining the single currency at this time, even if they meet the criteria.

Central and Eastern European membership of NATO is also being normalised. Given Russia's increasingly aggressive military posture, NATO members are now persistently deploying forces and equipment within the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, with four multinational battalion-

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size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, on a rotational basis, as part of NATO's enhanced forward presence.

Today, Central and Eastern European countries are no longer passive partners in a "Western" Europe. In NATO, they have proved reliable contributors to military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Mali. They have taken up important positions in NATO and EU institutions, with European Council President Donald Tusk being the highest-profile example. Nor are they simply net recipients of EU funds, dependent still on the generosity of their West European neighbours. The Czech and Slovak automotive sectors are now essential contributors to the continental and global success of the German car industry. And, benefiting from the free movement of labour, Central and East European citizens have moved westwards, contributing in particular to the success of the EU's agricultural and retail service sectors.

Over the past 30 years, GDP per capita has increased rapidly across the new EU members, with the starkest example of the benefits of EU integration being visible between Poland and Ukraine. GDP per capita was the same for both countries in 2004. By 2017, it stood at nearly $14,000 for Poland but at only $2,700 across the border in Ukraine.[2]

Former Eastern Bloc countries still have their problems, but, as discussed below, they are in many cases similar to those of their western European neighbours.

What Has Gone Wrong and Why

Part of the reason for the slowing of the enlargement processes since 2007 has been "enlargement fatigue" among current NATO and EU members. Labour migration has contributed to a sense of economic and political insecurity in the West—with poorer segments of society believing that wage levels have been suppressed by the influx of Central and Eastern European migrants willing to work for lower wages. Pressures have risen on local public services, such as healthcare, education, and housing, given that central governments have rarely re-directed the tax income from migrant workers to those locations where it could help alleviate the social pressures of their arrival.

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The desire to put a brake on EU enlargement has also been driven by experience. Fifteen years after the "big bang" eastern enlargement, some Central and Eastern European countries are still struggling with widespread cronyism and corruption. Recent cases include the resignation of Slovakia's prime minister following the murder of journalist Jan Kuciak, who was investigating corruption in the country; the resignation of Bulgaria's justice minister over his involvement in corrupt real-estate deals; and, the awards of state contracts to businessmen close to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in Hungary.

The conclusion in Western capitals—setting aside their own recent examples of corrupt practices—is that the EU did not impose sufficiently stringent conditions for strengthening the rule of law and associated institutions ahead of these countries' accession, and that tougher conditions should be applied to new applicants. This impression has been confirmed by recent changes to the judicial systems in several Central and Eastern European countries, the most notable examples being Poland and Hungary. This has led the European Commission to instigate disciplinary procedures under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union against Poland while the European Parliament has called for the same approach to be applied to Hungary.

The weakening of the rule of law is worrying not only because of its potential impact on the spread of corruption, weakening of civil society, and centralisation of political power. It has also provided an entry point for Russia. The decision to offer a NATO membership perspective to Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, at a time when NATO members and the applicant countries lacked the sustained political will to follow through on the commitment, convinced President Putin that Russia was in a zero-sum competition with the West. Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was designed in part to expose the risks of NATO's further eastward expansion, as well as to sow doubt as to whether NATO members really would come to the defence of new NATO entrants in the event of a direct confrontation with Russia.

Putin also concluded that the EU's soft power was as threatening to his authoritarian style of government as NATO's military alliance could be to Russia's security. This was evident in the Kremlin's failed efforts in 2014 to derail

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Ukraine's planned Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU. The ensuing Russian annexation of Crimea and military incursions into eastern Ukraine highlighted the extent to which Western governments and the EU had erroneously treated the integration of its eastern neighbours into Western institutions as a technocratic process, rather than appreciating the underlying political and geopolitical forces at work in each country.

Having helped slow, but not reverse the EU's and NATO's eastward expansion, Putin is now trying to poison the well from the inside. Russia is exploiting opportunities for corruption in the Central and Eastern European countries and sharpening the internal political and social divisions across the whole of Europe over the effects of enlargement and EU and non-EU immigration.

Putin's strategy is aided by the resentment among many in Central and Eastern European countries that they are still being treated as second-class members of the NATO and EU clubs. Energy is a case in point. Energy security remains a matter of high national interest to the EU's most powerful members, including Germany. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, like her predecessor Gerhard Schröder, has driven forward, over EU objections, plans for two major pipelines—Nord Stream I and II—to deliver Russian gas into Europe via Germany. This will sustain Europe's current levels of gas imports from Russia while lessening the financial benefits to countries in Europe's east and south from alternative pipelines through their territory.

The way Germany and the EU addressed the 2015 refugee crisis has compounded the sense of resentment. Not only did Germany break the EU's Dublin Convention that refugees should be processed in the first EU country in which they arrive, it then forced through by qualified-majority vote in September 2015 a decision that all EU members should accept a proportion of those refugees on a quota-basis. This so-far unsuccessful action opens West European governments up to the charge of hypocrisy. They criticize Orbán for his intolerant rejection of Muslim immigration while relying on the fortified fence he has built along the border with Serbia to keep out the flows of migrants along the Balkan route.

Similarly, Central and Eastern European leaders resent EU criticism over their willingness to attract Chinese foreign direct investment via the China-sponsored “16+1” process (now, with the addition of Greece, “17 + 1”),

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when France, Germany, Italy, and the UK constantly promote their own bilateral economic interests vis-a-vis China, including by serving as the most popular EU destinations for Chinese foreign direct investment.

Central and Eastern European leaders and citizens saw entry into NATO and the EU as an opportunity to reclaim their sovereignty as well as their national identities, after being agglomerated into the Soviet sphere of influence during the Cold War. Many in these countries now see EU decisions as undermining these hard-won freedoms, and the current Polish, Hungarian, and Czech governments are leading members of the anti-integrationist wing of the EU.

A Europe More Whole but Less Free?

To return to the question at the beginning of this essay, is this a new form of East-West divergence within Europe? Or are the Central and Eastern European countries now at the heart of the core debate over Europe's future, rather than at its margins?

Central and Eastern European countries already share many similarities with their West European neighbours, from low levels of defence spending to ageing populations. More importantly, the sovereigntist approach to EU integration that many Central and Eastern European leaders now promote is shared by leading parties across the EU, from Marine Le Pen's *Rassemblement National* to Mateo Salvini's *Lega Nord*, the Swedish Democrats and the Dutch Party for Freedom. The sharp economic downturn of 2009–2012 has led to a fundamental loss of trust in established political parties in Spain, Italy, and Greece and to a fragmentation of politics across Europe and has increased scepticism about the process of European integration that established parties have long supported.

As a result, sovereigntist Central and Eastern European parties now have a growing number of allies in Western Europe willing to challenge the idea of Europe as the global epicentre of socially liberal democracies that downplay nationalism, relativize religious belief, prize diversity, and support immigration. If these are "illiberal" parties, then the Central and Eastern Europeans have been in the vanguard of a pan-European

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movement rather than its followers. At the same time, of course, those supporting liberal and pro-European platforms continue to have their counterparts across the Central and Eastern European countries, with the candidate of the Progressive Slovakia Party being elected as Slovakia's new president in March 2019.

While this reveals that Europe is more whole today than 30 years ago in its very political heterogeneity, it raises the question of whether it will also remain free. To the extent that illiberal parties support and promote socially illiberal norms and greater economic nationalism, they have a legitimate voice in the political debate across Europe. However, if illiberal politics proves to be a gateway to majoritarian politics and, ultimately, authoritarianism (including the sort of "illiberal democracy" that President Putin espouses), then it will corrode freedom in Europe. A Europe that is whole *and* free can only be so if its leaders remain steadfastly committed to the standards of individual human rights, accountable governance, separation of powers, and primacy of the rule of law that are enshrined in the EU's Copenhagen criteria, which the Central and Eastern European countries committed to uphold as a requirement of their EU accession.

Here, the role of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE) remains important. Both institutions are constrained by the need for consensus decision-making at a time of deep mutual suspicion between Russia and other members, as well as a general increase in authoritarian governments. But they are both also pan-European in their membership; include the U.S. and Canada (as observers in the Council and full members in the OSCE); and serve as the only European institutional bridges to Russia, all while containing within their missions and work the same principles of individual freedom and accountable governance, which a Europe that is free and whole should embody.

How to Deliver on the Promise

If Europeans compromise on these principles, they will weaken their societies and economies and create space for outside powers to pursue their interests at the expense of Europeans collectively. What to do?

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First, it is essential that EU and NATO governments and officials, as well as those working in the Council of Europe and OSCE, adhere to the principles of open, democratic governance that they were founded to protect. If any political party attempts to compromise or undermine these core principles, then there can be no compromise. State-led efforts to limit independent media, undermine the independence of the judiciary, or use public procurement contracts for political favour must be challenged. Although the sovereign rights of EU and NATO member states will make it difficult for the majority to punish any state that transgresses these principles, every institutional step possible must be taken to ensure that there is no backsliding without the perpetrator paying a price, whether reputationally, institutionally, or financially.

Second, both the EU and NATO need to keep their doors open to eventual accession by the remaining European nations and states that have not yet been able or wanted to join. The attraction of membership in these two institutions, in terms of the long-term beneficial effects to their members' prosperity and security, can be a powerful tool for applicants to undertake essential reforms to their economies and their political and judicial systems. This also means, however, that full membership must be awarded based on real achievements towards the values and standards that these institutions represent.

In the interim, there is plenty the existing institutions can do to support their European neighbour that have yet to join. On the security front, NATO can increase its tempo of defence training and military exercises, along with assistance in security sector reform, and a strengthening of security infrastructure, including cyberdefence. On the economic and political fronts, EU institutions and members need to rediscover the political will for enlargement and support practical steps towards convergence.

Third, NATO and EU members should underscore the vitality and value of both institutions to non-members by meeting their own commitments, whether to national defence spending and modernisation, to upholding EU rules and standards, or to delivering integration where it offers the greatest near-term value, such as in energy markets and in strengthening the protection of data and cybersecurity.

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When will we know if Europe is "whole"? The answer implies a clear conception of Europe's ultimate boundaries. But these are not institutional. Is Europe incomplete if an undemocratic Turkey remains outside the EU, but is inside NATO? Can a democratic Ukraine still contribute to a whole and free Europe, but not be a member of either institution? Will Europe be less whole in any meaningful way if or when Britain leaves the EU?

A Europe made "whole and free" will be one in which each country faces no meaningful threats to its independence and where its peoples can be confident in their personal freedoms and in the accountability of their governments. Membership for all European countries in all clubs on the same terms may not be necessary to achieve this goal and may even be counterproductive. A more realistic goal is a Europe composed of states that are dynamically linked in economic, human and political terms with and through NATO and the EU. In this sense, helping the UK secure a "sensible" Brexit, involving a close economic and security relationship with the EU, may offer a more realistic perspective for other European countries that may not be able to become full EU members or, if they do, do not wish to be at the heart of all its dimensions of integration.

In his 2011 *Orbis* article, Walter A. McDougall concluded that "a High Conservative is someone who knows that things could be worse than they are—period!" This is a reminder that we should not berate ourselves too much for the failures to live up to the perfect goal that the phrase "a Europe whole and free" implied in 1989. Europeans, collectively, are freer and are more interconnected economically and politically than at any time in their history. Much has been achieved, which means there is much to protect. Plenty has not, which means much remains to be done. But it is a positive development that decisions about Europe's future will now involve the views of *all* Europeans, and not just those who were privileged to live under NATOs' and the EU's protection prior to 1989.

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Adam Daniel Rotfeld

Visionary Concept and Reality

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Annus Mirabilis—The Year of Wonders. This is how we could, in a nutshell, characterise the events of 1989. The speech that U.S. President George H.W. Bush addressed to the Germans and Europeans on 31 May 1989 was a vision and an outline of a political strategy adopted by his administration towards a rapidly changing Europe. In his speech, two important goals were outlined: the unification of Germany and peaceful democratic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe.

These forecasts were soon positively verified by reality. Four days later, on 4 June 1989, Poland held a partially free election. It was a kind of referendum. For the first time since 1945, Poland saw open competition between the opposition and the single-party rule of the communists. The democratic opposition received the complete support of the society: out of the 100 seats in the Senate (the upper chamber of parliament), 99 senators came from the *Solidarność* list; in the Sejm (the lower chamber) the democratic opposition won the maximum (35%) available in the partly free competition. Polish society chose peaceful transformation. Finally, Poles made use of the promise given to them 44 years earlier, on 11 February

1945 at Yalta, when the declaration of the leaders of the three Allied powers (the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) stated that the shared desire of President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and General Secretary Joseph Stalin was to see Poland as "strong, free, independent, and democratic."[1]

In Mainz, President Bush presented four postulates. The aim was to overcome the division of both Germany and the whole of Europe. The implementation of these postulates assumed respect for the principles of political pluralism, also in the part of Europe under Soviet domination; recognition that there is no freedom and security without the policy of "openness" (*glasnost*), that is, the free flow of information; common efforts to address threats and environmental catastrophes; and, ultimately, the safe, mutual and controlled arms reduction of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both in nuclear missiles and conventional weaponry.[2]

Today, 30 years later, we know that the address that Bush delivered in Mainz entered the annals of global diplomacy. It was a political concept and a vision that, at the same time, was deeply rooted in reality. Its gravity could be compared to Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946. The significant difference between these two addresses lies in that while Churchill talked about the division of Europe ("From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent"),[3] President Bush formulated a programme for eliminating divisions. He was aware that the Cold War was becoming a thing of the past. He addressed his speech to the nations that, unlike in 1945, did not expect that the change of system imposed on them would be possible only with outside intervention, that is, a military confrontation between two superpowers—the USSR and the U.S.—but that it would rather be the result of ongoing changes within these states. The Kremlin was no longer ruled by Stalin and his followers, but by Mikhail Gorbachev, while the new foreign policy was being loyally implemented by Eduard Shevardnadze.

In Russia, the new political philosophy faced resistance from the *siloviki*, the main military and party hardliners. However, in a historically short period of time, this resistance was partially overcome and some shifts were made from "confrontation" to "cooperation." As Gorbachev would then often say, "the process has started." Central European countries, which were

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fully dependent on the USSR, varied in their reactions to the change in the Kremlin's policies. In Poland and Hungary, they were received with great hope and enthusiasm, by the rulers in Czechoslovakia, with carefulness and anxiety, and in East Germany and Romania, with resistance and fear. Bush's contribution to this ongoing process was that he understood the gravity of the changes and made sure that they would not lead to an uncontrolled explosion within the states that had been under Soviet domination.

An Experience

By chance, liberalisation of the mono-party system in Poland had a direct impact on my personal fate. A week after the 4 June elections, I received the permission of the MFA to accept an invitation by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute to lead a research project on "Building a Co-operative Security System in and for Europe."[4] Within the framework of this project, less than a year later, I co-organised with the director of the institute, Walther Stützle, a conference on "A European Peace Order and the Responsibility of the Two German States" in Potsdam on 8–10 February 1990. This was an unprecedented event in the sense that for the first time, high officials of two German states took part in a common project—unthinkable just a few months prior. Leading politicians of both German states participated in the debate: Hans-Dietrich Genscher from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, West Germany) and Christa Luft, who was the deputy prime minister of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, East Germany). As a representative of the host country, Luft stated in her introductory remarks that "an attempt to build an independent, socialist nation in the GDR had failed."[5] The following day, Prof. Kurt Biedenkopf, a CDU member of the Bundestag, noted that "all political forces had determined that the two German states should be united."[6] In my conference summary, I underlined the Egon Bahr suggestion: The time is ripe, he said, "to think of a six-power conference, i.e., two German states and four powers," later known as the Two Plus Four.[7]

At that moment, I had a feeling and a sense that history was accelerating its course and thus it was necessary to record it for future

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generations, to make a kind of picture of the events. I included it in the volume of 60 documents that until today have more than just archival value. The publication opens with the address delivered by President Bush on 31 May 1989. It is followed by other documents that reveal the position of the other great powers (the U.S., USSR, Great Britain, and France), both German states (the GDR and the FRG) and other countries of Central Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary), as well as Northern European states (Sweden and Finland).

A special place in this process belongs to the Paris Charter for a New Europe of 21 November 1990. All these declarations, treaties, and statements confirmed the accuracy of the vision "Europe whole and free" that was proposed in May 1989 by President Bush. In December 1989, this concept was further developed by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who said in Berlin: "Free men and free governments are the building blocks of a Europe whole and free."[8] A quarter-century later, in my assessment of this concept, I wrote: "The Europe of 2012 corresponds only in part to Baker's vision; Europe is not entirely united and free."[9]

This state of affairs has not changed for the better. It has become worse and the reasons for this change are many and complex. From the formal point of view, the process that was initiated by President Bush's address in Mainz and the words of Secretary of State Baker in Berlin led to the extension of NATO and the EU. The alliance-based NATO, the community-based EU, and the cooperation of the remaining countries within the OSCE and NATO partnerships, all reflect the implementation of Bush's vision of Europe being whole and free. However, on the other hand, as it was noted in the *NATO 2020 Report*, under the chairmanship of Madeleine Albright, the alliance entered the second decade of the 21st century "as an essential source of stability in an uncertain and unpredictable world."[10] What has happened?

What Has Gone Wrong and Why?

While looking for an answer to the question "what has been achieved," we need to show our appreciation of the successes, but also explain the

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failures and their causes. The reality in which we are living now is indeed better than the one we departed from at the end of the Cold War (however, there is no shortage of critical opinions stating that today's world is equally, if not more, dangerous than the one that came before). The postulates put forward by President Bush in May 1989 have, to a large extent, been met. Germany was peacefully united and the division of Europe was overcome. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved and the Soviet Union collapsed, while NATO extended significantly, gathering today 29, and not 16, member states. The alliance is now an unprecedented, defence community driven by common principles and values. The new quality of the alliance is determined by its political philosophy expressed in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, "one for all and all for one."[11]

Looking at the 70 years since the signing of the Washington Treaty (4 April 1949), we can say that NATO is the most effective alliance in history. It has prevented a nuclear war between global superpowers and brought nations of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe peace and safe development. It has prevented military conflicts between member states (for example, between Turkey and Greece) and deterred potential external aggressors, initially the Soviet Union and later by Russia. As long as Gorbachev and, later, Boris Yeltsin were deciding Russia's foreign policy, it was justified to assume that the deeply-rooted reservations and the lack of trust and confidence towards the West that was characteristic of Russian leaders could give way to a search for cooperation in the sphere of security. However, Yeltsin's final years already signalled a return to the policies defined by the security and special services.

In his memoirs, the recently deceased Russian diplomat Oleg Grinevsky rightly noted:

> In the Soviet Union's post-war European policy there was probably no more important task than the breaking up of NATO. Stalin quickly came to the understanding that an establishment of a Euro-Atlantic alliance would bring an end to the Soviet expansion into the West. In Europe there was a marked line which could not be crossed – otherwise a war could break out. Stalin trampled in front of that line, trying to forcefully push through in the East in Korea. However, there he also met resistance. After that, the Soviet

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> Union undertook a dynamic political campaign to undermine NATO. The first activities were quite straightforward [and included proposals—*ADR*] to dissolve NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[12]

The next steps—as Grinevsky further writes—were more sophisticated. For example, Russia declared its readiness to join NATO with a clear intention to "break this organisation from within, make its existence lose sense." There were also proposals made within the OSCE to establish a pan-European security system that would make the bloc structures irrelevant.[13] In time, Russia returned to the traditional imperial strategy of the division of the world into spheres of influence and the areas of its "near abroad." The illustration of such thinking was, among others, an essay that was published on the pages of the Russian journal *Political Class*, whose author recommended "Finlandisation" of all of Europe:

Russia's maximum program assumes Finlandization of the whole of Europe, but it needs to be started with the reorganization of the near abroad.[14] The Russian sphere of influence would—in the understanding of the Kremlin "strategist"—include not only "Finland and Poland but also Kazakhstan, Turkey, Iran, and unconditionally Ukraine.[15]

The concept of "Finlandisation" also found some understanding among leading U.S. thinkers and officials.[16]

The implementation of such a project was foreseen as the first stage in the implementation of the strategic concept of transforming Europe into a buffer zone between Russia and the U.S. Multilateral institutions of the democratic world—NATO and the EU—are thus perceived as the main obstacles to the path of rebuilding Russia's imperial position. The activities undertaken by Vladimir Putin are not limited to foreign policy and security. They actually seek to destabilise democratic states, weaken the institution of the rule of law, influence the course of elections, and shape social moods with the help of new information technologies, especially social media.

Putin publicly presented his vision of mutual relations between the West and Russia at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. He further developed his concept at a closed meeting of the NATO-Russia Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 and at the Valdai International Discussion Club on

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24 October 2014 with a telling title: "The world order: new rules of the game or a game without rules?"[17]

What Has to Be Done?

A new strategy should respond not to past needs of a bygone world but rather to new challenges and threats. These threats are generated by geopolitical changes both on the global and regional levels and—in fact primarily—through the changes that have taken place within states rather than between them. This is as true for the global superpowers as it is for medium- and small-sized states. The world has entered a time of accelerated change. The highest priority for the leaders of the democratic nations of the transatlantic community is to find the right response to the question of how to manage this change.

Researchers and experts should not only be looking for ad hoc and model solutions but also include in the assumptions of a new strategy the long-term shared interests of their own nations and the entire democratic community of nations. We need to avoid idealistic concepts that sound beautiful but at the same time are unrealistic. We have to concentrate on our common threat—how to avoid the temptation of returning to egotistic interest-driven politics, which unavoidably lead to conflict. In other words, the priority of the transatlantic community is to counteract attempts that are aimed at undermining the solidarity of the alliance and especially the differentiation of security interests between Europe and America. As a matter of fact, the goals of the U.S., NATO and the EU are similar: "To preserve peace and safeguard freedom."[18] The time has come to establish security relations between NATO and the EU based on qualitatively new rules. The efforts of both these institutions in the area of security should not be duplicated. They should increase the effectiveness of defence spending. In 2020, Europe and Canada's defence spending will be equal to $100 billion.[19] Money should not be saved on peace and freedom, but the costs of deterrence should be rationally used in the common interests of the whole of Europe, America, and the world.

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Since in today's world, conflicts are born mainly within states, then—as experienced thinkers warn us—"freedom will not defend itself."[20] Life in freedom requires active strategies, not reactive thinking. It requires multilateralism and solidarity, not unilateralism and "Concert of Powers" games. Today, even the greatest powers need friends and allies.[21] Above all, their decisions, based on truth, require respect for relations with partners in the outside world.[22] There is no doubt that the leadership of the U.S. has been indispensable for the transatlantic community[23]; however, this is true when there is adherence to such fundamental values as individual freedom and the rule of law, as well as solidarity, equality, and partnership in mutual relations between all states, from large superpowers to medium-sized and smaller states. The future and effectiveness of the transatlantic community will be decided by its unquestioned unity.

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Sergey Utkin

A Chance That Was?

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In a verse devoted to Cicero, Russian poet and diplomat Fyodor Tyutchev famously noted that coming to this world at a crucial point is a sign of blessing, like being invited to a feast by saints. This describes the life experience of George H.W. Bush, who happened to be involved in wars and the business of peacetime, and whose presidency witnessed the rapid and unforeseen collapse of a country that suddenly ceased to be the principal adversary of the United States. Tyutchev's words point to the obvious fact that the one who is invited to the saints' feast is not the key actor—in many respects, he is a watcher, who should be grateful for being allowed to see the action of superior forces. The high posts held by Bush gave him exceptional tools to influence world events, but they still could not secure an exception to the rule that even the mightiest politicians have had to deal with tectonic shifts of human history that they personally were not able to determine.

By the time of Bush's presidency, the mills of history were already at full swing, and this did not go unnoticed by politicians and thinkers. In his 1987 book *Perestroika and the New Thinking*, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev reflected on the fate of Europe, which was, in his words, a "common home," where the Iron Curtain, as a legacy of the "old thinking," was redundant.

Gorbachev still believed that different social and economic systems would co-exist in Europe but that the military blocs could be disbanded. He attacked those who tried to limit the definition of "Europe" to Western Europe and complained that Western Europe often let the U.S. "kidnap" the independence and national interests of Western European states. Gorbachev added that the common European home would welcome guests (like the U.S.) if only they would not kick open the door or behave as the hosts. That was at the time when Western policymakers were still mainly talking of containment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Soviet internal reforms had barely started. Much of Gorbachev's discourse essentially predated 1987, survived the revolutionary changes of 1989–1991, and is still present in the Russian debate on Europe to these days.

Neither Bush nor Gorbachev could launch or stir the rapid collapse of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, but eventually, the two leaders facilitated the revolutions, since neither of them was willing to reverse the course of events. Both believed that the future would not be the same as the past, and one had to adapt to the new realities in order to make a better world out of them. The visions of the better world happened to be different in the U.S. and in Russia, and while they were not doomed to that, from the beginning of the post-Cold-War era chances were high that history would develop this way.

Freedom Is Not Free: What Has Been Achieved

While the collapse of the Eastern bloc was hard to predict, its striking weaknesses were obvious both for its inhabitants and external observers. The socialist economic system failed to satisfy people's basic needs, and limitations to political freedoms excluded any open debate on the real issues. The ageing leadership proved unable to leave space for the next generations without breaking the system. Some of the Eastern bloc's systemic features could still live on, but taken together they represented the conservative interpretation of the Soviet model that could not survive unchanged and was hard to reform. Not only in Europe but elsewhere, countries looked up at the levels of economic success and prosperity

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demonstrated by the West. As soon as political conditions allowed it, Western businessmen set foot in the formerly closed economies. They were welcomed as gurus who would teach the aborigines how to get rich.

The transition to a market economy was a shock that was hard to live through, but it represented a necessary restoration of the basic mechanisms able to deliver goods and services to the people. This also meant a serious change to societal structures, a reshaping of the labour market, and the rise of the super-rich, who were able to influence politics. Not everyone liked these changes, but the return to the old socialist practices was rarely seen as an option. The post-Cold War economies encountered many hardships, but overall they are far healthier and resilient than the creatures of the socialist experiment.

Although in the Russian debate some still play with the idea that the required economic change can be performed without a political one, as had been the case in China, most countries of the former Eastern Bloc do not find reasons to complain about the demise of the old communist parties and the political systems they held together. No democracy is ideal, but the possibilities for citizen participation and effective protection of human rights increased dramatically in comparison with the previous historical era. It took time to learn the opportunities and problems that came with true multi-party parliamentarism. Relationships between politics and business often remain an issue, although not only to the east of Vienna. Democracies will be facing new challenges in the future, but this time it will not be enough to look at best practices and act accordingly—the former masters will have to look for new ways together with former apprentices. Notwithstanding a few remaining issues and cases of regress, the basic understanding of human rights and civil liberties is widely accepted in Central and Eastern Europe.

The groundbreaking positive changes on the continent were well reflected in the proceedings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Up until the 1989 revolutions, the Soviet Union's allies were the most conservative voices when human rights and political freedoms were discussed—more so than the Soviet Union itself. Right after the revolutions, it suddenly turned out that the standards the West had desperately insisted upon at the CSCE over more than a decade were

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readily accepted by the newly born democracies. The ease of the initial transformation could even have a deceptive effect—it strengthened the argument that, rather than look for compromises, the West just had to wait long enough until others agreed with the Western model.

The Limits of Europe: What Has Gone Wrong and Why

In late December 1989, when many outcomes of the revolutions and reforms in the Eastern Bloc were already at hand, an outstanding American foreign policy thinker and diplomat, George Kennan, delivered remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations.[1] He was fully aware that the moment through which the world was passing was one of those crucial points comparable to the 1815 Congress of Vienna or the 1919 Versailles peace conference. Kennan warned his audience against thinking that the only problem at the time was to "reintegrate" the post-communist rest of Europe into the West because changes that "put an end to a false stability" had not led to the creation of a "new and sound one." He noted the looming troubles in the Balkans—a region without "any very firm status quo." He was also concerned that across Eastern Europe "the removal of the Russian hand will release not only the thirst for freedom" but outbursts of "romantic and intolerant and dangerous nationalism." Kennan then spoke of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, stressing that "they should not be allowed to go out of existence before something has been created to take their place," while "they will themselves not be adequate to the needs of the longer future."

The Warsaw Pact survived for slightly more than one year after Kennan's speech, the Soviet Union and socialist Yugoslavia for two. These events completely changed the security environment that yet existed in November 1990, at the time when the CSCE states rapidly drafted and agreed the Paris Charter "for a New Europe," which could have been the first step to the new security structure hinted at by Kennan.

The U.S. was hardly ever a true enthusiast of the CSCE process. Bush's national security advisor Brent Scowcroft documents in *A World Transformed* that, at the time of German reunification talks, the U.S. fought back ideas that the CSCE could somehow absorb NATO functions. Scowcroft also described

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Baker's acceptance of the position that the Soviet Union had to be reassured that "NATO territory would not be moved eastward" as an unfortunate concession to the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "which could have created serious difficulties."[2] That was the time when even America's closest ally, the United Kingdom, led by Margaret Thatcher, spoke in favour of a demilitarised East Germany and a stronger CSCE, which made Scowcroft "uneasy" because "the French might seek to use CSCE as a way to supplant NATO." Scowcroft believed this to be "an unacceptable notion both because of the centrality of NATO to U.S. strategy" and because, to Scowcroft, "collective security, as typified by the League of Nations and the United Nations, was, in the end, no security at all."[3]

All in all, at the brief moment when negotiations on a new regional security architecture were possible, the U.S. administration took an understandably careful stance—it was not the U.S. camp that was falling apart, and in spite of some risks, the changes in Europe were seen by the United States as long overdue. As to the Soviet Union, when Gorbachev was still strong enough, the U.S. did not see him as a friend. For Washington, he was at best a relatively pragmatic leader at the helm of a dangerous military power that should not be given any new trump cards.

The dramatic changes in Europe came as neither controlled nor regulated. Negotiations were constantly lagging events. U.S. foreign-policy makers in 1990–1991 were busy with Middle East developments around the Gulf War and watched with growing concern how Gorbachev's powers evaporated. At the point of the Soviet Union's collapse, the new Russian leadership seemed ready to find a common language with the West on all issues, including international security. The U.S. Secretary of State at that time, James Baker, remembered in his memoirs, *The Politics of Diplomacy*, that in December 1991 Boris Yeltsin was hoping to maintain the emerging Commonwealth of Independent States as a military alliance (possibly modelled after NATO) that would eventually merge with the western alliance. Neither part of this equation came true. The foreign and security policy choices and concerns of post-Soviet countries were far from truly harmonious. The conflicts in Moldova and in the Caucasus were leaving new scars on the European security landscape as well as on bilateral relationships. The war in Yugoslavia was the new focal point of

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European security. Diplomatic and military fire brigades were coming first, and solutions for the longer term had to wait.

Russia also did not stand still. As Bush lost his bid for a second term and left office, the Russian leadership was still in its nascent pro-Western mood, which very soon started to be squeezed by conservative circles inside the country and growing Russian disappointment with Western policies on a variety of issues. The U.S. took note, but Russian concerns did not immediately look to be the principal stumbling block that would force the United States to reconsider its policies.

By the late 1990s, NATO, which Scowcroft was so busy keeping intact, became a true beacon for a large number of post-socialist countries in Europe while Russia expressed its disagreement in vain. Bush was successful in the difficult diplomatic task of keeping Germany within NATO territory. NATO's expansion from Tallinn on the Baltic Sea to Constanta at the Black Sea, with an appetite for more, was not in the cards. In spite of various hints and speculation coined at the expert and official levels, Russian membership in NATO was not seen as a realistic option by either side. Russia was not in the mood to join the U.S.-led alliance, and the United States was determined to stay in the lead. Warnings that NATO enlargement could eventually reignite the adversarial relationship with Russia were not listened to; in the West, Russian concerns were interpreted as exaggerated or completely made up. A rational Russia, as imagined by the West, was supposed to celebrate the growing number of stable and prosperous EU/NATO members, and to accept the policies and rules set by the Western alliance, even though it was not allowed to participate in their elaboration.

In spite of many words being said about a Europe without dividing lines or a common European home, the division persists to this day in people's minds as well as in politics. The Russian transformation has never reached the phase that would make it a true ally for the West. The political mainstream in a number of European countries is satisfied with having Russia out and with the ability not to take Russian concerns into consideration during the decision-making in the EU and NATO. Wherever the Russian internal dynamics go in the future, a scenario in which all EU/NATO countries would want to have Russia on board with the same powers as other members is not realistic even in the long term.

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While Gorbachev and numerous other voices in Russia claimed that historical Russia is a European country, and Russians are Europeans, this was probably never the mainstream view in the United States. The Soviet Union was a political and military heavyweight while Europe was not. The "Europe whole and free" about which Bush spoke in spring 1989 could mean that the USSR would potentially be Europe's guarantor or facilitator, together with the U.S., but not a part thereof. Any idea that the fate of Belarus, Ukraine, or Moldova as sovereign states had to be discussed in this context was foreign to actual policymaking of the time. The Europe whole and free of early 1989 was a Europe where an option of military alliances disbanded was juxtaposed with the co-existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia was still seen as a heavyweight, no more European than the U.S., but weakened, less stable, and more dangerous for some. Many points of no return were passed since then, and no one can guarantee that the option of truly collective security for Europe, which Scowcroft so vehemently rejected, was a realistic one. But maybe this was a chance lost.

Looking for Hope: What Can Be Done?

The 1989-91 revolutions were determined by internal developments in the countries where they happened rather than by U.S. policies. In the West, as well as in the countries that stalled in their transformation process, many hope that the next wave of democratisation could help resolve the remaining issues. In some cases this might work, but others are more complicated. At some point, the great powers of the 21st century might be forced to elaborate a new code of conduct that could help to secure stability and prosperity for all, but so far they have been moving away from that goal. Nevertheless, some good policy options are still on the table, and it is the responsibility of decision-makers to explore them.

It was presidents Bush and Gorbachev who signed the START treaty on strategic arms reductions in July 1991, less than a month before an attempted coup d'état dealt a decisive blow to Gorbachev's powers. The positive changes in Europe happened against the background of two

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superpowers sharing an interest in arms reduction. The times are now different, but some of the arms-control mechanisms, including the New START treaty, can be saved.

The notion of confidence-building measures was developed at the time of the Cold War when actual confidence was no less scarce than today. These measures were developed in the OSCE framework and through other mechanisms. Making use of the existing tools and strengthening them further would eventually strengthen European security for all.

The NATO and the EU enlargement processes are running out of steam. In comparison with the dreams and hopes of mainstream politicians of the late 1980s, their success has been astonishing. But the mechanical nature of enlargement is already driving it against the wall. A Europe whole and free cannot be protected through the immediate proximity of military infrastructure developed by adversarial powers. Non-aligned countries in Europe should feel safe and stable rather than being forced to choose a camp.

Almost 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's relations with some of its post-Soviet neighbours are still marked by bitter conflicts. Ukraine and Georgia are prominent but not exclusive examples. Overcoming this legacy will be one of the hardest tasks in future European security affairs. Long-lasting political solutions for these issues remain somewhere beyond the horizon, but at the very least conditions must be created for decent living in any part of the continent, despite political disagreements.

Europe cannot realistically be made into a fortress. Its wellbeing depends on developments in Africa, the Middle East, Russia, China, and the rest of Eurasia. The strong transatlantic linkage makes the policies of the U.S. crucial too. Even if taken together, Europe, Russia, the U.S., and Canada represent a relatively small part of the growing human population. Negotiations with others, whatever their political preferences or cultural background, will be part of everyday life in all spheres. Globally important relationships need to be carefully managed. This can happen through multilateral forums or bilaterally. The most important task is to make politicians aware of the risks that can arise from bad global governance, and not take peace for granted.

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Robert Kupiecki

Europe Whole and Free: Mission Accomplished or an Unfulfilled Promise?

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Grand projects ordering the world, from the Kingdom of God, or a Wilsonian design, to George H.W. Bush's "Europe whole and free," have always been suspended somewhere between the theory and practice of international relations. However, it would be a mistake to treat these grandiose visions as coherent policy plans. The expectations they comprised were of a general nature, leading any attempt at their evaluation to disappointment rather than satisfaction. Grand visions are also strained by the literal treatment of detail, one disregarding the passage of time or changed context since they were originally formulated.

The Bush Corollary

The post-Cold War concept of "Europe whole and free," declared by the U.S. president in his Mainz speech of 31 May 1989, announced supporting an

inclusive (re)integration project in Europe, developed in a collaborative and rule-bound way, as well as support for reform and the transformation of its eastern part without estranging Russia, under U.S. supervision. For some, the presidential pronouncement was a clear sign of the end of the Cold War's East-West division, its political and economic differences, ideological clash, and most notably, the lack of freedom of choice for the nations located on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain.

Few people remember that Bush's Mainz speech was preceded by his Hamtramck, Michigan, address of 17 April 1989. It contained the founding idea of what was to become "Europe whole and free," namely that the Cold War would not be over without the restoration of freedom in Central Europe, and overcoming the "unnatural division of Europe." He also mentioned that the U.S. "accepts no spheres of influence that deny the sovereign rights of nations." The co-writer of this speech, Daniel Fried, is right in claiming that this was a clear rejection of the "realist" tradition of Cold War U.S. foreign policy that *de facto* recognised a Soviet sphere of influence.[1]

To Western observers, this might have looked like a return to Wilson's or Reagan's principled policies, but to the Central Europeans, the words of the 41st president of the U.S., regardless of how it was conceived of over there, sounded like the end of Yalta—the Western betrayal of the East, or a failure of its policy, one brought about by a clash with Soviet totalitarianism.[2] Bush was clearly alluding to the legacy of Woodrow Wilson, who championed a world order based on the overturning of war as the means of conflict resolution, respect for nations' laws, and a common institution guarding those rules towards the end of World War I.

Eighty-one years later, his successor offered a European amendment, one ingrained in the needs of the new world emerging from the Cold War. Its addressee was Europe itself—a divided continent, the source of two world wars, and the central front in the Cold War, which was to end soon. Both constructs looked to the future and expressed an American point of view, which was to become a programme for "the free world."

Bush's intention was to present a new powerful vision of a common destiny for nations of East and West that would be neither a simple projection of Washington's or Moscow's will nor any imperfect compromise

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between freedom and oppression. In that sense, as an academic suggestion, for further discussion, I would like to propose naming Bush's vision the "Bush Corollary."

Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rightly notes in her 2014 book *Hard Choices* that "the vision of Europe as whole, free, and at peace had been a goal of every U.S. administration since the end of the Cold War. At its heart was the notion that peoples and countries could move beyond old conflicts to chart a peaceful and prosperous future." These words emphasize the dual meaning behind this concept. The first was as an important element of a programme organising international relations and anchoring U.S. power in a new more cooperative European post-Cold War order. The second was as a key strategy and axiological premise for U.S. politics and an inclusive understanding of relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as transatlantic relations more broadly.

Bearing in mind the post-Cold War reality, such actions could be seen as the modernisation of the American grand strategy, the European elements of which had been based on three factors since the 1940s: first, a transatlantic security-oriented community, largely financed by the United States, acting based on common interests and a common threat assessment; second, a community with a liberal economic model and democratic values that have become fundamental parts of the process of globalisation throughout the years; and, third, Washington supporting European allies as part of its global politics. A project subscribing to those parameters was to be continued in the face of the collapse of a bipolar world.

Bush's vision was clear and simple, offering a fresh political perspective after a four-decade-long confrontation of two worlds. The optimism expressed in the declarations by the 41st president of the United States was in stark opposition to the blurred concepts preserving bipolarity formulated on the other side of the Iron Curtain by Mikhail Gorbachev ("Common European Home") or the complex predictions by academic pundits: "permanent instability due to historical conflicts" (John Mearsheimer)[3] or scenarios assuming relations shifting between rivalry and cooperation (Pierre Hassner).[4] All of these concepts were linked by a common understanding of the need to establish norms and rules mitigating the challenges of the transitional period. That being said, only

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the promise of Europe whole and free seemed to allow for a vision matched by strength and transformed into a strategy.

Based on that, Bush's successor, Bill Clinton, defined America's role and the foreign policy instruments at its disposal, such as support for democratic transformations within post-communist countries, NATO's Open Door policy, special relations with Russia, and a broad spectrum of partnerships beyond the Alliance's borders. Bush's vision and Clinton's European policies also supported the EU in continuing its integration project.

A coherent balance of policies resulting from Bush's ideas is incredibly difficult to assert. The varying evaluation will be a natural result of the subjective perspectives of European nations, the traditional American dispute between activists and reductionists (neo-isolationists) in foreign affairs or polarised analyses of the global results of this way to carry out politics (without excluding revisionist takes). However, two narratives deserve special attention: first, the net result of the benefits stemming from Washington's engaged politics in Europe, and second, the unfulfilled promise of Europe whole and free.

Europe Whole and Free—Mission Accomplished?

In the same way that American politics and sensible leadership allowed Western Europe to rebuild its identity and power after World War II, the fall of communism brought about an eastward expansion of the project, resulting in the democratisation, rule of law, and speedy development of market economies.[5] Progress in these areas was *sine qua non conditio* for the accession of Central European countries to NATO and the EU.

This transformation also greatly benefitted the nations of Western Europe, who supported their neighbours' stability and broadened their influence and access to new markets. The U.S. also benefited by solidifying its status as the lone superpower and widening its net of alliances. That scorecard offers strong evidence to support the view that the mission of "Europe whole and free" was accomplished in the decade following the fall of the Iron Curtain.

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On the other hand, Bush's vision, one put into motion by his successors, rendered Europe lazy and unused to thinking about its hard defences. Potential threats seemed far away while problems closer to home seemed to pose no grave military threat. Nothing caused greater damage to the foundations of the transatlantic community than the so-called "peace dividend," an ill-advised chance to capitalise on peace at the expense of collective defence. It went too far in the direction of disregarding the West's defences and its material needs. Russia's new assertiveness, from the first neglected signal (2008 war with Georgia) to its peak in Ukraine in 2014 and continuing, has been a harsh reminder of old Cold War ghosts, insensitive to "peace dividend" policies and wishful thinking.

This trend is now in reverse in the West, as the end of its "strategic vacation" becomes more apparent. The integrity of the West is undermined by internal problems, such as rising populism and nationalism, as much as it is threatened by hybrid threats from the East and South. Trump's hegemonic approach, which seeks to deploy the might of the U.S. as a key foreign policy tool while questioning multilateral and traditional alliances, also is changing American politics and its international image. America's hegemonic nationalism (motivated by setting the record straight with free-riders in the world) is hugely tempting. So, too, is the tendency by some countries on the other side of the Atlantic to react defensively and to contest American leadership. Similar temptations are apparent in China and Russia, as these two aspiring hegemons unabashedly advance their own projects to revise the status quo.

The U.S. is shifting its attention from Europe to Asia. The rules of the global game are dictated by two strategic factors that contribute to a phenomenon Andrew A. Michta describes well in his *American Interest* essay, "The Revenge of Hard Power Politics," namely the remilitarisation of neo-imperial Russian politics, fuelled by sentiments of a "Western betrayal" (the mother of all Russian political myths), and the quick rise of China as a regional hegemon and global challenger to America.

Both of these processes are attempts to push the U.S. and the West out of their long-held positions by using economic instruments, soft power, and ambitious military build-ups. Both China and Russia use all available

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means to press the free world. They also force Europe to assume a more active role as a global player.

NATO is the most successful political-military alliance in the world. It has been managing security in Europe for seven decades, retaining its classical mission of collective defence in the meantime and assuming new tasks in the field of cooperative security and crisis management. Created to counter communist aggression and to protect freedom and the common Western heritage of democracy, it allowed its nations to rebuild after World War II and thrive politically and economically. After the Cold War, with the prospect of its enlargement, NATO became a solid incentive for reforms in Central Europe. Through its partnership programmes, it contributed significantly to spreading freedom and democracy further east and south. Without diminishing its problems, stemming from a European tendency for military free-riderism and Trump's rhetoric about NATO's obsolescence, anticipating the fall of the Alliance would be a mistake.

NATO remains a body of high strategic culture, solid military structure, unmatched aggregated military budgets, tools for policy-deconfliction, and interconnected interests of member nations. They still form a very solid base for transatlantic relations. To a serious degree, the future of the Alliance still will depend on the U.S., and the new transatlantic bargain will have to comprise greater military, financial, and political responsibility on the part of all allies.

The Unfulfilled Vision of Europe Whole and Free

An opposite narrative claims that despite the achievements of the last three decades, Europe whole and free has never been brought into existence. Despite the American presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War, courtesy of Bush's project, which consisted of a blend of neo-conservative and neo-liberal visions (American leadership, promotion of freedom and democracy, inclusive world order, and global economy), along with the evolving international context, one has a hard time assessing whether the project was completed, interrupted, or not even remotely applied in real life because of the serious rift between vision and reality.

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Commencing their work on constructing a post-Cold War world order, Bush (as the visionary of this new world) and Bill Clinton (its architect) worked to bring it about without any guarantee that the transformation of post-communist countries would be successful (it is worth remembering that NATO's 1991 strategy saw instabilities resulting from that process as possible risks to the Alliance) or that the U.S. Congress would support such a European policy. As long as the conditions were favourable, succeeding administrations led the world through the period of communist retreat, the fall of the Soviet empire, the unification of Germany, the first Gulf War, and the Middle East peace process.[6]

The support of the American government undoubtedly helped the process of Central Europe's reintegration with the West. However, it was led by a dynamic dating from the Cold War, when many challenges and threats were numbed by the Cold War rivalry. This led to a focus on an incomplete list of issues located primarily in Europe: the unification of Germany, supporting the Russian transformation, rebuilding the politics and economy of former satellite states, and generating a broad base of stability that motivated NATO enlargement. Those conditions that enabled the West and its partners to maintain a certain discipline and determination in the face of the challenges lasted merely a decade. Pressures arising from the dissipation of control over international processes due to ongoing globalisation (the information technology revolution, climate change, war on terror, awakening of dormant regions and civilisations), as well as the symptoms of renewed superpower rivalry, forced the U.S. government to work out a fitting solution. As a result, the U.S. global strategy stopped being Eurocentric, perhaps on a scale that posed a threat to transatlantic relations as we knew them.

Soon after, following NATO's first expansion in 1999 (which, according to President Clinton, was the height of U.S. power and prosperity), Washington was encouraged to prioritise its goals and limit its involvement with "Europe whole and free," so as to use the achieved results instrumentally. This is why its performance in the 21st century is less impressive than in the last century, despite the "big bang" enlargement of both NATO and the EU in 2004, and subsequent NATO expansion since. In aggregate terms, it is evidenced now

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by the petrified NATO and EU eastern border, and the success of Russia's blackmail concerning its expansion into Georgia and Ukraine.

The integration of Central Europe within NATO and the EU was declared to be synonymous with the decisive success of the stabilisation of this region, allowing for significant reductions of major American investments there, or at best calling on the states in the region to take up more equitable burden-sharing of military programmes. It also marked the beginning of U.S. expectations that countries blessed by post-Cold War transformations should make a loyal contribution to the U.S.'s global agenda. In Washington's view, the countries that have been successful in managing their post-communist transformation have graduated from being partners-in-need and recipients of assistance to partners able to contribute their military and material resources to the international conflict resolution and the U.S.-led war on terrorism.[7]

James Goldgeier is right that "after the war in Iraq and the global financial crisis, the United States lost not only its standing but also its self-confidence as global leader." He concludes, sadly, that

> with the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the Brexit vote, the rise of authoritarianism in Central Europe, and the continuing challenges of maintaining the Eurozone, the vision of Europe whole, free and at peace no longer serves meaningfully as a framework for America's Europe policy. The optimism underpinning the 1989 strategy—that the West won the Cold War and could set the terms for the integration of the East, including Russia—has given way to pessimism now that Russia is bent on undermining Western institutions and populist politicians in Europe are doing the same.[8]

Questions for the Future

Arguably, Bush's vision was the last wholesome American strategy in Europe. Strategies are good as scene-setters for policy. However, without the decisive U.S. leadership of the West, it would have been nothing more than a record of the positive attitudes that crystallised at the end of the Cold War. The project of "Europe whole and free" has been completed to a far greater degree

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than anybody could have predicted in 1989. The reasons why the project was brought to a halt at the eastern border of the European Union and NATO are complex. It could be said that the transatlantic world today is painfully reminded of not only the lack of a strategic vision but also a lack of leadership that can translate it into policy. Perhaps this unfinished project will receive its second life, in a way similar to the Wilsonian vision of a new world order. The one formulated at the end of WW I had to wait a good quarter of a century for its political life and materialisation in the form of U.S. involvement and the set of institutions forged after World War II—in a way that referenced the source material but was modern in content and form.

With that in mind, when reflecting on the vision of Europe whole and free, instead of jumping to conclusions, it is worthwhile to ask the following questions. Does the vision retain its validity as a whole and is it simply losing momentum for several reasons: the populist revolt against globalisation and the liberal economy, failing to address social concerns, the political exhaustion of Western societies caused by economic crises, and a return to power politics by revisionist Russia and China?[9] Does it require an update based on a new assessment of the global circumstances upon which it can be put into motion in the future? How might such a modification be managed? If, however, this project has lost its validity, not as an axiological roadmap but as an undertaking that cannot realistically be continued, then the question is how to delay the effects of the dissolution of a concept that organised the politics of the West for the past 30 years? The related question: what should replace it?

American and European strategy houses should tackle these questions, as Joseph Nye has suggested, "the terms liberal international order and Pax Americana have become obsolete as descriptions of world order, but the need remains for the largest countries to organise multilateralism for public goods."[10]

The essence of Europe whole and free might not be outdated if the future Western strategy retains a cooperative spirit with regard to the entire spectrum of new threats. The first step towards it would be genuine European defence capability, supported by NATO and integrated into existing transatlantic political-military frameworks. The need for solid and responsible U.S. leadership has been always there.

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Lilia Shevtsova

Russia: A European Headache

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Today the idea of "Europe whole and free," coined by George H.W. Bush and adopted by the transatlantic community in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and Mikhail Gorbachev's idea of a "common European home" both look about as feasible as the goal of building communism on a global scale. Perhaps it would be a reasonable goal if we were to view Russia as a civilization alien to Europe and separated from it by a *cordon sanitaire*, but could we really say that Europe is "whole and free" if Russia is angrily peering over the fences from outside?

Russia is thus a crucial factor in determining whether the Bush/Gorbachev ideas are realistic visions or just a mirage. Does Russia's anti-European pivot reflect its true nature? Can the West help Russia become a European state? We cannot answer these questions for sure until we discard the illusions that distort our understanding of Russia's development, and until Russia rethinks its existential pattern.

Where Have All the Flowers Gone?

The West turned out to be unprepared for the disintegration of the global socialist system, revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Seymour Martin Lipset and György Bence wrote that both the right and the left in the West believed the Soviet Union "to be exceptionally viable." The right thought that "the system could not be overthrown from within" while the left basically insisted that "the system was a good one."[1] The events of 1989–1991 spelt disaster for those political scientists and politicians who were confident that the USSR was as strong as it had ever been, just as it began to collapse.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western world kept on acquiring new misconceptions. The bitter irony was that the West's belief that capitalism would lead to democracy and that Yeltsin would guarantee Russia's democratic transition helped the restoration of personalised power in Russia. Indeed, the West offered Russia participation in a number of transnational forums to facilitate its adaption to liberal standards. But none of them involved conditionality—mechanisms tying Russia's entry into Europe with its mastery of liberal norms. Conditionality would have worked on one condition: Russia had to relinquish the idea of being a great power with areas of influence. This, however, was unimaginable, even for Russian liberals.

The West was ready to accept the Kremlin's grievances about the West taking advantage of Russia's weakness and its refusal to accept Russia as "equal" by offering an accommodative approach to Russia and apparently hoping that various forms of embrace would secure Russia's cooperation. "If the U.S. wants to cooperate with Russia on its priorities, it must be willing to cooperate on Russia's," wrote a respected U.S. observer. "... At a minimum, it must not actively seek to thwart Russia's efforts to advance Russia's key interests ... If the U.S. wants Russia's cooperation on Iran and Afghanistan, it can work to accommodate Russia's interests in the former Soviet space and Europe."[2] However, Western acquiescence did not prevent Russia's hostility. Western accommodators failed to detect the Kremlin's mentality: the more the West is ready for concessions, the more it stokes the arrogance of the Russian political class—to them, concessions indicate weakness.

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A wide array of schools of thought failed to predict Russia's post-communist trajectory. Who could have foreseen that a member of the Council of Europe would breach the principles of the Helsinki Accords and upend the world with a confrontational agenda? Europe pursued its strategy of "Partnership for Modernisation" with Russia just as Moscow had started thinking about how to weaken the European Union. The U.S. offered Moscow a "reset" while the Kremlin was debating how to contain the United States. The Western community was confounded by Russia's wars with Georgia and Ukraine and its gambit in Syria, and totally unprepared for Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

One can only guess what the authors of numerous books and essays on Russia's democracy, Yeltsin's liberal revolution, Russia's integration into Europe, and Putin's modernisation are thinking today. All of us have to eat humble pie and own up to the illusions we have created.

The Deception Game Continues

What elements of the Russia narrative look dubious today? First of all, the pervasive *Putiniana* of the discourse—observers' attempts to identify Russia with Putin and tell their audience his deepest thoughts. The fascination with the Russian leader on the part of Western observers provokes consternation. How could it happen that the "most powerful man in the world"[3] would allow his nation to be sanctioned?

Here is one more Russia axiom: "*Russia's great power status is the core of Russian identity*." Fans of *Realpolitik* chant that Russia wants the West to accept Russia's importance as a great global power. Indeed, it would be unusual for Russians to think about their country as a normal state. However, we need to see the evolution of the Russian view of "great power" status. The country is split on this issue: 42% of Russians said they would like to see Russia as a great power that should be feared by the world; 56% would like to see Russia as a great power that would guarantee the people's wellbeing.[4]

Pundits continue to discuss the "deepening integration" of the Eurasian Union.[5] However, with Ukraine jumping the Eurasian boat, and with

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Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan seeking warmer relations with the West and pursuing an agenda with China, the Eurasian Project has lost its momentum. So much energy spent in vain!

Another exercise of Russia hands is the idea of a "*Sino-Russian Entente*."[6] "*Rejected by the West, Russia has pivoted to Asia and found in China its leading partner*"—this has become the song sung by Russian analysts.[7] Meanwhile, attempts to "intertwine" the Eurasian Union with China's ambitious "One Belt, One Road" (Belt and Road Initiative) could be perceived as another bit of fakery. "Intertwining" may take place, but only as a means for China to develop the infrastructure that will connect it with Europe. Is Russia ready to serve as China's "bridge"? Hardly!

One more pastime of the pundit community is to deliberate on how to achieve "mutual predictability." But is that possible if the best environment for the Russian system is "fluidity" (in Zygmunt Bauman's terms) and its ability to be unpredictable? It certainly does look as if President Trump has borrowed this Russian trump card.

Illusions about Russia not only distort Western policy, but they also give the Kremlin the wrong ideas about the West's intentions. The Kremlin's actions on the international scene have been motivated not only by Russia's domestic agenda but also by the Kremlin's view of what the West thinks about Russia and President Putin. A decade ago, the Kremlin concluded that the West, and first of all Europe, would make accommodation the premise of their Russia policy. This was one of the factors behind Moscow's Crimea annexation and war in Donbas; the Kremlin was sure that the West would "stomach" it. Thus, Western acquiescence is at least partly responsible for Kremlin belligerence.

The Russian ruling class believes that the West is in a state of decay. The liberal order based on the preponderance of U.S. power is over, and the European Union is in crisis. "Europe has failed to stop the degradation of the European project," argues Sergei Karaganov.[8] The Russian mainstream hopes that it can force Europe to accept Russian demands. But while the West has often misjudged Russia in the past, now it is Russia that frequently misjudges Western resilience, leading it into several miscalculations: the Kremlin's hopes for the collapse of Ukraine were in vain; it erred in thinking that the West couldn't institute painful sanctions in response to Ukraine;

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its hope for populist victories to sweep throughout Europe have been stymied; and, even its bet on friendlier relations with Trumpian America hasn't panned out.

The Russian political class's key concept of a multipolar world, with Russia as one of its poles, could also prove to be yet another illusion: multipolarity would engage Russia in a struggle with more powerful competitors, and there is no guarantee that this would allow it to succeed in its goal of building a galaxy of satellite states.

In trying to conceptualise Russia's role in this new situation, Russian political thinkers have gone back to old ideas about Russia's uniqueness, highlighting that Russia is neither West nor East (which is true enough).[9]

Being a lonely power, Russia could perhaps make its mission, as Dmitri Trenin suggests, "to maintain the geopolitical balance and strengthen security in the various regions of Greater Eurasia and on the continent as a whole."[10] But would other states accept such a role from an alien civilisation drifting toward an unknown destination?

Even more ridiculous is the idea that Russia could become "a decisive factor" in forming a new world order because Russia has a "competitive advantage" over other states due to its "lack of ideological rigidity and readiness for risk." Hence, Russia needs only to stop "following the rules" and live by "the law of the taiga" (the Siberian forest).[11] If the proponents of such ideas actually mean what they say, Russian political thought is in deep trouble.

American retrenchment and tensions between the U.S. and Europe have led to a new line of thinking in Russia: the EU's focus will supposedly become less transatlantic, thus allowing Russia to normalise its relationship with Europe. Europeans will have to be "more pragmatic in implementation of their economic interests, less dependent on political circumstance" (by which the writer means Europe will have to sideline "normative values").[12] But are Europeans ready for the political suicide that such a shift would entail?

Western realists are also improvising. The latest innovation offered by Henry Kissinger is the idea of "equilibrium": "Russia should be perceived as an essential element of any new global equilibrium, not primarily as a threat to the United States." One of the premises of this "equilibrium"

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should be Ukraine's readiness to accept the role of "a bridge between Russia and the West."[13] But is Ukraine ready for this function?

Could the new equilibrium rest, as realists argue, on NATO stopping further enlargement into the post-Soviet space? We already know that the intermission in NATO's expansion toward Russia did not prevent Moscow from souring on the West. In any case, reaching "equilibrium" would require the West to give Russia a veto over its security decisions and to accept the Kremlin's right to interpret international rules as it sees fit. It is hard to see the U.S. agreeing to that, given its confrontational posture. Is Europe ready for such a bargain?

Thinking in Minimalist Terms

Russia continues to be a civilizational oddity: European in its culture, anti-European in its system. This strangeness has allowed the Russian elite to use ambivalence as a means of survival. When Russia stopped pretending to be a democracy, it became clear that there was an insurmountable obstacle to it becoming a European power: the belief, among both the Russian elite and the Western community, that Russia's only choice is to exist as a superpower relying on military might, a balance of powers, and spheres of influence. Thus, for the foreseeable future, Europe could be whole and free, minus Russia if Russia fails to transform its system of personalised power based on an expansionist great power role.[14]

After we recognise this fact, we need to rethink the toolkit used to manage the relationship between Russia and the West. The paradigm of engagement has become synonymous with a failure to engage. Confidence-building measures are pointless because both sides understand the rules differently. The "ignore Russia" or "wait-and-see" options won't work, because they would entail a lack of a coherent Western policy, which would leave the scene wide open for the Kremlin's adventures. Calls to reopen channels for "managing confrontation" look like vain attempts to paper over a lack of substance. Belief in the notion that the key to success lies in "personal chemistry" puts the relationship at the mercy of Russia's leaders and strengthens the country's personalised system, which will always

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produce leaders who long for "greatness." Efforts to solidify a "status quo" are pointless when one side prefers volatility. Attempts to find a "new normal" raise a question: Exactly what is "normal" in this relationship? A return to the idea of "strategic patience" sounds like a rejection of "strategic vision."

How can we describe the kind of interaction to be had between a Europe and a Russia that live under different orders? There will, of course, be areas for dialogue between Russia and Europe, and between Russia and the U.S., on security and economic issues. However, dialogue cannot bridge the gulf separating Russia and the West when it comes to principles. This gulf will continue to be the source of their mutual suspicion.

Does that mean that Russia is incorrigible and that the European project can't influence Russia's trajectory? I hope not. The evolution of moods in Russian society demonstrates that hostility to liberal civilisation is not an immutable characteristic of Russia writ large. Russians are tired of living in the Besieged Fortress, and they don't want confrontation with the West. About 51% of Russians state that the key goal of Russia should be "guaranteeing the wellbeing of the Russian population" while 49% say that Russia should be a "great power with a strong military."[15] In another recent poll, 68% of respondents said that Russia should strengthen relations with the West (21% were in favour of increasing Russia's distance from the West).[16] Every fourth Russian respondent said that Kremlin foreign policy is "unsuccessful."[17]

Russians will accept the idea of a rule-of-law state if it is offered to them. The problem is that the current Russian regime is moving toward anti-Western consolidation. The Kremlin views Europe as "the weakest link" in the Western community, and thus the key target of its charm offensive.

Meanwhile, as long as the U.S. is considered a hostile force in Russia, Europe could initiate its own response by, first, looking for areas of dialogue and, second, building up an environment amenable to a future, modern Russia. Europe would be doing Russia no favours if it were to continue to excuse Russian rule-breaking, thus leaving Russians at the mercy of an elite class unable to live in a rule-of-law state. True, lending support to transformational impulses will inevitably create tensions. The trick is to resolve these tensions without surrendering the normative ground. Will the Europeans be ready to combine values with pragmatic approaches? If not,

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then we will be back in the situation in which European accommodation helped to reproduce the Russian system of personalised power.

There is a familiar list of axioms that could help Europe formulate a new Russia strategy. First, the European community needs to form a new expert community unburdened by the old fallacies about Russia. Second, Europe should reassess the impact of the sanctions regime on Russia. Sanctions didn't consolidate Russian support for the Kremlin but they also failed to split the elites or weaken Putin's regime. Russia has suffered some economic hardships but has also adapted to them. Europe must consider carefully the goal of the sanctions: to contain Russia, to punish it, or to spark calls for change? Moreover, sanctions targeting Russian kleptocracy should not bring hardship for ordinary Russians (apparently, a naïve hope!). Third, the new Russia policy needs to re-energize transatlantic unity. Fourth, the key issue that will determine the future of the European relationship with Russia is Ukraine. De-escalation and an end to the war in Donbas are achievable only if Russia accepts Ukraine's sovereignty. A strong Ukraine would create fewer incentives for anti-modern forces in Russia to view it as a Russian sphere of influence. Fifth, Europe has lost its appeal for Russians as a model. Thus, adhering to the maxim "practice what you preach" and rejuvenating the viability of the European project would be effective instruments in restoring the goal of liberal transformation in Russia.

Of course, re-engaging with Russian society is vitally important as well. However, over the years of imitation partnership with Europe, this agenda has lost its meaning. "Engagement" between societies has turned into a dialogue between Europeans and Russian "civil society" representatives appointed by the Kremlin. Building a platform for engaging with real Russian people requires a new agenda and new means of communication.

Creating an environment conducive to Russia's transformation and maintaining a dialogue with the Kremlin may seem like mutually exclusive objectives. To make it work, Europeans must summon up reserves of political wisdom, courage, intuition, and commitment to principles. For the time being, Russia will remain outside Europe, and Europe will face the constant temptation to surrender its principles in exchange for tactical victories of a dubious long-term bargain.

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We can't exclude the possibility of a more pessimistic scenario: that Russia will grow restless with the ruling group's failure to address the country's problems and will grow even more hostile to the West. One hardly can predict how this new "Cold War" would end. We are dealing with the extended agony of the personalised system, which is exhausting peaceful means of survival but still does not have the means to change peacefully.

Meanwhile, Russia is entering turbulent times. Do not be fooled by the apparent lull; the system's shrinking resources and the authorities' inability to reform are increasing the threat of political and social turmoil. The ultimate fate of the Russian state-system will have tremendous repercussions for the global order. Indeed, Russia's moment of truth could close one chapter in world history and open a new one. Europe should be ready for it. Now is precisely the time to start thinking about the inevitable demise of an obsolete construct, the price that Russia and the rest of the world will have to pay for it, and how to guarantee Russia's peaceful transformation toward a better future.

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François Heisbourg

A Europe Whole and Counterfactual?

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The main objectives of President George H.W. Bush's Mainz speech of 31 May 1989 came to fruition in less than 15 years. The goal of self-determination had prevailed "in all of Germany and Eastern Europe" (as then defined), with Poland and Hungary being singled out, as well as East Berlin. Democracy and open society had become the norm rather than the exception in a Europe "whole and free," where one was now "free to move from room to room," at least west of the Narva and the Bug. Bush did not mention the USSR as a target for transformative upheaval of this sort: indeed, until August 1991, the president would go out of his way to support the continued existence of the Soviet state, notably in his so-called "Chicken Kiev" speech at the beginning of that month. Nor did he suggest that NATO should be either expanded or dismantled in the long run. What he did say in the speech's first proposal was that free elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe should be pursued in the framework in the CSCE's Helsinki process—neither NATO nor the EU is mentioned in this connection.

He did give a central role to NATO as an agent of arms reduction and control, in concert with the Warsaw Pact. These objectives were achieved or surpassed, albeit largely through the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, respectively in July and December 1991. The emigration of some one million Jews and non-Jews (up to 30% of the total) from the former USSR took place during the 1990s.

Bush suggested cooperation in areas such as a cleaner environment and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical armaments. This helped open the way to both the Rio conference (1992) and, in time, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in 2016, and to the permanent members of the Security Council supporting the first Gulf war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq (1990 onwards) and subsequently the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) freezing Iran's nuclear ambitions from 2015 onwards. The decision by President Donald Trump to withdraw from these two undertakings can hardly be laid at Moscow's doorstep, nor can its origins be traced to Bush's statements.

No less far-sighted was President Bush's support for what had not yet become the European Union, extolling "its giant step in 1992," the year that saw the creation of the Single Market. However, as for the case of NATO, he did not hint at an eventual enlargement process.

Such questions and others were contingent on subsequent decisions and developments. The Mainz speech's content and context left wide open alternative futures. Under specific circumstances, that speech could have ushered in not only the post-Cold War European security order that we have known until it eventually broke down during this decade under President Vladimir Putin's strategic challenges and President Trump's refusal to pursue his predecessors' support of a liberal democratic rules-based order. It will be argued here that the Mainz speech could have led to a Europe whole and free but without NATO. Such a scenario is worth developing, not only to give a sense of what it would have taken to deliver an outcome different from the one that prevailed during the following quarter-century but also to reflect on whether it would have impeded the return of war between Russia and its neighbours. That assessment may, in turn, have practical consequences for ongoing decision-making. It also provides an opportunity to recall what was and what wasn't promised by the American

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president in and after the Mainz speech. As in any serious counterfactual analysis, I will only make demonstrably realistic assumptions, none of which rest on removing key players from the scene or on changing the scene itself: for example, as in the real world, the Wall falls peacefully, Germany reunites consensually, the USSR collapses, the Balkans wars take place, the EU enlarges. The counterfactual part of the scenario is written in italics; everything else is stated as it happened.

I will conclude with a *mise en perspective* of what has become of the Mainz speech's legacy.

The Road not Taken: No NATO, No Warsaw Pact

12 September 1990 is a moment of immense historical importance for Europe. *That morning, the assembled leaders of the 16 member states of the Atlantic alliance and the seven members of the Warsaw Pact signed what became known as the Egmont Treaty, named after the eponymous palace in Brussels. This declared their common commitment to disband the two organisations by 31 December 1994, contingent on associated measures, notably the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the territory of the USSR's Eastern European neighbours.* These withdrawals were completed ahead of schedule, with the departure of the last Russian soldiers from Berlin on 31 August 1994. Furthermore, thanks to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russian forces had also left the newly independent Baltic states by that date. No less remarkably, there had been no parallel undertaking for the withdrawal of U.S. and Canadian troops from Western Europe. *By 1 January 1995, the NATO flag had ceased to fly.* The Warsaw Pact, for its part, had been dissolved on 1 July 1991, a few months before the end of the USSR itself.

Later on 12 September, the heads of state and government of France, the two German republics, the USSR, the UK, and the U.S. gathered in Moscow for the signing of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, more generally known as the “2+4” agreement. This opened the way for the formal reunification of Germany within the framework of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) three weeks later.

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How did this state of affairs arise? Shortly after Chancellor Helmut Kohl had given impetus to the prospect of German reunification in his 10-point programme delivered to the Bundestag in November 1989, President François Mitterrand suggested the establishment of a European Confederation in his televised wishes for the coming New Year. This rather vague initiative was welcomed by all and sundry at the time, including the governments of the emerging democracies of what was still called "Eastern Europe." More ominously, in February 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev signalled that he ran the risk of being overthrown by a coup if the West were to insist that the eastern part of Germany, the still-existing German Democratic Republic, be included within NATO as a result of eventual German reunification. These fears were taken seriously: statements by this author downplaying the issue were criticized in Paris at the time.[1]

Yet, it was inconceivable that a united Germany be divided in two in terms of its security regime or divorced from its Atlantic allies. Deadlock loomed. The U.S. administration was determined to disregard this threat of political turmoil in Moscow for lack of an acceptable alternative. *However, what would presumably have been a reckless course of action by the U.S. was never put to the test. In early March 1991, President Mitterrand, after closely held consultations with Chancellor Kohl and President Bush, put forward a more detailed version of the "European Confederation." This was to be in effect a strengthened version of the Bush-compatible CSCE framework, with full U.S. participation. In what was hailed as a daring move, Mitterrand also posited that Western forces continue to be stationed in Germany (this was later given sustenance by the transfer of NATO command assets to "Live Oak," a* little-known but significant military organisation tasked during the Cold War decades with the defence of West Berlin by Britain, France, and the United States). *A* united Germany would also continue to be a signatory of the Atlantic Alliance's 1949 Washington Treaty *since the Egmont Treaty meant the dissolution of NATO (and its Warsaw treaty equivalent), but not the "un-signing" of the residual Atlantic Treaty. Despite his initial doubts as to the viability of this CSCE-centric scheme, President Bush was relieved not to have to press with the alternative all-NATO Germany, with its attendant risks.*

The French president suggested that this U.S.-friendly European Confederation be located in Prague. *In the summer of 1990, Bush, Gorbachev,*

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Kohl, Mitterrand, and UK PM Margaret Thatcher hammered out the key features of what were to become the September 1990 Egmont and "4+1" treaties. By November 1990, an ambitious Paris Charter was adopted by the members of the CSCE, *rebranded as the European Confederation,* naturally including both the U.S. and the USSR. On 13–14 June 1991, the new European Confederation held its first formal meeting in Prague, involving an unusual mix of high-level officials, intellectuals, and artists drawn from civil society, with Czech President Václav Havel as a benign host and role model. *In the presence of a beaming President Bush, Havel hailed the new European security architecture as fulfilling the promise of the Mainz speech*.

In the second half of the 1990s, Western military forces *in the form of an ad hoc U.S.-led military coalition* intervened belatedly but decisively in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999). *What had worked in the Gulf War of 1991 could work in the Balkans,* although it wasn't until the 9/11 attacks against the U.S. that an American Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, was to coin the expression "the mission determines the coalition."

By 2004, the EU had for its part extended to the Narva and the Bug. Moscow did not then see the EU as a threat. European Commission President Jacques Delors' fears that the EU's broadening would come at the expense of its deepening did not impede the enlargement process, encompassing Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia by 2008. However, the EU did not go further. Ukraine, the Western Balkans, Georgia, and Armenia did not join the EU at the time, not least because of the intrinsic difficulties of the task and the lack of political appetite among the incumbent membership. Russian pushback played a substantial role from 2009 onwards, notably vis-à-vis Georgia and Ukraine. In 2019, things are pretty much where they were a decade earlier in terms of EU enlargement.

Things turned increasingly sour with Russia in the new millennium. After its egregious failure in the first Chechen War, and its failure to prevent Western military operations in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, a dysfunctional and impoverished Russia saw itself as a humiliated power. A dynamic new leader, Putin, after having recovered Chechnya and rebuilt the Russian economy with considerable help from rapidly rising energy prices, did not take kindly to President George W. Bush's unilateral decision to opt out of the ABM treaty, a hallmark of superpower status, or the invasion

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of Iraq. He built up an increasingly vocal revanchist discourse, blaming the West for Russia's impotence under Boris Yeltsin. At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, he rolled out his vision and his narrative (6), which he has been sharpening ever since. In 2014, political turmoil in Ukraine offered Moscow the opportunity to annex Crimea: a revisionist Russia with newly modernised armed forces was on the move. The issue of the defence of the Baltic States and Poland became a major concern: these countries were devoid of any Western troop deployments. The West answered through an "Extended Force Deployment" of U.S., British, French, and other members of the *ad hoc coalition of Western forces coordinated by "Live Oak" command-and-control assets*. Russia was put on notice that it would have to kill the soldiers of nuclear-armed powers and sundry others if it were tempted by a coup-de-main, or worse, against its immediate neighbours. Here ends the scenario.

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Scenario Analysis

Timing is everything. In early March 1991, at the very time the scenario posits Mitterrand's decisive move for a U.S.-inclusive European Confederation, he was in fact embroiled in a second-order dispute with Kohl after the latter had made inflammatory remarks about the Oder-Neisse line.[2] Prior to that, Mitterrand was still acting as if he could slow down German reunification, creating a climate that would have precluded early consultations with Kohl and Bush (this negative episode ceased later in March 1991 when Mitterrand and Kohl worked together to launch the process leading to the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992). The French president was therefore not ready to reposition his "Europe-only" Confederation into a broader CSCE, Euro-Atlantic context.

The fears of a coup expressed by Gorbachev in early 1990 dissipated fairly rapidly, and the U.S. and West Germany were ready to push the one-Germany-in-NATO option without fear of reactions in the USSR. These came much later, with the August 1991 failed coup attempt in the USSR. Bush's embrace of CSCE had always been tenuous. So the scenario's window of opportunity, if it ever existed, had closed by April 1990.

The virtue of the scenario lies not only in its compatibility with the Mainz speech but also in its minimal-change nature. It could have happened with a few nudges. With all other things remaining equal (Soviet collapse, EU enlargement, Yeltsin-Putin governance in Russia, Western engagement in the Balkans, Clinton-George W. Bush in the U.S., etc.), the absence of NATO (and therefore the absence of its enlargement) in this scenario does not prevent Russia's evolution towards revanchism and revisionism.

Notwithstanding George Kennan's warning that NATO's expansion would lead Russia to create a stab-in-the-back-legend, the material available in the scenario does not produce a security situation very different from the one we have in 2019. The current revanchist Russian discourse includes, but does not require the expansion of NATO. If NATO had been dissolved in the early 1990s, the beneficial effects in terms of Western-Russian relations of that act would have eventually dissipated, with the whole affair being taken for granted and thereby forgotten. Russian resentment would have built up in the absence of a forgotten alliance system. Furthermore, the dissolution of the alliance system, which could have occurred in our scenario, would not have been the product of an isolationist and retreating United States, but on the contrary, something resembling hubris on the part of a dynamic America enjoying its unipolar moment and fully confident of its ability to handle a prostrate Russia. Post-Cold War America believed it could afford to no longer treat Russia as a superpower even in the nuclear arena when it left the ABM treaty. It intervened decisively in the Balkans wars, but it did so at a moment of its own choosing, and with little regard for Russia's regional agenda. The U.S. asserted the "responsibility to protect" against Russia's Westphalian vision of state sovereignty and supported "colour revolutions" inimical to Russia's sphere of influence conceptions. It invaded Iraq without a UN Security Council mandate. For the revanchist leader of a revisionist power, there was more than enough with which to work.

Beyond the Legacy

The Mainz speech was part and parcel of the remarkable statecraft that led to a peaceful end of the Cold War, helped make the collapse of the Soviet

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Union a manageable process, and opened the way to more than a decade of U.S. strategic preponderance, Western-defined economic globalisation, and the hegemony (in Gramsci's sense of the "h" word) of liberal values as they had been recast under Reagan and Thatcher. America's Iraq misadventure, the great financial crisis, the rise of China, and the return of Russia later created the conditions for a very different dispensation. The world is definitely not unipolar, globalisation is no longer Western-centric, and liberalism, however defined, is on the defensive. Russia's malign activities and the rapid build-up of China's influence feed on the auto-immune disease of political and societal division within our democracies, notably in the U.S. and Europe.

The poison of distrust is spreading, not least within middle classes, who see themselves as threatened by *déclassement*, despising, on the one hand, the privileged globe-trotting elites deemed to be both supremely greedy and incompetent while resenting, on the other hand, the wretched of the earth fleeing war and poverty, and clamouring for attention, money and jobs. Instead of a democratic and liberal environment, the gap is widening between the *précariat* of those who consider themselves the losers of the disruptions of the information age, and its perceived winners. Ready audiences are found by those promising a return to a mythical golden age, offering social stability and economic security at the expense of political freedom, lacing the combination with a heavy dose of identity politics, light years away from the spirit of the Mainz speech.

The miracle here is that overall, Europe still remains whole and free, and the transatlantic security order still operates. But the vision and the values prevailing in 1989 and in the following years are now in jeopardy. An alliance that has always viewed itself not only as a sum of interests but also as embodying shared values, is now in great danger.

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Michael Haltzel

U.S. Congressional Engagement with Central and Eastern Europe since 1991: Ending the Balkan Wars and Pursuing NATO Enlargement

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While the impetus for American involvement in making possible a Europe whole and at peace came from President George H.W. Bush, implementation of the policy had to come from the legislative branch of government, the U.S. Congress. And, in fact, U.S. congressional action on NATO enlargement and ending the Balkan wars did create the necessary preconditions for a "Europe whole and free." The story of these processes will be sprinkled with a few personal reminiscences of my time as Democratic staff director

for Europe on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and senior policy advisor to Vice President, then-Senator, Joseph R. Biden and will conclude with an analysis of lessons learned.

Along with the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., 1991 also saw the first Gulf War and the beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia amidst bloody warfare in Bosnia and Croatia. The leaders on the Bosnia issue in the U.S. Congress were Senator Biden and Senator Bob Dole, who travelled to the war zone early in the conflict. Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain also played important roles. The Clinton administration complied with the UN arms embargo on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, a measure which severely disadvantaged the principal aggrieved party, the Bosnian Muslims, because the Bosnian Serbs inherited most of the weaponry of the old Yugoslav National Army (JNA), and the Croatian army smuggled arms across its border to the Bosnian Croats.

Twice Congress passed resolutions to "lift and strike"—i.e., lift the embargo and strike by air against Bosnian Serb forces—but President Clinton, not wishing to antagonise NATO allies, vetoed the legislation. Biden and Dole continued to press for ways to ease the pressure on the poorly armed Bosnian government forces. In October 1994, as part of the 1995 Defense Authorization Act, the Congress limited U.S. participation in *Operation Sharp Guard*, a joint NATO-WEU naval force in the Adriatic charged with preventing arms smuggling. The Clinton Administration began turning a blind eye to clandestine Iranian arms deliveries to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH) via air through Croatia.

July 1995 brought the mass murder in Srebrenica of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys, directed by Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladić, who after the war went into hiding and was not captured for 16 years. In November 2017, he was sentenced to life in prison by The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). At the end of August 1995, the Bosnian Serbs mortared the Sarajevo Market for the second time, killing more than three dozen civilians. That was the last straw for the Clinton administration. Led by the U.S., NATO launched an air campaign that helped the ABiH recapture large sections of the country. By November, both sides had had enough and agreed to peace negotiations. The result was the Dayton Accords, an imperfect solution, which although

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far preferable to the earlier carnage, nonetheless created dysfunctional institutions that continue to hamper the democratic development of Bosnia and Herzegovina to this day.

Shortly after Dayton, Congress authorised funding for the Implementation Force (IFOR). The Republicans would only agree to a one-year authorisation, but one year later after no casualties to U.S. peacekeepers had occurred, Congress agreed to fund a longer-term, UN-sanctioned Stabilisation Force (SFOR).

Attention in the former Yugoslavia shifted to Kosovo, a Serbian province whose autonomy had been revoked by Slobodan Milošević in 1989 and whose ethnic Albanians, comprising more than 90% of the population, were suffering under apartheid-like conditions. Unfortunately, Kosovo had been left off of the Dayton agenda.

Led by the French-educated intellectual Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovar Albanians maintained disciplined, passive resistance for nearly a decade. In 1998, radical elements began attacking the Serbian military, prompting ruthless reprisals including the killing of women and children. An especially gruesome massacre of Kosovar Albanian farmers near the village of Račak in January 1999 pushed the situation to the point of no return. In March after further international diplomatic efforts failed, Senator Biden introduced a resolution authorising President Clinton to conduct bombing and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Senate passed the resolution by a vote of 58–41, with 15 Republicans joining 43 of the 45 Democrats. The House of Representatives failed four times to pass the authorisation, even after the air campaign had begun.

The NATO bombing got off to a shaky start but by late spring, as coordination with Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ground units improved, it began to take a serious toll on the Serbian forces. Behind the scenes, Biden was urging President Clinton to deploy, or at least make a credible threat to deploy, U.S. ground forces in the war. Clinton's speech at the Air Force Academy at the beginning of June 1999 did call for additional aircraft and several thousand troops as peacekeepers after hostilities ended, which—not coincidentally—occurred only a week later. It was an "ugly" victory for NATO, but a victory nonetheless.

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After years of fruitless, internationally brokered negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008. Although Kosovo has been recognized by more than 100 countries, its government still faces enormous challenges, with Serbia maintaining effective control of the northern part of the country and economic conditions still precarious. Nonetheless, if one compares the unsettled situations in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina today with 1991—not to mention with later wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—one must rate the U.S. Balkan policy a major success.

NATO enlargement was even more strikingly successful. Its initial impetus came from Lech Wałesa in Poland and Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia. The first substantial U.S. support for enlargement was contained in Newt Gingrich's Contract with America in 1994. President Clinton quickly followed suit, but widespread scepticism about, and opposition to, the idea remained.

A majority in Congress believed that the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe should be given the chance to show that they were serious about joining the alliance. The NATO Participation Act of 1994 declared that "full and active participants in the Partnership for Peace in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of such Treaty at an early date." The Visegrad Four—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia—were designated for assistance.

In the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, Congress called for the prompt admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia to NATO. Slovakia was dropped from the list because its semi-authoritarian government under Vladimir Mečiar was failing to meet the democratic criteria outlined in the 1994 legislation. The law further declared that "in order to promote economic stability and security in Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine ... the process of enlarging NATO ... should not be limited to consideration of admitting [the designated four] as full members of the NATO Alliance."

In March 1997, Biden and I made a fact-finding trip to the four leading candidate countries, beginning, however, in Russia. The Kremlin had voiced

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strong opposition to NATO's admitting former members of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow obviously could not exercise a veto over NATO membership, but its opposition and possible reaction to enlargement was a legitimate consideration in U.S. senators' decision on the issue. Arriving in Moscow just a few days after a now nearly forgotten U.S.-Russia summit in Helsinki, we were told that President Boris Yeltsin was "indisposed" in his suburban dacha. We were able to meet, however, with most of the other leading Russian political figures, including the charismatic nationalist party head General Alexander Lebed, communist party chief Gennady Zyuganov, and liberal Yabloko party leader Grigory Yavlinsky. Especially important was a lengthy evening meeting in the Kremlin with Yeltsin's national security council.

As Biden subsequently wrote, "... no Russian politician with whom I met believed that NATO enlargement posed a security threat to Russia. Rather, their opposition to enlargement reflected a deeper psychological problem of coming to grips with the loss of empire and a fear of Moscow's being marginalized in the changed world of the 21st century." None of the Russian leaders was happy about the prospect of enlargement, but no one exhibited the kind of paranoia on the subject that has characterized the Putin era. In the national security meeting in the Kremlin, we even discussed eventual Russian membership in NATO.

This mature, unthreatened attitude did not suddenly materialise out of the blue, for Washington had taken important measures to help Russia over the previous several years. As former Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar acknowledged, without hundreds of millions of dollars of emergency American agricultural assistance, Russia might not have been able to avert famine in the winter of 1991–1992. Moreover, at the time of our Moscow visit, our interlocutors knew that the U.S. Senate was nearing final consideration of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Flank Document, which would allow Russia to augment its forces on its northwestern frontier and in the Caucasus. Seven weeks after our Moscow visit, the U.S. Senate ratified the Flank Document by a 100-0 vote. It is worth noting that the Senate's ratification occurred *after* the first Chechen War and was an obvious conciliatory gesture to bolster Yeltsin's fragile democratic government.

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All this gives the lie to Putin's revisionist history, introduced in a speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, claiming unremitting U.S. hostility toward post-communist Russia. Similarly, except for verbal chit-chat, Putin's assertion that in 1990 the United States promised not to enlarge NATO, although still accepted by a few academics, has been refuted by the leading Soviet participants in the negotiations, President Mikhail Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

But back to Biden's March 1997 fact-finding trip. After Moscow, we flew to Poland. In a speech at Warsaw University, Biden declared that there were only two things that would impel him to oppose NATO membership for Poland: a reversal of the just-instituted civilian control of the military or continued manifestations of anti-Semitism. Although Biden verbally clashed with one or two parliamentarians—in particular, the ex-communist opportunist Longin Pastusiak—he was impressed with Polish politicians' near-unanimous desire for NATO membership.

In the Czech Republic, public opinion was running against alliance membership. In his office in Prague's Hradčany Castle, President Havel, a former imprisoned dissident, opined that the communists had "brainwashed" his country's people against NATO. Hence, he had decided to conduct a public education campaign to explain the real nature of the alliance. The next day in Budapest when Prime Minister Gyula Horn, the last communist foreign minister of Hungary, declared "we need to do a public education campaign" to convince the people of the benefits of NATO membership, Biden and I could barely contain our amusement.

Because of its Yugoslav non-aligned heritage, wealthy and successful Slovenia was showing even less public support for NATO membership than the Czech Republic or Hungary. It would take the assassination in March 2003 of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić to convince the majority of Slovenes that in their rough neighbourhood they could benefit from being part of a strong alliance.

A week after our return, Biden told me he was convinced that NATO enlargement could work and was in the U.S. national interest. He asked me to work with my Republican counterpart to organise exhaustive hearings on the subject.

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Events in the alliance continued to move forward. At the Madrid NATO Summit in July 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to enter accession negotiations. Further, the statement of heads of state and government reaffirmed that "NATO remains open to new members under Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Alliance will continue to welcome new members in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area." Romania and Slovenia were singled out for special mention.

After the three candidate countries successfully completed accession negotiations with NATO, each of the current 16 members had to ratify the candidates' joining the alliance. In nearly every member this was a relatively uncontroversial process, with approval swiftly following a brief parliamentary debate. Not so, however, in the United States.

Legislatively, U.S. approval of NATO enlargement is in the form of an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which the legislation was referred, held a dozen hearings (several occurred before Madrid and the amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty was introduced), including an inspiring "open microphone" opportunity for informed citizens. The Armed Services Committee also held several hearings.

A few books written hastily after the event have argued that the ratification of NATO enlargement was inevitable, largely because of the lobbying of Polish-American and other ethnic groups. This erroneous assertion betrays a surprising unfamiliarity with the Senate. Lobbying, including some *against* enlargement, undoubtedly did play a role in the outcome. It was a proper activity of American citizens exercising their First Amendment right to petition. Art. II, Sect. 2 of the U.S. Constitution gives the Senate the power to ratify treaties by a two-thirds vote of those present. Despite the 80-19 margin in the final passage of ratification, the decision could have gone either way. Support among Republicans was fairly solid, but on the Democratic side it was more tenuous. With only about a dozen votes to spare, Biden personally moved several party colleagues into the "yes" column, even buttonholing one or two of them while working out in the Senate gym.

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In an unprecedented bipartisan gesture, the majority Republicans asked Biden to be floor manager of the bill. The wide-ranging, substantive discussion, unlike most congressional floor proceedings, was largely spontaneous. It was the Senate at its best. Three questions were paramount: the effect of enlargement on U.S. relations with Russia; the cost of enlargement to U.S. taxpayers (it proved to be trivial); and the defensibility of the three candidate countries. The seven days of debate constituted far more formal discussion than in the parliaments of the other 15 NATO members combined. One issue handled exclusively in top secret briefings was the potential for security breaches by Polish, Czech, or Hungarian intelligence officers with longstanding ties to Russia dating from the communist era.

Final passage of the NATO enlargement amendment occurred on the evening of 30 April 1998. The galleries were packed with members of the diplomatic corps, journalists, and citizens who had waited hours to get in. C-SPAN reported an average of more than 20 million viewers for the final days of debate, which were also televised in Poland. In a dramatic roll-call Senators rose individually from their chairs to cast their votes.

Ratification of the next round of NATO enlargement in 2003–2004 was more routine. Unlike 1998, there was no suspense about whether or not it would succeed. The real drama was whether it would contain five countries or seven. After some initial hesitation, led by Washington the alliance was certain to invite Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Romania and Bulgaria were on the cusp. Despite a last-minute flap about illicit Bulgarian weapons exports, the alliance extended invitations to all seven countries in November 2002 at the NATO Summit in Prague. Debate on ratification in the U.S. Senate was uneventful, with final passage occurring in a 96-0 vote on 8 May 2003.

Since then Albania, Croatia, and Montenegro have joined the alliance. Macedonia was vetoed at the 2008 Bucharest NATO Summit because of the name dispute with Greece, which was finally settled by the June 2018 Prespa agreement, ratification by the two parliaments, and the official renaming to North Macedonia in February 2019. North Macedonia appears likely to join the alliance within a year. Before Bosnia and Herzegovina can become a serious candidate, it must resolve its bitter internal problems. Two

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countries certain to be admitted should they apply for NATO membership are Finland and Sweden, but for now they are content with extremely close partnership ties with the alliance, supplemented by bilateral military arrangements with the United States.

The current situation in East Central Europe features a populist backlash and democratic backsliding in Hungary, Poland, and elsewhere. Dismaying though these phenomena are, a longer view casts 2019 in more favourable light than the stifling pre-1991 Soviet atmosphere. As a result of NATO enlargement, well over 100 million additional Europeans now can freely exercise the right to elect their government. Moreover, the negative developments are still potentially reversible, as in Poland where civil society remains vibrant.

Some unanticipated events that contributed to today's democratic backsliding were probably impossible to control. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 hit most new democracies hard, and the explosion of social media provided both a new platform for populist discontent and a vehicle for Russia to undermine the democratic order in the West.

The ongoing failure to enforce an equitable EU-wide quota for refugees has exacerbated insecurities and created ill will. Liberals have often made matters worse by deriding healthy manifestations of patriotism as primitive nationalism, thereby lending credence to crude and fallacious stereotypes of "cosmopolitan" globalist cabals. Patronising behaviour undoubtedly irritated already bruised Eastern European egos, especially since the Western "tutors" were displaying glaring democratic and economic deficiencies of their own. Moreover, Western assistance in reforming administrative and judicial systems should have concentrated more on preventing the corruption that perverted privatisation and turned the public cynical about democracy and capitalism.

To deliver on its "Europe whole and free" promise, the West must, above all, redouble efforts to remedy its own flaws. In the United States, that begins by electing a president who abides by democratic norms and genuinely supports NATO. In the EU, it means taking resolute disciplinary action against members that breach core values and defy EU directives. Without clear role models, young, post-communist democracies cannot be expected to ignore ethno-nationalism's siren song. Guarantees

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of personal freedom must be built into the framework of the nation-state, in which people can take pride. Finally, Europe, with America's help, must strengthen its defences against an aggressive Russia by bolstering NATO's military deterrence and enhancing societal resilience.

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Dov S. Zakheim

Europe Whole and Free: What Three Decades Have Wrought

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Thirty years ago, in a major address to the citizens of Mainz, Germany, on 31 May 1989, President George H.W. Bush outlined his vision of a "Europe whole and free." Today, it is arguable that Europe is neither entirely whole nor fully free. Indeed, in some respects, Europe is less whole and less free than it was in the first decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Moreover, it appears to be trending even further away from both wholeness and freedom.

When Bush gave his famous address, Eastern Europe had yet fully to break away from Soviet domination, and the Soviet Union was not yet in the throes of its own death rattle. Just four weeks before Bush spoke in Mainz, the first crack in what Winston Churchill had labelled the Iron Curtain was the opening of the border crossing between Austria and Hungary, two states that had once formed the core of an empire. Within months, the crack became a gaping hole; the Berlin Wall crumbled in November and freedom of movement between East and West became a

reality for the people of the Soviet Union's satellite states. For the first time since the end of World War II, Germany was once again a unified state and Europe's economic fulcrum.

For a time, it did indeed seem that liberal democracy and free enterprise would become the pillars of what Bush, in an address to Congress on 11 September 1990, labelled a "new world order." In that speech, he spoke of "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."

Bush presupposed that American power would underpin this new order; indeed, there appeared to be no limits to American power. Even as the Soviet Union was collapsing, the U.S. organised, led, and made by far the largest military contribution to a powerful coalition that included British, French and Arab forces, which mobilised in Saudi Arabia in response to Iraq's conquest of the small oil-rich state of Kuwait and scored a smashing victory over Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.

America played a decisive role in bringing the Balkan Wars of the early 1990s to a relatively stable conclusion. After much hesitation, Washington intervened militarily in Bosnia, negotiated the Dayton Accords that brought that war to an end, provided forces for what came to be known as the Stabilisation Force for Bosnia, bombed Serbia into stopping ethnic cleansing and paved the way for Kosovo's secession. America was now widely recognised as the world's only superpower.

Beginning at about the same time as operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* were underway in the Middle East, Western and especially American economists undertook to help transform the newly liberated former Warsaw Pact states, including Russia and several of its former constituent republics, into free-market economies. They met with some success in Central Europe and the Baltic states. They were less successful in Southeast Europe, where corruption quickly became rampant.

Russia's economy likewise proved far more resistant to change. The reformers who initially surrounded Boris Yeltsin soon lost control of the economy, as a class that came to be known as oligarchs were able to acquire state-owned enterprises for a song while the vast majority of the population suffered from economic dislocation and privation. By the time

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Yeltsin left the scene in 1999, Russia was an economic basket case with a bitterly resentful population that turned to a new strongman, former KGB agent Vladimir Putin, for its salvation.

Though both NATO and the EU virtually doubled their membership in the ensuing three decades, American triumphalism, which marked its policies especially toward Russia throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century proved to be premature. Both NATO and the EU found themselves challenged as much internally as they were externally by what could only be termed a revanchist Moscow. Some of the former Eastern Bloc states that now were members of NATO and the European Union began to follow the emerging Russian political and economic model rather than that articulated in Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, which called for "strengthening … free institutions." Capitalism evolved into cronyism, freedom into "guided democracy." The trends pointed in the wrong direction. They still do and they must be reversed.

Aftermath of the Cold War

The political upheavals in Europe during 1989 and 1990, in contrast to those in Central Asia, as well as the Caucasus (with the notable exception of Georgia), were led by individuals who were both democrats and nationalists. They resented Soviet domination and communist rule, both because foreign domination smothered their sense of nationhood and communist rule stifled their freedom to congregate, to assemble, speak out and publish freely, and to worship as they chose. On the other hand, those who led the Central Asian states that broke from the USSR tended to be former Soviet *apparatchiks* interested in acquiring even more power and wealth.

There initially were two exceptions to the democrats who rose to power in the wake of the Central European independence movements: Slobodan Milošević of Serbia and Alexander Lukashenka of Belarus. Milošević was the central actor in the wars of Southeastern Europe during the 1990s. He was finally removed from the scene in 2001 after having resigned the presidency of the rump Yugoslav state the year before. Lukashenka's

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authoritarian impulses were no more restrained than those of his central Asian counterparts; beginning in 1994, he has led a state that has increasingly become his personal fiefdom.

Apart from Lukashenka and Milošević, however, national leaders from both the conservative and liberal ends of the political spectrum, ranging from Poland's Lech Wałęsa and Hungary's Victor Orbán (whose studies at Oxford were funded by the Soros Foundation, against which he has since turned) on the moderate right to Czechoslovakia's Václav Havel on the moderate left, were all committed to the values outlined in the European Union's Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was ratified in December 1990. Indeed, all the leaders of Europe's former Warsaw Pact allies as well as of the Baltic states sought their countries' membership not only in the EU but also in NATO, whose charter in Article 2 called for the same rights and freedoms as were later articulated by the EU.

During the quarter-century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe not only looked inward to expand and deepen the EU but in the absence of a perceived threat from the East, NATO members looked outward beyond NATO's traditional boundaries. While NATO's operations in the Balkans were tangential to its boundaries, its invocation of Article 5 when the World Trade Center was attacked and the alliance's subsequent participation in the Afghan war, known as *Operation Enduring Freedom*, brought it well beyond its traditional area of operations. So too did its involvement in the 2011 attack on Libya, dubbed *Operation Unified Protector*, which led to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, the country's long-time dictator.

At the same time, as they were participating in NATO operations, however, the overwhelming majority of NATO states were reducing their defence spending. Germany was most notable in this regard. Once the bulwark of NATO's continental defence against a Warsaw Pact attack, its defence budget dropped from 2.68% of GDP in 1990 to 1.18% of GDP in 2015. Most other NATO members, including the new entrants, did not do much better. Moreover, other long-time NATO allies performed just as poorly. During the same period, Turkish defence spending dropped from 3.53% of GDP to 1.85%; Italy's from 2.12% to 1.38%; Spain's from 2.29% to 1.27%. Defence spending by the two nuclear NATO European allies

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also declined. France dropped from 3.34% to 2.27%; the decline in British defence spending was even sharper, from 3.56% to 1.88%.

The sense of security that had prevailed during the 1990s, when Russia was weak, did not, however, dissipate in NATO Europe when Russia was resurgent in the following decade. NATO already had effectively ignored Moscow's creation of a puppet republic of Transnistria inside Moldova's borders during the 1990s. Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008, which resulted in its formal recognition of the breakaway enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, likewise failed to awaken NATO to the growing new reality along its eastern border. Instead, because the Russian military had performed poorly in the Georgian war, only defeating Tbilisi's forces because they were far weaker, NATO's European allies continued to consider Russia to be a second-class military power.

It was only when Russia seized Crimea in 2014, followed by the invasion of eastern Ukraine and Moscow's support of the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk enclaves, that NATO's European states finally committed themselves to spend 2% of GDP. President Donald Trump's heavy jawboning, including threats that the U.S. would leave NATO, also helped to elicit European promises of more defence spending.

Strains on European Defence Budgets

Nevertheless, other issues were convulsing Europe, making it less likely that NATO Europe would seriously increase its defence budget levels. As a result of the seemingly endless wars in both Afghanistan and Syria, hundreds of thousands of immigrants from those states began to flood Europe in 2010. At the same time, there was an upswing in the number of migrants from Africa, especially North Africa, to Southern Europe. Immigration continued to rise from 2013 onward, especially in light of the Libyan civil war, reaching what were widely perceived to be crisis levels.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's 2015 decision to open her country's doors to immigrants, especially those from the Middle East, resulted in Germany's absorption of about one million people. This, in turn, required Berlin to find the resources to house, feed, educate, and provide

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for the health of these people, most of whom required considerable time to assimilate into German society, which itself had a mixed record of welcoming them.

These financial burdens put a considerable strain on the German budget, which traditionally ran surpluses but faced the prospect of lower future tax revenues. Given the country's long-standing commitment to social services, defence spending was likely to be Berlin's bill payer, notwithstanding Trump's bullying. Indeed, in 2018, Germany actually spent less on defence, 1.13% of GDP, than it had three years earlier. While Germany faced perhaps the most serious consequences of the immigration crisis, other European states also confronted large-scale influxes of migrants. Greece and Italy in particular found themselves overwhelmed by refugees from both the Middle East and North Africa.

Impact of the Refugee Crisis

The refugee crisis tore at the fabric of the EU, which had promoted the free migration of persons within the borders of states belonging to the Schengen group. Sweden and Denmark announced restrictions on migrants. Among others, Austria, Slovenia, and Hungary—which had been first to tear down the barriers that demarcated the Iron Curtain—now built fences to restrict immigration. By then, however, hundreds of thousands of immigrants had entered Europe, creating strains on the budgets of many states, not only Germany's. For those EU states belonging to NATO as well—such as Hungary and Slovenia—the prospects for coming anywhere close to meeting the alliance's spending goals looked particularly grim.

More troubling still was the impact of the immigration crisis on the domestic politics of several NATO states. Hungary's increasingly authoritarian Viktor Orbán, who had been beating an ultra-nationalist drum for some time, exploited latent Hungarian xenophobia by seizing upon the immigration issue. So too did the leaders of Italy's Five Star Movement and the League (Lega), who rode the issue to power in 2018. Moreover, Orbán, the Five Star Movement, and the League's Matteo Salvini, who held the posts of deputy prime minister and interior minister from

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2018 to 2019, have radiated unusual warmth towards Russia and Putin, casting considerable doubt on their respective country's reliability in the event of a NATO confrontation with Moscow.

Italy and Hungary have not been alone in cosying up to Moscow. Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's willingness to acquire Russia's S-400 air defence system in defiance of NATO and especially the U.S. has represented a new first for the alliance. Moreover, Erdoğan has not hesitated to coordinate Turkey's interests with those of Russia and Iran—and to exclude Washington in the process of doing so—when seeking a resolution to the Syrian civil war. No less authoritarian than Orbán, Erdoğan seized upon a July 2016 military coup attempt to incarcerate thousands of journalists, civil servants, and military personnel, and to relaunch hostilities against the Kurdish PKK while undermining the legitimacy of the Kurdish-led People's Democratic Party (HDP). Erdoğan has also effectively declared war on the Syrian Kurds, arguing that they are merely henchmen of the outlawed PKK.

As if the pressure of immigration and the anti-democratic trends within NATO members were not enough, NATO now faces the challenge of the UK's decision to leave the EU (Brexit) and its implications for Britain's ability to maintain its already considerably diminished defence posture in the event it faces what are expected to be severe economic disruptions once it departs from the EU. Britain was able to devote 2% of its GDP to defence spending in 2018. Whether it can continue to do so in the aftermath of Brexit is highly uncertain.

Equally troubling for the alliance has been Italy's decision to sign up to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which it did on 23 March 2019. In becoming the first major European economic power to do so, Italy has significantly enhanced China's influence in Europe and simultaneously diminished that of the U.S. Other signs of weakening American influence include Germany's refusal to ban Huawei, China's mega-electronics and telecommunications firm, from its 5G network and to move ahead with the Nord Stream II project with Russia despite American entreaties on both issues.

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America's Self-Inflicted Wound

America's loss of influence is a self-inflicted wound. It is a result of President Donald Trump's clear distaste for both NATO and the EU, his coddling of autocrats, most notably Putin, his rejection of the Iran nuclear deal, and the chasms in the alliance and in transatlantic relations that are certain to emerge should he launch a tariff war with Europe—especially in the automotive realm—comparable to that which he has initiated with China. All of the foregoing developments bring Russia closer to an objective that successive leaders of the Soviet Union could never realize: the break-up of NATO and Europe's alienation from the U.S. To the extent that Washington continues to frustrate Europe, the prospects for European cohesion in the face of a clear threat from Putin's Russia will therefore continue to worsen.

Putin sees NATO as Washington's cat's paw, and it therefore should come as no surprise that the Chief of Russia's General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, openly declared in his annual lecture of the General Staff Academy on 3 March 2019 that the U.S. was Russia's "enemy." At the same time, however, precisely because Moscow perceives a growing chasm between Washington and its European allies, it has placed great emphasis on tightening its economic bonds with NATO members. It has done so extensively with Hungary, and more narrowly as a supplier of natural gas, especially to Germany, in both cases with the objective of increasing Europe's reliance upon Russia and its commensurate vulnerability to Moscow's political objectives.

Gerasimov has also made clear that Moscow's military strategy will exploit the emergence of cyber, space, and hypersonic technologies, as well as the employment of what has been termed "little green men," Russian soldiers without clearly identifiable uniforms operating outside the country's borders. These activities build upon the Soviet Union's classic use of fifth columnists and information warfare to disrupt NATO and the West. Indeed, Moscow has increasingly interfered in the domestic policies of NATO members, stoking hostility to immigrants, and, most notably, attempting to influence the Brexit referendum and the 2016 American presidential election.

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Russia is also ramping up its industrial base to support both its conventional and nuclear warfare capabilities. It has live-fire tested the vast majority of its conventional systems in the Syrian civil war. In addition, because it recognizes that it might not prevail in a longer conventional war, Moscow has emphasized both speed, and, as required, theatre nuclear weapons in order to obtain its objectives so as to confront the West with a *fait accompli*.

None of the foregoing bodes well for the prospect of realizing the dream of a Europe "whole and free" that President Bush articulated at the dawn of the post-Soviet era. Moreover, although NATO has faced many stresses and challenges throughout its existence, it is certainly arguable that the current situation is more ominous than previous debates over the multilateral nuclear force (MLF), Vietnam, the neutron bomb, the Mansfield amendments, or the 2003 *Operation Iraqi Freedom*, to name but a few. Those debates were not further complicated by a negative attitude to NATO on the part of the president of the United States, as are current transatlantic disputes.

Nevertheless, there remains a tremendous fund of American goodwill toward NATO, not only among the American public, as poll after poll has demonstrated, but also in the United States Congress. As in the late 1940s, when Senator Arthur Vandenberg led an otherwise hostile Republican party to support Democratic President Harry Truman's efforts to rebuild and defend post World War II Europe, the current Congress has been able to overcome the bitter partisanship that has otherwise infected its legislative activities. This bipartisanship was manifested most remarkably in the overwhelmingly enthusiastic response of both Republicans and Democrats to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's address on 3 April 2019 to a Joint Session of Congress on the occasion of the alliance's 70th anniversary.

The U.S. thus remains firmly committed to NATO even if its current leader is not. American presidents serve for no more than eight years; whenever Trump leaves the White House, bedrock American support for NATO, and for Europe, will still be in place. Active and supportive American leadership of the free world in general and NATO in particular will once again be restored. And the prospects for a Europe that is "whole and free" will brighten once again.

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CHAPTER TWO

INSTITUTIONS

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Thomas Wright

After a Europe Whole and Free

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When President George H.W. Bush spoke of a Europe "whole and free" in Mainz on 31 May 1989, it may have looked like a distant pipedream. Yet, by any reasonable metric it became a reality. Yes, it was incomplete. And yes, there were conflicts and the threat of war. But if you told someone in 1989 that 30 years later NATO would consist of 29 members and that Central and Eastern European states would be members of a more integrated European Union that had its own currency and survived the worst financial crisis since the 1930s, you would have been considered wildly optimistic at best.

Despite this success, Europe's story has not settled on a happy equilibrium of peace and prosperity. As is frequently the case in international politics, a solution to one problem sows the seeds of another. It is thus with modern Europe.

The enlargement and deepening integration of the EU created new fissures and vulnerabilities that led, in turn, to a new debate about the future of the European project. The Union will almost certainly survive—that much is clear from Brexit and the eurozone crisis—but the precise

form and orientation of the EU is in question. Over the past 30 years, European politics was dominated by the centre-left and centre-right—they disagreed about tax and spending but agreed on globalisation, the Union, and open societies. Now there is a heterogeneity of ideas that creates a real debate about the future of Europe.

On the other side of the Atlantic, many Americans are rethinking their view of the transatlantic relationship. For all of their differences, the Obama and Trump administrations both expressed concerns about America's role as the primary provider of security in Europe and both called upon European counties to do more for their own defence. This sentiment appears to have given rise to a smaller movement, led by President Donald Trump, that argues the U.S. should pull back from Europe if the burden-sharing concern is not satisfactorily addressed. Meanwhile, American conservatives are torn on the EU. Trumpists view it as a competitor and want to empower nationalists and populists in Europe. Traditional conservative internationalists continue to see it as a partner and a vital part of the alliance.

One should expect these differences and tensions to continue and deepen in the years to come. The question is what it means for Europe and the future of the alliance. That is the subject of this essay. The first part looks at changes in Europe, the second at changes in the U.S. view of Europe. The third argues that America's priority must be the maintenance of an open and classically liberal European order that bolsters an international order of free societies.

Europe Rethinks Europe

The European view of the EU has been transformed by various perceived policy failures over the past 10 years, particularly the 2009 eurozone crisis and the 2015 mass-migration crisis. Both crises weakened the European centre and empowered populists. This is not surprising. Citizens usually are most open to new ideas when the old ideas are perceived to have been discredited.

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The 2009 eurozone crisis exposed one of the fault lines in the EU—a one size fits all monetary policy in the absence of a common fiscal or financial policy created divergences that left smaller countries exposed and vulnerable in a time of crisis. Germany reacted by insisting that the liabilities of the banks, which were considerable, were the sole responsibility of their home country, even if other banks (particularly German banks) were partly culpable. Moreover, Germany insisted that the crisis was the result of a moral failing by the debtor nations rather than the inevitable consequence of the structure they had designed. The EU, through the European Central Bank, provided vital assistance to the affected nations but under strict conditionality that the International Monetary Fund considered too severe.

The outcome of the crisis was to reshape politics in Germany and in the debtor nations. German citizens became concerned that the rest of Europe was taking advantage of it. If Germany was not careful, it would be dragged down by the delinquent behaviour of the debtor nations. The German mainstream began to demand severe austerity and restrictions on economic policy while also rebuffing demands that they stimulate demand through increased investment that took advantage of historically low interest rates.

The debtor nations, and other sympathetic actors including the IMF, came to the view that the German position was self-serving (after all German banks had made many of the bad loans in the first place) and counterproductive. They began to push back, arguing in favour of the mutualisation of liabilities (so that a bank's bad debts were the responsibility of Europe as a whole), a eurozone-wide banking guarantee, and a more Keynesian approach to economics. The centrist parties that adopted this position in opposition found themselves having to yield to the German view once they were in power. The populists gained as a result but with the exception of Syriza in Greece, none won power during the crisis so they were never put to the test.

The end result of the eurozone crisis was to sow the seeds of mutual suspicion throughout the euro area about other Member States. In Germany, the right and the left became deeply fearful of French-led plans for further integration that they regarded as a way of trapping well-

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intentioned Germans into being responsible for the sins of others. In the debtor nations, voters worried that if a new crisis emerged they would have no ability to choose policies that might ease the suffering.

Both sides stopped short of advocating exits from the eurozone. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble considered it in 2015 during the second Greek crisis but was overruled by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who came under pressure from the French, Italians, and Americans. They feared that there was no such thing as a managed exit and it could lead to a second global financial crisis. The debtor nations believed that an exit would result in the immediate and dramatic depreciation of their new currency, which would, in turn, cause the collapse of the banking sector and wipe-out deposit holders, something no government could endure.

The emotions of the eurozone crisis would ease with time but it fundamentally changed the terms of the European debate. The EU was no longer seen as a one-way bet but as a relative sum game in which there were winners and losers between the Member States. It also entrenched a populist movement that positioned itself as the protector of national interests, whether that be as creditors (as in the case of Alternative für Deutschland in Germany) or debtors.

In parallel, the rise of the Brexit movement in the United Kingdom is inextricably linked with the eurozone crisis. Brexit was a fringe concept before the crisis but the perceived failure of the EU's most important project discredited the Union, particularly amongst conservatives. UKIP, which only garnered less than 3% of the vote prior to 2009, surged, putting pressure on the Conservative Party. The EU was now seen as a failing entity. The left was more supportive but it is very likely that elements of the hard left saw the EU has a nefarious force for austerity and the financial sector after the Greek crisis of 2015.

The second shoe to drop was the mass-migration and refugee crisis in 2015. By 2015, the Syrian civil war had raged for four years but the refugee flow began to increase significantly that year. Middle East nations began to tighten their borders and the worsening conflict in Libya ruled out that country as a viable destination. Europe tried to stop boats at sea and even stopped rescue missions in the hope of deterring migrants. In September 2015, the world was shocked by the death of a 3-year-old Syrian boy named

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Aylan Kurdi who washed up on a Turkish beach near Bodrum. A picture taken of his body, face down in the sand, shocked the world. The next day, Merkel gave a speech at Bern University promising to take in all Syrian refugees with the famous words "wir schaffen das" ("we can manage this"). Refugees took her at her word and soon they arrived in Germany at the rate of 10,000 a day.

Coming as it did after the eurozone crisis, the centre had already been weakened and populists were poised around Europe. A revanchist Russia was keen to exploit the problems. European institutions were unable to deal with the challenge. Refugees were free to move within the Schengen Zone, which applied to almost all of the continental EU (but significantly not the United Kingdom). The rules governing refugees were covered by the Dublin Agreement, which held that refugees were the responsibility of the EU state they first set foot in—an impossibility given the numbers and the size of the states on the front line. Germany tried to insist that all countries share the burden but found Eastern European leaders quoting back to them the principle established during the eurozone crisis that these liabilities be nationalised. Efforts to introduce Qualified Majority Voting on this matter exacerbated the division—quotas were set but they were not abided by. Several Eastern and Central European countries publicly rebelled against Berlin, believing that Germany was trying to steamroll the wishes of small countries. The result was inertia. If refugees wanted to head to Germany, they would be Germany's responsibility.

The refugee crisis transformed the politics of Eastern and Central Europe, shifting the mainstream in a restrictionist direction deeply suspicious of German intentions and liberal values. It strengthened the position of Hungarian strongman Viktor Orbán and set the stage for the rise of other populists like Matteo Salvini in Italy. The German debate moved against Merkel and she was compelled to accommodate her critics over time. It provided a new rationale for AfD, which was originally established in response to the eurozone crisis. By 2019, the centre of gravity had moved toward a restrictionist position—even the centre-left in Denmark would take a tougher line on immigration to win power in the 2019 Danish general election.

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The net effect of these was to undermine the principles of European integration. In some countries—particularly Hungary—it weakened democracy itself. In all, it legitimised a nationalism that saw intra-EU politics as inherently competitive. This does not mean the EU is close to collapse. The nationalists and populists do not want exit—they now know how hard, indeed impossible, that is. But they do want to change the nature of the EU.

America Rethinks Europe

The United States was deeply involved in all aspects of European politics since World War II, including since the Cold War. The U.S. was instrumental in the enlargement of NATO and the European Union. It took the lead in dealing with the Balkan wars in the 1990s. The U.S. was even involved in the eurozone crisis, making a critical intervention in 2015 to dissuade Germany from forcing Greece out of the eurozone. However, despite this, the beginnings of a rethink first came to the fore during the Obama administration. The president was frustrated with Europe, believing it should do more to tend to and take care of its own interests. He criticized Europe directly on defence spending and strictly limited American involvement in the Libya intervention to create an incentive for France and the UK to do more. He remained committed to the transatlantic alliance but saw America's strategic future in the Asia-Pacific region.

Trump would radicalise this sentiment. He has a 30-year history of opposition to America's alliances and defining the national interest in narrow and mercantilist terms. Up until mid-2016, he had said nothing about the EU, although he was explicitly critical of NATO. However, after the Brexit referendum, he began to make common cause with the Eurosceptics, identifying with their underdog, come-from-behind victory. He met Nigel Farage in Mississippi in August of 2016, starting a seemingly genuine friendship that would influence his views on the EU. His choice of Stephen Bannon as campaign manager also had a role to play. After Trump's election victory, he began to talk about the EU as a competitor of the United States and enquired as to when it would collapse entirely. His views of the

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EU were wrapped up with his complicated hostility to Germany, which was in turn connected to his father (who was of German origin).

Trump has expressed various views of the EU throughout his presidency. He has veered between outright hostility and acceptance, usually depending on who he spoke to last. President Emmanuel Macron helped moderate his views somewhat. However, over time the trendline was clear—again and again, Trump comes back to the notion of the EU as a competitor to the U.S. He has embraced a hard Brexit, imposed tariffs on the EU, considered the nuclear option of tariffs on automobiles, and rebuffed the EU's overtures to work together on China, calling the EU "worse than China, only smaller." He has embraced Orbán and travelled to Poland and spoke of Western civilisation, making clear his preference for nationalists and populists.

Trump's ambassador to Germany, Ric Grennell, spoke out early in his tenure in support of the populists but pulled back following fierce criticism. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo criticized the EU in a major speech in Brussels in 2018 and Assistant Secretary of State for Europe Wess Mitchell said he saw European integration as a destabilising force as much as a stabilising one, prioritised Eastern Europe over Western Europe, and stopped talking about the erosion of democracy and the rule of law in Hungary. The administration strongly opposed EU proposals for strategic autonomy (PESCO). Nevertheless, the administration has never fully operationalised its Euroscepticism. The EU seemed to deter the U.S. from imposing auto tariffs and Commission President Jean Claude Juncker came to an improbably mutual understanding with Trump.

It is impossible to predict where U.S. policy toward Europe will go, but for the first time since World War II, one can imagine a U.S. approach that seeks to divide the EU, restrict transatlantic trade, and tolerate the erosion of democratic institutions. If a Democratic administration comes to power, it is possible that the matter of burden-sharing will continue to shape American views of Europe, and that the U.S. provision of security will be pared back, particularly when it comes to conflicts in non-NATO countries, whether it be Ukraine or in North Africa.

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What's Next?

The old rationale in the U.S. approach to Europe is undoubtedly fraying. Europe is changing and the U.S. is growing less interested. Simply recommitting to a Europe whole and free is not enough. It doesn't address what is happening in the Union and it is unlikely to be enough to keep America engaged. We need to place the transatlantic alliance in a broader context of what is new about our era.

We are witnessing the early stages of a clash of systems between free societies, on the one hand, and authoritarian systems, led by China, on the other. Each of these systems challenges the other not because of the strategic choices they make but because of what they are. The freedom of the press and information, social media, non-governmental organisations, and a truly open global economy threatens the stability of authoritarian regimes by increasing the likelihood of domestic unrest. On the other hand, China's tools of domestic repression—such as facial recognition powered by artificial intelligence—and its mercantilist economic model pose a real challenge to democratic societies. Even if both systems lacked hostile intent, each by being itself poses a problem for the other. Layered on top of this is emerging geopolitical competition with China in East Asia and with Russia in Europe.

The U.S. and Europe find themselves confronting this authoritarian system in multiple ways—Chinese and Russian money empowers illiberal forces in Europe, Chinese technological innovations raise questions about the integrity of allied infrastructure, Russian election interference undermines democracy itself, while Chinese mercantilism causes many to question the very principles of an open global economy.

The U.S. and Europe should move beyond universalist notions of a rules-based international order toward a commitment to uphold free societies. This would mean working together to address the challenges posed by the authoritarian model. It means an economic dialogue that goes well beyond the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to address the shortcomings of the global economic order (corporate tax avoidance, inequality, the failure to prepare adequately for automation) and the challenge posed by China (cyberespionage and cyberattacks, the

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use of state-owned enterprises, and technological competition). It means forging a common position on the rules, whether for cyber, AI, big data, or trade. It means working together to combat election interference and standing together for liberal values when they are threatened, in old ways or new.

An agenda to uphold and protect free societies will be challenging. Europeans may worry about becoming embroiled in America's competition with China. Americans may be frustrated with having to compromise where real differences exist, particularly with respect to technology and the global economy. But ultimately this rationale offers a way to deal with the challenges of the future that affect the lived experience of all American and European citizens.

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Sven Sakkov

30 Years Later

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The Europe of 2019 and the Europe of 1989 are from different planets. Not Venus and Mars—much further apart. When George H.W. Bush spoke to the people of Mainz, the Berlin Wall was standing and the Soviet Union existed. Soviet troops were at the Elbe and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were occupied. The Soviet Union possessed about 68,000 nuclear warheads. Both sides had nuclear landmines and nuclear artillery shells in their arsenals. The threat of nuclear annihilation was still hanging over Europe, even though the détente of the previous few years had taken some edge away from the standoff.

The past three decades between 1989 and 2019 have been a miracle. Central Europe was freed, Germany was reunited, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania restored their lost independence and rejoined Europe. The Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991. Russian troops left Germany and the Baltic states by late August 1994. The EU has expanded from 12 members to 28, NATO from 16 to 29. These twin expansions are probably the biggest positive geopolitical achievements of this generation. Half of a subcontinent has been added and consolidated into these two great clubs of democracies. Europe as a whole has never in its history been as peaceful and prosperous as in 2019.

Europe is, mostly, whole, free, and at peace. Why "mostly" is the subject of this short essay. Since it has been a miracle, everything I write below should be taken with a grain of salt. Compared to the Europe of 1989, any deficiency is meaningless. But it is in our human nature to strive for better, to aim higher, never to be content. And there are many things in Europe of 2019 with which we need not be content. We should never be content, in fact, until Europe is truly and fully whole, free, and at peace.

1989 was an *annus mirabilis* in Europe, as was 1991. We enjoy a Europe that is mostly free and mostly whole thanks to the tireless efforts of countless thoughtful individuals, Bush being prominent among them. The course of history was not predestined. In China, the protests at Tiananmen Square in 1989 led to a very different outcome.

This chapter has been written from an Estonian perspective. Many examples drawn are connected to the Baltic states, not because they are the only or the best examples, but rather because they are better known to the author. This essay is also tilted towards defence for a simple reason—Europe whole, free, and at peace is not our God-given right, but something that has been protected by the military might of the United States and NATO. Joseph Nye once compared security to oxygen—you don't notice it until you suffocate. Let's hope we will be able to notice the importance of security before it's too late.

Europe That Is Whole

What is Europe? Is it about boundaries that are physical, or those that are mental, cultural, or political? Who is the arbiter of what Europe is? Who decides which country belongs to Europe and which does not? Should we rely on the principle of national self-determination to identify what is Europe? If Georgians identify themselves as European, who are we to tell them otherwise? The mental map of Europe is not about geography, it is a map inside the heads of people. Ukrainians are still dying in trenches in Donbas because they believe in their European destiny. In contrast, most Russians do not consider Russia to be a European country, but rather a civilization in its own right, one that is neither European nor Asian.

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Europe will not be whole and free in its entirety as long as countries that identify themselves as European and want to come into the European fold are held back, not by their own level of preparedness or European deliberations but by outside powers holding them at ransom militarily. Georgia made steady progress towards NATO membership and was stopped in its tracks by the Russian military machine. Ukraine wanted a European destiny. In order to stop that, Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and is hindering Ukrainian progress via ongoing aggression in the eastern part of the country.

EU expansion and integration have stalled. The EU's high-water mark was probably 2004 when 10 new members were brought in and the constitutional treaty was signed. There was to be a constitution and an anthem. These dreams and high hopes were shot down by citizens in the Netherlands and France, who voted against the ratification of the treaty. Soon after that crisis was solved, Lehman Brothers collapsed. The global financial crisis was followed by the eurozone debt crises, followed by the mass-migration crises, followed by the Brexit referendum in 2016. The fate of the constitutional treaty demonstrated that European political elites had overreached. Financial crises damaged the reputation of European political classes significantly and the migration crisis gave rise to new populist forces. European integration has been treated as a bicycle ride—one needs to keep pedalling or risk falling over. Voters have clearly rejected that analogy and would rather dismount and enjoy the scenery.

The European Union has been an elite project. European populations in general have been far less enthusiastic about ever new heights of integration. The growth of social media as a primary channel of news has deprived the elites of their information dominance. Anyone can set up webpages that look like they belong to media organisations. Meticulous editorial policies of newspapers have been replaced by the speed of a click, like, share, and retweet. Populist forces have already reaped benefits from this new information landscape. “Europe that is whole” is a never-ending quest; it will never be completed and it can start unravelling any time.

The Brexit referendum was a magnitude 8.0 political earthquake. For the first time in the EU's history, the size of the Union is set to contract, not expand. Two days after the referendum, the German foreign minister

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hosted his colleagues from the six founding members of the EU. That was a worse signal to give to the other 21 member states—as if Brexit was not a crisis for the whole Union, as if what really matters was just the Europe of Charlemagne. That meeting awoke old divisions—what is Europe? Is it comprised of a Charlemagne core and layers of periphery?

There are numerous divisions inside our mental map of Europe—between East and West, North and South. More often than not these divisions are imaginary. But even imaginary division can lead to real-life cleavages. Words and perceptions matter, especially in diplomacy. Estonia is wealthier than Portugal or Greece. It is less corrupt than France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, or Greece. It ranks better in Freedom House's democracy index than Italy or France. It does better than the UK, France, Spain, Italy, or Germany in terms of press freedom. How does that correspond to a popular understanding of what Eastern Europe mean? It does not, because these political categorisations are not relevant anymore.

Milan Kundera once famously pointed out that Prague is 300 km to the west of Vienna, but is considered "East" while Vienna is "West." Unfortunately, old Cold War concepts die hard. Milan Kundera's work has not been completed. During the Middle Ages, four Estonian cities were members of the Hanseatic League. The first monument to Friedrich Schiller in the world was erected in Estonia. Estonia is a world leader in public e-services and e-governance. Yet, when major European and American media outlets write or talk about Estonia, they more often than not refer to it as a "former part of the Soviet Union" or a "former communist country," as if these were the defining characteristics of Estonia today. Of course, it should be noted, Estonia was not "part of" the Soviet Union, it was occupied by it. It was not a "communist country," it was occupied by one. Let's hope that in the future mental map of Europe these artificial divisions are gone, that countries are not identified through their former occupier or through the ideology that was imposed on them by force.

I hope a time will come when the terms Eastern Europe and Western Europe just mean geographical parts of Europe, not mental, notional or political separations. When Europe means a continent united by the EU and NATO, not separated into North and South or East and West. When

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countries that joined already 15 years ago are not referred to as "new member states."

The bonds that bind us are also physical—energy and transport infrastructure that unites our sub-continent. Europe will not be whole as long as Baltic electricity grids and railways are still connected to Russian networks and not European ones. And the European Union will not be whole and fair until all its members are treated equally under the Common Agricultural Policy.

There will always be limits to how whole Europe will be. There will be no European Army. There will not be one unified European history, but a plethora of sometimes competing national ones. This patchwork of differing identities, languages, histories and customs is Europe's strength, not its weakness. We should retain our strength, not weaken it.

Europe That Is Free

Since 1989, the borders of oppression and suppression in Europe have been pushed far and away—with some notable exceptions. Belarus is not a free and democratic nation, and change does not seem to be in the cards. There is ample ground to suspect that Russia will intervene militarily if it sees Belarus slipping away from its orbit and moving towards the West. Since no outside power besides Russia is willing to fight for Belarus, we can assume that the regime built up by Alexander Lukashenka will persist. And if Lukashenka falls, he will be replaced by someone with whom Moscow can live. That means an undemocratic leader.

Europe is not totally free as long as parts of it are occupied by the Russian Federation. Russia is occupying a sliver of the territory of Moldova (Transnistria), parts of Ukraine (Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk regions), and chunks of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Unfortunately, the march of democracy has been stopped by Russian tanks. Historically we can think back to 1848, or 1956, or 1968. Sometimes history does rhyme.

A relatively new phenomenon is the retreat of democracy and the rule of law in Poland and Hungary. It is a surprising development because Poland and Hungary were at the epicentre of the democratic wave of the

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late 1980s and early 1990s. This aberration will hopefully be corrected by the democratic process in these countries themselves. The EU is not well-equipped to deal with bad apples among its own members.

Another question far too broad to be addressed adequately here is whether European political processes are free from interference from abroad through social-media manipulation, fake news, and the like. Robert Mueller's investigation into Russian meddling in American elections has shed some light on the tradecraft of Russia's so-called "active measures." There have been some reports of foreign influence on the Brexit referendum. We can only imagine the political fallout if concrete proof would be found of Russian influence on the British referendum of 23 June 2016. There might be many other instances in other European countries that we do not know yet or do not know enough about. Driving a wedge between NATO allies, between EU Member States, between Europe and the United States is the essence, the bread and butter of Russian political warfare against the West. We do not fully comprehend how successful Moscow has been because we do not fully know the extent of its subversive activities.

Beyond the most important goal of its survival, the foreign policy goals of Putin's regime in Russia seems to be the desire to rupture the transatlantic bond between Europe and North America, push the U.S. out of Europe and replace it with itself as an outside balancer and arbiter of European destiny. And that leads us to the next question—whether Europe will be at peace?

Europe That Is at Peace

Europe whole, free, and at peace needs to be protected. The Russian Federation attacked Georgia in 2008 and commenced its ongoing military aggression against Ukraine in 2014. Russia interfered in the Syrian civil war in 2015 and has committed numerous war crimes during the past four years, interfered in the U.S. presidential elections in 2016, tried to foment a coup in Montenegro in 2016, and used a military nerve agent in Salisbury, UK, in 2018. Russia has become a rogue power and an unpredictable spoiler

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in word politics. Unfortunately, many European countries are treating this phenomenon as a minor nuisance, not a major menace. The thing with minor nuisances is that they do not come fully armed with nuclear weapons.

The vital transatlantic link between Europe and North America is currently under threat. It started with President Obama's pivot to Asia, which can be also be described as a pivot away from Europe. The Obama administration took a political back seat to NATO's 2011 effort in Syria and yanked the carpet from underneath the feet of its European allies by not following through on the president's promise to intervene in the Syrian civil war if chemical weapons were used. Obama had declared it a red line but when that line was crossed, he dithered. Since NATO's Article 5 is also a red line, this un-decision undermined NATO considerably.

The presidency of Donald Trump did not augur well for Europe and NATO. While running for office, Trump did not utter a single good word about NATO. At the same time, he was full of praise for Putin. Friends of Europe in Washington, DC, have advised us to look at deeds, not tweets. And the deeds have been reassuring. Funding for the European Deterrence Initiative has been increased, Russian sanctions expanded and Russian operatives involved in the efforts to interfere with the American political process indicted. It is not inside the remit of this essay to determine whether this has been achieved because or despite Trump, but it needs to be noted that tweets matter. Part of deterrence is based on clear and unequivocal red lines. There should be no ambiguity about the collective defence clause of NATO. President Trump has undermined that unambiguity repeatedly. Fortunately, support for NATO is very strong in Congress and among the American public. But, ultimately, when it comes to ordering the use of American military might, only one person matters—and that is the president of the United States.

New World Order and the Future of Europe

Post-World War II peace and prosperity in Europe has depended upon the liberal world order, which has been based on the Bretton Woods

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arrangements, American involvement in European security through NATO, and on European integration manifesting itself through the European Union.

For 70 years, this world order stood strong. Now, we see cracks emerging, mostly originating from the builder and keeper of the existing world order—the United States. We should not be complacent in taking U.S. involvement in Europe for granted. The United States might lose interest in European security for three mutually reinforcing reasons. First, because the American people are tired of "forever wars" in the Middle East and Central Asia. Second, because the U.S. has become self-reliant on oil and gas, thus diminishing the strategic importance of the Middle East and Europe as an ideal staging area for contingencies there. With the exception of Israel, the importance of the Middle East is in decline in Washington, DC, and with that the strategic importance of Europe. The third reason is a growing American obsession with managing the rise of China. Europe is of some, but not critical, importance in that task. Compared to the management of the rise of China, managing the decline of Russia is seen as an easy task. For Europe, especially its eastern part, Russia looms large. For the United States, the main effort is containing the rise of China.

Let's think back to the words of Bush: "a Europe that is free and at peace with itself." Robert Kagan writes in his latest book, *The Jungle Grows Back*, that there is nothing inevitable in the current liberal world order—it is based on the ability and interest of the United States to defend this order, if necessary with the force of arms. If the U.S. were to retreat from this role, writes Kagan, Europe might very well fall back to its historical wars within. The U.S. stayed on in Europe after WWII for two reasons—to deter the Soviet Union and to ensure that Europe was "at peace with itself." Even though not comparable to the Soviet Union, Russia is still a menace and it is of vital European interest to keep the U.S. engaged in European security affairs.

Even if Europe remains united and at peace, it faces a future of playing second fiddle to the American-Chinese great rivalry in artificial intelligence and other disruptive technologies of the future. The only conceivable way for Europe to be a player in that category is by joining its forces with the U.S., Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand,

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and other democracies in the world. Europe has, for the last half millennia, been a dominant power in the world, either by itself (as a collection of rival powers during most of these 500 years) or in alliance with the United States. With the rise of China and uncertainties surrounding transatlantic relations, Europe's dominant role in the world will probably fade. That process will be exacerbated by the demographic decline of Europe.

There are five tests for Europe to pass if it wants to remain a world player:

Will Europe stay united?

Will the United States stay in Europe?

Will Russia be contained?

Will China's rise be managed?

Will Europe stay in the game of new technological superiority?

The answers to these questions are far from certain. Even if Europe might become fully whole and free and stay as such, will it be the same Europe we have grown accustomed to during the last half millennium?

These are known unknowns. The known known is that Europe whole and free will never be completed. It is a living organism that requires care, nurturing, and protection. I am sure that Bush was proud of where Europe has travelled since his historic speech in Mainz. I suspect that he did not envisage the geographic extent of today's Europe whole and free. His vision has been fulfilled. But, as explained in this article, not fully.

Western Europe was rebuilt after 1945. Its eastern part rebuilt after 1989. Norte Dame will be rebuilt after 2019. There is still hope that Europe in the future will be truly and fully free, whole and at peace. Hope seldom materialises by itself—good people need to work and, if necessary, fight for it. This is our task for the next 30 years.

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Kurt Volker

NATO Enlargement: Still One of the Best Accomplishments of the 20th Century

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When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, NATO was comprised of 16 members. All were in Western Europe and North America, and all had benefited from decades of security, stability, and democratic political and economic development. People trapped behind the Iron Curtain in Central and Eastern Europe found their first opportunity in over 45 years to build democracy and secure their freedom for future generations.

Today, NATO has 29 members (soon to be 30) and in addition to North America and Western Europe, well over 100 million people in Central and Eastern Europe now live in freer, more prosperous, and more secure societies than at any point in history. This is a remarkable historical accomplishment that must not be underestimated.

The domestic democratic challenges faced in Central and Eastern Europe today are no different than those same challenges being faced

in Western Europe and the United States. They are not a result of NATO enlargement, but of other factors. Meanwhile, external threats mount, and over 60 million more people in Eastern Europe are still at risk and are still struggling to achieve the same degree of freedom and security as in the rest of Europe. The answer is not to question our accomplishments, but to extend them to these people in vulnerable societies as well.

It's about Humanity, after All ...

In the field of governance, the great achievement of humanity over millennia has been the establishment of governments where people choose their leaders, and leaders serve the people. This is vastly different from having powerful leaders who "rule" their subjects. Putting into practice the rule "by, for, and of the people" was first achieved at scale in the West, but the longing for governance based on human values is universal.

When the dust of World War II settled, people in Western Europe and North America, who had nurtured and protected this form of governance for decades, were able to build a system of collective security aimed at preserving these gains for future generations. That is why NATO was created: to provide collective defence of the West against external threats so that the West could preserve human freedom.

People in Central and Eastern Europe, who had also been part of Europe's long history and development, and who yearned for the same guarantees of freedom and security, were trapped under governments imposed by the Soviet Union.

They struggled to regain this freedom on their own—in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in the 1980s, and the Soviet Republic of Georgia in April 1989.

It was only in late 1989, however, after over 40 years of Soviet-imposed rule in Central Europe, when cracks in the Iron Curtain emerged, the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union lacked the will to impose its rule by force, and people in Central and Eastern Europe were again able to assert their demand for freedom and security.

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The Soviet Union collapsed two years later, in 1991, and people in territories that had been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union—particularly the Baltic states, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova—also sought to define and preserve their newly gained freedom.

That is the background to the enlargement of NATO: the 40-year success of NATO in the West, and the aspirations of newly free people in the East to make sure that their freedom would never be taken away again. There was a sudden, historic opportunity to ensure that the gains of humanity, which the West had long realized, would not now also be available to people in the East.

NATO did not agree to take in new members right away. Indeed, when Poland and others sought immediate membership in NATO, the alliance pushed back. It was hesitant to draw new lines in Europe, having just seen the Iron Curtain come down. NATO was insistent that newly free countries actually demonstrate democratic performance, market reform, civilian control over militaries, good-neighbourly relations, interoperability with NATO, and contributions to security in Europe as a whole.

It was not until 1999, 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that the first three new members of NATO assumed their full rights as allies. Further members only assumed their places later—in 2004, 2009, and 2017.

What Did NATO Enlargement Achieve?

NATO enlargement since 1989 has ensured that an additional 100 million people in Europe are now able to live in free, more prosperous, and secure societies. Before 1989, this was not the case. This is a tremendous advance for humanity, and a remarkable accomplishment at the end of the 20th century, which otherwise saw the greatest destruction of humanity in history.

The process by which NATO enlarged was useful. It insisted on reform first, with the promise of membership later if reform was achieved. This promise was mirrored by the European Union's own promise of openness to new European democracies as well. As a result, NATO enlargement provided a huge incentive for far-reaching reform in Central and Eastern

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Europe that benefited the citizens of those countries—achieving far more, and more quickly, than would have been done otherwise.

NATO enlargement also strengthened security in Europe as a whole. New members have benefited the "old NATO" by adding territory, populations, military capability, economic capacity, and a fresh commitment to core values of freedom and democracy when many in Western Europe took those for granted. Aspiring NATO members and new members have made major contributions to NATO operations—for example, in Afghanistan—which have had a significant multiplying effect on NATO's force-projection capability.

When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, questions were immediately raised as to whether NATO had now outlived its usefulness. Should NATO also be retired? But the determination of newly free countries to join NATO—as well as NATO's decision to engage in out-of-area crisis management, supported by new allies and partners—put to rest questions about NATO's obsolescence. Enlargement, alongside crisis management, helped give NATO a new lease on life.

So What Went Wrong?

Given the striking success of NATO enlargement, the question "what went wrong" is jarring. The short answer is: nothing. The United States, Western Europe, Central Europe, and even people in non-members such as Ukraine and Georgia are all better off today than they were before NATO enlarged. And the opposite—a NATO that never accepted new members—would have left all of these states in Central and Eastern Europe in a state of limbo. Indeed, through the addition of new members, the EU and NATO have helped build a stronger, more inclusive, and more resilient Europe, where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

Nonetheless, the question deserves serious examination. "What went wrong" is an oblique reference to concerns about the current trajectory of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland and Hungary). The assumption is that after 1989, these nations were avidly

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embracing democracy, but in the past few years, they are now undoing democratic institutions.

There are many problems with this assumption. First is that the challenges we are seeing in Central Europe are somehow a uniquely Central European phenomenon. The view is that if we had somehow done something differently over the past 20 years, since the first NATO accession, we would not face these challenges today. But the fact is that the trends affecting Central Europe are affecting Western Europe and the United States as well. This is not an issue of a poorly performing Central Europe, but rather an issue of public disenchantment with established politics and politicians at a time of great disruption caused by everything from globalisation to immigration to perceived threats to national identity.

A second problem with this proposition is that it assumes that policies being implemented by Central European leaders are inherently anti-democratic. That is not necessarily true. Again, it is a case of Western (and some Central European) elites looking at Central European populists as somehow different, when in fact the same populist political pressures are changing established Western democracies as well.

For the most part, established European elites have tended to favour a particular form of liberal democratic politics, which includes a high degree of multi-nationalism and multi-culturalism, secularism, social liberalism, and status quo politics. In Western and Central Europe alike, substantial and growing political parties are challenging this mindset and this set of policies. In Western Europe, this is seen as change taking place within democratic systems. In Central Europe, however, this same phenomenon is often cast as anti-democratic.

What we see in many Central, Eastern, and Western European societies alike is not a rejection of democracy, but a rebellion against these particular elite attitudes and policies, which many voters see as riding roughshod over national interests. They are using democratic systems to demand radical change, and to attempt to defend national identity, traditional social views, and economic and cultural protection. They harangue a liberal media, which they see as part of the liberal establishment, just as the liberal media criticizes these populist leaders and political parties.

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Above all, the touchstone issue has been immigration, where populist nationalists fear mass immigration as threatening everything from national identity to social welfare systems to the rule of law. They see established political elites as having failed to tackle this problem adequately.

When they can, these populist forces seek to use their acquisition of political power to replace entrenched elites from key positions, much as any other victor in a democratic election would seek to do. It is simply that their choices of policies and people are at odds with the establishment itself. This is not the tearing up of democracy, but voters making choices within democracy. We must respect the choices, even if we disagree with them, and not see that as equivalent to destroying democratic institutions.

The third problem with the "what went wrong" question is that it carries an inherent sense of finality. Political issues and politicians rise and fall. Today's darlings are tomorrow's outcasts. We are indeed going through a difficult phase in all of the West, including in Central and Eastern Europe. But our strong commitment to core values and the strength of our democratic institutions will outlast all the particular individuals and policies that cycle through. Indeed, we may even see the beginnings of that now, with new political movements or protests changing the landscape in Armenia, Moldova, Slovakia, Georgia, and Ukraine, as well as the discrediting of the far-right leader in Austria, and the strength of Green Parties in European Parliamentary elections.

What to Do Now?

If we think of the problem as described above—as populist and nationalist choices being made within European democracies rather than a Central European reversal of democracy—we can identify a number of policy steps for European and American leaders.

First, is the embrace of diversity in political views. Diversity usually is used to mean embracing ethnic and religious minorities and liberal social causes. But just as important is embracing those of our citizens who have conservative social and political views, a strong attachment to national identity and culture, and a scepticism of multinational structures that take

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over pieces of national sovereignty. We must not demonise these people or their ideas but must recognise that in a democracy, we need to recognise that others have different views and engage in a healthy competition instead.

Second, we need to stop thinking of Central Europe as a second-class adjunct to Western Europe. True, the political and economic systems have had less time to mature. But the citizens of Central Europe are no less European, no less committed to core values, and no less legitimate in their aspirations than any others. Indeed, the challenges faced in Central and East European societies are the same as those faced in the West, and we have a shared need to work together to address them.

Third, we must reinforce our explicit commitment to core, universal human values: freedom, democracy, market economy, rule of law, human rights, and security. Even as we face populist and nationalist challenges within our democracies, these core values are still shared on all sides of the spectrum. We need to uphold them as the central element of our societies, which will give us strength and resilience in dealing with different political views and external challenges over time.

Fourth, both sides of the Atlantic need to work harder to forge common positions on addressing external challenges. All of us in the West, whether in Central Europe, Western Europe, or North America, face an immediate security challenge from an authoritarian Russia, and a growing strategic challenge from a China that is amassing and using political, economic and military power. China is seeking to supplant the democratic, rules-based, free-market global economic order that has produced the success of the transatlantic community of today with its own non-democratic, state-driven economic model, that will instead benefit China.

Differences of policy among Europeans, or between Europe and the United States, are natural and inevitable. But we must not allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that even with these differences, Europe and the U.S. are part of one community that shares core values and interests.

Finally, we need to think outwardly, not defensively. Because of the successive rounds of NATO enlargement, over 100 million people in Central and Eastern Europe now live in safe, democratic, and increasingly prosperous societies. Yet, tens of millions of others—in Georgia, Ukraine,

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Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Belarus, and even Russia itself—have still been left out.

We should continuously work towards an inclusive Europe—a Europe "whole, free, and at peace"—where all people have equal access to freedom, prosperity, and security, not just those who are already safe. Why should people in Tbilisi, Kyiv, or Chisinau not enjoy the security that has brought confidence and prosperity to people in Berlin, Paris, and Rome?

Some argue that NATO and the EU are fatigued. Or, that they must address their own internal challenges first. Or, that states in Eastern Europe are simply not ready to join NATO or the EU. These are all relevant considerations to shape future policy, but they are not reasons to freeze things as they are.

Some argue that further NATO and EU enlargement would provoke Russia. The reality, however, is that Russia invaded Georgia and Ukraine, and still occupies part of Moldova—countries that do *not* have NATO or EU membership. Where NATO has a defensive guarantee, there has been stability and security. It is only where NATO and the EU have left a "grey zone" that Russia seeks to impose itself on other European nations.

Are there risks? Of course, but no more than NATO was designed to face in the past when it brought a divided Germany into the alliance, manned the checkpoints at the Berlin Wall, or patrolled the seas and skies of the North Atlantic.

As a defensive alliance, NATO would need to be clear that it would not support any military effort to retake territories that Russia has seized from Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova. NATO would only act to protect those territories that remain under their sovereign control while supporting only peaceful reintegration of territories currently occupied by Russia. Nor are NATO and the EU seeking regime change in any non-democratic countries in Eastern Europe. Rather, the West should uphold the principles of freedom and democracy—enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act—as beacons to people throughout the Euro-Atlantic area, with the hope for change from within, and without any imposition of external change.

NATO recognized that the building of a Europe whole, free, and at peace is incomplete when, at its 2008 Bucharest summit, the Alliance assured

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Ukraine and Georgia that they would eventually become members. Since then, however, no further steps have been taken.

To be sure, these states still have much work to do in strengthening democratic institutions, the rule of law, and open, competitive economies. But as they continue to develop, soon the only obstacle to NATO membership will be Russia's seizure of territory.

That is where Western policy will face a dilemma. How can we be true to our own values, protecting our own freedom and security, when other European democracies who share our values live under the shadow of constant, immediate security threats? Isn't that why NATO was founded in the first place? And isn't our ability to move beyond that problem the key lesson we should learn from the success of NATO enlargement until now?

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Stephen J. Flanagan

Sustaining the Promise of Mainz

This chapter offers an American perspective on the progress, shortcomings, and possible initiatives to revitalise key elements of President George H.W. Bush's vision of building a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Most of President Bush's specific proposals in his May 1989 speech to the people of Mainz, Germany, were realised or advanced during his tenure in office: strengthening and broadening the Helsinki process to promote free elections and political pluralism; ending the division of Berlin; pan-European action to address environmental problems; and, dramatic reductions in the levels of conventional armed forces. Great progress has also been made since 1992 in achieving his broader goal of healing Europe's divisions, most concretely through the enlargement of both the European Union (EU) and NATO.

There is, however, the harsh reality that the past decade has seen the unravelling of key European arms-control agreements, the return of armed conflict to the continent, and the deterioration of democratic governance and rule of law, not only in Russia but also in several countries that are members of NATO and the EU. These developments have been accompanied

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by a resurgence of nationalism and a crisis within the European Union that has slowed the process of integration and pan-European action on many critical issues. Moreover, since 2014, Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, military intervention in the Donbas, ongoing efforts to undermine Kyiv's sovereignty in eastern Ukraine, and use of information operations and hybrid attacks to intimidate a number of other European countries have led to growing tensions and forced NATO members to undertake military initiatives to enhance deterrence. These actions, coupled with Moscow's continuing interference in the internal politics of a number of European countries and the U.S., have trampled many of the fundamental principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. So too Russia's 2007 decision to cease implementation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and clear violation of the 1979 Treaty Limiting Intermediate Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) have further diminished transparency and stability and threatened to unravel the remaining elements of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control. Despite these setbacks, the last part of this essay will discuss steps that have and can be taken by European and North American governments and citizens to sustain the transatlantic community of democracies committed to peaceful cooperation.

My observations are informed by my service in the Bush (41), Clinton, and Obama administrations between 1989 and 2015. I joined the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State in February 1989 to support Secretary James A. Baker III in the development of the Bush administration's policy toward the conventional arms-control talks in Vienna between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, which were then entering a new stage after years of stagnation. I later had responsibility on the staff for the development of policy towards the transformation and enlargement of NATO. This essay draws on my recollections from that period, speeches that I co-authored, declassified government documents, as well as the scholarly literature.

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The Four Elements of the Mainz Vision

In his May 1989 speech in Mainz, President Bush articulated the U.S. policy goal of working with other governments to realise a Europe "whole and free." It is easy to forget how radical this vision was at a time of considerable uncertainty. While Mikhail Gorbachev had embraced the policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and Soviet forces had begun their withdrawal from Hungary, there were still 338,000 Soviet troops in East Germany, 56,000 in Poland, and 70,000 in Czechoslovakia. The revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and other Central and East European countries were still unfolding, and their success was far from certain. In his speech, which is reproduced in the annex to this volume, Bush advanced four specific proposals to heal Europe's divisions: strengthen and broaden the Helsinki process to promote free elections and political pluralism; end the division of Berlin; pan-European action to address environmental problems; and accelerated negotiations to achieve dramatic reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional force levels and military capabilities, including a detailed set of specific proposals. This section provides a brief assessment of what has been achieved to realise the three political and security proposals.

Strengthening the Helsinki Process and Political Pluralism

President Bush called not only for bolstering implementation of the Helsinki Final Act principles with respect to free elections and political pluralism, he challenged the Western governments and political parties to take concerted joint action to lend counsel and support to reformers in Central and Eastern Europe who were working to help form the first truly representative political parties in their countries. This went straight to the heart of Helsinki's Principle VII, which called for respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms—including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief—and the "Three Baskets" provisions on humanitarian issues and the free movement of people and information. Moscow and its communist allies reluctantly accepted these provisions in 1975 in order to realise "Basket One," principles that ratified the post-World War II territorial

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status quo, sovereign equality, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

Here, the West's response was remarkable and highly effective due in large measure to the hard work and sacrifices of many Eastern reformers. The U.S., individual West European governments, and the European Community, along with most Western political parties and many non-governmental organisations (NGOs), came together to build a web of support that helped to develop, nurture, and deepen democratic processes, good governance, representative political parties, rule of law, and civil society over the following decade. Most prominently, the U.S. and the European Commission (EC) coordinated their programmes of political assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe—the Support to East European Democracy Act (SEED) and Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (PHARE)—and to Russia and the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union—Freedom Support Act and Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS). Large parts of this assistance also went to support the development of free enterprise, including micro-lending programmes to create small businesses that actually returned funds to Western taxpayers. For example, when the Polish-American Enterprise Fund completed its mission and was liquidated in 1999, some of the proceeds were returned to the U.S. Treasury and some were used to endow the Polish-American Freedom Foundation, with the dual mission of consolidating the results of Polish transformation and sharing the Polish experience with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

So too the U.S. and other European governments made good on their promise to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE), particularly in the areas of promoting democratic institutions, peaceful resolution of disputes, greater openness in military affairs, respect for human and political rights, and adherence to the rule of law.[1] The 35 participating states ratified the 1990 *Charter of Paris for a New Europe,* which catalysed the institutionalization of the Helsinki Process that envisioned an undivided continent based on agreed principles of interstate behaviour, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and a new European security architecture, with reduced levels of military

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forces, greater transparency, and a cooperative partnership between the former Cold War adversaries. CSCE participating states established the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to provide assistance and expertise to participating states and civil society to develop and sustain democratic institutions, the rule of law, and human rights, and to observe elections.

Sadly, the last decade has seen the dismantling of democratic governance, the rule of law, and free media in Russia. At the same time, we have seen the erosion of democratic principles and institutions in several NATO member countries, most dramatically in Turkey and Hungary, but also to lesser degrees in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the U.S.

Freedom House's annual survey, *Freedom in the World*, now rates Turkey as "not free."[2] Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP), democratic and civil rights in Turkey have steadily declined since 2012. As it has consolidated power, the AKP government has also restricted media freedom, prosecuting more than 250 journalists, publishers, and activists since 2007 and forcefully repressing several flare-ups of dissent from civil society. These trends dramatically accelerated under emergency rule, ongoing since the failed July 2016 coup. Through constitutional change, Turkey is being transformed from a parliamentarian system with strong checks and balances into an authoritarian state in which political power is fully concentrated in the hands of an executive president and the dominant party. These constitutional amendments, approved in an April 2017 national referendum and being implemented following the June 2018 general elections, substantially remove current powers from legislative and judiciary bodies. Executive decisions have and are expected to further diminish political pluralism, democratic institutions, and civil society.

Freedom House now categorizes Hungary as "partly free." Since the 2010 elections, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Alliance of Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz) party has implemented constitutional and legal changes that have given it control over the country's independent institutions. The Fidesz-led government has also implemented policies to severely restrict the activities of opposition groups, critical journalists, universities, and certain NGOs.

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In Poland, the Law and Justice (PiS) government has undertaken reforms of the judicial system since it came to power in 2015, including appointing judges to the National Council on the Judiciary in a manner that the Venice Commission concluded was not in keeping with European norms and that legal experts assess as having exacerbated trends toward the politicisation of the judiciary.[3] While Poland's media remains pluralistic, public media such as TVP have become partisan mouthpieces for the government and independent media have struggled under the loss of revenue from state-controlled companies, regulatory pressure, and investigations.[4]

In the Czech Republic, harassment of journalists by government officials and consolidation of major outlets in the hands of a few wealthy owners, including Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, have eroded their independence and public confidence. Journalists in Slovakia have also faced official harassment while consolidation of the ownership of private media companies and government pressure on the public radio and TV broadcaster have eroded the independence of both.[5]

A 2018 poll in the U.S. conducted by Freedom House, the George W. Bush Institute, and the Penn Biden Center found that 55% of those surveyed agreed that American democracy is weak and 68% said it is getting weaker.[6] These findings reflect concerns about deepening polarisation and hyper-partisan political rhetoric and media that have eroded trust in elections, the rule of law, and various institutions and made it difficult to reach compromise on legislation and policy to address urgent problems. While public institutions and civil society in the U.S. and most other allied countries remain highly resilient, these threats to democracy cannot be ignored because they are having a corrosive impact on the cohesion of the transatlantic community.

Berlin and German Unity

President George H.W. Bush's vision for ending the division of Berlin proved to be too modest. Like most officials and analysts at the time—even the best informed West German experts on the German Democratic Republic—he did not appreciate how brittle the communist system had become there

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and elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. Five months after the Mainz speech, in mid-October, I travelled to Berlin as part of a delegation from the U.S. State Department's Policy Planning Staff led by Francis Fukayama. Our mission was to initiate a policy dialogue with the East German Foreign Office. Secretary of State Baker called off the talks because of fears that the Honecker regime was about to brutally repress mounting citizen protests, so we spent time speaking with West German experts and analysts. By the time we arrived at our next stop, Bonn, Honecker had stepped down. When we returned to Washington, Fukayama had the foresight to draft a memo to Baker saying that the U.S. should plan on a united Germany within a few years.

With the opening of travel between and East and West Germany and the fall of the Berlin Wall in November, German unity became the focus and a critical first step in the Bush administration's strategy in advancing wider European integration. The administration moved quickly to support the manifest aspirations of the German people for rapid unification despite the strong reservations of other European governments, particularly those involved in the postwar occupation, about the security implications of a unified Germany. To address these concerns, the U.S. worked nimbly to fashion the set of negotiations that became known as the "2+4 Talks," involving the two Germanys plus the four occupying powers. To invoke a communist metaphor, President Bush and other leaders more than "fulfilled the plan."

Conventional Arms Control

The fourth part of President Bush's Mainz speech advanced a dramatic set of proposals for conventional arms limitations to realise a less militarised Europe on an accelerated schedule. He noted that the Warsaw Pact had accepted major elements of a Western approach to the new negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) that were to replace long-stalemated talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Vienna. Bush called for ceilings on equipment that could support rapid offensive operations, destruction of weapons removed, a 20% cut in

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combat manpower of U.S.-stationed forces, and a ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at around 275,000 each. Moreover, Bush called for achieving such an agreement in six months to a year and to reductions by 1992, or 1993 at the latest.

Bush's specific goals were realised. The CFE Treaty, signed in November 1990, set equal limits on the number of tanks, armoured combat vehicles, heavy artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters that NATO and the Warsaw Pact could deploy between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains and resulted in the destruction of tens of thousands of pieces of military equipment. The treaty's zonal limitations and transparency and inspection measures stabilised the military competition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in ways that would make it difficult for either alliance to amass forces for a surprise attack. While the threat of such military action disappeared with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the treaty's weapons limits and inspection regime continued to provide transparency on military holdings, and together with military confidence-building measures under the OSCE Vienna Document formed a context that helped advance East-West reconciliation and integration during the 1990s.

CFE participating states signed the Adapted CFE Treaty in 1999 to take account of the significant changes in the security environment. However, because Russia failed to fulfil various side commitments, the new treaty was never ratified by NATO members. Moscow announced in December 2007 that it was "suspending" implementation of the original treaty. Subsequent efforts by the U.S. and other NATO governments to convince Russia to resume implementation of the treaty were unsuccessful. In 2011, the U.S., the 21 NATO CFE States Parties, Georgia, and Moldova ceased implementing CFE with respect to the Russian Federation. The CFE Treaty still provides transparency about military forces in Europe, including in Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, as well as NATO members and many other states. Russia's refusal to implement CFE provisions has contributed to uncertainty about its military intentions and diminished crisis stability in a period of deepening tensions in Europe. This situation, together with Russia's violation of the 1979 Treaty Limiting Intermediate

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Nuclear Forces in Europe (INF), which led to the U.S. withdrawal from the treaty in August 2019, have further diminished stability and threatened to unravel the remaining elements of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control.

Sustaining the Mainz Vision

On the positive side of the ledger, the CFE Treaty and NATO and EU enlargements played critical roles in healing the Cold War division of Europe and providing a security environment that facilitated a peaceful and successful democratic transition of much of Central and Eastern Europe. These initiatives proved to be instrumental in realising President Bush's vision of a Europe "whole and free." It was by no means a foregone conclusion in 1989 that this transformation of the European political and security landscape could be achieved so effectively in less than 15 years.

It remains to discuss what the democracies of Europe and North America should now do to sustain the Mainz vision in light of the negative political and security developments noted at the opening of this chapter.

With respect to Russia's continued efforts to undermine the European and global international order, aggression against neighbouring states, and return to authoritarian rule at home, the most effective course would be for Western governments to make clear to the Kremlin that there can be no resumption of normal relations so long as it continues its political and military interference in other countries. Transatlantic solidarity in the implementation of sanctions against Russia since 2014 has not produced all the desired policy changes, but Western resolve and the costs they have imposed on the Russian economy appear to have tempered some aspects of Kremlin behaviour. While the Kremlin views Western concerns about Russian domestic governance and support to civil society groups as thinly veiled efforts to foment regime change, the West should not retreat from policies to promote observance of the Helsinki principles, democratic institutions, and the rule of law as the most durable basis for a peaceful European order.

Within the Western family, members of NATO and the EU should do more to address the erosion of democratic practices and the rule of law in

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Turkey, Hungary, and Poland. The promise of NATO and EU enlargement 25 years ago was founded on the principle that the existing members would welcome other democracies committed to promoting and protecting common values and interests. The member states of the EU and NATO must continue to take steps to address the increasingly authoritarian, nationalist rule in Turkey, and similar trends in Hungary, as well as challenges to judicial independence and media freedom in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The European Parliament's March 2019 vote to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey, and its overwhelming September 2018 vote recommending disciplinary action against Hungary under Article 7, as well as the invocation of Article 7 by the EU Commission in December 2017 concerning the risks to a breach of the rule of law in Poland, were useful political expressions of concern. However, more should be done to censure and restrict the institutional rights within the Union if Hungary, Poland, or other members are found to have made serious breaches of European values. NATO should also consider ways to limit the institutional rights of member states, including participation in committees, operations, and intelligence-sharing.

In the current political climate, the prospects for a return to full implementation of the CFE Treaty or negotiating a new treaty seem remote, as do the chances of salvaging the INF Treaty. These developments have further diminished stability and could result in the unravelling of the remaining elements of U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms control. U.S. and Western arms-control efforts should focus on the more promising path of seeking Moscow's agreement to extending by five years the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) that will otherwise expire in February 2021. This would preserve the limits on overall strategic nuclear forces and the transparency provided by the treaty's verification measures. Efforts should also be made to revitalise strategic stability talks with Moscow, and explore new confidence- and security-building measures in Europe to enhance stability during a crisis.

These are some specific steps that European and North American governments, NGOs, and individual citizens can take to sustain the Mainz vision of a "Europe whole and free" and to preserve a transatlantic community of democracies committed to peaceful cooperation.

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Ernest Wyciszkiewicz

Predicting the Past and Unmaking the Future

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When President George H.W. Bush delivered his speech on "Europe whole and free" in May 1989, the liberal transformation that was to come was far from inevitable. The world was in flux, though the balance visibly tilted toward global optimism, fuelled by epitaphs to the Cold War. Francis Fukuyama, in his forthcoming essay "End of History?," was about to herald the victory of economic and political liberalism and the triumph of the Western idea. Although he thoughtfully put a question mark at the end of the heading, his catchphrase paved the way for the deterministic idea of the final destination of the West looming large on the horizon. Journals were flooded with articles about the closure of one chapter of history and opening of a brand new one, as if international order could move discretely from one phase to another through leaps, similar to an electron changing orbits around a nucleus. Accordingly, the world was about to jump into a new era of a norms-based international society of states bounded willingly by multilateral institutions. We only had to muddle through the post-whatever era—post-Cold war, post-national, post-ideology, post-history—to reach the state of political and social homeostasis.

Today, similar interpretations are sometimes used by admirers of "hard" realism to point out what they believe to be the self-delusionary character of idealistic thinking. The Western dream, allegedly, is over. It is high time to sober up and face the "nasty, brutish, and solitary" reality of geopolitics. The liberal international order is repeatedly pronounced dead or at least losing heavily in competition with good old power politics. The progressive, linear liberal path turned out to resemble a drunkard's walk. The conclusion: it's time to get back on track with cold-blooded political analysis focused solely on the distribution of power. We are back to square one with particularism prevailing over universalism, conflict over cooperation, interests over values, structure over agents. The zero-sum game seems to be working not only in politics but also in the world of expertise.

Interestingly, there is a striking resemblance between the euphoria of the past and the declinism of today. Both approaches seem to be driven by a desperate need to fit enormously complex social reality into a single and simple theoretical framework, whether it is called realist, liberal, constructivist, or something else. Theory-based reasoning tends to prevail over observation and contextualisation. Both liberal and realist camps continuously prefer to operate in confirmation mode rather than follow good old Popperian advice to focus on falsification. A relatively long period of stability supposedly validates the claims of the former, while any increase in volatility, more great power competition, let alone a war outbreak, allows the latter to declare intellectual victory.

Yet, liberalism is not necessarily right when diplomacy and multilateralism seem to work, nor does realism ultimately prevail whenever something turns out badly in world politics. Both should rather look at "proofs" raised by the opponent as something that might actually falsify their own theses and thus help to improve their analytical methods. Unfortunately, such an approach is quite rare both in international relations theory and practice. For that reason, general claims like "the end of history" and "return of power politics" are both descriptively and normatively off the mark, though hugely popular.

History—like any social process—generally prefers incremental changes over leapfrogs, and messy complexity over elegant simplicity.

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Paradoxically, this is exactly what makes both realism and liberalism (in their many incarnations) important if one wants to understand the international environment in its entirety. Power and norms, anarchy and institutions, interests and values are not mutually exclusive concepts; they are context- and actor-dependent. There are no chapters to be opened and closed, there are constantly changing realities and narratives shaped by state actors operating under various constraints and equipped with diverse capabilities. It is up to those actors—Western policy makers specifically, not some abstract systemic factors—how to extend life span of ideas that seemed to work well in last thirty years.

What Has Been Achieved?

The dilemma of whether "the glass is half empty or half full" has been haunting political pundits since the dawn of history. It goes beyond the mere demonstration of a more optimistic or pessimistic worldview. How we answer this trivial question when we think about past events and decisions and their outcomes might generate powerful framing effects and shape perceptions and expectations of both the public and policymakers about the future.

Thus, the achievements of 1989 and ensuing years can be assessed in terms of distance covered either from the starting point or to the final destination. Both approaches are inseparable, though frequently lead to conflicting conclusions. The former method is descriptive, based on what actually happened. The latter is normative and relies on subjective expectations about the world-that-should-be. In-between there is space for counterfactual thought experiments, namely "what if" questions.

So, where were we on the day President Bush delivered his speech in May 1989?

The Soviet Union was still alive, although it was a bit shaky due to an economic crisis, diminishing control over its Central European satellites, and widening cracks in the communist world. Just a few months earlier, the Supreme Soviets of Estonia and Lithuania declared sovereignty (officially still within the empire). It took only a year for full declarations of

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independence from the USSR to be announced. As of today, it might look like the beginning of the final stage of the decomposition of the Soviet state, yet it was far from certain at that time, and the bloody events in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, as well as the August putsch, demonstrated it vividly.

The socialist bloc was already in disarray, but no one knew what to expect. Sudden death? Slow agony? Optimism was mixed with anxiety. A few days after the Mainz speech, partly free elections in Poland accelerated the process of dismantling Soviet rule over the region. Again, everything thereafter seemed to resemble a chain reaction whose symbolic apogee came with the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the time, however, what would follow was highly uncertain. The Soviets were preoccupied with domestic tensions and centrifugal forces, but they still wanted to have a say about the fate of the region. The Red Army was to be deployed in Poland up to September 1993. Central European diplomats invested considerable effort in convincing Western partners to throw out the window the concepts of "spheres of influence" and "legitimate interests."

As it soon became apparent, the Russian Federation inherited not only the formal attributes of great power status from its Soviet predecessor, such as a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, but also its predatory instincts. Central European diplomats invested considerable effort in convincing Western partners to throw out the window the concepts of "spheres of influence" and "legitimate interests," and to deny Russia veto power over choices made by other countries.

And today, the West's non-recognition of Russia's Crimea annexation and its sanctions regime against Russia are rooted in this transformation, which was still far from certain in the mid-1990s.

Bush called for a Europe "whole and free" just a few days after a NATO summit in Brussels where the 40th anniversary of the alliance was celebrated. The leaders were rightly proud of its achievements and still unaware of many of the challenges to come. While they felt that unprecedented change was coming, they decided to define long-term objectives modestly and vaguely: to establish a "new pattern of relations between East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with co-operation, trust and peaceful competition." No one dared to look further than a couple of months ahead. The Soviet Union was

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thought to stay around with a still undefined role for countries in-between. Thus, from the vantage point of Warsaw, Prague, or Tallinn, it really seems to be a miracle that only 10 years passed before the unthinkable idea of enlargement was translated into political reality.

In 1989, the European Communities (EC) were about to start talks on structural reforms. Accession of still existing COMECON members was a pipe dream. Yet, only two years later in 1991, against the background of the disintegrating Soviet Union, several Association Agreements were signed between the EC and Central European countries that ultimately paved the way toward integration. Like any transformative experience, it was not a painless process for anyone. The EC was in a process of adjustment that was ultimately to lead to the Maastricht Treaty that formally set up the European Union (EU) in 1993. Supranational and intergovernmental pillars of cooperation were erected, with the former applicable to economic integration and the latter for would-be common foreign and security policy. The single market was set in motion, convergence criteria were adopted to prepare the ground for a monetary union, and a new institutional framework was introduced. Many doubted the chances of successful strategic multitasking, namely going deeper and wider at the same time. There were ups and downs, but both supranational institutions and national policymakers passed the test with distinction, given the complexity of the circumstances at the time.

The West—in particular the EU—has definitely benefited from favourable external circumstances during the last 30 years, which made certain decisions easier by lowering the political costs of ambitious undertakings. Without proper choices made on time by risk-taking politicians, however, this might not have happened. If such tasks were on the table today, the outcome would probably be endless procrastination. It is hard to overestimate the achievements of that time—advancing parallel processes of political, economic, and military integration based on a mutually accepted set of values while negotiating responses to a series of internal and external challenges.

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What Has Gone Wrong?

This success story might seem a bit unreal when confronted with the perfect storm of domestic and international crises that the West, and in particular the EU, faces today. Some were caused by third parties, but most had internal sources: eurozone problems, migration crises, Brexit, and (what seems to be the most troubling) deep disillusionment within European societies with the idea of integration and political representation. Anti-EU populism has found fertile soil and is spreading all over the continent. When the picture is supplemented by a series of other challenges such as growing protectionism, Chinese encroachment, Russian interference, and instability in its neighbourhood, then one can become quickly depressed. Yet, this pessimism is as ridiculous as the naïve optimism of those who assumed a decade ago that they would be living happily ever after.

There is no point in enumerating specific errors of the past. Hindsight bias would surely distort the picture. This phenomenon, often called knew-it-all-along, describes a common propensity to perceive what has already happened as more predictable than it actually was before it took place. In other words, we are great in predicting the past once when we are equipped with knowledge of the present. Everything becomes neatly interconnected, overdetermined, almost as if pre-planned. One event leads inevitably to another, enabling us to build a nice, coherent, and consistent narrative. Yet, if we really knew now what we should have done better in the past to put ourselves in a more preferable present, then we should also know today what we shall or shall not do to avoid unpleasant developments and achieve a more desirable future.

To underscore the futility of such an endeavour it is enough to do a little thought experiment and go back in time to 2008. Think about all that has happened since then that we had not expected but that actually changed the regional and global landscape in many domains, for better or worse. Let me sketch just a few: the Russia-Georgia war, the global financial crisis, the shale-gas revolution, the Arab Spring, the euro crisis, Wikileaks, Ukraine's Euromaidan, Russia's Crimea annexation, Stuxnet/Not petya/Cambridge Analytica, Brexit, Donald Trump. These and many other low- probability, high-impact events led us to where we are.

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It is also good to remember, however, that those in charge in 1989 were as helpless when it came to projecting their future as we are today. The international reality of that time was extremely messy, no matter how elegant and eloquent present explanations and narratives about it may be. Nonetheless, they did quite well. This was due less to a carefully planned chain of rational decisions than to a rather difficult learning-by-doing process under the significant dual pressure of time and changing circumstances. In the end, however, decisions made in those days eventually led to a fundamental remodelling of the world, in particular of the West and Europe, and definitely for the better.

Deliverance through Incrementalism, Not Master Plans

A European federation, a constitution for Europe, a European army, a European seat in the UN Security Council and many other big ideas were announced proudly as if the future of the European project was to survive only through grandiosity. Some have already died, prompting recurring hiccups of pessimism. Others will pass away soon since there is no real political demand for them. Their lifecycle is limited to several speeches and counter-speeches, followed by a series of friendly or hostile op-eds. Then a new concept emerges and the cycle repeats itself.

Instead of wasting energy planning things that probably will not occur, it would be healthier to focus on dull incrementalism, namely to push the community forward, not through long-term strategies (outdated shortly after ratification) but by sketching general, preferable outcomes and several possible ways to get there. It would mean going back to the roots of integration, which used to be a rather slow, thoroughly negotiated process that can enable all diverse stakeholders, with their different values and interests, to adapt to new conditions. Such a process has become even more important today when the pace of change generated by the information-technology and artificial-intelligence revolutions can be difficult to grasp by individuals, let alone states or international organisations. Measurable goals are psychologically important to avoid the impression that we just

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randomly walk around, but the sheer fact that we set a goal does not make reality more predictable and uncertainty less disturbing.

Detailed roadmaps, strategies, master plans (excluding war-like situations or crises when strict chain of command is necessary) very often turn into a fetish since they provide an illusion of rational decision-making. When something goes wrong, lack of strategy is typically identified as a major cause, and consequently preparing a strategy is thought to be a key solution. However, more important than overambitious strategic planning is reaching flexibility when it comes to reaction to a challenge. It is less politically costly and thus easier to agree upon among many actors. Actually, in a sense, NATO's experience in contingency planning might serve as inspiration for the EU.

The Union in its present shape was far from being carefully planned in cabinets. It emerged from a constantly changing mix of ideas, preferences, interests, and expectations that offered policymakers a chance to push the process forward. We should be willing to accept that under certain circumstances a consensus might emerge that it is better to take a step or two back than to always push forward with deeper or wider integration. It seems difficult for euro-enthusiasts (including yours truly) to accept that economic and political integration is not linear and progressive by nature. To work properly, it should first and foremost fulfil public expectations as reflected directly and through its representatives.

There is an interesting decision-making heuristic proposed by Herbert A. Simon that might be useful here. He called it satisficing. It comes down to examining available alternatives until a sufficient acceptability level is reached in contrast to a never-ending process of looking for the optimal solution. To translate it into EU jargon, instead of the time-consuming and politically exhaustive process of political optimisation to reach an ideal state of affairs, which turns each and every Member State into a profit-maximiser, more attention should be devoted to pragmatic responses when confronted with specific tasks. For example, adopting a long-term China strategy for the EU with catchy names (be it systemic competitor or strategic rival)—however important—is less pressing than specific, preferably coordinated, national decisions regarding the presence of Chinese IT companies in critical infrastructure in Europe.

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When an international institution does not deliver all it was supposed to, it does not mean it must kneel down before the gods of power politics, but rather that it must change. The fact that we have not reached political paradise does not mean that we are on our way to hell. The EU, NATO, and the WTO are processes set in motion some time ago and in need of regular refurbishment. The key is the capability to adjust and not play blame games between idealists and realists. The view that ideas and norms are politically negligible as a by-product of power distribution is equally ridiculous as the idea that military capabilities and power projection are only social constructs. The question is how to tackle an environment that is rapidly changing—intellectually, politically, and institutionally.

In general, as people get older they tend to idealise what was and dramatize what is to come. Pessimism about the future is mixed with nostalgia about the past. 1989 stands out as quite exceptional since it was actually optimism (despite deep uncertainty) rather than pessimism that gave impetus to policies that paid off significantly. A small dose of that optimism would be very welcome today.

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Ian Bond

Has the West Achieved George Bush's Vision or Abandoned It?

George H.W. Bush's speech in Mainz, and his call for a "Europe whole and free," gave NATO a catchphrase that was repeated in summit declarations and foreign ministers' communiques about 60 times since he uttered it on 31 May 1989. But what did he mean by it, and how does today's Europe measure up to his vision?

A Common European Home vs. A Europe Whole and Free

Bush's words must be seen in the context of the changing East-West relations at the time. When Bush came to Mainz, he was in a popularity contest with Mikhail Gorbachev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. It was the era of "Gorbymania" and the Soviet leader was at the height of his acclaim throughout Europe. In April 1989, he paid

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a very successful visit to London and was due to meet Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn in June.

Though Bush had been vice president under Ronald Reagan for eight years, he did not immediately build on the warm relations developed by Reagan and Gorbachev, which had produced, among other advances, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. As President-elect, Bush (together with Reagan) met with Gorbachev in December 1988. Gorbachev had just announced to the UN that he was cutting the Soviet armed forces by 500,000 and withdrawing 50,000 troops from Central and Eastern Europe, but the Russians felt that Bush was slow to respond.

By the time Bush came to Mainz, however, the U.S.-Soviet relationship was thawing. The visit to Germany took place the day after a NATO summit at which the allies had hailed "the current [Soviet] reforms that have already led to greater openness, improved respect for human rights, active participation of the individual, and new attitudes in foreign policy," and had suggested that "if sustained, the reforms will strengthen prospects for fundamental improvements in East-West relations."

Gorbachev had used the phrase "a common European home" several times to describe his vision of the future in Europe, including on his groundbreaking December 1984 visit to the UK. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher picked up the phrase in remarks made when Gorbachev visited London in April 1989, implicitly accepting the idea of a "common home," but arguing that there was still a long way to go before the "deep and legitimate anxieties of Western Europe" were removed.

It was clear to the Americans that Gorbachev's charm was more successful in creating splits between the U.S. and its European allies than the threats of his predecessors. According to Soviet records of Gorbachev's discussion with Thatcher, published by the National Security Archive at George Washington University, the Russians believed that the Bush administration saw the success of Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika* (reconstruction) and the development of a new image of the Soviet Union as bad for the West. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker had returned from a visit to Western Europe (according to Gorbachev) "on the verge of panic."

Bush had once dismissed the idea that he needed to decide where he wanted to take the United States as president by saying, "Oh, the vision

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thing." But now, he needed a vision of Europe in a post-Cold War future that Western politicians and publics would respond to as warmly as they had to Gorbachev's. The result, courtesy of the late Harvey Sicherman, an adviser and speechwriter to Secretaries of State under Reagan and Bush, was the phrase and concept "Europe whole and free."

How did Bush's vision differ from that of Gorbachev? In a speech to the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly in July 1989, Gorbachev complained about the "widespread belief … that what is meant by overcoming the division of Europe is actually overcoming socialism." He argued that differences between states could not be eliminated. Gorbachev's concept may have played on the ambiguity in the word *dom* in Russian, meaning either "home" or "apartment block"—in the common European apartment block there could be very different apartments.

Bush had a more Western idea of "home," with one family under one roof. In his Inaugural Address in January 1989, he had likened political reform in communist countries to passing through a door: "Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door to freedom. Men and women of the world move toward free markets through the door to prosperity." In Mainz, Bush clearly implied that he did not foresee the "peaceful coexistence" described by Nikita Khrushchev, with the communist and capitalist systems respecting each other's spheres of influence. Instead, he saw the communist system being swept away by democracy and freedom spreading across Central and Eastern Europe. Reform in communist countries would unleash "a force they will find difficult to channel or control: the hunger for liberty of oppressed peoples who've tasted freedom."

Bush referred directly to the concept of a common European home, but stressed that all within it had to be "free to move from room to room." Gorbachev sought to establish a *modus vivendi* between East and West in which states would not interfere in the internal affairs of others, even their own allies (in a nod to past Soviet suppression of uprisings in Eastern Europe). He assumed that the communist system could be reformed and flourish alongside the capitalist system. Bush assumed that given the chance, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe would seek to emulate

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the democracy and prosperity of their Western neighbours, an assessment that turned out to be largely correct, at least in the short term.

The Verdict so Far: Not Quite Whole, Not Quite Free

Bush used the Mainz speech to make four specific proposals "to help Europe become whole and free." The first was that the Helsinki process should be broadened "to promote free elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe." The second was that *glasnost* should come to East Berlin. The third was that East and West should work together to solve the world's environmental problems. And the fourth was that East and West should agree on cuts in conventional armaments in Europe, with an "open skies" agreement providing additional transparency. Setting aside the question of Berlin—definitively answered when the Wall was breached in November 1989 without any Soviet attempt to prevent it—how have Bush's other proposals fared in the last 30 years?

In promoting free elections and political pluralism, Bush was pushing on an open door. The Soviet Union had held its first relatively democratic elections in March and April 1989, and the resultant Congress of People's Deputies (including opposition figures such as Andrei Sakharov) met for the first time on 25 May. The Polish Round Table Talks between the government and the Solidarity opposition movement concluded on 5 April 1989. In elections on June 4, Solidarity won the maximum permitted 35% of seats in the Sejm (lower house of parliament), and 99% of the seats in the Senate. In Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (i.e., the communists) began roundtable talks with the opposition in April 1989 that led to multi-party elections in March and April 1990. Elsewhere in Central and Southeastern Europe, change came later but progressed rapidly. By mid-1991, almost every state in Central Europe and the Western Balkans had ended communist rule—some more peacefully than others—and held comparatively free elections.

As Bush proposed, the Helsinki Process—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994—played an important

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role in supporting the development of democracy in the former communist bloc. At the Paris CSCE summit meeting in 1990, the CSCE's participating states agreed to establish an Office for Free Elections "to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections." With its mandate expanded in 1992 and renamed the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, it became an acknowledged authority on conducting and monitoring elections.

The speed of the initial transition to democratic elections and multiparty systems proved deceptive, however. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the newly independent states reverted to authoritarian models of governance, particularly in Central Asia, or ended up with democratically-elected but weak or corrupt governments (as in Ukraine and Moldova). In Central Europe, the picture has been more positive but still mixed. While elections have generally been free and fair, the performance of the governments that followed has often disappointed their voters (not, of course, a problem unique to the region).

In Russia itself, the collapse of the Soviet Union after the coup of August 1991 did not produce a stable, democratic system. Boris Yeltsin, the democratically elected president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, played a heroic role in defeating the coup and breaking up the Soviet Union, but the Russian constitution of 1993, adopted after Yeltsin had violently suppressed his opponents in the Russian Supreme Soviet, concentrated too much power in the hands of the president at the expense of the new Federal Assembly. Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, took full advantage of this power to undermine democracy in Russia. Free and fair elections have become a distant memory, from a period denigrated by Putin as the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century"—the collapse of the Soviet Union—though many living through it also saw it as a period of liberation and a chance to live in a "normal" country.

The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index has tracked a number of indicators of democracy annually since 2006. Of the 11 states in Central Europe and the Western Balkans that acceded to the EU in 2004 or later, only the three Baltic states were rated as more democratic in 2018 than in 2006, and all 11, together with Serbia, were rated as "flawed" rather than full democracies. Another nine states of the former Soviet Union and the

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Western Balkans were classed as "hybrid regimes" while seven, including Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Russia, were categorised as authoritarian. Even in the countries that were the first to reform, Hungary and Poland, there has been significant backsliding.

What about Bush's proposal for environmental cooperation? Bush offered the countries of the communist bloc "technical training, and assistance in drafting laws and regulations, and new technologies for tackling these awesome problems." Bush's approach to the environment in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union mirrored how he was talking at home: speaking to Congress in February 1989 about his priorities as president, Bush said: "If we're to protect our future, we need a new attitude about the environment. We must protect the air we breathe. I will send to you shortly legislation for a new, more effective Clean Air Act. It will include a plan to reduce by date certain the emissions which cause acid rain, because the time for study alone has passed, and the time for action is now."

As Robert Darst argues in his 2001 book *Smokestack Diplomacy*, however, both during and after the Cold War, the Eastern countries took a more transactional approach to cooperation on environmental issues. For the Soviet Union, proposing that East and West should come together to discuss common environmental problems was a way to show the Soviet system in a better light. Thus, for example, in a speech in Murmansk on 1 October 1987, Gorbachev proposed "drawing up jointly an integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural environment of the North," including a system to monitor the state of the environment and radiation safety.

After the collapse of the Soviet system, by contrast, the successor states manipulated the environmental concerns of the West to secure external financing for economic development. Ukraine and Russia both resorted to what Darst calls "environmental blackmail"—threatening in the former case to keep the Chernobyl nuclear power plant running unless the West paid for a replacement, and in the latter case to resume nuclear waste dumping at sea if its neighbours would not finance alternative disposal methods.

EU law forced the acceding countries to take steps to cut air pollution (though the collapse of unprofitable state-owned enterprises often

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achieved more) and improve wastewater treatment. Even among the Central European states, however, environmental policy could be a bone of contention with their Western neighbours. Though they have made significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions since 1990 (by more than 30%, according to a study by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, PISM), some countries in the region, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland, still rely heavily on coal or other highly polluting fossil fuels and put a higher priority on energy independence than on combatting climate change, unlike their Western European neighbours.

As to Bush's arms control and confidence-building proposals, in Mainz, he was largely repeating what the NATO summit the previous day had already agreed. NATO's original proposals, made in March 1989, were to reduce tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces to about 5-10% below NATO's stock at the time. But Bush had quickly accepted, and persuaded the allies to accept, Soviet counter-arguments for including combat aircraft and helicopters in the negotiations, with lower overall equipment ceilings (despite the reservations of some European allies, including the UK). This move effectively unblocked the talks, clearing the way to establishing a balance of forces between East and West at much lower levels.

By the time the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty entered into force in July 1992, however, the concept of "balance" was meaningless: the Warsaw Pact had dissolved, as had the Soviet Union. Twenty-three states organised in two blocs had begun the negotiations, but 30, 16 of whom were members of NATO, ended up ratifying the treaty. Nonetheless, the parties to the CFE Treaty implemented many more reductions than required. According to the Arms Control Association, by 2007, the NATO allies had 61,281 pieces of treaty-limited equipment (TLE, i.e., the categories of land- and air-based weapons systems included in the treaty) and a ceiling of 101,697; Russia had 23,266 TLE and a ceiling of 28,216. In 1999, the parties signed a treaty to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new security situation in Europe. NATO nations refused to ratify it, however, until Russia fulfilled pledges to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. Ultimately, Russia first suspended compliance with the CFE Treaty in 2007 and then

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withdrew from it entirely in 2015, having by then annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine.

The Open Skies Treaty, which Bush also proposed in his Mainz speech as a military transparency measure, was eventually signed in 1992. It was provisionally applied until it entered into force in 2002. But by 2017, Russia and the United States were trading accusations of non-compliance and seeking to limit access to each other's airspace for flights; and in 2018, the U.S. Congress refused to fund modernisation of the aircraft used by the United States to carry out the flights.

Why is Europe still divided 30 years after Bush's speech and the end of the Cold War? Why has freedom taken root in some states, but not in others? Two clues lie in the closing paragraphs of Bush's speech, and one in something Bush didn't mention.

First, Bush stated that the West's goal was not to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union but "to convince them, step by step, that their definition of security is obsolete, that their deepest fears are unfounded." The task was beyond Bush and his successors. Even in the Yeltsin era, the West's decision to accept former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO was seen as a threat to Russia's security. Though Putin allowed NATO to use Russian airspace and a logistic hub on Russian soil to resupply its forces in Afghanistan, in general he fed the perception that Russia is a fortress besieged both by NATO's military power and the West's depraved and decadent culture. Russia has not shaken off its deepest fears. Its own actions, particularly the annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, have created renewed fears in many NATO states. The arms-control agreements and confidence- and security-building measures that helped to ease the end of the Cold War have largely been dismantled—some, such as the CFE treaty, by Russia; others, such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, by the U.S.—and neither side seems at present to have the political will to try to replace them.

Second, Bush spoke approvingly of the planned launch of the European single market, which he described as "borders open to people, commerce and ideas," but went on to say that it did not mean countries giving up their culture or sovereignty, and praised the fact that the nations of Eastern Europe were "rediscovering the glories of their national heritage." Like

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Woodrow Wilson, Bush saw the advantages of nationalism in Europe, but not how dangerous it could be: he did not foresee the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia or the ethnic conflicts that broke out in the former Soviet Union. Bush's vision of happily co-existing nationalisms gave way to a very different reality. Thirty years later, nationalism has become a tool in the hands of European politicians who think that their nations are held back from greatness by membership in organisations like the EU and NATO; and both Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump are cheering them on, welcoming the prospect of a Europe not merely divided but fragmented.

Third, an important concept is missing from Bush's speech, namely the rule of law. To the extent that the West thought about the rule of law at all in the early 1990s, it imagined that it would develop organically as emerging elites realised the advantages of being able to protect their newly-acquired assets in court rather than by force. The EU included the rule of law as one of its values (alongside *inter alia* democracy and respect for human rights) but also assumed that states that had to respect the rule of law to join the Union would continue to abide by it afterwards. The experience of the last 30 years has shown, however, that the rule of law needs more than benign neglect to develop and be sustained. Bush's speech did what was needed at the time, setting out an American vision for Europe after the Cold War. But perhaps Europe would be more united and freer today if the main focus of attention after 1989 had been on the long-term task of establishing and defending the rule of law throughout the continent, not just on elections, the environment, and arms control.

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Anna Wieslander

Why European Unity and Freedom Still Matter to the United States

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"Europe whole and free" was an American strategy for Europe at a historically transformative period. It was introduced, pushed, and implemented by the United States, mainly using NATO as its vehicle, though adopted by the Europeans also in the European Communities, later the European Union (EU), which possessed vital tools for its success.

When President George H.W. Bush first outlined the strategy in Germany in Mainz in May 1989, no one could anticipate the speed of change. It was the irony of destiny that Bush, known for being a man who cherished continuity, had to handle the greatest transformation of societies in modern times. Yet, continuity is discernible in the strategy in two ways.

First, the idea of a "Europe whole and free" was firmly nested into the transatlantic bargain, as ithad looked since the foundation of the alliance. The transatlantic deal rested on two legs: U.S. military support for Europe on one hand, and European attempts towards unity and integration, on the other.

Second, the strategy was embedded in a grander scheme of a "new world order," heavily based on values, following a Wilsonian tradition in American foreign policy.

In this chapter, I argue that the strategy was partially successful, mainly due to the first trace of continuity—American support for European unity. As for the scheme of a "new world order," it tended to overemphasize the novelty of world politics, and the universal appeal of Western values. Accordingly, the U.S. failed to use its unipolar moment to prepare for an adapted leadership in a world of rising rivals, which in turn contributed to a halt in the process towards fulfilling the vision of a "Europe whole and free."

The Unipolar Moment

After the end of the Cold War, the United States had its unipolar moment when it completely dominated the international system. While the Soviet Union claimed that both sides had won the Cold War, there was clearly just one winner, who took all. As Vladimir Putin recognized in his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference while complaining about American dominance in the world, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, even the Russians preferred "the American way": democracy, freedom, and openness.[1]

Globally, President Bush outlined a "new world order" to which "Europe whole and free" constituted a regional expression. Rather than acknowledging that U.S. dominance was dependent on the defeat and weakness of its rival, the "new world order" built on a Wilsonian tradition and borrowed heavily from the 18th-century philosopher Immanuel Kant and his notion that on a basic level, the interests of all peoples are one and the same. Once peoples were exposed to the superior values of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, these values would prevail. States were able to conduct moral and rational behaviour. A linear development of civilisation could, in the end, lead to "perpetual peace." Francis Fukuyama successfully captured this line of thought in 1989 when he argued that the world was witnessing "the end of history."[2]

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Most of the Central and Eastern European states that just had regained their freedom took a less idealistic stance, or at least, combined idealism with a big slice of realism. For them, it was clear that they were facing less the end of history than a historical moment in which Russia was weakened to the extent that it could not prevent their Western orientation. However, there was no doubt that Russia would rise again. In order to survive this potential threat, they needed to join forces with allies. Hence, the knocking on the door to NATO and the EU became increasingly louder during the 1990s. This cyclical thinking of history was supported by realists such as James Schlesinger, who warned of a world order in the making similar to that prior to 1939, "marked by power politics, national rivalries, and ethnic tensions."[3]

Nevertheless, the "Europe whole and free" strategy left antagonistic threats aside. If there were a threat, it rather came from the inside, where, as proponents of NATO enlargement put it in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in September/October 1993, "the Soviet collapse has left behind significant and unbalanced military forces and weapons inventories among nations experiencing a wave of instability and conflict generated by virulent nationalism."

Guaranteeing a peaceful process towards democracy and market economy in Central and Eastern Europe was a priority, for which the United States needed its allies and sustained Western unity. The strategy saw an expanded role for the U.S. in Europe, from containment to engagement.

The Need for a Strong U.S.-EU Partnership

After the Cold War, for the first time in history, the European continent was dominated by a non-Eurasian state, namely the U.S., which had reached the status of a hegemon. Inevitably, as Zbigniew Brzezinski argued in *The Grand Chessboard* (1998), the hegemon would be challenged by rivals trying to shift the balance of power in their favour. Brzezinski, therefore, outlined a strategy that would serve to prolong the unipolar moment of the United States, a term coined by Charles Krauthammer in *Foreign Affairs* in 1990/91, in order for the values it promoted to become rooted as

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they spread across the globe and lay a solid foundation for a cooperative community worldwide. To this end, Brzezinski supported NATO and EU enlargement. He also argued in favour of solid U.S. support for a stronger EU. By encouraging European unity and integration, democracy could spread eastwards. The European influence in NATO should increase so that in 20 years' time, the EU and NATO would be more of equal partners, even if this, as Brzezinski carefully emphasized, would imply some American sacrifices. Overall though, in order to maintain its prominent position, the U.S. needed to share more leadership with Europe.

The idea of an alliance of equals was not new. It had its roots in Kennedy's Grand Design (1962) and Kissinger's Year of Europe (1973), both unsuccessful attempts to move towards a more balanced relationship. Brzezinski was supported by David Gompert, Stephen Larabee and others, who in *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (1998) argued for Europe to start lifting its gaze above the European continent, stop worrying that the United States would leave, and instead show willingness to act as a global leader together with the U.S. Means to this end were a transatlantic trade agreement, a reformed NATO and continued EU integration and enlargement.

However, a strategy of shared leadership that included security and defence was not picked up by any U.S. administration following the end of the Cold War. Despite ambitious initiatives such as the U.S.-EU New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995, attempts by Europe to strengthen its role were continuously met with scepticism from Washington. As Sophie Vanhoonacker points out in assessing the first Bush administration's response to the development of a European security identity, the Bush administration was "so obsessed with safeguarding its own predominant role on the European security scene" that the issue of how the U.S. could make it attractive for Europeans to launch their security initiatives within the framework of the Alliance was neglected.[4]

The Rise of Rivals

With the "Europe whole and free" strategy, President Bush succeeded in maintaining U.S. engagement for Europe. Unified Germany remained in

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NATO without embarrassing the Soviet Union, a strategy was launched for the alliance that adapted it to new risks, and the foundation was laid for a range of arms-control treaties, such as the CFE treaty and Open Skies, which decreased tensions on the continent.

The Clinton administration built on this momentum. In 1994, the signing of the Budapest Memorandum gave security assurances from Russia, the UK and the U.S. to Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which in return gave up their nuclear weapons. To solidify the pan-European foundation of common values, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, was transformed into an "Organisation" of the same name (OSCE). The allies also opened NATO's door. On 12 March 1999, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic joined the Alliance, despite severe initial resistance both in Washington and European capitals, given the risk that this would increase tensions with Russia and destabilise security in Europe. To handle Russian concerns, NATO signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which acknowledged Russia's special status. Russia also became a member of the G8 in 1997.

In 2004, during President Bush's presidency, the so-called "big bang" enlargement opened the doors to both NATO and the EU for a big group of East Central European and Baltic states—seven new allies and 10 new EU Member States. The accessions had been preceded by extensive processes in both organisations, especially in the EU due to its broad policy scope, in promoting reform towards democracy, a market economy, and the rule of law in the candidate states to prepare them for membership. EU enlargement continued in 2007 and 2013 while NATO took on new allies in 2009 and 2017.

Nonetheless, Europe today is contested both from the outside by rising rivals and from the inside by populist and nationalist forces. New dividing lines are developing; "West" and "East" are back in the vocabulary of international affairs. Trust has once again given way to tension, also across the Atlantic. President Trump is sceptical of European integration and ambivalent about the U.S. commitment to NATO. The EU has closed its doors due to enlargement fatigue, and NATO is struggling with its promise of keeping its door open to Georgia and Ukraine, each of which lacks control of its territory due to Russian aggression.

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What went wrong with the American strategy for Europe? A major shortfall was that it underestimated rivals to the hegemon and their cyclical motion towards revenge and competition. Failure to adapt American leadership to new circumstances allowed for vacuums, into which rivals successfully entered.

In Russia, energy, and especially rising oil prices, helped boost the economy to such an extent that in 2005-2006, Moscow could pay off its loan to the IMF and the Paris club of creditors early. President Putin received considerable credit for the era of relative prosperity between 1999 and 2008 when average real GDP growth grew 6.9% annually, average real wages rose by 10.5%, and real disposable income went up by 7.9%.[5] In 2012, Russia joined the WTO.

While the economy thrived, democracy was suppressed. The so-called "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine in November 2004, a public uprising due to election manipulation, caused nervousness in the Kremlin mainly by its risk of spreading to Moscow. In April 2005, Putin, in his state of the nation address, expressed his view that "the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama." He promised to be tough on popular uprisings inspired by surrounding countries.[6]

At this time, Putin also started to articulate the idea of areas of primary Russian interests. At the Munich Conference in February 2007, Putin called the enlargement of NATO "a serious provocation" that imposed "new dividing lines and walls on us."[7] The Russian war on Georgia in August 2008 was initiated half a year after NATO's announcement at the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine would one day become members.

The weak Western response to the Russian aggression sent a signal to the Kremlin that far-reaching violations of international rules would not have major consequences. President Obama's reset of Russian relations in 2009 had some success in certain policy areas during its first years but did not solve the broader need for a strong and coherent U.S.-EU posture on Russian attempts to assert a sphere of influence in neighbouring countries. Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014 came after public

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uprisings in Kyiv and EU-Ukraine rapprochement of Ukraine through negotiations on an Association Agreement.

On a broader scale, Russia conducted disinformation campaigns and used economic and social tools to challenge societal cohesion and institutional trust in a range of countries that used to belong to the Soviet sphere. Overall, the Russian strategy was to ensure that these countries could not be used against Russia by preventing them from being "whole and free."

As for China, it never embarked on the same road as Russia in accepting the liberal agenda of the U.S. as a foundation for a "new world order" after the end of the Cold War. When the Clinton administration tried to make economic ties conditional on modifications within the Chinese system, China answered that relations with the U.S. could only be conducted on a geostrategic basis, as described by Henry Kissinger in his book *World Order* in 2014. The Chinese offensive towards Europe came quite recently and should be assessed in light of the "new era" that China entered in 2017 in order to become a global superpower by 2050.

For quite some time, China's growing economic power, and its clever Belt and Road Initiative, was the focus of European attention. Lately, however, Chinese infrastructure and technology investments in Europe have been highlighted from national security perspectives by EU Member States. The so-called "17+1" format, initiated by China involving 17 Central and Eastern European states, has introduced a political platform that could spur cooperation but also risks fragmentation on the continent.

In 2017, yet another dimension of Chinese engagement in Europe was illustrated as China and Russia for the first time conducted a joint military exercise in the Baltic Sea. The Arctic is one area in which China drastically has increased its presence in recent years. For the U.S., the rise of China as a competitor on the global scene is nowadays defined as a major threat to national security. The European approach is more nuanced, but there is an increasing awareness and discussion on Chinese interests and motives in Europe beyond economic growth. Hence, there is a window of opportunity for the U.S. and the EU to align in their response to Chinese rivalry to diminish the risk of fragmentation in Europe.

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Conclusion

When the "Europe whole and free" strategy was initiated in 1989, it was not clear whether the world had entered a novel, unprecedented stage, or if history would repeat itself. Was the U.S. powerful because of the strength and supremacy of its values and that it could act accordingly? Or was its supreme power a systemic effect, creating a hegemon that needed to act benevolently in order to prolong its unipolar moment? In retrospective, it seems as if the Bush administration and its successors leaned more towards a linear rather than cyclical approach, thereby underestimating the rise of rivals and failing the opportunity to partner with Europe in regional and global leadership in order to prolong its power posture.

The potential for human betterment is an important part of U.S. foreign policy, but as Kissinger pointed out in *World Order* in 2014, "to be effective, these aspirational aspects of policy must be paired with an unsentimental analysis of underlying factors, including the cultural and geopolitical configuration of other regions and the dedication and resourcefulness of adversaries opposing American interests and values."

Given the new geopolitical landscape, is "Europe whole and free" still a valid American strategy? Is there any chance of it being successfully implemented ahead or is it too late?

Surely, the task has become more difficult and the stakes higher, but it is possible if the strategy is adopted to account for a Europe that once again is contested space. The supremacy of Western values is not enough to win that battle. It must be matched with a unified approach from the U.S. and the EU, committed leadership, and a willingness to raise the costs if necessary, for instance with regard to economic sanctions, investments in physical and digital infrastructure, a tougher stance on money laundering and continued open-door policies.

Is the strategy still relevant? Yes, European unity and freedom still matter to the U.S.

The unipolar moment is gone. In a world of rising competition among the great powers, the U.S. and the EU need each other more than ever. Ultimately, the contest is between the free world and authoritarian, corrupt, state-led capitalism. Hence, the Trump administration must overcome its

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resentment towards European integration and seek joint leadership with the EU to push the agenda forward. The EU must boost its self-esteem, take on a larger load in its neighbourhood, and fulfil its potential as a global actor while continuing to address tendencies among its Member States to divert from the EU's core values.

As a vision, with its promise of liberty and human betterment, "Europe whole and free" is still attractive. The long list of countries that seek closer cooperation, including future membership, with the EU and NATO underlines the importance of keeping doors open and constantly seeking new ways of maintaining dialogue and close ties to those nations that strive towards democracy, a market economy, and the rule of law.

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Oana Popescu-Zamfir

Neither Eulogy nor Euphoria: The EU Learns to Live with a World Order Other than Its Own

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The European Union started as a "self-centred" project meant to ensure peace on the European continent. It built itself around a unique paradigm of cooperation based on a set of common values, which it placed higher in its "cosmogony" than any or each of the diverging interests of its individual Member States. It instrumentalised cooperation by building the single market and increasing interdependence to the point where the socio-economic costs of divorce from the Union would themselves be incentive enough to keep investing in this cooperative paradigm. It has since delivered peace, stability, cooperation, the world's largest single market, and a quality of life matched by few other nations, with economic prosperity going hand in hand with good governance, democracy, and human rights.

Winner Takes All

It became the most accomplished model for implementation of the global order promoted by the winners of WWII and formalised in the Bretton Woods institutions, in the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one designed to prevent large-scale war, foster cooperation among the nations of the world in both trade and international affairs, and affirm universal human rights. The European Economic Community provided the economic and political model to follow for former colonies after they gained their independence. Then, ending up again on the winning side after the Cold War, the EEC-turned-EU added geographic expansion to the deepening of integration. The countries behind the former Iron Curtain did not just seek to follow in the footsteps of the Union's political and economic development, they sought to join the club altogether. "This process of integration, a subtle weaving of shared interests, which is so nearly complete in Western Europe, has now finally begun in the East. We want to help the nations of Eastern Europe realise what we, the nations of Western Europe, learned long ago: The foundation of lasting security comes not from tanks, troops, or barbed wire; it is built on shared values and agreements that link free peoples," said the late American President George H.W. Bush in his famous "Europe Whole and Free" speech in Mainz, 31 May 1989,[1] laying out the same vision of a united Europe that both ensures its own peace and serves as a model for others, just by strengthening its shared values and cooperation among its Member States.

The EU has always been a successful project, carried on by the drivers of 20th-century history, and has drawn others to it with the combined force of its attraction of power and success. It has mostly stood like a "city upon a hill," to borrow the American political phrase: successful, enviable, haughty, magnanimous, engaging with those who sought its friendship, guidance, cooperation or authority, but focused primarily on consolidating its own internal peace, prosperity, solidarity, and integration. Its international standing and leverage were part legacy (of its former colonial history) and part side effect of its admirable recovery and progress after WWII. For most of its existence, the Union has not made a priority out of becoming a global power player and has consistently refused to look at the world through a

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Realpolitik lens, susceptible of awakening monsters it had striven hard to bury. The current state of its common defence and foreign policy testifies to the Member States' lack of interest in pooling resources and decision-making to leverage size and political-economic influence in the hard-power realm.

The EU has enjoyed the status of global power, though it came relatively effortlessly, absent any significant competition. Allied America relieved Europe from having to worry about its capacity for hard-power projection even during the Cold War years, allowing it to focus on its uncontested growth and ever-stronger unity. While the world stood divided between two competing economic and political models, the EU had little reason to aspire to more than just internal success of its original purpose. After all, competition between the two blocs was not about convincing the other side of the righteousness of one's own model, but preserving cohesion and the loyalty of one's own citizens while pushing the adversary to lose that of its own, fail miserably and collapse. Yet again, economic and social-political success was the most convincing in the Western narrative.

This particular blend of democratic order and prosperity-generating open-market capitalism accounts for the decades of undisputed success and attractiveness of the EU: it was able to claim efficiency in satisfying most human aspirations, legitimising its collective and supra-national model. A self-development experiment whose initial design was only marginally concerned with any external power projection, the EU has achieved results above and beyond its planned aims, including outside its borders, for as long as it was able to demonstrate superior ability to deliver both freedom and prosperity. As such, it inspired others to follow in its footsteps, seek close relations and, where possible, join the club. This almost involuntary success hit a wall when autocratic regimes limiting human rights and civil liberties divorced their political behaviour from the generation of economic failure and poverty.

The World has Changed

From China to Europe, the autocratic regimes of today no longer necessarily consolidate power at the expense of their citizens' prosperity. In fact, the

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formidable strength of the Western model is reflected in how convincingly it has imposed democracy as the best of all existing systems, to the extent that nowadays, rather than challenge it, the new autocrats claim in fact to be its only true guardians, protecting it from alterations brought about by the dictates of self-serving liberal elites. What they do is try to void the democratic framework of substance while keeping the form—an empty shell, rightly described as autocratic legalism.[2] They claim absolute legitimacy for their decisions, since this was conferred upon them by the popular vote, and claim to be catering to the interests of the majority and to be protecting them against abuses from minorities (i.e., LGBTQ, corporations, Brussels bureaucrats, etc.), to whom "political correctness," "neo-Marxism" and so on have allegedly given an outsized say over the collective fate of the populace. They also claim to be the actual defenders of equality and human rights. The ruling coalition in Romania has denounced the anti-corruption fight of recent years as politically targeted and sought to reverse it, to "restore equality in front of the law," when in reality placing its own corrupt leadership above the law. In Poland, PiS claims to be restoring social justice by taking power back from the hands of a privileged national elite and giving it back to "the people." In Hungary, Orbán brands himself as a fighter against a transnational elite riding on the back of globalisation, as do Salvini, Le Pen, and Farage.

What is it that has led to the success of populists and "illiberals," even in countries that should remember all too well their struggle under communist dictatorships? Very likely, apart from other factors (the appeal of a discourse critical of traditional politics and policies, often indeed inadequate to current realities) it is the fact that they mix the usual self-enrichment and power consolidation with a fair amount of redistribution (even where they do not necessarily empower "the people," they disempower the globalist elites).[3] That is to say that established democracies have not stopped delivering prosperity and a fair society and the vote in favour of populists does not reflect a genuine belief that the latter will necessarily provide better results. It rather reflects the hope that anti-establishment forces will unseat the winners of the present institutional and ideological architecture,[4] which they allegedly designed so they could profit from it,

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while marginalising others, generating an increase in in-country inequality and a drop in the quality of democracy.[5]

As long as democracy was seen as going hand in hand with increased prosperity, unlike other competing systems, the buy-in was natural, since true freedom can only exist in the absence of poverty. What we are experiencing these days is a double challenge: after 2008, European democracies have been perceived[6] as failing to deliver a sustainable increase in quality of life and fair redistribution, whereas some autocracies have managed significant rates of improvement. In Turkey, material deprivation has gone down from 73.4% in 2010 to 41.3% in 2017. In Hungary, it is down from 45.4% in 2013 to 19.6% in 2018. Poverty reduction in China follows the same pattern.

These numbers reflect the changing landscape in the global economy and its social impact. This is not to say that democracy has stopped delivering (although it may have underperformed) or that autocracies are better placed to do that—they often generate prosperity in the short run at the expense of long-term development. It is simply the case that confronted with fast-evolving global shifts, the constituencies of democracies no longer feel protected: institutions appear rigid, slow in adjusting and making decisions, politicians seem unprepared and in the service of the business and social elites to which they belong. By contrast, centralised autocratic leadership, with its minimal consultation process and no opposition, populist and often radical decisions, create an impression of efficiency and determination. The long-term consequences are something electorates don't often bother considering.

A House Divided against Itself Cannot Stand

On the other hand, the EU has gradually raised expectations, to possibly unrealistic levels. The promise of converging levels of stability, democracy, and prosperity in Bulgaria as in Germany, which may have fed the imagination of Bulgarians before accession, increasingly seems like utopia, especially as older Member States ask that cohesion funds be linked to performance and rule of law—another ill that has turned out to be harder

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to cure than initially projected. Overall security and quality of life within the borders of the EU now look sustainable only as long as the Union preserves the ability to isolate itself from the "brave new world" outside. The mass-migration crisis was the first failed test and other challenges have followed, from the conundrum of European defence to Chinese business coming into Europe, Russian malign influence, and the competition for influence between multinational companies and governments.

Briefly put, the EU held strong for as long as it was able to stay closed upon itself. But the bubble has now burst under outside pressure, coupled with some internal unfinished business, and the cracks risk turning into a gaping abyss. Frustrations about the Union's diminishing role on the international scene are misplaced since from the beginning it was a self-serving project *par excellence*. Disillusionment with internal delivery, however, can deal a fatal blow to the edifice, because it fails exactly on this initial promise.

A recent ECFR internal study shows representative samples in 14 countries feel that the EU and/or their country's political systems are broken: in most countries surveyed, only a minority, as low as 6% in Greece, 7% in Romania, 9% in Italy, or 10% in France, still trust either Brussels or their own capitals to cater to their interests. The study also provides an explanation as to why: second to immigration, unemployment is seen as the biggest problem (by 20% of those surveyed), followed by the cost of living, health, corruption, pensions, economy, environment, crime (housing is the second-biggest concern in Germany!). External threats like terrorism and security challenges are rated as significant by none to 5% of respondents. One in three Europeans considers that the EU has been detrimental to their country's prosperity; two out of three are unsure their children may have a better future than their own. Given the serious brain drain in several EU countries, over a third of EU citizens favour foregoing free movement and preventing nationals from leaving the country for long periods of time as a policy response, despite the fact that for many of the same citizens, this is one of the main perks of living in the Union.

This sends a clear message that there is a growing perception within the EU itself that the Union is failing. Worsening healthcare, housing, education, loss of jobs to automation and relocation to cheaper places,

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declining democratic standards and rising in-country inequality are to a large extent objective realities. Additionally, though, the EU struggles to regain legitimacy and leadership to advance the political project. With the single market at its core, Brussels has been evolving into a massive, complicated, technocratic machine but has neglected political messaging and the connection with its constituency. That dimension has been compensated for, to a certain extent, by the European Parliament and the Council, but the recent rise in intergovernmentalism only creates a perception that Brussels is dysfunctional and that political leadership and legitimacy remain in fact with the Member States. This happens at a time when people across Europe feel that they are faced with fundamental challenges that require not only a technical solution but also a strategic vision. Immigration, climate change, a shrinking middle class,[7] the nature of the family, religion, gender roles, all these seem too daunting for individual or small-scale response, and decision-makers seem hesitant in providing a sense of direction. It is worth underscoring that these issues are not unique to Europe; they are the basis for the Trump vote in the U.S. and a similar problem throughout the Western world.

...and Again, the World Waits[8]

The prevalent feeling is that we are still right in the middle of the storm: Brexit uncertainty, populism, and Euroscepticism, the East-West divide, multi-speed Europe—not a time to be building long-term grand strategies. Yet, at the same time, a positive wind of change seems to be blowing, mostly from the East, in a reversal of Bush's vision of "the great political parties of the West" assuming a "historic responsibility to lend counsel and support to those brave men and women who are trying to form the first truly representative political parties in the East, to advance freedom and democracy ...." New liberal, pro-European political parties and leaders scoring highly in Slovakia and Romania, high turnout in EU elections in several countries, impeccable democratic alternation to power and political accountability in Greece (with Syriza's dignified loss to New Democracy), rejection of the radicals in the Netherlands, the "Renew Europe" group

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as an influential voice in the European Parliament, etc. This shows the EU as a living body, with its uncertainties and frustrations, but debating them within the framework of a democratic process in which many of the 400 million potential voters willingly choose to participate. This could well contradict those forecasting doom for the European project.

The task ahead for a truly united Europe is to regain its ability to deliver prosperity and democracy at home, within the EU and beyond. It will have to bring along with it not only the "post-material" generation but also those who feel they are the losers of globalisation. This cannot be done in isolation from a reflection on Europe's role in the new global order where the West is no longer the sole decision-maker and inspiration. The focus needn't be on projecting power abroad, but firstly on adjusting so that it can continue to lead by example, but this time in a much more globally fluid environment, which easily penetrates the European bubble.

European defence is unlikely to materialise and emancipate from the United States—and it shouldn't. The transatlantic relation is a difficult and unpredictable one, but investment in keeping it alive and kicking is worth every headache. Last but not least, Europe is not yet "whole and free." Enlargement advances painfully slowly and is very different in character from what we pictured in the 1990s, as we now face competition in our immediate neighbourhood from the aggressive revisionism of Russia to the growing influence of China, Turkey, or the Gulf states. "Strategic patience" in this respect may not be something we can avoid altogether, but otherwise the EU is in retreat only as compared to earlier expectations. It remains the main investor in development and democratic transformation in its neighbourhood—perhaps it is high time it just learnt to connect the two more coherently to achieve scale and strategic results. It also needs a more articulate strategic posture and the capabilities to back it vis-a-vis Russian and Chinese influence, as well as any other disruptors whose goal is to thwart precisely the EU delivery and projection capacity and to undermine its agenda, rather than create an alternative.

The promise of a "Europe Whole and Free," came after decades of the world waiting for the Cold War to end. We may have to spend some time waiting again, this time for the current "hot peace,"[9] to cool a bit before we can take more ambitious steps forward. It remains of essence, in the

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meantime, that we "look ahead and grasp the promise of the future," in every way, rather than being distracted by the challenges of the present and resuming ourselves to short-termism. We must engage in conversation about the future while avoiding the trap of settling for the lowest common denominator. The political project would then have lost all ambition—and its public. The primary objective though needs to be the preservation of the European construction itself, above everything else and any differences or conversations about the future. Unity remains the one overarching virtue and strength of the Union, even more so in troubled times.

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Bruno Tertrais

The Thirty-Year False Peace: A Mostly Free, but Divided Europe

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet.
Rudyard Kipling, The Ballad of East and West

Having avoided major war from 1945 to 1989, Europe has since lived in a false peace. The continent has been marred by conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, and Ukraine.

The promises of a Europe whole and free have been only partly fulfilled, and many divisions on the continent remain. Some are intra-European, though not necessarily East-West. And Russia is drifting away from most of Europe, shattering the 1989 illusion of a unified space from the Atlantic to the Urals, a space of freedom from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

While responsibilities for the current state of affairs in Europe are to some extent shared, most rest largely with the Kremlin.

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Taking Stock of the Family Reunion

Most of Europe has been reunited and is no longer "disassociated like a neurotic," in the words of Carl Gustav Jung.

The entry of former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and Warsaw Pact members in the European Union (EU) and in NATO was more a movement of countries re-joining the European family (outside-in) than an expansion (inside-out).

EU enlargement has been an economic success. Most of the new members are growing more quickly than the old ones and have relatively low levels of unemployment. They have benefited from an increase in trade and foreign direct investment. This has not been without costs: national debts have risen and large population segments have suffered from economic and social reforms. Overall, however, EU enlargement has benefited the Union as a whole.

The same goes for NATO enlargement. Few new members have brought in significant and modern defence capabilities and enlargement has complicated the task of NATO planners. But NATO enlargement also has a political logic and an assessment of its value cannot be reduced to a cost-efficiency calculation. Joining Western institutions has forced members to solve border problems with their neighbours. By reassuring members of their security, Western institutions have limited the risks of strategic drift and renationalisation of defence.

But a new divide is looming. As a French journalist put it in 2019, "Eastern Europe is back in the vocabulary."[1] Political freedoms do seem to indicate an East-West divide. According to The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) report for 2018, countries in the eastern part of the continent are all "flawed democracies" or "hybrid regimes." According to the Freedom House report of 2019, there are indeed several "partly free" or "not free" countries in the eastern part of the continent. Population trends show the same divide: most western countries are growing while most eastern ones are declining.

A more nuanced view might be more appropriate. First, the EIU analysis does not show a clear-cut divide between East and West. Second, as noted by Anne Applebaum, "a clear line divides the region into two camps: those countries that formed part of the Soviet bloc from 1918 and those that did

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so from 1945."[2] Third, the most appropriate division is in fact between the northwestern and southeastern parts of the continent. Such a division is relevant for GDP per capita, youth unemployment, monthly wages, and other factors. Citizens in Eastern and Southeastern Europe are also those who believe that religion is a key part of their national identity, according to a 2018 Pew Research Center study. The success of populist forces in the 2018 Italian elections show that this trend is not limited to Central and Eastern Europe.

Europe thus remains divided to some extent—but not the way it was during the Cold War.

A False Narrative about NATO Enlargement

By and large, NATO's enlargement has also been a success story, but many have suggested that the alliance reneged on a promise and thereby provoked Russia. This narrative is a rewriting of history.

In 1990, Bonn and Washington assured Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO forces would not be stationed in the eastern German *Länder* of a unified Germany. At that time, the Warsaw Pact still existed, and none of its members had declared their interest in joining. Gorbachev has declared that "the topic of 'NATO expansion' was never discussed; it was not raised in those years. (..) Not a single Eastern European country brought up the issue, not even after the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist in 1991. Western leaders didn't bring it up, either."[3] Enlargement was not a hot topic in NATO circles in 1990-1991: the new democracies were encouraged to seek integration into the EU. In the early 1990s, several Western leaders did declare that they would not seek Eastern European countries to join the Alliance or that they did not think it could happen. But no promise was ever made to not enlarge to the east of Germany.

Scholars who argue otherwise refer to alleged Soviet perceptions. But there is scant archival evidence that such perceptions existed. Moreover, such a promise would have broken by the Helsinki Final Act, which grants "the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance." And if such assurances had been given, can one believe that Moscow would have not

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insisted that they are put in written form and/or made public one way or the other?

On the contrary, NATO has gone to great lengths to reassure Russia. In 1996, NATO stated that "in the current and foreseeable security environment" it had "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. It agreed to revise the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on terms favourable to Moscow. In 1997, it stated that it had no reason to seek the "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." A few days later, Boris Yeltsin asked Bill Clinton to refuse any admission of a former Soviet Republic; Clinton declined, and this would not deter Yeltsin from signing the Founding Act. Yeltsin recognized that he had "failed" to persuade Clinton and did not make it a cause for crisis.

Putin also did not make the second wave of NATO enlargement a *casus belli* with the West. When it was decided in 2002 to invite the Baltic states, he stated that it would not be a "tragedy." Moscow welcomed the creation of the NATO-Russia Council. In the following years, relations with the West were good. Russia hoped that its contribution to counterterrorism would lead to a recognition of its security needs: it politely criticized the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, participated in Operation *Active Endeavor*, and welcomed a nuclear accident response exercise in Russia.

The case for enlargement to the east as a NATO provocation is thus dubious.

Russia's Place: Attempts at Uniting the Continent

The West has gone to lengths to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic family. The 1990 London summit declared the end of the Cold War. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1991 signalled an intention to put an end to the division of Europe. The U.S. created a joint U.S.-Russia Commission. In 1994, NATO and Russia agreed to set in train the development of a far-reaching relationship. Russia signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document, endorsed the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and signed the Founding Act on NATO-Russia relations.

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Moscow was admitted to the G8. In 1999, it endorsed the Charter for European Security, adopted in Istanbul, as well as the Adapted CFE Treaty.

Up until 2014, relations between the EU and Russia were cordial. Economic integration was increasing. The 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements were met with minimal immediate objections from Moscow. EU enlargement intensified EU-Russia trade and investment relations.

In 1990, meetings of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) resulted in the adoption of common norms on democracy and human rights that seemed to herald the complete end of the ideological division of Europe. The adoption of the "consensus minus one" rule allowed for the operationalisation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia were models for reconstruction. The Vienna Document of 1999 contained a range of confidence- and security-building measures aimed at creating military trust on the continent. In parallel, Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996 and signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU. Then things started to go downhill.

Moscow's second war in Chechnya led to a suspension of its voting rights in the Council of Europe. Then it turned against the OSCE. Due to Russian obstructionism, the organisation proved unable to solve conflicts in the periphery. In 2000, Moscow blocked consensus for the first time. In 2003, it unsuccessfully attempted to have the OSCE legitimise Russian pre-eminence in Moldova. It accused the OSCE of having encouraged the "colour revolutions" of 2003–2005. At the same time, it refused the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy, requesting a special status. In 2007, it suspended its participation in the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (ACFE) treaty.

The invasion of Ukraine was the break-up moment. As former U.S. diplomat William Hill put it, "by mid-2014, Europe had essentially once again become divided into two separate, mutually antagonistic camps."[4] The work of the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was made almost impossible by pro-Russian forces. Western diplomats have no doubt that the OSCE crisis is attributable to the very well-thought-out long-term strategy of Russia. Moscow now constantly refuses compromise language, blocks the appointment of officials, encourages the closing down of OSCE

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offices, and seeks to nullify norms inherited from the Helsinki Final Act. The organisation's budget is funded at 95% by Western countries but Russia does not want to increase its own contribution as long as the sanctions against it are not lifted. In the Council of Europe, where Russian voting rights were once again suspended in 2014, Moscow stopped funding the organisation. In 2019, a compromise was reached through which Russia would regain its voting rights in return for paying its outstanding debt.

Could Things Have Turned Out Differently?

The narrative of missed opportunities does not stand up to scrutiny. A report for the OSCE argues that "the vision of a new European security architecture … did not stand the test of the 1990s" and that "the 'CSCE moment' in 1989–1990 was already over before it could take off. By mid-1990, the original Soviet goal of a CSCE summit and the floating pan-European visions had all collapsed."[5] It suggests that the West took advantage of Soviet weakness. Others mention an "insecurity spiral," blaming "Western reluctance to adapt Europe's post-Cold War security institutions to craft a place for Russia" and a process that "kept Russia out of Europe's security architecture."[6]

But such authors rarely explain how a different pathway to unite Europe could have been taken. Should NATO have been disbanded? But why would its members have terminated the most successful alliance in history? And would that really have been a guarantee that Russia would never again become aggressive? Hill's book never once puts its finger on the key issue: NATO's *collective defence* functions could not have been subsumed into a *collective security* organisation.

Could Russia have been admitted to NATO? Gorbachev and Yeltsin floated the idea but never submitted an application. The country is hardly a valid candidate due to its geographic and demographic size, as well as its political identity—Russia was always half-Asian. It is also dubious that NATO would have been ready to commit to the defence of Russia against China or that Moscow would have been willing to defend the U.S.

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In 2009, Moscow proposed a treaty on a new security architecture for the continent. The text was vague but the intent was clear: to have a decisive say on any strategic decision that would be seen as affecting its security and maintain dominance of its neighbourhood. Hill would later describe it in his book as "a preventive, restraining document, designed to restrict the freedom of action of other Euro-Atlantic actors from undertaking actions or activities of which Russia did not approve."[7]

Moscow has always sought to downgrade the importance of NATO and get a veto on European security decisions. Former U.S. diplomat William Burns concludes that the question "Who Lost Russia?" misses the point: "Russia was never ours to lose ... The sense of loss and indignity that came with defeat in the Cold War was unavoidable ... From that humiliation, and from the disorder of Yeltsin's Russia, grew the deep distrust and smouldering aggressiveness of Putin's."[8]

The Kremlin as the Main Obstacle to a Europe Whole and Free

Russia *could* have played the OSCE game and, absent a unification of Europe's institutional landscape, a relationship of good neighbourliness could have developed. But Russian revanchism was too strong. As an author put it: "history shows that Russia has only been satisfied with its role in Europe when it has dominated its neighbours."[9]

This manifested itself very early after the end of the Cold War. Great-power status concerns and nationalism became the primary driver of Russian policies. NATO's intervention in Kosovo fuelled paranoia in Russia, but 1999 is also the year when Putin came to power. This was as much a turning point as bombing Belgrade.

The success of EU enlargement became a problem for Russia. By the mid-2000s, Moscow realised that former satellites were escaping from its orbit. Integration into the EU may have had a deeper and greater impact than NATO membership through the stringent requirements of the accession process. It led new members to turn their gaze to Europe rather than Russia. The 2008 NATO decision to put Georgia and Ukraine on an accession path (and the recognition of Kosovo's independence) may

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have rattled the Kremlin's nerves, but the 2013 choice by Kyiv to sign an Association Agreement with the EU may have been as important. When Barack Obama downgraded Russia by calling it in 2014 a "regional power," the damage had already been done.

Today's Russia shows no interest in being just another European country. Russian writings emphasize the messianic role of Moscow with a mission to save European culture and the distinct nature of the country's civilisation. Moscow's ruling circles are inspired by a combination of *Slavophilia* and *Eurasism*. This is reflected in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015.

The Russian project runs counter to that of a Europe whole and free. The expression *blizhnoe zarubezhe* encapsulates the Russian vision: Moscow cannot stand the idea that former tributaries choose the Western camp. The Kremlin feels a responsibility for the whole *Russkiy mir*. Says Putin: "our country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad."[10] He does not care about borders: "for me, it is not borders and state territories that matter, but people's fortunes."[11] Nowhere is this truer than Ukraine, which he sees as belonging to the same space as Russia. He reportedly told George W. Bush in 2008 that Ukraine was "not a state." He openly regrets Ukrainian independence, and for him, the country's borders are "arbitrary."

Russia seeks to divide Europe into spheres of influence and weaken the Alliance. The essence of Putin's Russia is to consider itself a fortress embattled by the West. The Kremlin has succeeded in making this vision popular. "Most Russians today see the world as consisting mainly of intransigent enemies of Russia engaged, at best, in a zero-sum game, or, at worst, in a hidden war against their motherland,"[12] according to a German analyst.

What to Do?

In 2018, Vladislav Surkov, an adviser to Putin, wrote that "Russia's epic journey toward the West" was over, and that after the Ukraine crisis Russia would face "a hundred years (...) of geopolitical solitude." The author did

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not seem to regret it, referring to Moscow's "repeated fruitless attempts to become a part of Western civilisation."[13] This does not mean that Russia will accept the status quo. It will continue to advance its interests in the soft underbelly of Europe—Belarus, Ukraine, the Balkans, and the Caucasus.

The right attitude is to leave the door open to further enlargement of the EU and NATO, at least in the Balkans and in the north. Well-meaning schemes amounting to the neutralisation of non-members would amount to appeasement. This does not mean we should rush to enlarge further. Several EU members have not upheld their commitments to consolidate the rule of law and fight corruption. Accepting Ukraine or Georgia into NATO (or the EU) as long as their territorial integrity is not assured would not be a wise move.

But NATO members could reiterate their 1990 statement that "the consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are … of direct and material concern" to the Alliance. It should also reconsider its unilateral reassurance statements of 1996 and 1997.

Meanwhile, regarding the rest of the continent, we should all be mindful of not speaking of an East-West division. "Europe's leaders, east and west, face a choice. They can treat the continent as one: the product of a rough history of geographically differentiated leaps forward and lurches backward in which no nation has a monopoly on progress … (o)r they can accept the dichotomy of east and west and aspire, at best, to build wobbly bridges between the two. The former path offers the better way forward. The latter points to collapse."[14]

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Heinrich Brauss

A Europe Whole and Free: Vision, Accomplishment, or Unfulfilled Pledge —A NATO Perspective

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It was a time of profound political change in Europe when U.S. President George H.W. Bush gave his legendary speech on "Europe whole and free" in May 1989 in Mainz, Germany. The Cold War was coming to its end and a new era was looming. Only some six months later, the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain that had divided Germany and Europe for decades were taken down. In October 1990, Germany celebrated its unification. In 1991, the Warsaw Pact was disbanded and the Soviet Union fell apart. Central and East European countries attained liberty and national sovereignty. The political and strategic landscape in Europe changed fundamentally. It was an historic, peaceful revolution.

These developments came about due to the brave Polish people of *Solidarność*, the hundreds of thousands of marchers in eastern Germany, the leadership of German Chancellor Kohl, the wisdom of Russian President Gorbachev, and President Bush's exemplary engagement. His proposals to help Europe become whole and free and at peace were meant to allow for a "second renaissance of Europe." The values, principles, and policies that had led to a democratic, prosperous, and peaceful Western Europe after World War II should also shape the development of Eastern Europe.

A Europe Whole and Free: A Promising Start to a New Era

In strategic terms, the stability of the West was to be transferred to the East, leading to comprehensive security and stability for the whole of Europe. During the Cold War, strategic stability was maintained primarily by means of a precarious balance of large conventional military forces and a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons underpinning the so-called mutually assured destruction capability. Had deterrence failed, Europe would have been the battlefield of a devastating war. In the new era, stability was supposed to come about where (1) internal reforms led to democracy, rule of law, and a market economy; (2) former adversaries became new partners, old disputes were settled, minority rights respected, and good neighbourly relationships established; and, (3) key political and security institutions were adapted to support the new momentum in moving from confrontation to cooperation—in particular NATO and the European Union.

This transfer of stability required a strategy and an institutional framework. In his speech to the International Institute of Strategic Studies on the occasion of the 1993 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture in London,[1] German Defence Minister Volker Rühe presented the concept of combining "integration" and "cooperation" to shape European security towards lasting stability—opening NATO and the EU to Central and Eastern European nations and enhancing political, economic, and military cooperation with Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, in view of new crises and conflicts outside NATO's borders, but affecting Europe's

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security, he suggested transforming NATO to become capable of managing crises "out of area."

Rühe's forward-looking concept shaped the development of the European security landscape in the following years. It obviously required the United States' full buy-in and leadership under President Clinton to implement the concept. As an example, NATO's milestone program, the Partnership for Peace, which was launched in 1994, allowed for both, deepening military cooperation with new partners to improve interoperability for common peace support operations and preparing aspiring European nations for NATO membership. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which in 1997 developed from the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, provided a multilateral forum for regular political dialogue on security-related issues between the then 16 allies and more than 30 European and Asiatic partner nations. And in the Western Balkans, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo, NATO conducted its first peace support operations beyond NATO's borders, together with many partner forces, including from Russia and Ukraine, to bring the atrocious wars accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia to an end and to help implement the ensuing peace settlements.

Parallel to NATO's enlargement, the EU also opened up. Between 2004 and 2013, a total of 13 countries became new members—complemented by the Eastern Partnership involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus. In addition, the EU began developing its crisis-management capacity, eventually leading the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Meanwhile, the EU has conducted some 35 civilian and small-scale military operations and missions, mainly in Africa.

When it comes to cooperation with Russia and the other post-Soviet states, the U.S. and Germany again led the process. By way of the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, Russia was offered a privileged partnership, primarily through the Permanent Joint Council, which in 2002 was transformed into the NATO-Russia Council, providing a forum for "consultation, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect to security issues of common concern" in defined areas. In addition, duly considering

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Russia's concerns, NATO unilaterally committed itself not to deploy any nuclear weapons or "additional permanent substantial combat forces" on the territory of new members, but to carry out its collective defence mission by ensuring the necessary integration, capability for reinforcement, and infrastructure. Moreover, since 1990, the allies had significantly reduced their armed forces and restructured them into lighter, deployable forces for peace support operations. They had also drastically decreased the number of nuclear weapons in Europe and kept engaged in negotiations with Russia on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. Furthermore, the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU provided another mechanism for political consultations and decision-making. And the Group of Seven advanced industrialised countries admitted Russia to become the G-8. In parallel, NATO and Ukraine agreed a Distinct Partnership and set up the NATO-Ukraine Commission to enhance political and military cooperation.

Europe Whole and Free: How Far Have We Come?

It is safe to say that the "integration" path to a Europe whole and free has advanced successfully. At NATO's 70th birthday in spring 2019, NATO's foreign ministers in Washington recalled its achievements as the most successful alliance in history, commemorated 20 years of NATO membership of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and marked the 15th anniversary of the accession of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Meanwhile, NATO has 29 members and will grow to 30 when North Macedonia joins. The parallel NATO and EU enlargement processes providing for both security and political-economic restoration, combined with a network of new partnerships, have expanded the zone of stability in Europe forming the basis of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

Looking at the "cooperation" path, the picture is mixed. On the one hand, NATO has developed a remarkable partnership network. The establishment of relations with some 40 partner countries is one of the alliance's greatest achievements. Many of them have made considerable

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contributions to NATO-led operations, such as in Afghanistan, thereby adding legitimacy, enhancing interoperability and mutual political understanding and sharing common burdens.

Cooperation with Russia, however, has developed far less successfully. In the 1990s, President Yeltsin tried to reform Russia and associate it with the "political West" and contribute to cooperative security in Europe in line with the 1990 Charter of Paris. Nonetheless, Moscow was against NATO's enlargement as a perceived unfavourable power shift in Europe, but could eventually accept it, as the Founding Act provided for a special relationship between Russia and NATO. Over time, however, President Putin has returned to Russia's traditional power politics and revived its antagonism to NATO. He has sought to restore Russia's great power status, on par with the United States, demanding a "zone of privileged interest" (Medvedev) in Russia's "near abroad," at the expense of the sovereignty of its neighbours, and a historical right to interfere in the affairs of certain European regions, such as the Western Balkans.

Essentially for that reason, from the outset there has been a conceptual tension between the integration of new members and enhanced cooperation with Russia. New allies who had shaken off the yoke of Soviet dominance were less interested in cooperation with Moscow than reassurance against what they perceived to be its persistent imperial ambitions. A larger NATO has denied Moscow the option of controlling or vetoing the development of their security. Russia's counterproposals therefore tried to diminish NATO's role. For example, the proposal made by President Medvedev in 2009 on a new "European Security Treaty" as well as his subsequent "sectoral" missile defence proposal, with eastern parts of NATO territory in Russia's "sector," would have granted Moscow a veto in NATO's decision-making and were therefore rejected.

It seems that Moscow's attitude is ultimately due to its perceived need to safeguard autocratic rule in Russia itself. The "Colour Revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine, along with NATO's membership promises to both countries, created the risk of democratic regime-change spillover into Russia itself—a *casus belli* for Putin. The wars against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 enforced a red line prohibiting former members of the Soviet Union (other than the Baltic states, which had already become

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NATO members and whose incorporation into the Soviet Union was never recognised by the West) to join the transatlantic community. Meanwhile, Russia stands in violation of numerous key treaties or agreements relevant to Europe's security and stability and has broken one of its fundamental political principles—not to change borders by force.

In sum, as Rühle has noted,[2] some key assumptions inspiring the post-Cold War development of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture have failed. Russia does not want to be part of President Bush's "Europe whole and free." The institutional integration of democratic nations ensures equal security for all of them, whether great or small. In Russia's view, however, equal security only applies to great powers. Yet, the alliance cannot negate its values, principles, and commitments to accommodate the geopolitical interests and objectives of Putin's autocratic regime. Also, Moscow does not offer any alternative political, economic, or security model that European nations would wish to join. Putin's Russia has become a revisionist and belligerent power, which has attacked its neighbours, occupied parts of their territories, and supports a murderous regime in Syria. As a consequence, NATO's core business of deterrence and collective defence—adapted to today's political and geostrategic circumstances—has been revitalised. In parallel, the EU has imposed sanctions. Yet, it is struggling to play its role in fully contributing to Europe's security. The historical disputes on the Western Balkans that erupted after the Cold War remain "unfinished business." The repercussions of the 2008 financial crisis, the effects of migration, the growing success of authoritarian politicians and populist parties in some countries, Russia's destabilisation campaigns and in particular the envisaged exit of the UK from the EU, have shaken its cohesion and effectiveness considerably.

As a result of all of that, it is dubious whether the full implementation of President Bush's vision is possible. For the foreseeable future, NATO and the EU have to make every effort to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic community as currently defined by their memberships remains whole and free—focusing on internal cohesion and stability and addressing external challenges and opportunities.

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A Europe Whole and Free: Looking to the Future

Considering Europe's future requires looking at the strategic environment, which has fundamentally changed since 2014. To the east, Russia's aggressive posture and hybrid warfare aim to destabilise Western societies and undermine NATO and the EU. To the south, continuing crises, state failure, regional conflicts, and wars across North Africa and the Middle East have fuelled terrorism and caused mass migration affecting Europe's stability. In addition, the transatlantic community is increasingly challenged by China, which is emerging as a strategic competitor.

Containing the geopolitical threat from Russia and projecting stability to the south are the immediate challenges NATO has to tackle. Consequently, the alliance needs to be able to respond to multiple threats from multiple regions across NATO's entire area and on short notice—from the north through the Baltic and Black sea regions to the Mediterranean region and the Middle East. The wide spectrum of challenges requires NATO to retain maximum awareness, flexibility, and agility to ensure it has the right forces in the right place at the right time. This necessitates rapid decision-making, forces at high readiness, and the ability to move them rapidly over great distances.

NATO has set up an ambitious programme to achieve this. A few examples: The NATO Response Force has been tripled in size to become a joint high-readiness force of some 40,000 troops. Its "spearhead" force of some 5,000 troops is ready to move within a few days. The multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland, led by the UK, Canada, Germany, and the U.S., demonstrate that even in case of a limited incursion, Russia would immediately be confronted with the alliance as a whole, including its three nuclear powers. The U.S. has significantly increased its commitment to, and funding for, Europe's security under the European Deterrence Initiative—$6.5 billion in 2019 for additional combat forces, enablers, pre-positioning of equipment, exercises, and improving infrastructure. In the Black Sea region, NATO's presence is being enhanced through multinational exercises and additional air and maritime activities. The Framework for the South improves NATO's understanding of the southern region, situational awareness, and ability to respond effectively

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to crises, including with forces, if needed. Projecting stability, however, is primarily being pursued by means of assisting partners, such as Jordan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but also Ukraine and Georgia, in their efforts to provide for their own security.

As decided at the 2018 Brussels summit, NATO's responsiveness is being further enhanced. Again, a few examples: Decision-making for short-notice crises is being improved. The NATO Command Structure is being adapted to include a Cyber Operations Centre and to reacquire capabilities to command the whole range of operations, including large-scale collective defence. Two new commands, one in the U.S., one in Germany, are in charge of moving forces across the Atlantic and across Europe. Alliance cyberdefence is improving and an offensive cyber capability is being developed. The NATO Readiness Initiative "4x30" will lead, by 2020, to 30 manoeuvre battalions, 30 kinetic air squadrons, and 30 warships at a maximal 30 days' notice to employ in theatre. These forces will develop into a number of larger formations—combat brigades, maritime task groups, and enhanced air wings at very high readiness. Together, these efforts aim to reinvigorate a culture of *readiness* in the alliance.

Full and expeditious implementation of NATO's strengthened posture is what matters. Russia's "strategy of active defence" (General Gerasimov, Russia's chief of defence[3]) and constant confrontation aims to intimidate and upset allies through hybrid combinations of non-military and military means, such as disinformation, deception, cyberattacks, or large-scale exercises on NATO's borders. They are designed to avoid open military aggression but blur the boundaries between peace and conflict, create ambiguity and thus compromise allies' decision-making. Russia's regional military superiority, rapidly deployable forces, and manifold long-range strike capabilities grant it the option of launching a rapid, "pre-emptive" attack to achieve a limited land grab and underpin any such military gains by a nuclear threat to confront NATO with a *fait accompli*.

Russia's breach of the INF treaty and the deployment of new land-based intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles has brought to mind its significant arsenal of sub-strategic nuclear weapons. It is capable of striking every capital and key civilian and military infrastructure in Europe, but leaves U.S. territory unaffected, thus decoupling Europe's security from

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that of the United States and putting NATO's unity and collective defence at risk. Attempts at blackmail through integrated use of conventional and nuclear means could disrupt NATO already in a crisis.

NATO must therefore pursue three priorities: (1) Foster state and societal resilience against cyberattacks and disinformation; (2) deny Russia any *fait accompli* by ensuring rapid reinforcement, profoundly improving air and missile defences, and further enhancing rotational forward presence of air, land, and maritime forces, including the persistent presence of U.S. units in the Baltic states; and, (3) develop appropriate countermeasures to neutralise Russia's regional nuclear threat. All suitable options should be considered, including land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Moscow needs to realise that again embarking on arms control is in its own security interest. The alliance must therefore maintain its dual approach of strengthening deterrence and meaningful dialogue with Russia. It is not only important to avoid misjudgement and unintended incidents but also to maintain political understanding and predictability. At the same time, efforts to support an independent Ukraine must continue.

Looking beyond Europe and its neighbourhood, China's growing economic and technological potential and declared ambition to become a world power is a challenge for the transatlantic community as a whole.[4] As the transatlantic political forum to discuss all security matters of common concern, NATO should address the manifold implications of China's strategy in order to develop a common approach. As the U.S. will likely shift its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region over time, European nations will need to contribute much more to the security of Europe, to NATO's deterrence and defence posture and crisis management beyond its borders, as well as support the U.S. in upholding freedom of navigation, which is essential for Europe's economies.

It is the totality of the strategic challenges posed to the transatlantic partners together that makes equitable burden-sharing a strategic necessity. European nations have to take their full part in ensuring security for their own continent. This is the rationale for all Europeans to enhance defence spending, as pledged by their political leaders, to at least 2% of GDP (by 2024), invest in high-end capabilities NATO needs and enhance contributions to missions that serve NATO's and Europe's security. There

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is progress: since 2014, European allies and Canada have spent an extra $88.5 billion on defence in real terms, and the amount will increase further. As the central power in Europe with the largest economic potential, Germany has to lead by example. The readiness of the Bundeswehr is critical for both NATO and EU missions.

Common strategic challenges also require the EU to enhance its contributions to transatlantic security. In the past few years, the EU has made a significant effort to improve its civilian and military crisis-response capacity and promote developing required capabilities. While collective defence remains NATO's sole responsibility, enhancing European nations' forces and capabilities by means of the EU to strengthen its ability to act also benefits the alliance and reinforces its European pillar since 22 EU members are also NATO allies. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) supported by the European Defence Fund (EDF) is intended to create—through enhanced multinational cooperation—more and better capabilities, which will also be available to NATO. The strategic challenges posed by Russia and China, however, also require the EU to focus on those capability requirements that are essential for the whole mission spectrum, defence and crisis-response alike. Improving military mobility is a case in point: NATO and the EU work together to create the legal, logistical, and infrastructure conditions to enable rapid military movement of forces across Europe. The EU will spend several billion euros improving roads, railways, bridges, harbours, and airports. It thus contributes to facilitating the deployment of European and U.S. forces to, across and from Europe, thereby contributing to transatlantic burden-sharing. It is essential to ensure full transparency and the fullest possible involvement of non-EU allies in EU capability projects since they provide substantial contributions to Europe's security.

North America and Europe form a security community that defends democratic values and institutions that other powers contest. Together, they represent half of the world's economic output and are each other's biggest trading partners. They need to stand together against the multitude of challenges and threats that concern them both. The differences on issues such as trade, energy, or climate change must not affect NATO's effectiveness. U.S. leadership remains imperative, its military presence in

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Europe and extended nuclear deterrence vital for the security and stability of a Europe whole and free. But Europe is also vital for the U.S. to remain the global superpower it is. Europe provides the geostrategic hub for the projection of American power to other regions at limited cost, and there is no partner more valuable to the U.S. across the globe than Europe—a Europe that should act as a unified, self-determined, and capable partner of North America.

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CHAPTER THREE

FUTURE

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Krzysztof Szczerski

Four Challenges and One Solution for the Unity of Europe

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Today, when discussing Europe's future from the perspective of its security, and especially its development, we very often use such terms as "Europe" and the "European Union" interchangeably. Whenever a politician at the helm of one of the EU institutions in Brussels says that they act in the name of Europe and represent it, then they usually refer to the EU Member States. Hence, they subconsciously imply the assertion that Europe already is "whole and free" within the boundaries of the present European Union. This assumption does not seem to fit the vision presented in 1989 by President George H.W. Bush, who combined the notion of a Europe whole and a Europe free not so much with European integration itself, but with overcoming the Cold War divide. That was the point of reference for him. Hence, is this kind of identification of Europe with the European Union correct?

Obviously, it is not. Such identification of Europe with the EU may at its best be considered a mere political metaphor. As others would put it: it is

one of those political spells that are applied to turn the existing reality into a proposed condition, just as in fairy tales it is possible to turn a stone into gold by means of a magic formula.

Europe—a Dynamic Continent

The EU is a central part of Europe, but it is not the whole of Europe. In the European area, many old borders and divisions still exist and new ones are constantly being created. This, of course, is not to say that the very vision of Europe as a whole is not attractive, ambitious, and lofty.

Hence, Europe today is still neither whole nor entirely free. Its present condition must not in any way be considered similar to that of 1989, when in May, Bush delivered his historic address. Nevertheless, the difference between Europe's present state and the one 30 years ago, which for many is a miracle come true, must not be an explanation for the lack of further actions for the sake of European unity. One can often hear the sentimental phrase, if back in 1989 someone told me that the EU and NATO would extend as far as Tallinn and Sophia, I would have considered them a dreamer. That's true. Surely many of those listening to that presidential speech in Mainz would say so. However, even such a justified sense of fulfilment and satisfaction with achieving what seemed to be impossible then (and which incidentally was reflected in President Bush's text, which is marked by deep realism and pragmatism combined with a far-reaching vision) must not provide any basis for passivity in the face of presently unfolding processes. We must not be prisoners of our old dreams. As people on whose actions, decisions, and analyses the future depends, we have to be visionaries and dreamers, looking now into the time which is only about to come. We have to understand current realities and respond to emerging political trends.

Over the last 30 years, Europe, like no other continent, has managed to become an inspiration for other parts of the world as a unique laboratory of unification, with its nation-states able to demonstrate a far-reaching, shared responsibility for the future of the entire continent. That process has been especially remarkable because Europe is a continent with a very dense network of sovereign countries that share borders across a relatively

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small area, and a large number of nations, some of which feature very modest populations of distinct cultures and strong identities, that have been able to survive even extended periods of occupation without their own states.

The struggle among European countries for domination over the continent was also the reason for the outbreak of two world wars, which drew other parts of this globe into the nightmare of those conflicts. It is an unprecedented achievement that 30 years ago, Europe, which had been torn apart by the Cold War, successfully embarked on a path leading to overcoming the divisions enforced in the aftermath of those conflicts.

The magnitude of that experience has been so powerful that in their different forms, the integration processes—which are most advanced in Europe—have encompassed in recent decades also countries on other continents. The world is teeming with various regional and continental forms of cooperation. These comprise part of the globalisation process, but at the same time, they provide a response to this phenomenon, for they are aimed at integrating the potential of states on a given continent in the face of the growing importance of supranational and global hegemonic leaders, to have a chance to compete, or to simply ensure for themselves external protection from their impact in the area of production and trade, to name just one example.

Against the backdrop of these processes, Europe with its European Union is certainly the most advanced and mature of examples. By no means, however, have the unification processes been completed here either and, in some areas, we are seeing a regression from unity.

The Spectrum of European Unity

Looking from this angle, I wish to point out four types of challenges facing European unity today, due to which the call to create a Europe whole and free is still an incomplete political plan.

The first is the recurrent trend challenging the unity of the West. When in his address President Bush used the term "we," it served to illustrate the tasks and actions of "Europe on both sides of the Atlantic." The notion of the

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West was invoked in exactly the same way by U.S. President Donald Trump in his 2017 Warsaw speech. However, various European intellectual and political milieus tend to question this approach every now and then. These voices indicate the need to give up on the Atlantic bond as the foundation of Europe's political identity and to define Europe as "Non-America"—as Timothy Garton Ash terms the phenomenon. The wave of such thinking is often correlated with emotions originating from personal views of the person holding the office of the president of the United States and media assessments about him.

The first such wave occurred during the term of George W. Bush after the start of the war in Iraq, whereas the second one is happening now. These are correlated with the political interests of some of the most powerful states of continental Europe, which regard the concept of breaking the Atlantic bond as akin to cutting the umbilical cord that made them junior partners to America and thus would be a major step towards granting them an independent place as a supra-regional superpower. Yet, cracks in the West that run through the Atlantic always result in weakening Europe. Furthermore, such efforts would mean abandoning the conviction that values take precedence over short-term goals and particularistic interests.

The second challenge is a crack in the EU itself. First and foremost, the painful process of Brexit needs to be invoked at this point. Through Brexit—if ever fully implemented—the area of integrated Europe will shrink rather than expand for the first time since the launch of the integration process. The reasons behind this are manifold and their description exceeds the scope of this text. Nevertheless, there is one lesson learnt: European unity is not achieved through the multiplication of central organs and agencies. The expansion of a centralised European bureaucracy is not the source of European unity. One cannot propose the establishment of a dozen or so new central institutions in one single speech as a remedy for Europe. The source of European unity, as stipulated by the treaties, consists of the loyal cooperation of its Member States. Therefore, Europe must return to the principle of such loyal cooperation.

The word "loyal" means based on trust and on the rule that no country acts contrary to the interests of another, that we respect each other and cooperate with each other. We do not plan projects beneficial for us yet

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extremely dangerous for other states, for instance, undermining their energy security. Such efforts distort European unity.

A thousand new agencies are not going to increase European unity unless the Member States cooperate loyally with each other. The same goes for the market. Unity is also ensured by overcoming various internal divisions that already exist in Europe. Even though there is one EU, it is segmented by a multitude of internal borders. There is the eurozone, the Schengen zone, and many social models in place. Perhaps most importantly, there is still a discrepancy in the development level of different parts of Europe. This discrepancy cuts along both an east-west and a north-south axis.

Unity today should be about blurring or overcoming the real divides that exist in today's Europe, not drawing lines between the eurozone and the rest, between those inside Schengen and the rest, or between North and South or East and West.

An example of a potentially unifying project is the Three Seas Initiative, which cuts precisely across all the above-mentioned boundaries. It brings together eurozone and non-eurozone countries, those from inside and outside the Schengen zone, countries from the North and the South, East, and West. This is a classic example of an initiative launched within the EU that can overcome existing divisions within it.

In this context, there should be cause for concern that stereotypes and prejudices rooted in the Cold War era have been reborn. It is worth pointing out that the Iron Curtain, which cut Europe in half, separated Central and Eastern European countries from the West and Western countries from their Eastern neighbours. No party was free. No party developed optimally because Europe, as a whole, was not able to tap into all of its resources, unable to harness its full potential.

Those who graduated from universities in Western Europe when the Iron Curtain collapsed, and who during the course of their studies were taught nothing about the potential of the part of the continent that lay behind the Iron Curtain, are only in their fifties today. Many hold leading positions in politics or business. They had to become familiar with "Europe as a whole" after becoming adults. How many of them made that effort? How many are simply unaware of the real potential of "Europe whole and

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free?" The number could be considerable, otherwise, this generation would not succumb to the rebirth of such prejudices about "unfair competition of the labour force from the East" or "mental backwardness" of East Central European nations, and other similar examples of quintessential ignorance and the contemporary European tendency to differentiate people's status depending on their nationality. Such attempts in the past led to disaster in Europe.

The third challenge is the existence of Europe outside of the Union. The process of European unification must not be deemed complete as long as large swathes of the continent remain in the "grey zone" and in a strategic vacuum despite being populated by European nations. The enlargement momentum of the EU has been stifled. Fortunately, it is still flickering in the North Atlantic Alliance. Clearly, nowadays there are no more simple and obvious enlargements. The Western Balkan countries have their own historical, social, and political conditionalities, due to which their path to membership in the structures of united Europe is largely dependent on the will and ability of their state authorities to implement domestic reforms. The same holds for Eastern European countries that are part of the EU's Eastern Partnership. In each of these groups of countries, the key question is which path of development and which political orientation they wish to choose, and their level of determination to go down that path. Some countries are still ambivalent about their course. If they demonstrate both the will and determination to advance along the path of integration, however, EU and NATO countries will be obliged to address their freely and democratically expressed aspirations. It would be a huge strategic error and an immense moral burden for the people of integrated Europe if they promised to build a continent united in freedom and, at the same time, closed the door on those who want to formally join them. Today, however, a visible enlargement drive is missing.

The fourth challenge, the elephant in the room, is obviously Russia. In his speech on the occasion of formalising the annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin clearly indicated that Russian politics had never come to terms with building a Europe whole and free according to Western conditions but was too weak to oppose it. In contrast, contemporary Russia has, in his opinion, enough strength to throw down the gauntlet

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to the West and initiate actions aimed at resuscitating the lost empire. Russian policy in Europe today is the source of shifting borders by force and undermining the architecture of trust. Therefore, if we are supposed to sustain European unity, not as an empty slogan but as a programme for the creation of a community founded on such fundamental principles as abiding by international law and respect for the value of peace, then it is not possible to understand current Russian policy other than as one of confrontation with the West.

The Human Factor

To be able to respond to these four challenges, European and transatlantic policy has to reach out, once again, to its biggest asset—its citizens. European unity can only be built on the basis of robust national communities equipped with their own efficient states. It is worth pointing out that in his 1989 speech, President Bush did not sketch a vision of Europe without states and nations. Quite the contrary. His promise for the countries liberating themselves from Soviet oppression in the times of the Cold War was based on the reconstruction of their identity, respect for their culture, and equal acknowledgement of the achievements of each nation. European states, with their diversity and differences, are indispensable building blocks of Europe whole and free. Every project that embraces the possibility of weakening or eradicating the nation-state as a precondition for European integration is imprudent and detrimental, as it leads Europe towards a dangerous pipe dream.

Democracy means respect for free European nations. The EU has no citizens other than those of its Member States. By the decision of the citizens of its Member States, the Union may do one or another equally well—roll back or roll ahead. A visible example is Brexit. For this reason, the choices made by the citizens of the EU Member States deserve primary respect. According to Lincoln's definition: democracy is the government of the people, by the people, and for the people. You simply cannot do it otherwise. Democracy is absolutely fundamental to Europe's future.

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The recipe for restoring stability in Europe, in the face of the sentiments and social movements we are seeing, is to find the point of balance between the growing wave of unilateralism of one-sidedness, on the one hand, and the need to preserve the integrated area, on the other. European nations want to have control over their fate and future. They do not want to be steered from above by some kind of international hyper-bureaucracy. One has to take note of that. What is important is to make sure that different countries do not have to do it by dividing the community and in opposition to one another, but within the framework of a general agreement on the unity of European interests. Such an agreement has to be defined anew by the will of all those within the community, including its small and medium-sized members. Only then will each country and each nation feel they are a shareholder and a co-host of the community and will not have the sense of being dominated since the desire to bring a state out of integrated structures is usually born from a predominant feeling of losing influence and being subjected to decisions taken in non-transparent processes.

The common feature of the latest political choices made by the citizens of such diverse countries as the Netherlands, the UK, the U.S., and Poland (previously by Hungary), and in the nearest future probably also by France and Germany as well as other states, is the will to regain control over political decisions, to make those decisions in a more national direction. It is the willingness to be driven by the expectations of one's own societies rather than by an overarching ideology to which one has to become subordinate, forced to renounce not merely one's goals but even one's convictions. I call this process precisely unilateralism or one-sidedness.

A European House Divided

This phenomenon manifests itself in different forms, some of which are potentially very unfavourable both from European and Polish perspectives. A Europe that is split and divided more easily becomes prey for external empires. A very simple metaphor can be used here: in international politics as in life, it is easier to swallow small bites—things can stick in the throat if devoured whole. We know this principle from the Latin adage *divide*

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et impera—divide and rule. As long as the West remains united, those concerned with its strength will be in a more difficult position. Once it is divided, it will automatically become weaker. Therefore, it is not in the Polish interest to divide Europe. Still, one has to keep in mind that our task consists also in making sure that nobody questions the position and the role of our country within the European family.

Europe cannot limit itself merely to a group of selected countries ready to sacrifice those whom they regard as in the periphery for the sake of their prosperity and interests. Hence, it is our task to protect Poland and Europe from bad scenarios. We have to present a project ensuring more subjectivity to the European nations and states by means of upholding their rights to take unanimous decisions in most important matters and providing a more flexible form of co-participation in the single market and in common institutions while preserving their community beyond borders.

Today, it seems to be politically very difficult, some would say even impossible, to do this because it exceeds the capacities of politics. Why is it that when today we read similar speeches like the one delivered by President Bush in 1989, we feel nostalgic about big political visions—bold and concrete at the same time, capable of defining the instruments for their implementation? I believe that the key to answering that question is abandoning basic, classic values, the axiological emptiness of the current stage of European integration. In other words, without a spiritual foundation it will indeed be impossible to rebuild European politics. For politics should be an expression of identity, an implementation of values considered common, the development of tradition and order, bequeathed upon us by our predecessors. Otherwise, everything is just a temporary coincidence of short-term interests, circumstances, human vices, and emotions. A construction without such solid foundations can fall apart like a house of cards. The Mainz speech about a Europe whole and free abounds in profound axiological foundations, a strong vision of values turned into political actions with conviction. The strength of vision outlined there and its validity, even after 30 years, allow differentiating between meaningful politics and passing trends. And only meaningful politics turn the course of history.

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Daniela Schwarzer

"A Europe Whole and Free": Where We Are and What Still Needs to Be Done

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For Germans, the idea of a "Europe whole and free" has special significance. Germany sat squarely on the dividing line running through the European continent, isolating the liberal democratic West from the authoritarian Soviet-controlled East. Hence, it is not surprising former U.S. President George H.W. Bush formulated his vision for a free and united Europe on German territory during his state visit to Mainz in May 1989. Six months before the Berlin Wall came down, Bush called for "a Europe that is free and at peace with itself." In the years after 1989, both the U.S. and the member states of the European Communities worked towards a united European continent. This contribution reviews to what extent the European Union (EU) has delivered this 30-year-old promise, which new dividing lines and failures have surfaced, and what remains to be done.

Unifying Europe Within the Transatlantic Alliance

From across the Atlantic, the U.S. administration played a key role for Central and Eastern Europe's integration into the Western community. The U.S. focused first on paving the way for German reunification, built trading relations, and successfully advocated for NATO enlargement towards Eastern Europe. The year 2019 marks the 20th anniversary of an event that was decisive in overcoming previous divisions: NATO's historic enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 50 years after its founding. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia followed in 2004. It has grown to 29 members since, thereby showing the attraction of an Alliance that protects its members based on the principles of sovereignty, shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, and individual liberty.

The second historical achievement was the swift integration of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries into the EU. Only four years after the end of the Cold War, in 1993, the European Council, in its Copenhagen Declaration, offered them the prospect of joining the European Economic Communities. In 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, plus Malta and Cyprus, joined the EU as full members. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007, Croatia in 2013.

From a German perspective, "turning West" after the end of the Cold War seemed the only plausible and desirable way, for Eastern Germany as much as for the CEE. In both cases, this also was an internally driven objective. Similar to the process of Germany's Eastern portion joining the Western political and economic system, the expectation was that the CEE would "catch up" and converge to the Western liberal model enshrined in the EU principles. Germany built close political and economic ties with its neighbours, particularly with Poland. Here, as in other CEE countries, there seemed to be an almost universal understanding that countries should join NATO and the EU, both of which were seen as guarantors for living in peace without fear and prosperity. Observers in 1990 projected then-Chancellor Helmut Kohl's optimistic promise of creating "flourishing

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landscapes" regarding reintegrating Eastern German provinces through a rapid structural transformation on the entire continent.

The prospect to one day become part of the EU was key for the establishment and solidification of Western-style liberal democracies in states that were formerly part of the Soviet bloc. The EU's support, both financially, politically as well as through administrative cooperation projects, of the newly independent Eastern neighbours backed those who worked for their countries' sustainable transition away from autocracy and who accepted the substantive costs of adjustment confronted by the transition countries.

Thus, the unification of the continent became a living reality: People, goods, services, and capital can circulate freely in a Union of 28, in case of Brexit soon 27, countries that when combined are comparable to the U.S. in terms of population and GDP. Extending to the Baltic states, Slovakia, and Slovenia, even the euro area is no longer a Western project. Parts of the promises of economic prosperity seemed graspable as economic convergence set in rather quickly. In terms of GDP per capita, half of the new member states have already overtaken Greece and Portugal. Many of them feature competitive universities, industries, as well as digital and technological sectors.

New Divides Within the EU

Despite these arguable successes, divisions within the EU remain a concern, and this not only pertains to the CEE. The EU has been dealing with a North-South divide since the sovereign debt and banking crisis hit the euro area in 2010. This mainly socio-economic challenge related to particular adjustments the Southern European member states had to go through under the constraints of financial markets, euro-area membership, and, in some cases like Greece, Portugal or Spain, IMF and EU-programmes. Interestingly, there is a particular East-South dimension to this divide as some of the CEE countries like the Baltic States in particular, the recent euro-area members, pointed out that lagging reforms in some Southern countries were unacceptable, particularly if those countries received EU

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financial aid, to which those new euro area entrants from the CEE—with a lower GDP per capita than the recipient countries—contribute.

Around the year 2015, in the context of the migration crisis, a new East-West divide surfaced that quickly became a bigger concern, for instance, to German policymakers, than the North-South divide. From a Western European perspective, decisions such as Hungary curbing the powers of its top court, as well as civil liberties, media, and academic freedom, or the controversial reforms of the judicial system in Poland raised deep concerns about the state of democracy and the rule of law in some, though by far not all CEE member states.

The debate recently has become more nuanced, not least because there is growing pressure to provide answers to rising EU scepticism. The socio-economic dimension of the East-West divide is increasingly taken into account in its complexity. Moreover, the upswing of the EU-sceptic far-right League (Lega) in Italy shows that the North-South divide can no longer be framed predominantly as a socio-economic challenge. The advance of "neo-populist" forces over the past three years has led to the hypothesis that a "deconsolidation" of Western democracies is underway. This expression of the East-West EU divide is now situated in a broader debate on the progressive dissolution between democracy and liberalism, as a broader trend seemed to emerge with the election of the Five Star Movement-Lega government in Italy, Donald Trump in the U.S., and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

On an economic level, too, there are several reasons why Western and CEE countries are not as close-knit as they were expected to become 30 years ago. First, there is still a noticeable gap between the respective socio-economic developments in the East and West, as it also is between Northern and Southern Europe. The financial support of the EU's structural funds, which amounted to 3% to 4% of recipient countries' GDP, supported some economic convergence so that today CEE economies are stable. However, the global financial crisis hit a number of CEE countries in 2008/2009 in the convergence process. As their currencies weakened, the fact that a large share of public and private debt was denominated in foreign currencies, such as the Swiss Franc, made debt service more expensive. Moreover, wage development stalled and income gaps remain, partly due to weak unions

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and an underdeveloped social dialogue. Social convergence reflected in pension levels or social security lag behind substantively in some CEE states. As Stefan Lehne has argued, the current anti-EU backlash may be related to the CEE countries decoupling from the EU's social and economic development and the departure of many of their well-educated younger citizens for Western Europe.[1] The mobility of workers in the single market, initially desired by the CEE in particular, after all countries except the UK imposed a transition period on CEE accession to protect their own labour force, is no longer seen as beneficial by many who feel left behind. While education costs stay with home countries as their talent moves on, this "brain drain" reinforces the centre-periphery imbalance and feeds the anti-European political discourse.

Dealing with Diverging Policy Priorities

These developments may be the root cause of one of the major disputes over EU policies of the past years. Ivan Krastev, among others, has argued that the CEE's reluctance to accept the EU's immigrant quota system is linked to citizens' concerns for their own future and worries about the nature and identity of their societies. Other contentious issues are the future of the EU's structural and cohesion funds and the reform of agricultural policy as the EU seeks agreement on its new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021–2027.

Socio-economic divergence, plus the CEE countries' desire to catch up with Western standards of living, may help explain why there is little readiness to put particular emphasis on issues such as environmental sustainability.

Transatlantic relations have also become a divisive topic for Europe. This has happened before: As the U.S. went to war in Iraq in 2003, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld singled out the CEE as the "New Europe," which stood with the U.S. together with the UK. More recently, the question of how the EU should adequately react to U.S. President Donald Trump's questioning of NATO and his criticism of European allies' contributions to the alliance divides EU members. While Germany and France, together with

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other EU governments, drove the launch of the new permanent structured defence cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 as an adequate response by Europeans to increasing the capability to act while staying anchored in NATO defence structures, Poland and some other CEE countries remained sceptical, worrying that the U.S. commitment to NATO could be undermined or that their governments could be pushed to shift their procurement to European providers if the EU successfully advances its own defence industrial projects. These concerns are based on substance as well as tactics: with Russia on their back, some CEE and Baltic countries see the U.S. as the only guarantor of their security. Any EU move could serve as an excuse for a U.S. administration to withdraw their commitment to NATO, and this is seen by CEE and Baltic countries as undermining the safeguard of their core security interests.

Trump and his administration further developed traditionally close ties between the CEE, as well as Romania, in the field of defence. But defence is by far not the only subject on which Trump can be seen as driving a wedge between Western and Eastern Europeans. Trump's rhetorical support for the new national sovereignty discourse pushed by some CEE governments as well as measures that, from a Western perspective, are seen as backsliding democracy, such as his pronounced support for Brexit, have raised concerns that the U.S. president may actually be using the close ties the U.S. fosters with some of the newer EU member states to undermine the EU.

Divergence, Differentiation, Alienation

The recent divergences over policy questions may indicate a renewed self-assertiveness of some CEE countries. Jarosław Kuisz has pointed out that the "dominant, naive and uncritical admiration for countries west of the Elbe and for the U.S.," which was prevalent after 1989, has ultimately come to an end, as "the post-communist myth about the West has lost the power to convince."[2] Western European policymakers have recently been surprised by some CEE leaders' new emphasis on national sovereignty. This notion has notably risen in the dispute over the EU's migration policy and possible distribution keys of migrants and is paired with a strong identity

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discourse in which the EU and its model of Western liberal society emerge as an enemy to national identity. Ironically, some CEE countries' quest for national sovereignty now is increasingly put forward against the very EU that was seen as a guarantor for their national sovereignty in defence of the former Soviet Union when they joined the EU 15 years ago. CEE governments, at least in Poland and Hungary, are perceived as showing little readiness to compromise for the sake of a European position. Conversely, from the CEE perspective, the decision about welcoming migrants was taken without prior consultation between all member states—a narrative that resonates well with a general feeling of never having been considered equal partners within the EU.

Given divergent national interests, in some cases amplified by external influence from players such as Russia, China, or the U.S., it has become more difficult to forge majorities let alone unanimity among the 27 EU member states. In order to enable progress, member states can opt for cooperation in smaller groups in pursuit of specific policies, at the risk, however, that countries feel left out, in particular when a certain group of countries works across numerous policy areas. CEE countries, at least those that are not members of the eurozone, as well as the UK, were concerned about deeper cooperation in the euro area, fearing they could move ahead on policy questions that might as well be dealt with as single-market policies for all EU members. Other examples are the Versailles summit of 2017 when Germany, France, Italy, and Spain agreed on a roadmap for possible differentiated integration or the decision to move the London-based EU agencies to wealthy Western European capitals instead of being relocated to Eastern European cities, many of which are still in a catch-up process.

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What We Can Do to Deliver on the 30-Year-Old Promise

30 years ago, the CEE countries were promised support in their transitions towards Western liberal democracy. They were subsequently helped to integrate into multilateral structures such as NATO and the EU, which promised peace, stability, and prosperity. Ascension to both was achieved

at an impressive pace thanks to each country's determination to converge and readiness to bear the costs of adjustment in expectation of lasting benefits through the integration of a community of like-minded countries. Today, faced with the weaknesses of an EU prone to a multitude of crises, anti-EU populism and, in some countries, authoritarianism have risen vis-à-vis EU partners and the EU, on some occasions coming close to outright hostility.

Facing these challenges, the EU has to rethink how it can accommodate differing views and become more flexible while not giving up on its basic principles. As a first step, both the EU and NATO should reaffirm their founding principles but may need to differentiate between, on the one hand, rule of law and democracy, which are non-negotiable, while accepting, on the other, that the societal models at this point do not converge.

Second, the EU, together with its member states, should focus on how socio-economic convergence can be enhanced more effectively and how the remaining discrepancies in the respective standards of living can be reduced. Given the deep traces the "brain drain" leaves in societies and the burden on competitiveness and public finances it represents, this problem needs to be tackled with high priority.

Third, the EU should be more adamant about the importance of the implementation of reforms and tools conducive to a broader and stronger acceptance of rule-of-law reforms. The next MFF should include conditionality to support this process while on the national level, laws and procedures to combat fraud and corruption should be sharpened.

To a large extent, this is also a matter of active engagement and strategic interest by current CEE political elites. More intensive, focused political dialogue between them and their counterparts from the rest of Europe is of key importance. Actual differences on policy choices continue to be amplified by a lack of mutual understanding as well as intentional polarisation and exaggeration of differences in political discourse and media coverage. As Stefan Lehne puts it, "much of the divide exists more in political rhetoric, newspaper columns, and think-tank articles than in concrete EU policy."

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Time and political capital should be invested in bilateral relationships on the governmental and parliamentary levels in order to obtain a better and deeper understanding of the thinking in each partner country. The CEE states all too often still get lumped together when talking about an allegedly similar past, political culture, or economic system. Deeper mutual understanding is helpful to deal with the (re-)framing of the notions of sovereignty and identity that is underway in some countries. Moreover, there is a need to build trust "across the East-West divide," which can subsequently help to reach common ground, for instance, on contentious issues such as a joint EU migration policy. Indeed, more effort should be put in identifying a positive agenda going forward, in particular as some CEE countries are increasingly seen as rather opting for blocking policy initiatives, such as the Visegrad group of states, than contributing to EU solutions. Some topics, for example, the completion of the single market, which Germany, Poland, the Baltics, and others should be able to agree upon, are undervalued in the current debate.

The insight that a common narrative and a shared memory of the European past matter should be considered. In Franco-German relations, important efforts such as a common history book were made to help educate citizens on their shared and unique pasts. Competing narratives between Eastern, Western, and Southern Europe also exist for very recent events, for example, on the root causes of the crises in the euro area, suitable tools to tackle past and future crises, or the drivers and adequate remedies to the persistent migration crisis. More dialogue, as well as academic and civil-society exchange programmes, could help in building understanding, trust, and transnational networks to solve these and other issues.

Part of the process to enhance mutual understanding will consist of the ability to grasp that the rationales for integration were fundamentally different in the EU's founding years compared to later accession rounds. In the 1950s, the focus was on locking France and Germany into a common framework that would make war between the two inconceivable. To this end, a sharing of sovereignty through supranationalism was a good thing. This approach may not resonate with all countries that experienced forced integration into the Soviet empire, although it has shown that the security promises the EU and the euro-area integration provided are seen

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as essential. For most, joining Western institutions is a step on the path towards security, prosperity, and freedom.

Given internal pressures, external threats as well as Brexit, European integration may need to be re-thought rather fundamentally going forward. On the one hand, current EU members may ultimately not see full EU membership as the best fit for their country if there is disagreement over the fundamental principles upon which the EU is based. On the other, the future EU is likely to be more flexible internally through differentiation, and externally because of the need and strategic interest to associate third countries closely with EU policies. A more flexible EU, and more differentiated CEE within it, may actually open options below full membership that may emerge as an attractive option for some.

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Justyna Gotkowska

We Are at the End of One Era and at the Beginning of Another

On 4 April 2019, 29 NATO foreign ministers met in Washington for the alliance's 70th anniversary. These celebrations played well with marking President George H.W. Bush's speech delivered 30 years earlier, which had been devoted to NATO's 40th birthday and to the incoming changes in Europe. In 1989, Bush rightly stated that the alliance was at the end of one era and at the beginning of another. He outlined a vision of Europe whole and free. In the following years, NATO underwent a huge transformation. The fall of the Iron Curtain made it possible to abolish Cold War divisions and to extend the Euro-Atlantic space of peace, freedom, and prosperity towards Central and Eastern Europe—the former Warsaw Pact countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania) and the three Soviet Union republics (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia).

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The Past: "A Europe Whole and Free" in the Making

In 1993, the Partnership for Peace programme, intended to bring the region closer to NATO, was devised. Later on, the Alliance decided to develop its Open-Door policy, which resulted in Central and Eastern European countries becoming NATO members in 1999 and 2004. NATO enlargement was coupled with the process of EU integration of Central and Eastern European countries, which led to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. These two processes resulted in a geopolitical redefinition of "Europe" and "the West," and brought about a huge transformation in the region. Membership in NATO and the EU provided a basis for the region's political, economic, and social development. It fulfilled the basic security needs of Central and Eastern European countries by guaranteeing their sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also helped to anchor democracy, strengthen the rule of law, and introduce the market economy.

The policy of extending Euro-Atlantic structures to Central and Eastern Europe was complemented by the transformation of NATO and EU relations with Russia. Moscow was redefined from being an adversary to an indispensable partner to maintain European security, stability and enhance peace, freedom, and prosperity on the continent. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security signed in 1997 provided a formal basis for NATO-Russia relations and laid the groundwork for the creation of the NATO-Russia Council in 2002. The EU also strived to develop partner relations with Moscow. It signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia in 1997 and put the development of a strategic partnership with Moscow on the agenda in the following years.

In the meantime, NATO redefined its threat perception, goals, and tasks. Since the early 1990s, allies no longer felt threatened by a conventional armed attack. Deterrence and defence ranked only third in the Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, after broader "political" tasks of providing Euro-Atlantic security through cooperation and dialogue and of serving as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations.[1] Wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the 9/11 terrorist attacks shifted NATO's attention towards the challenges arising from conflicts and regional instability in the immediate (Western Balkans) and broader (greater Middle East)

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neighbourhoods. Thus, NATO switched to the mode of conducting out-of-area crisis-management operations for nearly two decades.

At the same time, the geopolitical transformation in Europe was being re-evaluated by the political elite in Russia. A group of former KGB officials came to power, perceiving the world in terms of spheres of influence rather than that of a mutually beneficial partnership with the West. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was seen as the "major geopolitical disaster of the century"[2] and the enlargement of Euro-Atlantic structures in Central and Eastern Europe as the exploitation of Russia's political and economic weakness. The election of Vladimir Putin as the Russian Federation's president in 1999 marked the beginning of the gradual downward trend in relations with the West. Moscow showed goodwill through limited support for the U.S. operation in Afghanistan, counting on a grand bargain with the (then new) George W. Bush administration. However, the incompatibility of the Western and Russian visions of the European and world orders made Russia take a confrontational stance towards the West. The colour revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) were additionally perceived by Moscow as attempts to spread Western norms and values into Russia's "near abroad" and thus to undermine the Russian sphere of influence and Putin's model of power. The very survival of the Russian political and economic elite was perceived to be at stake. The Kremlin defined itself to be at war with the West, which by its norms and values was influencing the post-Soviet space and thus endangering the system of power in Russia.

Putin's speech during the 2007 Munich Security Conference was the announcement of the new offensive policy. In the ensuing years, Russia has shown it is ready to guard its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, including through the use of military means, to politically, economically, and militarily intimidate Central and Northern European countries, and to undermine NATO and the EU from within. Cyberattacks on Estonia and strategic bomber flights in the Arctic were initiated in 2007. At that time, the reform and modernisation process of the Russian Armed Forces started and work began on land-based cruise missile systems that violated the INF Treaty. The 2008 Bucharest summit's vague statement on Georgia's and Ukraine's possible NATO membership was the real reason behind

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the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, which aimed to prevent Tbilisi from getting closer to the Alliance.

The Obama administration's effort to "reset" U.S.-Russia relations introduced in 2009 did not last long for all the structural reasons above. Russia started to conduct large-scale military exercises with highly offensive scenarios against NATO allies (*Zapad 2009*) and returned to big snap exercises in 2013. NATO and EU attempts to strengthen relations with Eastern European neighbours were countered by Russia. Victor Yanukovych's retreat (forced by Moscow) from signing an Association Agreement with the EU brought about mass protests in Kyiv and resulted in the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine. In 2015, Russian military intervention in Syria followed; in 2016, cyberattacks and involvement in the U.S. presidential election campaign took place; and, in 2018, a nerve agent attack in Salisbury, UK. In recent years, Russia has also been involved in supporting radical left- and right-wing parties in EU countries, in disinformation activities, and in political and business corruption with the aim to strengthen the anti-American, anti-NATO and EU-sceptic mood.

The Present: External and Internal Challenges to the Euro-Atlantic Community

Thirty years since the Bush 1989 speech in Mainz, the successfully enlarged Euro-Atlantic community is again at the end of one era and beginning of another. This time, the West needs to counter two interlinked challenges, one external and one internal, that endanger its own survival.

In the external dimension, the era of strategic competition with revisionist powers has returned, in a new version. Russia and China are challenging the international rules-based order and seek to undermine U.S. global supremacy and the Euro-Atlantic community. Moscow and Beijing reject not only the current security order, based on the principle of sovereign equality of states with international law constraining states' actions, but also the economic order, with trade and exchange based on mutual gain with open and free markets, and the human-rights order,

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based on the liberty of individuals. Both powers would like to gain a veto over other nations' diplomatic, economic, and security decisions.

Europe is the main playground for strategic competition with Russia, which would like to challenge the post-Cold War European security architecture by introducing a regional concert of powers, restoring spheres of influence and limiting the sovereignty of smaller states. Due to the economic weakness and unattractiveness of its authoritarian governance model, Russia's main instrument in achieving its goals is coercion and the use of military power. However, Moscow uses also political and business corruption through big economic projects like Nord Stream 1 and 2, which involve key West European countries in order to influence and divide the Euro-Atlantic community.

China is a strategic competitor from Washington's perspective, an ascending economic power with growing military capabilities. It seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony through economic and military coercion and eyes possibly even global supremacy, displacing the United States. However, Chinese ambitions also have a European dimension and consequences. China is striving to enhance its political and economic influence in Europe also in order to undermine U.S. alliances. Through involvement in key sectors such as telecommunications or transport, China might be willing to disrupt U.S. military actions in/from Europe in the future.

In the internal dimension, allies perceive and respond to the changing strategic environment differently and this creates rising tensions in the Euro-Atlantic community. Diverging political, military, and economic interests add to these divisions. The U.S. views the re-emergence of long-term strategic competition by revisionist powers—China and Russia—as the central challenge to its prosperity and security, as defined in the 2018 National Defense Strategy.[3] Thus, Washington wants to contain their influence in both the regional and global dimension. To achieve this, the U.S. seeks to adjust the foundations of its global supremacy and strives to redefine the terms of political, economic, and military cooperation with Europe, among others.

Donald Trump no longer wants the United States to play the role of a benign hegemon. The Trump administration favours an "America First"

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approach that demands that allies adjust to U.S. policies. This, along with U.S. pressure on improving terms of trade with the EU, has become a cause of growing disagreements with European allies. The U.S. expects allies also to increase their military potential to adjust to the world of strategic competition, to support the U.S.-led deterrence policy in Europe against Russia and, to a certain degree, in the Asia-Pacific region against China. Washington also wants allies to curb both Russian (Nord Stream 2) and Chinese (5G networks) influence in strategic sectors in Europe.

The European allies differ in response to the changing security environment. Similarly to the United States, France perceives international relations in terms of strategic competition, but more in the political and economic realms. However, Paris sees the need for Europe's political, industrial and military emancipation from the U.S. and for the EU to play an independent pole in a changing world via-a-vis China and Russia, but also the United States. This would imply cooperation with Washington where interests meet and competition where they do not. Hence, Paris puts forward such ideas as European strategic autonomy, a new European treaty on defence and security or a European mutual defence clause, among others. At the same time, Paris doesn't really see Russia as a military threat.

Germany, for its part, doesn't want to perceive the world in terms of strategic competition. This would imply a drastic change in the post-Cold War German model of development that is based on trade, diplomacy, cooperation, and dialogue—hardly acceptable for the German public. Berlin sees the need to counteract harmful Russian and Chinese policies and activities but it sees no reason to restrict economic cooperation with both countries where sanctions do not apply. It also believes that it is necessary to find a response to China's growing power and Russia's new assertiveness mainly in dialogue and not in confrontation. Germany is not opting for the kind of comprehensive European strategic autonomy that Paris favours since it is well aware of the fact that the transatlantic alliance forms the foundations of German and European security and prosperity.

Differently from France and Germany, the allies from Central and Eastern Europe, defined as NATO's Eastern Flank, perceive Russia as the strategic challenge to the European security order and to the Euro-Atlantic community. They have been open to cooperation with China within the

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Belt and Road Initiative in recent years, but since they perceive the U.S. as their security guarantor, they are willing to adjust to a certain extent to Washington's perceptions and priorities.

The Future: How to Re-unite the West?

In view of the changing strategic environment, at times opposing political and economic interests of the allies, and Russian and Chinese efforts to undermine the West, the biggest challenge for the Euro-Atlantic alliance will be to ensure its cohesion and unity and the ability to act jointly in the years to come. George H.W. Bush rightly mentioned in his speech 30 years ago that peace, freedom, and prosperity were only possible because the nations of the West created NATO in order to protect their values, to share risks and burdens, while having a realistic recognition of the threat, and because they were determined to look beyond old animosities. This is—in a different way—also applicable today. Three issues are key.

First, the question arises how European allies can increase their contribution to the security and defence of the West. On the one hand, there is clearly the need to invest more in defence. This investment regards both cash, capabilities, and commitments. It is foremost the 2% of GDP benchmark for defence spending that the allies should strive to achieve by 2024. However, more spending should be prioritised to support a real build-up of military capabilities needed for collective defence first, and for crisis management second. It should also be mirrored in increased commitments—on the part of the West European allies on NATO's Eastern Flank and on the part of the Central European member states in crisis-management operations in the South. Both are needed to show the indivisibility of the security in the Alliance. On the other hand, an enhanced Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU should be developed so that it is complementary to NATO. It has to focus on building capabilities both for collective defence and for crisis management and cannot concentrate on creating structures without proper military resources or to be seen as seeking as a political and military alternative to NATO.

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Second, the allies should uphold a credible policy vis-à-vis Russia. In the military sphere, this means the implementation and enhancement of NATO's defence, deterrence, and dialogue policy towards Moscow. Defence and deterrence encompass both the allied forward presence on the Eastern Flank and a reliable reinforcement strategy. Allies still need to enhance NATO's forward presence with air defence and artillery components. The reinforcement strategy needs to be improved by increasing the readiness of allied forces and by generating greater capacity for military mobility throughout Europe. Additionally, NATO is facing difficult decisions on how to respond to Russia's violations of the INF Treaty and how to deter its growing offensive missile potential, which is threatening the whole of Europe. Meaningful dialogue with Moscow, for example, on credible conventional arms-control arrangements, will only function if NATO approaches the issue from a position of strength, which means investing in military capabilities in Europe.

In the non-military sphere, the allies need to realise that going back to business-as-usual with Russia will only embolden Moscow to take further offensive steps in line with the Kremlin's policy since 2007. Projects like Nord Stream 2 are indirectly financing the modernisation of the Russian armed forces and need at least to be subject to the EU regulatory framework.

Third, allies need to talk about the adequate response to China's more assertive regional and global policies. NATO might not be the best responder to counter growing Chinese military aggressiveness in the Indo-Pacific but that does not exclude support from individual allies for U.S. actions to enforce the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, among others. NATO might also be the venue where allies discuss "red lines" for Chinese engagement in Europe and in the neighbourhood. The best example might be the case of the much-discussed Chinese involvement in European 5G networks that might negatively influence military and intelligence activities and U.S.-European cooperation.

With many challenges ahead, the West needs to have new political guidance in the changing security environment—a new NATO strategic concept might offer such a roadmap.

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Heather A. Conley

A Europe That Is No Longer Whole and Free

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President George H.W. Bush's speech on 31 May 1989 at the Rheingoldhalle in Mainz, Germany, should be required reading for every U.S. government official annually. These days, in darker times for the transatlantic community, it should also be placed on the desks of those who are today's stewards of the transatlantic relationship for immediate and frequent reference. This speech was a powerful demonstration of the ideational strength of the United States and the value proposition of the overwhelming power of the dignity of the individual. It was not America's military might that was its most powerful weapon to unify Europe, it was the power of hope and the power of what America represented: “Our hopes [ran] especially high, because the division of Europe [was] under siege not by armies but by the spread of ideas.”[1]

After nearly two decades of America at war in Afghanistan without clear victory and the accumulation of anger and self-doubt, there are diminishing numbers of American leaders who think or talk like President

Bush did in 1989. It is also a reminder of what one of the youngest card-carrying members of the "Greatest Generation" represented and what is failing the U.S. now: the understanding of what a deeply knowledgeable, generous, and principled leader can achieve. When President Bush stated that "the generation coming into its own in America and Western Europe is heir to gifts greater than those bestowed to any generation in history: **peace, freedom and prosperity** [*emphasis added–HC*] … [t]his inheritance is possible because 40 years ago, the nations of the West joined in that noble, common cause called NATO," he said, speaking for himself, his children (particularly his son, the future president, George W. Bush, who would both enhance and profoundly strain that inheritance), and future generations of Americans.

President Bush spoke in 1989 at a hopeful and, like now, dynamic period in international relations. The Cold War was in the midst of rapid thaw. It was both an exhilarating and anxious time and the president, ever prudent and cautious, carefully balanced seizing opportunity with maintaining transatlantic unity and stability. The Mainz speech came just a few days before the first Polish elections that would include Solidarity. It also occurred amid growing protests in China that would lead to the 3–4 June crushing of student protests in Tiananmen Square. It would be six months before the Velvet Revolution would peacefully end communist rule in Czechoslovakia, and lead to the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia four years later.

Yet, even President Bush could not have foreseen the most significant events that would challenge his presidency in Europe: the fall of the Berlin Wall, German reunification, and the coming collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Looking back throughout American history, we can see the providential hand placed on the shoulder of American leaders who had special responsibilities, however imperfectly executed, toward Europe at critical moments of the 20th century: Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and, for this moment in 1989, George H.W. Bush. Great leaders leave great legacies that can either be strengthened by future generations or carelessly frittered away.

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Standing Firm and Confident

What has been achieved since that day when an American president travelled to Mainz to give a speech whose title would provide an enduring U.S. policy framework for Europe for the next 30 years? Simply put, the gifts of peace, freedom, and prosperity were extended to 100 million Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Albanians, Montenegrins—and, shortly, North Macedonians. This represents one of America's and Europe's greatest foreign policy and security successes in both the 20th and early 21st centuries. What was born in 1918 and 1919 under Wilson's Fourteen Points, though catastrophically consumed first by fascism and then by communism, was finally restored.

Providential hands notwithstanding, this outcome was not predestined. There were many significant moments of great transatlantic tension, crisis, and distraction prior to the 1989 speech and thereafter. There were disappointments when cries of freedom erupted but America failed to heed them, for example, during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968. There were also European fears about American militarisation and the placement of U.S. Pershing missiles in Europe. After 1989, there were deep transatlantic divisions over the conflicts in the Balkans, the 2003 Iraq conflict, and the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. But there were also deep moments of solidarity, such as the First Gulf War in 1991 and the outpouring of international support following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

Despite the many crises, one of which President Bush noted in particular when he stated "… at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1948, Ernst Reuter called on Germans to **stand firm and confident**, [*emphasis added–HC*] and you did—courageously, magnificently," it was a steady, firm, and confident American leadership that marched unapologetically toward a Europe whole and free. Self-confidence and firmness in foreign and security policy are two highly underestimated traits in the modern era that have served American and European leaders extremely well when exerted, but they require courage and political risk.

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Unfortunately, courage and confidence have been confused with arrogance and hubris. It was President Bush's firmness and confidence that returned Central Europe to its rightful place: "As president, I will continue to do all I can to help open the closed societies of the East. We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax, and we must not waver." This firmness was also rooted in a clear-eyed assessment, a "realistic recognition of Soviet expansionism" and an understanding that "[t]he Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole." Clear, firm, definitive.

Democracy's Journey East Is Not Easy

The heady transatlantic days of 1989 have given way to despair 30 years later. Our working assumptions about the permanent and positive trajectory of democratic transitions and the understanding that if something went wrong democratically, the institutional "straitjacket" of membership in either NATO, the European Union, or both would suffice, were deeply flawed. The original U.S. policy sin was Washington's thinking that their mission of "peace, freedom, and prosperity" largely had been accomplished in Central and Eastern Europe by 2004 with the so-called "big bang" enlargement of 10 countries either in NATO, the EU, or both, thus fulfilling President Bush's policy vision of expanding freedom from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Of course, NATO continued to expand into the Balkans by inviting Croatia, Albania, Montenegro, and soon, North Macedonia, but U.S. focus, energy, and enthusiasm had waned. It had also waned in Europe as the Juncker Commission vowed in 2014 not to pursue further EU enlargement during its five-year tenure.

In the glow of post-1989 transatlantic policy successes, we self-congratulated and underestimated how fragile these countries were, both institutionally and societally. President Bush rightly noted in his Mainz speech that "democracy's journey east is not easy." Policymakers had made the false assumption that it would be simple and required minimal policy engagement. More pressing policy priorities were afoot; for the U.S., it was the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the too-slow reckoning with China's

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growing global shadow. The U.S. shrunk its physical presence in Europe as well as its economic and civil society investments. In other words, America ceased to be a European power in every sense of the word. It redirected increasingly scarce resources toward South Asia and the Middle East to fight terrorism and win hearts-and-minds in the Muslim-speaking world, not in Europe. Powerful American tools such as Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe were removed from the region. As for the EU, its energy was focused on institutional development and the organisational capacity required to manage 28 members that vary in size and development.

The U.S., NATO, and the EU all assumed institutional membership would continue to ease democracy's journey. On the contrary, institutional membership has greatly complicated the member states' democratic journey as both NATO and the EU are ill-equipped to address democratic backsliding.

Peaceful Integration Need Not Supplant a Country's Culture or Sovereignty

Two seismic events simultaneously jolted Europe and the U.S. in 2008: the global economic crisis and Russian military forces entering and occupying parts of Georgia. Europe's economic crisis morphed into a political crisis that nearly became existential. The crisis has been managed but not solved; it continues to erode Europe's sense of economic security to this day. Russia's military intervention in Georgia shattered the assumption that Russia's journey toward the West—however uneven—would continue. The U.S., having removed itself from Europe, incorrectly interpreted both events. The U.S. government quickly reset relations with Russia in 2009 to reap strategic benefit on arms control, Iran, and Afghanistan. Many strong transatlantic voices in Central and Eastern Europe presciently cautioned the new U.S. president about his quickness to "reset," voicing concerns about the full return of Russian revanchism and the role of Russian malign influence working within their countries to impede their transatlantic orientation. The warnings were not heeded until Russia's 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and military incursion in the Donbas. Today, 20% of

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Georgian territory is effectively occupied by Russia; nearly 7% of Ukraine's territory and 12% of Moldova are occupied by Russian forces. Europe is no longer whole or free.

At the same time as Europe's sense of economic and physical security wasthrown into doubt, so shortly after their jubilant return to the Euro-Atlantic community, Central European nations began to directly challenge the functioning of their democratic institutions in light of multiple crises. There are several reasons underpinning this challenge: for some leaders, their actions are simply designed to eliminate opposition in order to remain in power. By staying in power and controlling all instruments of economic power, these leaders have developed a hybrid democratic-kleptocratic model of governance, which is becoming an attractive alternative to the rule of law. For others, the hyper-focus on returning to the Euro-Atlantic community delayed a true reckoning with the extraordinary traumas of the 20th century. What undergirds all of their decisions is a desperate search for identity in the 21st century as globalisation, immigration, and demographic decline threaten their nation's sense of identity and destiny.

The fear of losing one's identity both fuels the challenging of democratic institutions and incentivises the re-litigation of a traumatic past. Rather than looking confidently to the future, Central Europe is seeking safety and assurance in its past, with some nations reclaiming the interwar period as part of that region's modern national perspective (e.g., Poland) and others publicly elevating the restoration of a lost regional ethno-nationalist empire (e.g., Hungary). The current U.S. administration unfortunately offers succour to these identity narratives and to those aggrieved leaders who fully embrace a nativist sovereignty rather than encourage Central European leaders to aspire to a confident sovereignty that does not "relinquish its culture," history, language, or identity and successfully manages 21st-century challenges.

Returning to a Europe Whole and Free through Democratic Revival

Decades ago, the U.S. successfully established a durable policy toward the Soviet Union that won the Cold War without direct military conflict and

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helped spread greater security and prosperity for over 100 million people in Central and Eastern Europe. What can we do to return to the confident and principled vision of a Europe whole and free? The answer is simple: we must return to the basics of democracy. This means we must apply to ourselves the following: (1) safeguarding freedom through enhanced defence and deterrence; (2) remaining firm and confident that our democratic values and principles must always favour the interests of the governed over the privileges and kleptocratic practices of the governing; and (3) promoting the dignity of the individual and civil society, which goes hand in hand with the second objective.

Safeguarding Freedom. NATO is modernising its collective defence-and-deterrence capabilities to restore its founding mission and purpose: to safeguard freedom in Europe and North America and protect its members from external threats. However, many NATO members are increasing their defence spending and identifying rapid-reaction forces much too slowly for the threat at hand. It is no accident that the three Baltic states, Poland, and Romania have reached or will likely reach 2% of GDP spent on defence by 2020. Others are more reluctantly embracing their NATO commitments. Increasingly, NATO members must also guard against internal threats to freedom that are amplified by Russian malign influence, China's economic influence, or driven by leaders who encourage ethnonationalism and illiberalism. Despite uncertainty regarding the credibility of the U.S. security commitment to NATO previously expressed by President Donald Trump, the United States continues to demonstrate unwavering Congressional financial support for increased U.S. military presence in Europe. President Bush would have not thought it possible for nearly 4,000 U.S. forces to be based in Poland in 1989, but he would have approved of the confident message those forces project about NATO.

Yet, it is important to note that the rules that governed the Cold War are no longer at play today. Western policymakers with a deep understanding of Russian history and internal dynamics are not plentiful. The internal political balancing forces that existed within the Soviet Politburo are absent from today's decision-making process in the Kremlin, which is dominated by the security services. While the continued advancement of prosperous and stable democracies closer to Russia's borders should

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strengthen Moscow's sense of security—allowing it to confront its true long-term security and economic challenge, China—it has tragically had the opposite effect: it embodies the Kremlin's "deepest fears" that liberal governance could be coming to Russia.

Embracing Democratic Principles and the Dignity of the Individual. Implementing democratic principles and norms seems obvious for NATO countries, but today it is not. Americans and Europeans are increasingly organising themselves and mobilising politically around fear and hatred and are increasingly admiring authoritarian tactics and ideologies from the 20th century that are being repurposed for a new era, by a new generation. Therefore, it must be civil society and civic leaders who counter-organise and mobilise citizens to support greater democratic transparency and accountability in order to rebuild trust in institutions and leaders. Illiberalism and steps to restrict or suppress freedom of the press and judicial freedoms or, in effect, any political opposition, are taking roots in several NATO countries. Moreover, vested economic interests that are tied to high-level political interests actively work to avoid exposure of increasingly bold acts of public and private corruption. This vicious cycle of influence weakens democracies and is actively exploited by countries such as Russia and China. The United States must once again "help to open the closed societies of the East" by supporting the popular movements that demand greater transparency and accountability. This will be a disruptive process, but an essential one to strengthen democracy.

What has been largely absent from U.S. policy in recent years has been the prioritisation of the human dimension and the dignity and rights of the individual. Ultimately, the success of U.S. foreign and security policy rests on this pillar. As President Ronald Reagan understood, "peace through strength" means both a strong U.S. military *and* a proactive, offensive U.S. foreign policy that promotes democratic values and works closely with civil society in ally and adversary countries alike. The success of U.S. policy during the Cold War, particularly after the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, was the United States' unequivocal focus on the human dimension alongside security and confidence-building measures.

As neo-authoritarianism and illiberalism find fertile ground across Europe, U.S. policy must embrace a whole-of-society approach to support

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democratic impulses wherever they emerge. The U.S. must restrain its temptation to work exclusively with foreign leaders who have learned the techniques of placating whoever occupies the White House or European capitals without undertaking real reform. Transatlantic policymakers would do well to spend as much time, energy, and resources on rebuilding trust and confidence working with civil society leaders as they do with heads of state and government. The West must adopt an offensive policy approach that elevates the dignity of the individual and underscores the importance of civil society as well as democratic reform and renewal for NATO and non-NATO members, including Russia.

In other words, we must return to the foundational elements of what enabled, in 1989, a Europe Whole and Free. We must now fight hard for this vision, for the journey will not be easy; yet always our "hopes run especially high."

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Andrey Kortunov

How Can Russia Get Back to Europe?

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When U.S. President George H.W. Bush made his famous speech in Mainz about "Europe whole and free," Russia did not exist as an independent state separate from the Soviet Union. The Bush administration never encouraged the Soviet disintegration; on the contrary, it explicitly opposed it and fully supported President Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to keep the USSR alive. However, one can argue that in outlining his vision of "Europe whole and free" on 31 May 1989, the U.S. president addressed not only the captive nations of Central Europe but also the peoples of the Soviet Union itself, including Russians.

In 1989, this appeal looked fully justified and appropriate. Liberal reformers challenged the communist system not only in the periphery of the Soviet bloc but also in its very core. In many respects, Russian liberals were leading the transnational fight against the *ancien regime*, and the idea of a new democratic and inclusive Europe was no less popular in Moscow and in St. Petersburg than it was in Prague or Budapest. Enthusiasts of *perestroika* and "the new political thinking" carried on their banners the old Polish slogan "For our freedom and yours." Their views of the common

European future were vague, ambiguous, and romantic, but in most cases, they were not much different from the romantic dreams of Central Europeans.

Today, the predominant perception among liberals in Moscow and in the West is that the concept of "Europe whole and free" has failed for Russia in the most dramatic and explicit way. It was definitely not the only setback for this concept. British liberals are likely to regard Brexit as the main blow to building a truly united Europe. Turkish Westernisers would probably refer to the lack of progress in their country's accession to the EU. Many in Central Europe are concerned primarily about the rise of nationalism and Euroscepticism in their societies. However, other problems notwithstanding, Russia remains one of the graphic failures of the vision expressed by President Bush in 1989.

Manifestations of this failure are numerous and unquestionable. Russia has not mustered its relations with NATO or the EU; its political system moves further and further away from European pluralistic democracies; the "pivot to Asia" has become a top foreign policy and economic priority for the Kremlin. After 2014, Moscow and the West find themselves in a state of a protracted political, military, economic, and (dis)information confrontation that brings back memories of the Cold War.

Still, in my view, the perception of total failure is not entirely right. Thirty years of Russia's integration into Europe have not produced results that liberals on both sides had hoped for. However, today Russia is much closer to Europe than it was back in 1989. The EU remains the largest trading partner for Moscow, as well as the most important source of foreign direct investment, new technology, and modern corporate practices. Russia has many more social and humanitarian links to Europe today than it had 30 years ago in the social and humanitarian sense of the word—just consider the size of the Russian–speaking diasporas in major European cities, the numbers of Russian students in European universities, and the flows of Russian tourists in Europe. Moscow and St. Petersburg look more European (or even global) than ever before. Five years of the crisis in Ukraine have not changed these realities; on the contrary, we have observed a remarkable degree of resilience in relations between Russia and Europe.

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Back in the 1980s, the Soviet Union was directly challenging the fundamentals of the Western political and economic systems. Today, the Russian leadership emphasizes its adherence to principles of representative democracy and market competition. Even when deviating from these principles, the country's rulers have neither the ambition nor capacity to come up with an alternative social project. The official Russian narrative is that Russia stands for “authentic” European values, which Europe itself traded for the dubious benefits of globalisation. The Kremlin might be very critical of European institutions, but it does not have a lot of enthusiasm for leaving the Council of Europe or OSCE. In sum, the 30 years fell short of the inflated expectations of the 1980-1990s, but this time has not been completely wasted either.

On the other hand, the time that passed since 1989 also demonstrated formidable obstacles on the way to Russia's genuine integration into the Euro-Atlantic space. Some often argue that the only real reason for the ongoing confrontation between Russia and the West is Russia's behaviour in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine since 2014, and once this behaviour changes, the two sides will be back on track for deeper and more comprehensive cooperation. In my view, the crisis in and around Ukraine was the most dramatic manifestation of the problem but not the only cause of it. Even if we assume (which, in my view, would already be a clear oversimplification of the issue) that the Kremlin is the only side responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, we would have to conclude that by 2014, the crisis was already affordable to the Russian leaders since the relations with the West had already reached historically low levels. The crisis in and around Ukraine demonstrated that since 1989, Russia has not emerged as a major stakeholder to the European security and development systems. If you are not a stakeholder, you are tempted to be a spoiler.

During those 30 years, the two sides tried at least three ways to turn Russia into a stakeholder of a Greater Europe and all three failed for various reasons. The first attempt goes back to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (the Paris Charter) adopted by a summit meeting of European governments, Canada, the U.S., and the Soviet Union in Paris in November 1990. In certain ways, the Paris Charter was an endeavour aimed at operationalising the vision of “Europe whole and free.” If the participants

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had implemented the provisions of the Charter in full, and if the OSCE had become the centrepiece of a new collective security system in Europe, Russia could have found a relatively smooth way to become a significant player in such a system. However, the OSCE had never stood up to this challenge. The West had no appetite for creating institutional competition to NATO while Russia did not invest enough energy and political capital to make this approach work. As a result, the legal status of the OSCE remained unclear, and its institutional capacities remained quite limited.

The second attempt was the one undertaken by the West during the period of Russia's maximum weakness in the mid-1990s to early 2000s. “Europe whole and free” was to evolve as a geographical extension of major Western institutions that served the U.S. and its European allies so well throughout the Cold War. Since Russia, for a variety of reasons, could not join either NATO or the EU, it received special offers from both organisations. NATO came up with the idea of the NATO-Russia Council while the EU agreed to create the “Four Common Spaces” (4CS) initiative for cooperation in various domains. The 4CS was offered by the EU as the second-best option after Russia protested against the EU's idea of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in which Russia was meant to have equal status with other eastern EU neighbours. It should be noted that unlike the ENP members, Russia had no stated intentions to become an EU member and, therefore, Moscow apparently believed that its positions in the dialogue with Brussels were stronger. At the end of the day, 4CS was offered as a compromise, granting Russia more than most ENP members could hope for.

However, neither of these “consolation prizes” was good enough for the Kremlin. The NATO-Russia Council, even during its best times, was not much more than an information exchange and consultation meeting point while the implementation of the 4CS *de facto* did not differ in many ways from ENP applied by Brussels to other East European nations. While the ENP became by law a part of the EU's External Relations Framework, the 4CS remained only a political declaration of intent without any legal link to EU policies. For the very same reason, Russia was not included to the Eastern Partnership Programme, built upon the ENP. Dealing with NATO and with the EU, the Kremlin overestimated the importance of general

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political statements and underestimated the legal and institutional dimensions of the two organisations. In both cases, Russia's ambitions to have a say—if not veto power—in decision-making on the most important European matters were considered inappropriate and excessive by its Western partners.

Finally, the third pitch came from Moscow and envisaged a "Europe whole and free" based on two pillars—a Western and an Eastern one. In the security dimension, that idea implied close cooperation between NATO and CSTO (the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation uniting six former Soviet republics). In the economic dimension, "Europe whole and free" was to include the EU and the EAEU (the Eurasian Economic Union with five member states—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan). The West has never considered these proposals in a serious way—both the CSTO and EAEU were regarded not as potential peers to NATO and the EU, respectively, but rather as Moscow-ruled organisations designed to consolidate the post-Soviet space under direct control from the Kremlin.

Most of the specific proposals, suggestions, and plans for integrating Russia into "Europe whole and free" put forward since 1989 fit into one of the three approaches. None of them did the trick. Even if the West and Russia could find a mutually satisfactory compromise on Ukraine (mission impossible under the current political circumstances!), they would have to revisit one of the failed concepts. Today, it would be much more difficult than it was back in 1989—the West is not united on many issues including Russia, the centre of global economic activities has moved from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the Kremlin's credit history would be a major problem for at least some of its Western neighbours for a long, long time.

Russia's current drift away from "Europe whole and free" towards a highly fragmented and partially authoritarian Asia appears natural and unavoidable. Compared to the Kremlin's failed "European project," the "Eurasian project" has at least two decisive advantages for Russia. First, Russia's relations with most Asian countries do not have such a long trail of historical grievances, mutual claims, and negative stereotypes that are typical of relations with many of its European partners. For most Asian countries, Russia does not look like an existential threat, and a negative

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image of Moscow is not a source of their national identity. On the contrary, Russia is perceived primarily as a major potential opportunity for economic expansion, and there are few opportunities of such scale left on the Asian continent.

Second, unlike the "European project," the "Eurasian project" is only just beginning. There are no fixed rules of the game yet, no procedures that are set in stone, no powerful bureaucratic structures, the likes of which have long taken deep root in the EU. Moreover, it is not at all evident that the "Greater Eurasia" will copy the cumbersome European constructions: instead of Europe's bricks, Asia may use light relocatable polymer structures. Therefore, Russia might find it easier to join Eurasian processes as an equal participant, and even a leader in some areas.

One could add that, as partners, the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes in Asia are more comprehensible and reliable than European democracies. Interacting with Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or China's Chairman Xi Jinping is easier and more understandable than with President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker or the leaders of individual European states, at any rate in those cases when prompt and specific results are required. In the current highly fluid and poorly predictable international situation, the speed of decision-making is crucial.

However, the Asian pivot has its own, clear limitations for Moscow. In terms of their history, culture, way of life, and basic values, the Russian people are European and not Asian. In most social parameters (demographics, urbanisation, education level, religiosity, social stratification, etc.) the differences between Russia and Europe, particularly Central and Eastern Europe, are not all that significant; in any case, they are much smaller than the differences between Russia and most Asian countries. Russia is part of European civilisation and, therefore, speaking about Russia's "European choice" is meaningless. This is not a choice, but destiny.

Furthermore, only Europe can be an effective driver of Russian economic and social modernisation—if only for the reason that it has comprehensive scientific, technological, and social potential, the likes of which will not form in Asia any time soon, if ever. More importantly, Europe is truly interested in Russia making a technological breakthrough,

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as it could give a powerful impetus to its own technological and economic development. A fresh “graft” of Russia's “wilding” would be more than useful for the still powerful and abundantly fruitful, yet ageing, European tree. At the same time, Asian partners are content to continue using Russia as a reservoir of various natural resources, and at best as a transit corridor. For Asia, the development of Russia's human capital is not a priority; Asia is keenly interested only in using Russia's scientific and technological groundwork (primarily in the defence industry), which has been preserved since the Soviet era.

It is only in conjunction with Europe that Russia will be able to preserve itself as a truly powerful actor in global politics. On its own, Russia lacks sufficient potential to claim the role of an independent “centre of power” on a global level. Regardless of the geopolitical constructions that will determine the new “Eurasian” world, Moscow will inevitably play second fiddle to the rising Asian giants (China, India) that significantly outperform Russia in economic growth. Russia's transition to the “minor league” of Asian politics depends on the rate of depreciation of Russia's remaining foreign political assets (nuclear weapons, permanent membership in the UN Security Council, and fuel and energy resources). In Europe, on the other hand, Russia will find itself among powers of economically and demographically comparable potential. Moreover, in any development scenario, Russia will remain the largest and most powerful European state—a state whose interests cannot be ignored. Additionally, existing traditions of doing business in Europe, including the emphasis on multilateralism and taking minority positions into account, create more options for Russia than the openly utilitarian and strictly pragmatic Asian practices. The odds are that Asia will not become “whole” or “free” in any observable future, which might put into question both the stability of the continent and the sustainability of Russia's “pivot.”

In any case, Russia's turn towards a “Greater Eurasia” by no means equals Russia's transformation into an Asian state or some puzzling hybrid “Eurasian” country. This is impossible. And even were it possible, it would be pernicious for Russia and for the entire “Eurasian project.” The value of Russia for Asia is precisely that it is different—it is not like most Asian countries. It complements those countries more than it competes

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with them. Renouncing Russia's European identity by dissolving it in the currently non-existent "Eurasian" identity would be a national disaster for Russia. Fortunately, such an evolution does not appear feasible.

Instead of futile attempts to construct a phantom "Eurasian identity," Moscow could consider the positive experience of Australia and New Zealand, which succeeded in fitting into the emerging Asia-Pacific community largely due to their evident economic, political, cultural, and civilizational differences from their surrounding Asian societies. The paradox is that as Russia immerses itself deeper and deeper in the Eurasian context, it will have to focus more on boosting its European nature. This is impossible without active economic, cultural, educational, academic, and social interaction with the EU.

Furthermore, Russia should be interested in a successful European project. Only a strong and consolidated EU is capable of making a significant contribution to the shaping of a truly polycentric (multipolar) world, a very popular topic in Moscow. A weak and disjointed Europe incapable of reaching a consensus within its own borders will always remain an object for Washington to exert pressure on, manipulate in various ways, and even flat-out blackmail. It is the EU's weakness that stands in the way of Brussels successfully counteracting the new sanctions that the Trump administration is imposing on Iran, or unanimously condemning the decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Only a weak EU will face the need to join *de facto* the unilateral anti-Russian sanctions imposed by the U.S. A strong and successfully developing EU is, in addition to everything else, a reliable and promising market for Russian goods, services, and investments (it also means that, among other things, from the point of view of Russia's economic interests, Brexit is far from being a godsend).

Any international organisation, including the EU, is only as effective or as ineffective as its principal members want it to be. Therefore, placing Brussels in opposition to the capitals of the leading EU countries is quite unjustified. Remove the Brussels bureaucracy and it will be the bureaucrats in Berlin, Paris, and Rome who have to deal with all the unpleasant aspects in Russia–Europe relations. It should be added that for Berlin, for instance, continued European integration is a top foreign policy priority. There

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is no simpler way for Moscow to ruin its relations with Germany than by demonstrating the desire to undermine European unity or just raise the suspicions of the German people that such a desire does, indeed, exist.

Moscow should have learnt by now that all those Eurosceptics, European right-wing populists, and nationalists are highly unreliable partners. Some of them combine a pointed dislike of Brussels with open hostility towards Moscow. Others, who position themselves as loyal friends to Moscow, in fact use their bold statements of friendship with Russia to bargain with Brussels on other issues that are of greater importance for them. In the five years that have passed since the EU first imposed sanctions on Russia, not one European populist that has come to power has ever officially raised the question of lifting them. There are reasons to believe populists will not do so in future either until the European political mainstream allows them to do so.

In sum, Russia cannot get back to Europe politically or institutionally anytime soon—neither side is ready for compromises that such a shift would require. To manage their mostly adversarial relations, Moscow and Brussels will need temporary instruments and mechanism to reduce the risks and costs of these relations for both sides. However, long-term technological, social, and economic needs, as well as apparent limitations of the "Asian pivot" are likely to gradually change the current political trends. At the end of the day, Russia will get back to Europe, provided that there will still be a Europe to get back to.

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Vladimir V. Kara-Murza

A Europe “Whole and Free” Is Possible When Russia Returns to Democracy

As U.S. President George H.W. Bush took the podium at Mainz's Rheingoldhalle on 31 May 1989 to deliver a speech that would define the worldview for a generation of post-Cold War leaders, he was about to make a leap that is easy to underestimate with historical hindsight.

There had already been promising signs, to be sure. Václav Havel, the Czechoslovak playwright and symbol of his country's liberation movement, had just been released from prison. The Soviet Union had just held its first-ever competitive election, which, although far from truly democratic, opened the legislature to voices that could previously be heard only in dissidents' kitchens or in *samizdat*. Poland's Solidarity union had won official status and was preparing for elections after its Round Table Talks with the communist government.

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The prospects for "the seeds of democracy" so hopefully referenced by Bush in Mainz, however, were far from assured. Berlin still stood divided; Erich Honecker's iron grip over East Germany seemed firm, as did Nicolae Ceaușescu's over Romania; Soviet troops had just brutally put down an anti-communist demonstration in Tbilisi; and, many in the USSR's leadership were calling for an end to Mikhail Gorbachev's experiments with *glasnost*. Yet, Bush spoke on: "Let Europe be whole and free … the world has waited long enough."[1]

Few leaders have had the fortune of America's 41st president to see their goals realised to such a degree; few historical eras can compare with this period in Eastern Europe and in the pace of the transformation. Walls and dictators were crumbling at breathtaking speed. Within months, Berlin was reunited, Solidarity triumphed in Poland's multiparty elections, and Havel was president of Czechoslovakia. "When they arrested me … I was living in a country ruled by the most conservative communist government," he said in his address to the U.S. Congress in February 1990. "Today … Czechoslovakia is returning to Europe."[2]

The "return to Europe" would become a leitmotif for the post-communist transformation in the former Warsaw Pact countries. Much more than a shift to media pluralism, free elections, and a market economy, more even than the removal of foreign domination—fundamental as all of this was—the reforms of the 1990s represented for Eastern Europe a long-sought affirmation of its status as "fully" European. Domestic political and economic reforms were linked to—and incentivised by—the prospect of integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. It is doubtful that in their most audacious hopes of May 1989, American and Western European policymakers could imagine that within two decades most Eastern Bloc countries would become full members of the European Union and NATO or that the region once referred to as the "Second World" would become a model for democratic development. "What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such," political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote in 1989. "That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."[3]

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Yet, for all the progress made since 1989, the 30th anniversary of the Mainz speech was not a happy one, and its main premise—a Europe "whole and free" and "at peace with itself"—has not been fulfilled, nor will it be while Europe's largest country is ruled by an illiberal regime that has led an authoritarian restoration at home and engaged in aggressive revisionism abroad.

Russia's Road to Democracy—and Back

This course of events was not predetermined. Indeed, the wave of democracy that swept through Eastern Europe after 1989 culminated with Russia's own democratic revolution in August 1991—the three days that ended the Soviet system. It began as a *coup d'état* led by hardliners in President Gorbachev's inner circle: the leaders of the Soviet government, the Communist Party, and the KGB. The plotters controlled everything—the administrative machine, state media, security services, and the tanks, which they sent into Moscow. But against all that might was something Soviet *apparatchiks* did not count on: the determination of a people who had already tasted freedom not to return to the old ways.

The coup was met by hundreds of thousands of Muscovites, who took to the streets and stood in front of the tanks—and the tanks stopped. As Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first freely elected president who led the demonstrations, made his victory appeal from the balcony of the White House, Muscovites went to Lubyanka Square, to the headquarters of the Soviet KGB, to tear down the monument of its founder, Felix Dzerzhinsky. The statue of the head of the Soviet secret police hanging in a noose as a crane lifted it from its pedestal remains among the most enduring images of Russia's democratic revolution. That same evening, a plaque honouring another secret police chief, Yuri Andropov, was removed from the facade of the building. In Russia, symbols matter. The Communist Party was soon outlawed, its archives partially opened, its governing structures found by Russia's highest court to have been "the initiators of repression … directed at millions."[4] "The idol of communism … which instilled fear in humanity,

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has collapsed," Yeltsin told a joint session of the U.S. Congress in June 1992. "It has collapsed never to rise again."[5]

Just as with its Western neighbours, Russia's move toward democracy was closely tied to its "return to Europe." On 20 December 1991, before the dissolution of the USSR was even formally completed, President Yeltsin sent a letter to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner that was dramatically read aloud by Russian Ambassador Nikolai Afanasyevsky at a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels. Calling for "strengthening stability and cooperation on the European continent," Yeltsin informed Wörner that he was "raising a question of Russia's membership in NATO … as a long-term political aim."[6]

On 7 May 1992, Russia made a formal application to join the Council of Europe, the oldest pan-European institution whose Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had served as the gold standard on the continent for half a century. After an arduous accession process, on 25 January 1996, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe voted 164 to 35 to approve Russia's application and invite it to become a full member. "Our rendezvous with history," was the comment from Rudolf Bindig, a German parliamentarian and the rapporteur on Russia's accession.[7] On 28 February, the Russian flag was raised alongside others at the Palace of Europe in Strasbourg. "With the victory of democracy in Russia and with our accession to the Council of Europe, the territory of freedom has notably expanded; it now spans twelve time-zones," President Yeltsin told fellow leaders at the second Council of Europe summit. "Today we are coming close to creating a new and big Europe without dividing lines, a Europe where no country will dictate its will to others … It is in the interest of all Europeans to travel this road."[8]

That speech was made in 1997, the year that seemed to signal a long-awaited breakthrough on Russia's road to democracy. At home, it was the first year of economic growth since the end of the Soviet Union, the year the Russian government concluded a peace agreement with Chechnya, ending a brutal internal conflict, the year Boris Nemtsov, a young reformist regional governor, moved to Moscow as first deputy prime minister and quickly soared in the polls, becoming Russia's most popular politician and the presumed heir to the presidency. Abroad, it was the year Russia was

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invited to join the Group of Eight industrialised democracies, enacted its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union that emphasized "respect for democratic principles and human rights," and signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security with NATO, reaffirming a "shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free."[9]

Once again, however, the promise went unfulfilled. In Russia, the ensuing years brought change that was as rapid as the one a decade earlier, but in the opposite direction, what Harvard University's Samuel Huntington termed the "reverse wave" of democracy.[10] The financial crash of 1998, the "oligarch wars," and a sustained media campaign against Nemtsov, then the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, all contributed to a fundamental shift in Russian politics. Even more important was the long-term impact of an unfinished revolution. As it turned out, the job had only been half done in 1991. While the Soviet regime was removed from power, a Nuremberg-style trial or truth commissions to account for its crimes were never held, lustration against its operatives and its security services was never enacted, and even its archives, after a brief opening, were back under lock and key. "It's like dealing with a wounded beast," Vladimir Bukovsky, a prominent Soviet-era dissident, warned the Russian government at the time. "If you don't finish it off, it will attack you."[11]

Just eight years after Russia's democratic revolution—and two years after his "big Europe" speech in Strasbourg—Yeltsin handed the keys to the Kremlin to an officer of the very same organisation he had so spectacularly defeated in August 1991. Ominously, Vladimir Putin began his rule by restoring one of the Soviet symbols taken down during those days: the memorial plaque to Andropov on Lubyanka Square. In Russia, symbols matter.

Symbols were followed by substance as Putin moved at a speedy pace to dismantle Russia's nascent democratic institutions. Within three years, all private television networks were cut off or taken over; Russia's richest man, the oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was in prison for having the tenacity to support opposition parties; and, Russian elections, for the first time since Soviet rule, were being assessed by international observers as "not fair." With time, the screws became tighter, with peaceful opposition

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rallies routinely dispersed by riot police, with leading human-rights groups officially stigmatised as "foreign agents," and with the number of political prisoners rivalling that in the Brezhnev era. In February 2015, in what became the most high-profile political assassination in modern Russia, opposition leader Boris Nemtsov was gunned down near the Kremlin walls. The organisers of his murder remain unidentified and unindicted.

A Triumph of Realpolitik: Putin's Western Enablers

With a few notable exceptions, such as Republican Senator John McCain or Democratic Congressman Tom Lantos in the United States, the West chose to turn a blind eye to Putin's domestic crackdown, continuing "business as usual." While he targeted opponents and muzzled media at home, the Kremlin leader was welcomed in Western capitals, with presidents and prime ministers of democratic countries not only accepting but praising him. "A new style of leader, a reformer ... who is going to make a huge difference in making the world more peaceful," was the verdict on Putin from President George W. Bush, who had "looked the man in the eye ... [and] was able to get a sense of his soul."[12] Bush's successor, President Barack Obama, the author of the "reset" with the Kremlin, praised Putin for his "extraordinary work ... on behalf of the Russian people" and congratulated him on winning a sham election that observers ruled neither free nor fair nor democratic.[13] In what was perhaps the most grotesque illustration of realpolitik, in June 2003, days after pulling the plug on Russia's last independent nationwide television network, Putin was treated to a state visit to Britain with a lavish reception at the London Guildhall, not far from the spot where, three years later, agents likely acting on his orders would poison Russian defector Alexander Litvinenko with radioactive polonium.

The immorality of this approach aside, Putin's Western interlocutors seemed to forget—or ignore—a fundamental maxim of Russian history: that domestic repression and external aggression are closely connected. Why would a government that disregards its own laws and the rights of its own citizens respect international norms or the interests of other countries? Remarkably, a warning sign for those who could forget was

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sounded as early as December 1992. At a CSCE meeting in Stockholm, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, the face of President Yeltsin's pro-European foreign policy, took to the floor to announce a major shift in his country's positions. Russia, he said, will confront "NATO and EU plans to strengthen their military presence in ... the former Soviet Union" and any "interference in internal affairs," and regards the former Soviet republics as "a post-imperial space where Russia has to defend its interests by all available means" and where "CSCE norms cannot be fully implemented."[14] As diplomats rushed for the phones, Kozyrev approached the podium once again to explain that his speech had been a stunt intended to show what would happen to Russia's international posture should antidemocratic forces seize power at home.

By comparison to the present day, Kozyrev's speech was an exercise in moderation. Under Putin, Russia's national security strategy designated NATO actions as "a threat," one of his state-of-the-nation addresses featured a computer animation of a ballistic missile attack on Florida, Russian military exercises include simulated nuclear strikes on NATO countries and their allies, and the main state television anchor, Dmitry Kiselyov, boasted on the air of "turn[ing] the U.S. into radioactive ash."[15] The aggressive posturing has gone beyond words, with Putin violating key arms-control agreements, using Russian forces for military attacks in Georgia and Ukraine, sending soldiers and mercenaries to prop up dictators from Syria to the Central African Republic, and, with Crimea, carrying out the first state-to-state territorial annexation in Europe since the end of the Second World War.

Lessons Learned? Past Mistakes as a Warning for Future Decision-Makers

The lessons of history are not just for scholars; they are, above all, for political practitioners who work to avoid past mistakes. For Russia, the main lesson from the failed transition of the 1990s is that it is not enough to shed the outward trappings of a dictatorship; the core foundations must be uncovered and removed. This lesson will hopefully be heeded by those

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who shepherd Russia's next turn to democracy, whenever it comes. For the West, the main lesson should be a reminder that, in the end, the oft-touted conflict between interests and values in relation to Russia is false. Deals with an authoritarian regime are transient at best and counterproductive in the long run. Lasting peace and stability in Europe will only come with a democratic government in Russia that respects the rule of law at home and behaves as a responsible citizen globally.

It is, of course, for Russians to work for this outcome. The mass protests against corruption and authoritarianism that swept through the country in 2017 and 2018, with thousands of (mostly very young) people on the streets from Kaliningrad to Khabarovsk, give hope that such a prospect is real. But Western democracies have an important role to play too, both in adopting the right attitude to the current regime and in preparing to deal with a different Russia in the future. At present, it is important to make clear that values matter, and that adherence to the rule of law is not just a declaration, but a practical guide for policy. For years, the world's democracies have, in effect, supported the Putin regime by treating it as a respectable international interlocutor and, more importantly, by allowing its cronies and oligarchs to use Western countries as havens for their looted wealth. The people who abuse the basic norms of the rule of law in Russia have been enjoying the privileges and protections afforded by these norms in the West, where they have been storing their money, parking their families, and buying up real estate. For too long, the West has enabled such behaviour. More recently, the passage of "Magnitsky" laws in Europe and North America, with targeted visa and financial sanctions on those complicit in corruption and human-rights abuses, has signalled that such people will no longer be welcome on Western soil or in Western banks. This was a groundbreaking step toward accountability, but only the first one; more countries need to pass such laws, and those that already have them must do a better job of implementing them. Western leaders should also be careful not to equate—in rhetoric or in action—Putin's regime with Russia as a whole, and not to fall into the false (and insulting) narrative that Russians are somehow "incapable" of democracy.

Most importantly, while there is still time, Western countries should prepare a framework for integrating a future democratic Russia into that

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"big Europe" that never came in the 1990s. And here they should learn from their own past failure. For while the main reasons for Russia's "reverse wave" undoubtedly lay at home, Western inability—or unwillingness—to offer Russia the prospect of a full "return to Europe" of the kind it offered its neighbours played a significant role in disincentivising democratic reforms in the 1990s. According to contemporary accounts, after Yeltsin's proposal of joining NATO in 1991, the alliance's leaders "seemed too taken aback by the Russian letter to give any coherent response."[16] Although the Treaty of Maastricht clearly established that "any European state may apply to become a member of the [European] Union," such a prospect was never offered to Yeltsin's Russia, even as a distant possibility.[17] While accession to the Council of Europe gave Russia important symbolic status and the legal protections of the Convention on Human Rights, Russian citizens were never offered the economic benefits of "track one" European integration, such as free trade or visa-free travel, creating the perception, later skilfully used by Putin's propaganda, that Russians were treated as second-class Europeans. While others were welcomed, Russia was kept at the doorstep. It is imperative not to repeat this mistake. A Europe "whole and free," if that is still the goal, is only possible with a democratic Russia as an integral part of it.

"We realize our great responsibility for the success of our changes, not only toward the people of Russia but also toward … the entire world," Yeltsin said in his speech to Congress in June 1992. "We have no right to fail in this most difficult endeavour, for there will be no second try as in sports."[18] History has not been kind to Russia, but it has given it a number of "second tries," and opportunities for democratic change have come and gone. Someday, there will be another and, for the sake of everyone, it must succeed.

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Hryhoriy Nemyria

For Europe to Be Whole and Free, Ukraine Must Be Whole and Free, and at Peace

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In May 1989, with the Soviet Union's possible disintegration pondered more by novelists than policymakers, newly inaugurated U.S. President George H.W. Bush made a bold prediction: a post-Soviet Europe, he proclaimed, is one that must be "whole and free." Although Bush repeatedly mocked what he called the "vision thing" throughout his presidency, he had at last found a vision that he could support: Europe as a vast zone of peace to be formed when, and if, the Cold War came to an end.

A consummate diplomatic realist, Bush knew that achieving his vision would be no simple task, for Bush believed, as Henry Kissinger said in his first book, A *World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812–1822*, that "the attainment of peace is not as easy as the desire for it." Indeed, achieving peace is never as easy as the desire for it and in many ways has become progressively harder nowadays, given the rise to

great power status of non-European states with vastly different historical experiences.

With Kissinger's disciple Gen. Brent Scowcroft as his national security advisor, Bush understood that the key underpinning of a lasting international system is the concept of legitimacy, i.e., that international arrangements must be accepted by all the major powers within the system if they are to prove enduring. If that basic level of consent is lacking, no international system can survive without resort to force and/or coercion.

Less than two years after Bush's pronouncement, the opportunity to achieve his vision suddenly arose, following the breakup of the Soviet Union. For Bush, Scowcroft, and Secretary of State James Baker, designing a framework that would bring peace to Europe, pass the test of legitimacy, and yet also meet the aspirations for freedom held by the people of the formerly "captive nations" of the USSR, as well as the desire of the German people, in particular their chancellor, Helmut Kohl, for reunification of their country, would provide a moment for creative statecraft as challenging as those that existed in 1815 following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, 1918 at World War I's end, and 1945 after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Bush, at first, did not seem the man for so monumental a job. Since becoming president, Bush had not only abjured offering any "vision" of the future but also demonstrated great scepticism about Gorbachev, far more so than his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. But as the Iron Curtain began to disintegrate, pressure built on Bush to become more proactive. A visit to Poland and Hungary in 1989 exposed him directly to the rising hopes for change throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

By the end of 1991, communism in Europe was finished. Fortuitously, Bush's push to complete and sign the START treaty with Gorbachev provided a foundation, both of goodwill between the superpowers and what might be called a "macro-structure of peace" on which to begin to construct a new European order. But the breathtaking speed of change across the continent meant that organising this diplomatic construction could not be delayed.

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Structuring a Structure of Peace

Early on in the process of trying to create a Europe whole and free, Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft recognised their need for allies in organising whatever post-Cold War settlement was to emerge, and went about cobbling together a negotiating structure to handle the knottier problems facing the continent. The primary intent was to forge some consensus among the European powers about the order that was to prevail in the years ahead.

Little remarked upon today, besides the Round Table Talks of 1989, was the 2+4 forum which Secretary Baker brought together to address the thorniest problem of all, German reunification. It provided viable frameworks within which negotiations about the future structure of Europe could proceed. Both of these bodies, of course, were born of necessity—the need to agree the peaceful transfer of power in Poland and in East Germany to political groups and governments with greater popular acceptance and legitimacy.

The success of this form of negotiating structure in achieving viable domestic transitions was soon adapted by Bush in the international realm with the "2+4" forum (East and West Germany, plus the U.S., Soviet Union, France, and the UK), which negotiated the reunification of Germany. Indeed, so successful were the talks that, nowadays, few remember that the most recalcitrant parties in the discussions were not the Soviets or East Germans, but President François Mitterrand of France and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

To bring to an end the central issue that had incited the Cold War—the division of Germany—was certainly attractive to Bush, though he recognized the potential for undermining NATO, given the objections of Thatcher and Mitterrand. To be sure, no alliance can ever reconcile the national objectives of all its members; but the minimum condition for an alliance to remain effective is the requirement that its policies should not be seen as undermining or preventing the deepest aspirations of one of its members.

Unification was just such an aspiration for the Germans. Continuation of the status quo, in the face of East Germany's implosion, would have driven a stake through the heart of Germany's NATO membership, as it would have

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fatally divided German domestic opinion. By supporting unification, Bush not only would secure something every U.S. president had sought during the Cold War, the prevention of Germany becoming a neutral country, but it would also create a powerful new partner and interlocutor in Europe.

Once Bush accepted the need for German unification, the trick was to get Russia on board. Here, the negotiations proved simpler than expected, as Gorbachev did not demand that Germany leave NATO, only that NATO forces not be stationed on the territory of former East Germany.

"Chicken Kiev"

Next to resolving "the German Reunification Question," Ukraine posed the most vexing obstacle to securing a viable post-Cold War settlement in Europe. Although Bush had followed Bismarck's dictum that "[t]he statesman's task is to hear God's footsteps marching through history, and to try and catch on to His coat-tails as He marches past," where Ukraine was concerned, Bush sought to avert his eyes and his ears from what was happening, both before Ukraine secured independence and afterwards. Worse than that, he heard the rustle of history, and his first response was to deny what was happening. His successor, President Bill Clinton, did little better.

Bush appeared to discount the possibility of Russian revanchism so completely that grounding Ukraine's national sovereignty and territorial integrity in binding agreements was seen as unnecessary, an error of judgment for which Ukraine has paid, and is paying, a very heavy price.

That Ukraine was the "odd man out" in the immediate post-Cold War Europe is something that we can glimpse in both its status and its troubles today. Ukraine stands neither whole nor free, given Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war in Donbas.

The first indication that Ukraine would not fit neatly within the structure the U.S. and Western powers were envisioning for post-Cold War Europe, at least not in any way that would be acceptable to both Russia and the West, was hinted at during President Bush's visit to Kyiv. Bush arrived in Ukraine on 1 August 1991, a moment when calls for independence were at near fever pitch, as Johns Hopkins University historian Mary Elise Sarotte

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relayed in her book, *The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe*. Indeed, in less than three weeks' time, following the failed coup against Gorbachev, Ukraine's parliament would make its own declaration of independence from the USSR.

Bush's speech, however, appeared to throw cold water on Ukraine's aspirations for independence. He opened with some rare glowing praise of Gorbachev's reform efforts within the Soviet Union, as well as for the new union treaty. That treaty, Bush proclaimed, "holds forth the hope that republics will combine greater autonomy with greater voluntary interaction—political, social, cultural, economic—rather than pursuing the hopeless course of isolation." Then, he asked Ukrainians to recognise that prosperity is not something that comes in an instant, which seemed to many of his listeners to suggest that it would not come with independence. Bush concluded with a blunt warning that also belittled Ukraine's national aspirations: "Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism."

That speech shocked many Ukrainians, who never expected that a U.S. president would be so openly dismissive of their yearning for independence. But Ukraine's independence leaders took some comfort from the fact that Bush's speech incited a political storm in the U.S. The *New York Times* columnist William Safire, once a speechwriter for President Nixon, cruelly dubbed Bush's Rada address the "Chicken Kiev" speech, and Democrats, as well as Republicans to Bush's right, were openly contemptuous. They charged Bush with undermining, if not betraying, the cause of liberty among the captured nations.

Fearing the potential political fallout, Scowcroft rushed an op-ed into print, again in the *New York Times*, on 18 August. He argued that Bush in his Kyiv speech was not betraying Ukraine, but seeking to strike a balance between the USSR's political centre in Moscow and the republics' yearning for independence.

Bush followed up with an emollient letter to Gorbachev sent on 20 August, just as the putsch against him was getting underway. The U.S. president had not reconsidered his views and still saw Ukrainian independence as more of a threat to stability than the ongoing existence of the Soviet Union.

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Goulash Diplomacy

Ukraine's independence, coming at the same moment as the Russian Federation's first appearance as an independent state, meant that the consequences of Ukrainian sovereignty came as afterthoughts to Bush and the West's leading statesmen, an act of neglect they would try to remedy in piecemeal fashion in the ensuing years. The reason for some action was clear: for centuries, the status of Ukraine had determined whether Russia was to be an empire or a nation-state. Russia's attitude to Ukraine's independent status, indeed, was to become a litmus test revealing the Kremlin's willingness to adhere to any post-Cold War settlement that was agreed for Europe.

That Russia could not simply give up control of Ukraine should not have surprised anyone. Shorn of Ukraine, Russian leaders would need to conceive of themselves either in a new way, as the people of a normal nation-state, or retreat into their old imperial mindset. Bush and the West misplayed their opportunity to shape this psychological conversion within Russia, something Yuliya Tymoshenko presciently commented upon in *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2007):

> After the Soviet Union's collapse, the West made the mistake of assuming that Russia's reduced status meant it was unnecessary to accord the Kremlin any special diplomatic consideration—that Russia neither deserved nor should be offered a major role in world affairs. Accordingly, instead of drawing Russia into a network of dialogue and cooperation when it was weak—and thereby helping it form habits that would carry on when Russia regained strength—the West ignored Russia.

This failure of foresight that spawned Russian revanchism became incendiary because of another failure: the West's inability to assist Ukraine to develop a confident, independent mindset early on its existence as a nation-state. Although the threats to European stability that emerged from this failure are not sinister in the way that today's Russian aggression is, they did create the conditions that brought about a severe undermining of a fundamental principle of the post-Cold War European settlement—

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that borders in Europe are not changed by force, something Russia has sought to do through its illegal annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas.

The knowledge that the country's margin for survival was precarious made the diplomatic mindset of Ukraine's representatives both more complicated and less confident that those of their Western, and Russian, interlocutors. At times, this natural insecurity incited impatience in the West, appearing annoyed at the seemingly insatiable need of Ukraine's leaders for reassurance. President Bush and his international colleagues, however, too often failed to recognise that so profound a sense of insecurity was inevitable given Ukraine's historic situation.

The need to belong to something—with "the West" undoubtedly the preferred choice—to claim possession of some semblance of stability amidst the chaos of the USSR's disintegration: this was the overwhelming imperative of independent Ukraine's first generation of diplomats. This powerful, and quite justified, motivation should not have been ignored, let alone dismissed, in the way it too often was.

And yet, dismissed it was. But independent Ukraine, though seemingly a fragile construct due to the ability of external powers to manipulate its internal divisions, as well as the shattering of the entrenched economic ties between it and Russia, did have one diplomatic trump card it could have played had it wished: through its inheritance of about one-third of the USSR's nuclear arsenal (some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads, more than Britain, France and China combined, 176 ICBMs and 44 strategic bombers designed to target the U.S., and some 2,500 tactical nuclear warheads), Ukraine had suddenly become the world's third-largest nuclear power.

This sudden growth in the nuclear club appeared intolerable to the world's established nuclear powers. So, the big four nuclear powers of the time—the U.S., Russia, UK, and France (China stayed on the sidelines)—joined together to find the means to convince Ukraine to give up its nuclear arsenal. It was not Bush who would be tasked with managing this problem, but President Clinton, who nevertheless turned to Bush's preferred negotiating method for resolving Cold War problems: collective negotiations.

From the start, it was clear that the diplomatic balance was heavily weighted in favour of the nuclear disarmament of Belarus, Ukraine, and

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Kazakhstan that Russia and the Western powers wanted. Indeed, that Russia and the West were in lock-step agreement on the matter made the pressure even more intimidating for Ukraine's leaders, who were, in essence, the leading voice for the three new nuclear states.

Ukraine's negotiators were at another disadvantage. As representatives of a society that had known nothing but suppression and frustration of its interests for a century, and with scant real-world diplomatic experience, they appeared to be over-burdened by premonitions of disaster and of their nation's impotence. This "spiritual" malaise must be understood as an essential element behind Ukraine's decision to surrender its nuclear weapons while gaining almost nothing real in return. For instead of demanding elaborated meaningful binding guarantees of Ukraine's territorial integrity with a proper mechanism of enforcement in exchange for surrendering its Soviet nuclear stockpile, Ukraine signed onto what was only a diplomatic memorandum that offered only "assurances" of the country's borders. Neither the U.S., UK, nor France committed to Ukraine's territorial integrity. As the country would find out in 2014 when Russian troops invaded Crimea, Western "assurances" aren't worth the paper they're printed on.

Time for Creativity Again

As Tymoshenko wrote in her *Foreign Affairs* article, long before the invasion of Crimea and Donbas revealed the scale of Russia's revisionism:

> Ukraine's national experience has taught its citizens to regard peace as fragile and fleeting, its roots too shallow to bear the strain of constant social and political upheaval. We accept the lessons of our history and work toward solutions that relieve the sources of this strain, lest neglect allow war to overtake peace and authority to subvert freedom.

That work for Ukraine's future, of course, will demand creativity on the scale that President Bush employed in the aftermath of the Cold War's end. There is certainly an opportunity to be seized, and the format used from the Round Table Talks of 1989 to the negotiations that yielded the flawed

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Budapest Memorandum of 1994 remains a viable vehicle for negotiations to resolve the disputes between Ukraine and Russia. A new framework for negotiation is needed, given that the Minsk process has clearly reached a dead end, and the ability of Ukraine and Russia to even speak to each other on any issue is practically nil.

This does not mean that the Minsk\Normandy framework must be abruptly abandoned. There are still too many intertwined legacies and issues involved. However, inertia is becoming increasingly counterproductive and dangerous for all parties. As international armed conflict in Donbas is clearly a part of a larger problem, conflict resolution efforts must properly incorporate and reflect this understanding.

What is needed, therefore, is a format that can bring not only Russia and Ukraine together but also the other major powers—the U.S., UK, France, Germany, and, yes, China—with a stake in maintaining the post-Cold War settlement in Europe and, indeed, across Eurasia.

As is often the case, these issues are best resolved by expanding them so as to bring in more options. With the entire nuclear security system and future of non-proliferation and arms control now in question following the ending of the ABM Treaty, suspension of the INF treaty, and expiration in 2021 of the New START treaty, the entire post-Cold War settlement is now coming into doubt. Because China has benefited from this settlement perhaps more than any country, and because it has an enormous and ambitious development agenda along the old Silk Road route with its Belt and Road Initiative, it has an abiding stake in revitalising the agreements so as to ensure that all of the nations along the Silk Road route remain confident in their independence, their sovereignty, and their territorial integrity. Without China's participation, I believe, no renewed consensus over the post-Cold War settlement is possible.

That China's leadership has established deep and respectful ties with Russian President Putin will, of course, make its participation in a new framework invaluable in seeking resolution of the issues of Crimea and Donbas. For too long, the world has wrongly treated the conflict between Ukraine and Russia as purely a bilateral problem. Seen in its proper context, this is a pan-Eurasian problem that calls for the insights and participation of the other great Eurasian powers if peace is to return to Ukraine, and the

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security and territorial integrity of all nations is to be assured. Reference to the organising idea of the Budapest Memorandum focuses on the connection between Ukraine's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity and the reliability and durability of the non-proliferation regime.

As President Bush demonstrated, every diplomatic achievement was a vision before it became a reality. The "facts" of Crimea's annexation and the ongoing war in Donbas are undoubtedly monumental, but the effective statesman or woman sees facts not as immutable but as obstacles to be transcended, where necessary. And these are facts that must be transcended if Ukraine's independence, Russia's prosperity, and Europe's peace are to be secured now and into the future.

After five years of violence, and the risk of Ukraine's troubles becoming a "frozen conflict" on a far larger scale than any of the others in the former Soviet space, carrying with it, moreover, a far larger risk of contagion, it is time for the West, and for the leaders of Russia and Ukraine, to lift their sights. Indeed, if the West still wants to set a model of diplomatic leadership for the rest of the world, it can begin by demonstrating in the struggle between Russia and Ukraine that its wellsprings of diplomatic creativity have not run dry. If Europe is ever to be whole and free, Ukraine must be whole and free, and at peace.

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Michael Carpenter

Europe's Struggle Against Illiberal Oligarchy

Only a generation ago, the collapse of communist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe instilled a hope, even an expectation, that liberal democracy would become the dominant political system across the entire continent, even “the only game in town.” President George H.W. Bush's call for a “Europe whole and free” represented the optimistic mindset of those early days of the post-Cold War era. With today's hindsight, it is easy, even fashionable, to scoff at this optimism and dismiss the era's democratic triumphalism as naïve and premature. Recent democratic backsliding and Russia's revanchist wars have even led some to go so far as to criticize the very idea of building a “Europe whole and free” on the grounds that the West pushed its agenda too hard and too fast, thus precipitating a predictable revanche of illiberal forces.[1]

When looking back on the immediate post-Cold War period, however, what stands out is not the excessive optimism or naiveté of those embarking on democratic reforms, but rather how successful they

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were at establishing liberal democracy. From Tallinn to Sofia, countries that had been ruled by iron-fisted totalitarian dictatorships transformed themselves into functioning liberal democracies in a matter of just a few years, and in most cases with no prior historical experience to guide them. These successful transformations, even if imperfect, brought freedom and prosperity to tens of millions of people.[2] To criticize Western support for these transformations as geopolitically imprudent is to relegate Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest to an authoritarian sphere of influence forever.

To be sure, these nascent democracies were imperfect and had inherited a significant degree of corruption from the communist era. And as everywhere else in the world, post-communist political elites attempted to aggrandise power by using the advantages of incumbency to tilt the playing field in their favour. But the overall arc of history in that initial decade of post-communist transition tilted overwhelmingly towards liberal democracy.

While there are many reasons for this, two factors were critical: first, civil society pressure on political elites to act in accordance with democratic norms; and second, external leverage from NATO and the EU. The former pressure came from the bottom up and was marshalled by highly mobilised civic groups that had just gone through the life-altering experience of overthrowing seemingly invincible dictatorships. These civic organisations cried foul whenever efforts to abuse power came to light and were emboldened to speak truth to power. The latter form of pressure came from the top down in the form of conditionality applied through the twin processes of NATO and EU integration. As countries in the region subjected themselves to the rigorous conditions-based process of Euro-Atlantic integration, they allowed themselves to be graded on their adherence to democratic norms.

Both the top-down and bottom-up pressures were strongest in the countries of Central Europe, where organised civil societies and prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration were strongest, and weakest in former Soviet states such as Russia, Belarus, and the Central Asian republics.

Consider, for example, the case of Slovakia. When Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar and his cronies began to concentrate power in the 1990s by using the security services to go after their political opponents, they

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immediately faced a harsh backlash from NATO and the EU, which made abundantly clear that such actions jeopardised Slovakia's membership prospects. This external pressure combined with sustained civil society protests led to the regime being voted out of office. Six years later, Slovakia joined NATO and the EU.

While local circumstances were different across the region, similar combinations of bottom-up and top-down pressure kept governments in Central and Eastern Europe focused on adherence to liberal democratic norms and kept nationalist-populist demagogues like Mečiar or Poland's Stanisław Tymiński at bay. Farther to the east, where civil societies were less well organised and the prospects of NATO and EU integration more distant (or absent), a more illiberal, oligarchic system of government predominated.

The Oligarchisation of Europe

Today, 30 years after the revolutions of 1989, the transition to liberal democracy no longer looks as certain or as linear as it did around the turn of the century. Europe has instead emerged as a battleground for what future historians may well see as the defining geopolitical conflict of the 21st century: the clash between liberal democracy and corrupt, illiberal oligarchy.[3]

In contrast to the Cold War, today's conflict is less a contest of utopian ideologies than it is a competition between real-world political systems: one based on free and fair elections, constitutionally protected rights for individuals and minorities, and a competitive market economy; the other on the concentration of political and economic power in the hands of illiberal, oligarchic elites. The clash between these governance systems is manifested along two dimensions simultaneously: as a competition *between states* in the international arena and as a competition between political actors *within states*.

Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán provides perhaps the best illustration of how the process of "oligarchisation" works, in part because Hungary was a functioning liberal democracy in the 1990s with no

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indigenous oligarchs. The key to the subsequent subversion of Hungarian democracy lies in the relationship that was formed between Orbán's political party, Fidesz, and a small number of powerful oligarchs affiliated with it. As the Corruption Research Centre in Budapest has documented, the Orbán government systematically used procurement as a means of doling out lucrative contracts to cronies tied to the ruling Fidesz party and to Orbán personally.[4] This network of cronies accumulated enormous resources in the financial, agricultural, and real estate sectors.[5] These budding oligarchs then used their newfound wealth to buy up radio stations, television channels, and newspapers, including some of the most significant opposition media in Hungary. Some, like *Nepszabadsag* and *Magyar Nemzet*, were simply shut down, while others shifted to a more pro-government stance after their ownership changed.

While these oligarchs were buying up media resources, the regime went about stacking the tax authorities, law-enforcement bodies, and courts with party loyalists. This ensured favourable treatment both for party leaders but also for regime-linked oligarchs whose wealth depended on government contracts. This gradual process of capturing independent state institutions and concentrating economic resources and political power in the hands of a small network of loyalists is emblematic of the corrupt "oligarchisation" of European politics—a phenomenon that extends well beyond Hungary.

Looking back at the last two decades of Fidesz rule, it is impossible to point to a single event that would qualify as a constitutional coup. Indeed, Fidesz was forced into opposition between 2002–2010, demonstrating that Hungary is not yet a fully "captured" authoritarian state. Nevertheless, as former Hungarian President László Sólyom has rightly put it, the rule of law in Hungary has essentially "ceased to exist."[6] This is what makes the oligarchisation of power so insidious: it occurs in a piecemeal fashion and rarely challenges democratic principles overtly. Even Orban's infamous embrace of "illiberal democracy" seeks to retain an element of democratic legitimacy.

This is also true of Russia, perhaps the quintessential oligarchic authoritarian state. On its face, Russia has nominally independent courts, a nominally independent parliament, nominally independent opposition

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parties, independent media outlets, numerous civil society organisations, and a robust private sector. In practice, of course, the Kremlin fully controls the judiciary, has co-opted all the opposition parties in parliament, and controls all broadcast television stations. Civil--society organisations deemed to be dangerous are charged as "foreign agents" while private companies are forced to pay protection money to the security services to shield themselves from hostile takeovers. In short, Russia has the institutional trappings of a market democracy and its leaders sometimes pay lip service to democratic principles, but it is in many ways its antithesis. Kremlin ideologist Vladislav Surkov captures this Potemkin quality of Russia's democratic institutions by comparing them to a Sunday suit, "put on when visiting others, while at home we dress as we do at home."[7]

Conditions for the Rise of Illiberal Oligarchies

Looking back on the three decades since the end of the Cold War, the EU's "big bang" accession of 2004 was likely the high-water mark of democratisation in Europe, bringing Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia into the EU, and most of these same countries into NATO. The period that followed, however, saw the bottom-up and top-down pressures of democratic accountability weakened as a new class of illiberal politicians started to question the post-Cold war consensus favouring liberal democracy. While many reasons could be cited, three key factors stand out during this period.

The first was the pause in Euro-Atlantic integration that followed the EU and NATO's enlargement in 2004. Although Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2009 and Croatia was admitted to the EU in 2013, most candidates for NATO and EU membership perceived the door closing on their aspirations after the "big bang." European leaders expressed clear "enlargement fatigue" and the remaining aspirants came to understand their turn would not be coming for a long time. As the promise of Euro-Atlantic integration receded, the conditionality of EU membership no longer incentivised the same degree of reform, often leading to stasis or regression. Equally importantly, among the newest members of NATO

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and the EU, the end of the accession process diminished the leverage that had incentivised their progress to that point, making it far more likely for democratic backsliding to occur.

The second factor was the double whammy caused by the onset of the massive financial crisis in 2008 followed by an unprecedented wave of migration into Europe beginning in late 2014. The economic upheaval pushed many southern and eastern European economies to the edge of default and caused widespread social dislocation, youth unemployment, and dashed expectations. This, in turn, led to anger directed at incumbent politicians and the EU, which was widely seen as responsible for the imbalances in the eurozone that fuelled the crash. Then, on top of this economic calamity, the mass-migration crisis fuelled a potent mix of xenophobia and populism that allowed illiberal parties to blame deteriorating economic conditions on the new wave of migrants, regardless of whether there was a direct link. This was true both in countries that lay directly along the main migration route, like Hungary and Germany, and also in peripheral countries like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia, which admitted negligible numbers of migrants. By blaming these "others" for economic turbulence, tough times, and underlying cultural changes, illiberal forces made inroads in virtually every country in Europe.

Finally, a third factor was the generational shift that saw the moral standard-bearers of the anti-communist revolutions of 1989 replaced with a more technocratic class of professional politicians. The passing of the generation of Lennart Meri, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Václav Havel and the rise of a new cohort of professional politicians personified by ideological opportunists like Miloš Zeman and Milorad Dodik had a profound effect on European politics from east to west. Even within the liberal democratic mainstream this shift was discernible, as pragmatic careerists like Federica Mogherini (who joined the Italian Communist Party in 1988, just one year before communism was swept into the dustbin of history) came to dominate the political class while non-career politicians like Poland's Adam Michnik and Germany's Joachim Gauck retired from politics.

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The Geopolitics of Oligarchic Authoritarianism

The rise of illiberal oligarchies is also part of a broader geopolitical competition, as leading oligarchic powers like Russia and, to a lesser extent, China actively seek to support illiberal and oligarchic regimes as counterweights to liberal democracies. The Kremlin's close ties with oligarchic regimes in Hungary and Turkey are meant to undermine a "Europe whole and free" by supporting regimes that behave more like Russia. This is also why Russia supports illiberal forces that have not yet come to power. As Surkov cogently put it, "the political system that has been made in Russia is fit to serve not just future domestic needs but obviously has significant export potential. Demand for it and for certain specific components of it already exists, its experience is being studied and partially adopted, and it is being imitated by both ruling and opposition groups in many countries."[8] Russia's support for illiberal parties such as Lega, Vox, Jobbik, Alternative für Deutschland, or the Austrian People's Party is but one manifestation of Vladimir Putin's support for illiberal and nascent oligarchic forces in Europe.

Closer to home, the Kremlin has been even more aggressive about quashing incipient democratic movements and supporting pro-Russian oligarchic forces. In Georgia, the Kremlin actively opposed the democratic reforms initiated after the Rose Revolution and tried to manifest its influence through local oligarchs. When that failed, Russia ultimately resorted to the use of military force. The same is true in Ukraine, where Russia exerted control over the country's politics through its oligarchic proxies until the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 threatened to overturn this system through democratic reform. Sensing the imminent collapse of its patronage network, Russia intervened militarily. Even in tiny Montenegro, much farther from Russia's borders, the prospect of democratic reform through NATO and EU accession led the Kremlin to attempt a botched coup in October 2016.

Across all the frontline democracies of Eastern Europe, the Kremlin has consistently tried to undermine democratic reformers and support illiberal parties or oligarchic regimes. In Macedonia, the Kremlin supported the Gruevski government until its fall and then covertly funded protests

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to undermine North Macedonia's membership in NATO. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moscow has actively supported nationalist-populist leaders such as Dodik to block NATO and EU-mandated reforms. In Moldova, Russia has supported illiberal oligarchs like Ilan Shor. Even in the Baltic states, which are historically much more sceptical of the Kremlin, Russia has cultivated oligarch politicians such as Latvian oligarchs Ainārs Šlesers and Aivars Lembergs.

Strengthening Liberal Democracy Against Corrupt Authoritarianism

How do European states protect their liberal democratic institutions against illiberal, oligarchic forces?

The fight against illiberal oligarchies has to begin at home with strong civil societies and politically engaged citizens taking the lead. However, these civil societies must also be supported by other democratic states, which must pool resources and tactics by banding together as part of a larger alliance of democracies. The United States, for example, has a number of tools to fight corruption in other countries, and U.S. leadership on this issue has been vital to the success of anti-corruption efforts in frontline democracies like Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania. Whenever the U.S. and the EU have been engaged in the push for institutional reform, there has been steady progress in fighting back against entrenched, corrupt interests; conversely, when this engagement has waned, oligarchic interests have often re-asserted themselves. More aggressive use of the Global Magnitsky Act (in the U.S.) and similar European laws would also greatly increase leverage. European countries should also consider passing their own versions of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which levies sharp sanctions on companies that engage in corrupt practices abroad.

Second, NATO and the EU still retain enormous collective power to influence their individual members. Although the threat of expulsion is not credible in the absence of clear mechanisms for removing illiberal members, withholding benefits and bringing pressure to bear on corrupt, illiberal regimes can still have a powerful, galvanising effect.

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Equally important is reducing the loopholes and vulnerabilities that allow foreign powers like Russia and China to channel dark money to politicians, NGOs, and political parties. Campaign finance reform to ensure maximum transparency regarding funding for candidates and parties is critical, as are stronger anti-money laundering efforts. Transparency regarding government services and procurement, following the Scandinavian model, would also help reduce the scope of corruption by exposing government actors to more scrutiny and accountability. Intelligence and law-enforcement cooperation across Europe—with active U.S. participation—can also help target notoriously corrupt actors such as Eurasian organised crime figures, whose penetration of European jurisdictions from Monaco to Montenegro remains a significant threat and sometimes also a vector for foreign state influence.

Finally, American and European leaders must rally their citizens to defend their democracies from the creeping influence of illiberal and oligarchic forces. Unless Western leaders start taking more active steps to counter illiberal kleptocracies and get serious about building their own countries' resilience to corruption and foreign corrupt influence, more European states may well succumb to the Hungarian model. Europeans may not realize it yet, but a spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of illiberal democracy and oligarchy. If the transatlantic community does not take urgent action to counter it, the dream of a "Europe whole and free" will soon slip out of our reach.

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Vygaudas Ušackas

Advancing Europe Whole and Free: A Baltic Perspective

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To the formerly captive Baltic nations, the Atlantic alliance continues to be the guarantor and a safeguard of their freedom, democracy, and independence as well as a requisite for economic and social prosperity.

For more than 40 years, Lithuania and the two other Baltic states had been outside the alliance's area of stability. Separated from the West by the "Iron Curtain," the Lithuanian people nevertheless retained their commitment to and belief in the common values of free nations, owing to a persistent sense of statehood cultivated from the early 13th century, memories of the inter-war period of independence, and fragmentary ties with the Lithuanian community in the United States that accounts for almost one-fourth of the nation.

The conviction that Lithuania would re-join the community of like-minded nations also survived because we have consistently felt the—albeit insufficient—support of the West during the years of resistance between 1944 and 1953. Throughout the entire period of occupation, many of us

listened in secret to Radio Free Europe and Voice of America as the sound of truth and hope, as well as during the restoration of the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in 199–1991.

In 1949, the alliance was established as North America's and Western Europe's counteraction against growing Soviet aggression. To us, the alliance is not only a safeguard against any possible threat, with its "hard security" guarantee, but also the recognition and consolidation of the chosen path to a democratic and free world.

On the other hand, our membership in the alliance in 2004 was a historic act of European unification, making impossible any chance of turning back the clock and ever considering a repetition of the criminal acts of 1939, 1948, 1956, and 1968 in Central Europe. The vision of "Europe whole and free," articulated by President George H.W. Bush in May 1989, and the pioneering role of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to push and subsequently join NATO in 1999, encouraged the Baltic states to follow suit to aspire to NATO membership.

Thanks to hard work in implementing economic, political, and military reforms at home, a diplomacy with wise networking, and the support of their Western like-minded advocates for a "Europe whole and free," the Baltic states, alongside Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, officially joined NATO on 29 March 2004. The dream was realised. As President Bush said in Vilnius after the extension of the invitation to join NATO: "Anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America."

New Challenges

Here we are today, 15 years after the accession of Lithuania and the Baltic states into the alliance, celebrating the 70th anniversary of the establishment of NATO.

External threats and fundamental changes are calling us to review what is at stake and why transatlantic relations between North America and Europe remain critically important. After 15 years in both the EU and NATO, the Baltic states find themselves in new geopolitical circumstances.

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They cherish both memberships and remain staunch transatlanticists by choice and conviction. The history of Soviet occupation and the current resurgence of Russia give the Baltics no choice but to deepen their integration into the West.

While benefiting economically from EU accession, the Baltic countries do not see an alternative to NATO as a bedrock of European security, especially in light of the aggressive Russian policies and war in Ukraine. While enjoying the benefits of "Europe whole and free," we do not believe that this vision is fully implemented. For us, "Europe whole and free" should also embrace Ukraine and Georgia, which remain on the frontlines, defending like-minded nations of shared democratic values. These countries were promised NATO membership already back in 2008; their security and territorial integrity are vital for overall European security.

As dedicated members of the European Union, the Baltic states remain committed members of NATO. They are concerned about the growing divisions and tensions across the Atlantic and are keen to retain and strengthen the bonds between the two organisations.

Despite trade barriers, tensions, and remaining disagreements, the EU-U.S. economic partnership is unprecedented in its magnitude. Annual bilateral trade in goods and services exceeds €1 trillion, making each the other's largest trade partner. The last two decades have also proved that when we work collectively, we can improve not only our own security but the security of the world. As a result of a shared sense of responsibility and joint U.S.-EU efforts, the bloodshed in the Balkans region was terminated and international terrorism cells in Afghanistan countered. "Europe whole and free" was extended through the NATO and EU enlargement processes.

However, today we can witness that the international rules-based system created by the West after the end of the Second World War is being challenged, first by non-state actors, such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda and others, second by the growing economic and military might of China, and third by the aggressive foreign policies of Russia.

A number of unilateral decisions by the current U.S. administration (exit from the Paris Climate Change agreement, Iran nuclear deal, and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, as well as enacting trade barriers) undermine multilateral diplomacy and free trade, and further

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exacerbate problems for the EU and the historically important transatlantic community of shared values. On the other hand, calls by President Donald Trump for Europe to assume greater responsibility and invest more in defence have had an effect on continental allies.

Brexit, Grexit, the migration crisis, and the lack of EU strategic capacity, as well as the absence of a common strategic culture, have weakened the EU as a potential powerful force for good in defence of a democratic liberal order. The direction of the EU project is being questioned by a growing number of disenfranchised, populists, nationalist, "anti-EU" movements, and political parties. Tightened control over courts, media, and NGOs in some Central European countries has triggered an internal EU review whether individual Member States have breached EU values and individual rights and thus should be sanctioned under Union procedures.

In his speech in Warsaw on 6 July 2017, President Trump said that the "fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive? Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and destroy it?"

What can we do to rejuvenate relations between Europe and the U.S.? How can we enhance defence capabilities and deterrence in the context of new challenges and threats? What should be done to advance "Europe whole and free?"

Shift to China

The April 2019 NATO foreign ministers meeting in Washington D.C. demonstrated how keen the Trump administration is to shift the alliance's attention to the Pacific region and especially towards its main geopolitical competitor—China. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo used the occasion to urge NATO allies to work together to confront a wide variety of emerging threats, not only from Russia but also from China. Some politicians and observers have even suggested that while NATO has spent most of the past 70 years focusing on how to defend the European continent against

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Russia, China is set to become the main subject of the 21st century on both sides of the Atlantic. Questions about whether and to what extent Alliance members should allow Chinese network supplier Huawei to operate in their countries, along with Italy's and Central European's move to join Beijing's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, have put the question of how NATO should respond to the Asian power and its growing presence in Europe and beyond. It is important that Americans and Europeans use the NATO and EU transatlantic dialogue to better assess common responses to the risks, threats, and opportunities presented by the Chinese strategic competition.

Russia Puzzle

For the Baltic nations, an assertive Russia willing and capable to effectively project military force along its periphery and beyond remains the most acute security threat. After a quarter-century of military weakness, Russia is back as a serious military force in Eurasia, which NATO must address.

The West at large continues to face a long-term clash of worldviews with Russia. At the heart of this clash are fundamental differences, and not only over the future of Ukraine and Georgia and their right to choose their own alliances. This clash is also about core European values of freedom, democracy and the international rules-based system. The Kremlin is attempting to erode the Western liberal consensus both from within and outside by conducting an information war, meddling in democratic processes in the West, poisoning civilians on the streets of Salisbury, and violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and Georgia). The West and Russia have become locked in an open battle over the norms of international order.

The good news is that in recent years, the EU Member States and the U.S. have become remarkably united in their assessment of Russia. They still need to translate this unity, however, into a political strategy that reflects not just Western/European values but also Russian realities. The path of winning the overall normative war will go not only through countering Russia directly by sanctions and supporting Ukraine and Georgia but also

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through improving Europe's resilience and reinvigorating the Western model. So, what is the needed response from the West?

First, the EU and its Member States need to put their house in order by successfully coping with Brexit and its fallout, ensure growth, manage the migration crisis, reverse the trends of erosion of democracy and the rule of law, invest in defence, and shore up support for the EU project and its institutions. This is something French President Macron is trying to advance through a reinvigorated vision of a "multi-speed"/"flexible" EU and multiple calls for a European renaissance.

All of this may seem self-evident, but it is precisely our internal problems and deficiencies that the current Russian regime is instrumentalizing to discredit the Western democratic model among ordinary Russians, in our common neighbourhood and within EU countries themselves.

Second, our strengths lie in unity, consistency, and resilience. We must counter Russia's comprehensive approach in its meddling. This includes further efforts to counter Russian propaganda and disinformation. To a large extent, the unconventional and non-military threat posed by Russia creates the greatest difficulty for NATO and the EU. While Baltic politicians and diplomats have for a considerably long time called for the need to robustly tackle Russian political interference, only the last four years have awakened America and Europe to counteract it. Interference in the U.S., German, and French elections, assassinations of citizens in the UK (such as the attempt on the Skripals), the skilful promotion of fake news to shape Western opinion, and the manipulation of social media require unconventional responses. European nations and NATO have set up centres to identify "fake news," bolster cyberdefences and track the use of social media that target Russian-speaking communities, far-right groups, political parties, voters and decision-makers. We should further strengthen our vigilance and resilience to counter disinformation attacks effectively by disclosing and shaming the sources and preventing future attacks.

Correctness and politeness in this hybrid war are not options. The EU and NATO should act boldly and publicly. They should ensure that adversaries understand there will be certain retaliation. We should demonstrate our unity and determination via strategic communications and implementation of agreed assurance measures. Expanded intelligence

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and security cooperation is critical to expose and prevent Russia's meddling in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

Third, reassurance, deterrence, and military defence provided by other NATO member states to the Baltics and Poland are of critical importance. Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit, we witnessed and benefit from the biggest reinforcement of Alliance collective defence in a generation. NATO has enhanced its forward presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, with four multinational battalion-size battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, on a rotational basis. These battlegroups, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and the U.S., respectively, are robust, multinational, combat-ready forces. They demonstrate the strength of the transatlantic bond and highlight that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on the whole alliance.

As a consequence of the changing nature of military threats and following the urging of President Trump, a number of European NATO member states have increased their defence expenditures and intensified military exercises. Baltic countries benefit directly from Germany's more prominent role in NATO. This country leads NATO's Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, participates in the Baltic air-policing mission and retains leadership of a NATO Battlegroup in Lithuania. However, many believe that the EU's biggest economy can further expand its role in continental protection by increasing defence expenditure and upgrading its military.

While enjoying enhanced support of the allies, a permanent NATO presence, especially American troops on the ground in the Baltic region, would be the most credible act of deterrence and a highly visible demonstration to the Kremlin of resolute support to defend NATO member states' territorial integrity. The presence of U.S. troops in the Baltics could also be accompanied by military confidence-building measures with Russia to ease tensions, avoid misunderstandings, and demonstrate the willingness to talk.

Fourth, the EU should continue to stand its ground in supporting the international rules-based system, from the UN Charter and WTO rules to the Helsinki Act and different Council of Europe conventions and protocols. The EU should continue the active outreach and search for concrete deliverables with the U.S. to counterbalance isolationist trends

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and work together by promoting global governance and the international rules-based system.

Fifth, we need to provide greater support to Ukraine: economically, politically, and militarily. The multifaceted support of the U.S. and the EU has been of paramount importance. Ukrainians have demonstrated an incredible sense of resilience by withstanding military aggression and advancing a reform agenda as well as implementing the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU. We should nevertheless continue to demand greater accountability and transparency.

We not only need to acknowledge the European aspirations of the Ukrainian electorate, sooner rather than later we should grant Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova an EU membership perspective. President Macron's call for European renewal to develop the EU in a flexible and multi-speed manner alongside the formation of a new European Parliament and European Commission, provide an opportunity to reinvigorate the EU's "Eastern Partnership programme" and relaunch political discussions with the view to offering a membership perspective for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

Ukraine and Georgia should also finally be offered a NATO Membership Action Plan. We know from the experience of the Eastern European members that such a perspective works as a major stimulus for the implementation of modernisation efforts and reforms, no matter how difficult they may be. Uncertainty and ambiguity about Ukraine's geopolitical status leave the country exposed to further destabilisation by Russia. This, in turn, only negatively affects EU-Russia relations. A successful Ukraine will contribute to the stability in our common neighbourhood and will represent a powerful example for the Russian people.

Sixth, without a solution to the Ukrainian conflict it will be difficult to normalise relations with Russia. The EU and the U.S. should test the willingness of Moscow and push for a UN peacekeeping force in Donbas, ensuring their presence reaches the borders of Russia. The EU should follow the U.S. example and appoint a Special Representative for Ukraine to interface with Kyiv, Moscow, and Washington D.C. in advancing and monitoring the implementation of the Minsk accords.

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Seventh, while there will continue to be major issues of contention, as in the case of Ukraine, we should selectively interact with Russia where it corresponds to our interests. President Trump and European leaders continue to talk to President Putin about critical conflicts and problems in Syria, North Korea, Afghanistan, and the Middle East. Practical cross-border cooperation continues from the Finnish to the Polish borders with Russia, with the active participation of Russian local counties, despite major geopolitical disagreements between the capitals.

Eighth, we should invest in a "post-Putin Russia" by continuing to expand people-to-people contacts, educational exchanges, and cross-border cooperation, and extend support to human rights defenders and political activists. The West should continue to challenge Putin's regime publicly when abuses and violations of freedoms and human rights occur.

Last but not least, if after 2024, or even before, Russian citizens decide to return to the European way, we should draw lessons from the past and provide a credible roadmap for it. We need a Western strategy of our relations with a future democratic Russia. However, it must be very clear that Russia's road to Europe goes through Kyiv: respect for Ukraine's European choice and its territorial integrity.

Conclusion

NATO's historic legacy—providing security and defending a community of shared values—remains the best example of its relevance and significance. We should reinvigorate our unity in shared values, respect for human rights, economic partnerships and military capacity to act together. We must keep the alliance strong and united, and ensure that a more developed European strategic capacity is compatible with NATO.

Equally, as we enter the eighth decade of NATO's existence, "Europe whole and free" should continue to guide us as we open the door and help make Ukraine and Georgia's membership perspective a reality. A rejuvenated, united, and enlarged alliance will continue to preserve our civilization and defend our values and interests.

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Jana Kobzová and Tomáš Valášek

Europe Un-whole and Unfree: What if Things had Turned Out Completely Differently?

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Welcome to 2020, an important year for Slovakia. Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar is celebrating 25 years in power, a run interrupted only briefly by a pro-European, centre-right government in 2001-2003. The failure of the EU's Copenhagen summit to agree to a membership perspective for the Central European countries condemned Slovakia's pro-Western forces to an ignoble end and their ideas to obscurity. A pliant press has turned Mečiar's re-elections into a routine matter, with the rump of the opposition reduced to commiserating with civil society leaders in Bratislava's cafés.

The only slight frown on Mečiar's brow comes courtesy of the country's southern neighbour, Hungary, whose Prime Minister Viktor Orbán celebrates an equally impressive 23 years in power. Since the most entrenched of leaders, too, eventually wear out their welcome, Orbán is busy reinventing his political persona in a bid to shore up popular power.

This worries Mečiar, partly because he can see his own future in Orbán's but, more importantly, because his Hungarian counterpart had settled on restoring the country's pre-1918 borders as his new mission. Slovakia's defence spending, driven by historic suspicions of Hungary, worries about the emerging Budapest-Warsaw axis, and general anxiety about the state of things in Central Europe, is already at a historic high of nearly 4% of GDP. It is exceeded only by those of the warring Balkan states and surpasses even that of the 16 NATO countries. The OECD in its annual "Other Europe" report warns that such spending is unsustainable, given that Slovakia's economy has grown a paltry 1.5% annually for the past two decades, mostly on the back of agricultural goods exports to the Ukrainian market, which have recently collapsed.

Poland, meanwhile, has done about as well as expected, capitalising on its role as leader of Europe's "second division" Central European pack, skilfully playing off German and Russian economic interests while forging tight security cooperation with Hungary. Their joint efforts have already paid off in appropriating the Transcarpathian bits of Ukraine in 2014. Publics in Hungary and Poland have rewarded their leadership with the highest approval ratings yet, setting up nicely their next move: enlarging their newly common border by dealing with "the Slovak problem."

Most Western governments are sympathetic, arguing that Belarus' and Armenia's absorption by Russia in 2004 eventually had a stabilising effect after the last of the forces of resistance had been defeated. With Russia's *de facto* control becoming *de jure*, the region has become more manageable as there are fewer governments to deal with. Budapest and Warsaw count on the West to apply the same logic to the case of Slovakia.

Meanwhile, In the Civilised Bit of Europe ...

There is a general sense of relief in the 15 EU capitals at having avoided being bogged down in the "East European morass." It was a close call, with governments seriously (but briefly) contemplating invitations to the ex-communist countries to join the EU, with a parallel moment of insanity in

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NATO. But cooler heads prevailed and the natural order of things prevailed, first in Madrid in 1997 and then in Copenhagen in 2003.

The torrent of people from the much poorer likes of the Czech Republic and Poland has been brought under control, especially after implementing "extreme vetting" procedures for Central European visa-seekers, agreed at the 2015 emergency EU migration summit. The new Frontex agency, headquartered in London, got a handle on illegal crossings of the border at last, after a few testing years, earning its Greek CEO, Sevastopoulos Thermopylae, the European Parliament's coveted Sauron prize in 2016 for his valiant efforts to maintain the integrity of the Great Wall of Austria.

Russia remains a concern, with the 2008 Concert of Five Powers signed in Tbilisi yielding some encouraging, but still tentative results. The formal division of zones of influence has worked well and has kept the EU and NATO out of the 2009 Baltic uprisings, the 2014 war in western Ukraine, and the ongoing Balkan conflicts. Tensions between Moscow and Tehran, which led to the *de facto* partition of Azerbaijan in 2003, have kept the Kremlin busy enough to put its anti-Western ambitions to rest, at least for now.

Still, some in the West rue the failure to take up the suggestion of the late U.S. Senator Richard Lugar to help secure Russia's and Ukraine's nuclear arsenals, pointing to the subsequent proliferation of battlefield nuclear warheads to Serbia and a half dozen countries in the Middle East. But others argue that proliferation has helped the president in Belgrade, Milorad Dodik, maintain relative order in the otherwise warring Balkans. It has also deterred Croatia and Slovenia from trying to reverse Serbia's battleground gains, which would have only added to the 260,000 (and counting) dead in the region.

The transatlantic link remains strong and healthy. Bound by the worries about the risks and instability pouring out of Central Europe, the 16 allies reaffirmed at their recent jubilant Washington summit the goal to spend 3% of GDP, which most of them meet easily. Support for strong armed forces remains high, with images of bloodshed in the east dominating evening news and, thus, voters' concerns.

Fears of a conflict with Russia have receded following the 2008 Tbilisi grand bargain, so management of risks stemming from unruly Central

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Europe has become NATO's central organising principle. The doubling of NATO military forces in Germany, despite initial misgiving from the country's political left, has proven popular, as was the expansion of nuclear sharing agreements to three additional European countries. Some have questioned the continued need for these weapons, considering that fears of Russia have been laid to rest for now, but others have successfully held up Poland's and Romania's nascent nuclear programmes as evidence that the nuclear age has hardly passed.

And Now Back to Reality ...

Hold your usual criticism of these fictional alternative histories: we agree that there is no way of proving that things would have worked out as described. But that is beside the point. The purpose of this flight of imagination is different; it is to demonstrate the trends and show the likely direction of travel.

And of that we are fairly confident. If it was not for EU and NATO membership, the demons of Central Europe's past would have held far more sway over the region than turned out to be the case. The effect of membership was to "de-historize" mutual relations and to create completely new kinds of relationships and networks. These were not only cooperative in nature but also largely unprecedented (for Central Europe), with the effect of rendering past grievances irrelevant—almost quaint.

This is not to take away the faculty from local leaders. Even if the EU or NATO enlargements never happened, many Central European politicians would have had the skills and moral clarity to forge a happier, "alternative *alternative history*" (just as, conversely, membership has not kept those local leaders who are determined to relive the past from trying to do so).

The point is that many other good people would have tried to escape the demons of history and failed because too many forces would have been arrayed against them, such as hostile neighbours, poorer and therefore more restless populations, or the lack of calming security guarantees. In short, EU and NATO membership did not create a new class of virtuous

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Central Europeans; they have always existed. But the accessions made it easier for good people to do good.

Slovakia is one example. When Mečiar's shenanigans prompted a frustrated U.S. to eventually drop the country from the NATO accession track in 1997, and the EU to start contemplating a smaller enlargement group, a popular revolt of sorts followed. So strong was the lure of accession and of "returning to the West" that the opposition gained new wind, triumphed in the following year's elections and the rest is, well, history. Now imagine the NATO and EU offer had never been on the table.

What Now?

The point of looking at these alternative pasts goes beyond illustrating what, broadly speaking, could have happened. It is also to warn against complacency. Europe's relative stability and prosperity ought not to be taken for granted. The same applies to EU and NATO membership. They are not commandments; they are political decisions that can be effectively revoked when the politics change.

And changing they are, especially in the EU. Many in France or Belgium were never enthusiastic about enlargement and have remained nostalgic for a much smaller, intimate and possibly francophone EU. Recently, public attitudes in other countries, including Germany, have begun to turn, with one poll ("The 2018/19 Berlin Pulse," Körber Stiftung, November 2018) showing that 46% of Germans believe that the EU enlargement to ex-communist countries had been a mistake.

This might yet lead to a *de facto* partition, as Stefan Lehne noted recently: "Frustrated about a perceived lack of commitment to integration from the newest member states, some Western politicians have pushed for a two-speed Europe, in which the willing and able (Western) countries could move ahead, leaving the rest in an outer circle."[1]

The causes of this frustration, and the solutions to them, lie beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that both sides underestimated the complexities inherent in the post-1989 reunion of Europe, and both have

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a responsibility to make enlargement, from which both sides benefited handsomely, stick.

What If, Part 2

Instead of a conclusion, let us finish with another mind-bending exercise: can you imagine an alternative history for the countries east of the EU and NATO? One in which the grimness of Russian troops marching on Tbilisi, or the slaughter of Ukrainian soldiers at the Donetsk airport, look equally made-up, laughably unreal, as Baltic uprisings or nuclear Serbia?

Beyond the eastern borders of the EU and NATO, Europe is neither whole nor fully free, let alone at peace with itself. Belarus lives in fear of a Russian invasion and a repeat of the scenarios from Georgia and Ukraine, which, for their part, remain partly occupied by Moscow's forces. Moldova and Azerbaijan lost chunks of their territory in conflicts either originally fomented by, or currently sustained by, Russia. Russian-Western relations could hardly be worse, stuck in a circle of mutual suspicions, accusations and sanctions.

Others in this volume have tackled the difficult question of what specifically has gone wrong, and what the West could have done differently. This is not a place to go over the same ground but to reflect: just as there was nothing preordained about today's calm and stability of Central Europe, one shudders at the thought that violence further east could also have been avoided. That is a thoroughly depressing thought, for it implies that tens of thousands of dead, and untold other tragedies, could have been avoided.

But—to end on a more hopeful side—what these alternative histories also do is to warn against the laziness of linear thinking. History in Central Europe did not turn out the way it could have, the way it always has, because a wonderful human idea called “Europe whole and free” intervened. Nor is Eastern Europe condemned to relive its recent past forever.

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Daniel S. Hamilton

Europe: Whole and Free or Fractured and Anxious?

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For a quarter-century following the end of the Cold War, the prevailing paradigm in the United States and much of Western and Central Europe was of a magnetic, largely unchallenged and gradually expanding Western-led order in which the U.S. would continue as an affirmative European power, where Eastern Europe and eventually Russia could potentially find a place, where military tensions and military forces would be reduced, and where growing interdependencies and open borders would lower conflict and generate greater security and prosperity.

Much was achieved during this period. A Euro-Atlantic architecture of cooperative, overlapping, and interlocking institutions enabled a host of countries to walk through the doors of NATO, the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, the OECD, and other organisations in ways that were not at the expense of other states or institutions. Europe was not fully whole, but it was no longer divided. It was not fully free, but vast parts of the continent were no longer under the thumb of domestic autocrats or

foreign overseers. It was not fully at peace, but it was more secure than at any time in the previous century.

We have every right to be proud of these achievements. But we should have the courage to admit that we grew complacent. As time marched on, the vision of a Europe whole and free became more slogan than project; the business of knitting the continent together was left undone. And now a conflation of crises has so shaken our smug assumptions about the evolution of European order that the original vision could become a paradigm lost.

Moscow's interventions in Georgia and Ukraine jolted many—although not all—Europeans out of their dream that the future belonged to "civilian powers." Vladimir Putin's three-fold message is clear: hard power remains important; borders can indeed be changed by force; and, Russia is not somehow "lost in transition," it is going its own way.

European anxieties were further enhanced by the 2008 financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession. Traditional left-right divisions have splintered into new tensions between those who continue to champion open societies and open markets and those who seek to shield their societies and markets from what they perceive to be the excesses of globalisation and intrusions into their sovereignty.

The next shock wave emanated from an unlikely source: the United Kingdom. Brexit's message is two-fold. First, "ever closer Union" is not inevitable and the EU may not be forever. Second, European countries that appear to be models of stability, tolerance, and moderation can reveal themselves to be volatile, fragile, and fiercely divided.

The migration crisis made it further clear to many European citizens that the "Europe of institutions" is unprepared to tackle down-home challenges, and that the slogan "more Europe" is not a ready-made answer to every European question.

The reaction to the migration crisis, in turn, has made it clear that the remarkable quarter-century alignment of liberalism and nationalism in service to the European project is over—and not just in Central Europe.

The result is a Europe that has turned from being an exporter of stability to an importer of instability—a Europe that is less settled and more fluid, less capable and more turbulent, less Merkel and more German

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at a time when more Germans are also questioning predictable answers to unpredictable challenges.

Today, the defenders of European order are either exhausted or are fighting revisionists within their own ranks who are questioning the elite bargains and social underpinnings that have sustained that order. For a quarter-century, the European agenda was about how to transform one's neighbours. Now, it is about how to avoid being transformed by those neighbours. The expansive vision of a Europe whole and free is at risk of being replaced by the narrow notion of a "Europe that protects" some Europeans from other Europeans.

Revisionist Challenges

As the post-Cold War order faces unprecedented challenges, the influence and activism of revisionist states, groups, and even individuals have grown dramatically. Europeans clinging to their quarter-century of stability are simply flummoxed by the fact that their major external protagonists—Russia, China, and even the U.S.—have each in their own way become revisionist powers.

Russia under Putin seeks to undo the post-Cold War settlement, control its neighbourhood, and disrupt Western influence. Not only has Moscow intervened with force in Georgia, invaded Ukraine, annexed its peninsula of Crimea, and has troops stationed in five of the EU's six Eastern Partnership countries, it is exploiting fissures within EU member states and other European countries to generate uncertainty about the European project itself. Moscow's direct interference in the election processes of democracies across Europe and in the U.S., efforts to intimidate European energy consumers, launch cyberattacks in Estonia, Ukraine, and other countries, proclaim a duty to protect ethnic Russians in other countries regardless of their citizenship, and conduct provocative military activities, including simulated nuclear exercises and snap conventional force alerts, as well as violate the air, land, and seascapes of a number of EU and NATO member states, are all examples of the Putin regime's challenge to the prevailing European order. Putin seeks to anchor Russia as a Great Power

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pole in a multipolar world. His model is Yalta, not the Helsinki Final Act; it is Metternich, not Monnet.

European apprehensions have been enhanced by the dawning realisation that China has also now become a power in Europe. For too long, too many Europeans worried about America's supposed "pivot" to Asia while ignoring the fact that Asia—especially China—was making its own very real "pivot" to Europe. Beijing's engagement has taken various forms: strategic infrastructure investments in either poorer European countries or those afflicted by the financial crisis, from Portugal, Italy, and Greece to the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe; creating a special "17+1" mechanism with Central and East European countries and using the promise of investment deals connected to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to undermine common EU positions on issues important to Beijing; acquiring high-tech companies and stealing proprietary technological secrets; and, targeted funding for European universities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and think tanks.

Russia and China are both revisionist powers, yet each poses a different challenge. While Moscow loudly smashes the rules, Beijing quietly erodes them. China is a rising power. Its economic reach, rapid technological progress and growing military capabilities, global diplomacy geared to very different norms, and its vast resource needs render it a systemic challenger. Russia, in contrast, is a declining power. It does not have China's resources. It is, however, more desperate. This can mean that in the short- to medium-term it could also be more dangerous.

The United States: From European Power to Power in Europe?

The stakes for Europe have been rendered higher by the surprising realisation that the most unpredictable actor in this mix may in fact be the Unites States The advent of the Trump administration has not only shaken European assumptions about the steadiness and reliability of their major ally, it has exposed the painful reality of their continued dependence on what many fear to be an erratic and reckless superpower. Europe's irritation

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with being dependent on Donald Trump is almost as great as its fear of being abandoned by him.

Abandonment is not a likely scenario. The U.S. remains deeply engaged in European security. The Obama administration quadrupled U.S. defence spending in Europe following the Russian intervention in Ukraine. It sent U.S. troops on a rotational presence to the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania. The Trump administration has enhanced that spending, bolstered the U.S. presence on NATO's Eastern Flank, and supported a new Mobility Command and a new Atlantic Command for NATO. Moreover, recent European rhetoric about "strategic autonomy" has yet to be given any real substance despite EU efforts to develop a more robust defence identity. And in terms of ultimate security guarantees, NATO and the U.S. will remain indispensable for a long time to come.

But a more nuanced shift in U.S. approaches to Europe is underway, and it did not begin with Trump. Stated simply, the U.S. is drifting from being a European power to a power in Europe. That simple turn of phrase carries significant implications for transatlantic relations and European security.

For 70 years, the U.S. has been a European power. It has been integral to the intra-European balances and coalitions that comprised both Cold War and post-Cold War Europe. It has been actively involved in all of the continent's mechanisms and institutions, from NATO, the Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE, to the U.S.-EU relationship, the OECD and the G7/G8. It cultivated bilateral and regional partnerships, from the Northern European Initiative to the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, across the whole continent.

It did so not just out of hegemonic impulse but due to a number of fundamental understandings. The first was the realisation that Europe alone was still unable to deal with its own civil wars. The second was that Europe remained turbulent und unfinished. Advancing a Europe whole and free was deemed both important and urgent to U.S. interests. Third was the understanding that European order was a linchpin of world order. The U.S. also engaged as a European power because it realised that after two world wars in which Europeans destroyed their continent, it must play a role as Europe's pacifier. By aligning its security with its allies, it helped those allies

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build their security together, rather than against each other. NATO offered an umbrella under which the European experiment could flourish.

When the Cold War ended, Americans were tempted to step back from Europe. President Bush's vision of a Europe whole and free was prescient and bold. Yet, it was not clear at the time whether the U.S. would commit to its realisation. The domestic mood was decidedly inward-looking; there was talk of a peace dividend and retrenchment from global exertions. As Cold War divisions faded, it was tempting to say that it was high time that the Europeans worked out their problems themselves while Americans turned first to problems at home.

It was only when it became clear that Europe's inability to contain the fire spreading from the Bosnian conflict in the continent's southeastern corner could endanger the broader peace in Europe that the U.S. re-engaged in a comprehensive manner. The Balkan wars returned the U.S. to its role as an affirmative stakeholder and shaper of European and Euro-Atlantic architecture. The dangers were as apparent as the opportunities were historic. The wild mélange of posters and placards borne by the many thousands of people who had jumped into their Skodas, Ladas, and Trabants and taken to the streets of Gdansk, Budapest, Prague, Leipzig, Bucharest, and other Central and Eastern European cities in the late 1980s essentially carried one message: “We want to return to Europe”—to be part of a Europe to which they had always belonged, and yet had been prevented from joining because of where the Red Army stopped in the summer of 1945. Their message shook the continent and its institutions. Their message was both opportunity and obligation: the opportunity to build a continent that was truly whole, free, and at peace with itself; and the obligation to see it through.

The U.S. engaged anew, working with Europeans across the continent to extend the space of stability where war simply does not happen, where democracy, freedom, and prosperity prevail. These achievements have been significant. We can be proud. But we cannot be complacent.

Today, the U.S. is once again tempted to step back from Europe. Trump personifies this shift, but the temptation to retrench is both broader and deeper than him. Most of my compatriots wonder why 500 million Europeans still depend on 330 million Americans for protection and

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diplomatic initiatives that are essential for Europe's own security. As other world regions both beckon and threaten, and as problems pile up at home, Americans are tempted to ask why Europeans can't tackle their own problems, why America is still needed to the same degree it was in the past, whether Europe matters as it may have in the 20th century, and why Europe's challenges should be more relevant and pressing than problems at home or elsewhere in the world.

These are reasonable questions. The answer depends on whether one believes that in the new world rising a Europe with less America is likely to be more stable than a Europe with more America.

The New Era

Once again, Europe finds itself between strategic epochs. The post-Cold War period has come to an end. A new era has begun—more fluid, more turbulent, more open-ended. This new landscape is strange, unformed, yet forming fast. Familiar landmarks are changing before we can adjust our thinking. Revisiting those landmarks will help us better navigate this new landscape and better understand the viability of a Europe whole and free. Which markers still provide useful orientation? Which should be discarded in favour of new points of orientation more attuned to Europe's contemporary realities?

The post-Cold War paradigm posited that Europe's 20th-century earthquake had ended. Things had stopped shaking. Europe's new architecture could be built on stable ground. According to this perspective, turmoil in the Balkans, festering conflicts in Eastern Europe, and Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine were episodes to be resolved. Tragic, but peripheral and fixable.

These assumptions simply do not correspond to Europe's realities. Unfortunately, Europe's 20th-century earthquake did not end in 1989 or in 1991. Europe's East is less secure and less at peace than it was at the beginning of this decade. The Soviet succession remains open-ended, and it is still shaking the European landscape. Russian interventions in Georgia and Ukraine were not isolated episodes, they were symptomatic

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of deeper currents. While Ukrainians bear significant responsibility for the dysfunction and turmoil that has gripped their country, their drama is only part of much broader and deeper tensions that beset the entire region.

The post-Cold War paradigm also posited that the magnetic qualities of the EU would exert an irresistible pull on countries to create conditions by which their integration into the Union could be possible—resolving bilateral disputes and ethnic tensions, engaging in true political and economic reforms, respecting human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, working together rather than standing apart.

The new reality is that for more and more Europeans both inside and outside the Union, the European experiment, while still ground-breaking and attractive in many ways, has lost its power to induce transformative change. They only want "more" Europe when it can address their problems more effectively than local or national remedies. There is also greater sensitivity to the fragility of Europe's grand experiment at integration, and a greater caution when it comes to potential "Eurocratic" overreach.

The reality is that Europe's vast eastern spaces will remain turbulent, and sporadically violent, for the foreseeable future. Those lands are not just challenged by Russia; their volatility derives as much from their own internal weaknesses. Corruption and crony capitalism, kleptocratic elites, and festering conflicts continue to drain resources from countries that are already fragile and poor. Moreover, vast swaths of Europe's East are still beset with historical animosities and multiple crises, including a number of conflicts that affect the entire continent. Tensions over Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Crimea and eastern Ukraine, which some euphemistically label "frozen" conflicts, are in reality festering wounds. They inhibit the process of state-building as well as the development of democratic societies. They offer fertile ground for corruption, organised crime, trafficking, and terrorism. They foster the proliferation of arms and a climate of intimidation. They are a major source of instability within these countries and the broader region. These conflicts severely undermine future prospects for these countries, while giving Moscow major instruments for leverage on domestic policy and to question the sovereignty of these states.

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The combination of Western Europe's internal preoccupations, America's retrenchment, Moscow's revisionism, and Eastern Europe's volatility is a combustible brew. Putin has openly rejected the rules of the road in European security, and in Eastern Europe, beyond the EU and NATO, there are neither rules nor roads. Broader institutions that include all post-Soviet states, like the OSCE and the Council of Europe, have been weakened by Western disinterest and by the ability of Russia and other states to undermine reforms and undercut decisions. European-wide mechanisms built up over decades to increase transparency, predictability, and de-escalation, including through arms control, have lost priority. Europe's nuclear security architecture, which has brought stability over many decades, has eroded to the point of collapse. The danger is high of accidents or miscalculation among planes in the air, ships at sea, or troops on the ground. Disruptive challenges to critical societal functions have grown across the continent.

Unfortunately, despite this deterioration in Europe's security, the new reality is also that Europe's West is less confident and prepared to reach out in any significant way to Europe's East than at any time in a generation. An EU whose societies are once again defining and delineating themselves from each other is not a Union willing or able to integrate additional societies knocking on its door. The EU's Eastern Partnership, which was launched over a decade ago as a well-meaning effort at transformative change with six East European countries, has become the very embodiment of the EU's debilitating ambivalence about its relationship to its eastern neighbours. Over time, it has become more about holding countries off than about bringing them in. Does the EU seek a compensatory regionalism intended to mollify neighbours who will never be offered membership? Or does it seek a truly transformative regionalism that would tackle the priority challenges of the region and then work to align and eventually integrate these countries into the EU and related Western institutions? It doesn't really seem to know.

If a Europe whole and free has any chance of becoming reality, the EU must change course. It must stand by the Treaty of European Union's language that any European state that respects EU values "and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union." It should

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differentiate between those for whom political association, economic integration, and eventual membership is a goal (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and most of the Western Balkans) and those who are interested in cooperation short of membership (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus). Economic, technical, and financial cooperation with each country should address its most urgent needs and its specific capacities. Urgent needs should be tackled vigorously on their own merits without tying them to an unwieldy mechanism that has little meaning in the countries concerned. Only when fundamental needs are addressed and capacity is built can both sides hope to address more comprehensive efforts to address all aspects of the EU's *acquis communitaire*.[1]

Affirming the principle that the door to Western institutions remains open should not mean lowing standards. Those who seek to join our institutions do so because our norms and values mean something. Neither we, nor they, are served by diluting those standards. Realistically, that makes a membership perspective for the countries of wider Europe a generational challenge. The issue is not whether there can be a consensus on membership for any particular candidate today, it is whether those who are determined to take their countries into the European mainstream can create conditions in which the question of integration, while controversial today, can be posed positively tomorrow.

Ukraine is the crucible of change, not just because of its size and location in the heart of Europe but because of its meaning for the vision of a Europe whole and free. Ukraine has always been a critical strategic factor for European and Eurasian security, but today it stands at a critical crossroads between a more open society integrated increasingly into the European mainstream and serving as a positive alternative model to that of Putin for the post-Soviet space; or a failed, fractured land of grey mired in the stagnation and turbulence historically characteristic of Europe's borderlands.

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Turbulent Europe

Despite the huge progress that has been achieved over the past 30 years, the hard reality is that Europe remains turbulent, dynamic, and prone to instability. History did not end with the Cold War. Some walls came down, but others remained and new ones have appeared. A more fragile Europe is both more important and more urgent for U.S. interests. Yet, American leaders fail to appreciate this.

This time, the U.S. may finally succumb to its periodic temptation to retrench from European affairs. This time, it is in real danger of drifting from being a European power to being a power in Europe. By that I mean a country that is selectively rather than comprehensively engaged in European affairs, one that is focused as much on shedding burdens as sharing them, a country that is part stakeholder and part spoiler, one that is less supportive of integration and more open to "disaggregation" by playing Europeans off against one another, a country less intuitively convinced that Europe, while important, is also urgent, or that there is any particular link between European order and global order.

That is not the America Europe needs. However, it could be the America Europe gets, unless we can again affirm that enduring American interests—a Europe that is hospitable to freedom, a Europe at peace with itself, a Europe not dominated or threatened by any power or constellation of powers hostile to the U.S., a Europe that can be America's counterpart, not its counterweight—can be best advanced by an America that is a European power, not just a power in Europe.

America's debate is more open-ended than Europeans realise and more susceptible to influence than they may appreciate. It could turn on the message Americans hear from Central Europe. Over many centuries, the nature of Europe has been defined by the nature of its centre—often as crossroads, often as battleground. Today, this region of shifting borders and peoples, one whose turmoil has so often rippled across the continent, is once again our frontier of opportunity and obligation—opportunity to consolidate the progress of past decades towards a continent that is truly whole, free, and at peace, and obligation to see it through.

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The choice should be clear. Retrenchment means leaving tens of millions of Europeans suspended between a prosperous, democratic EU, a largely authoritarian Eurasia, and a turbulent Middle East. As we know to our sorrow, such "in-between lands" are often cockpits for violence, conflict, and geopolitical competition. Our goal still can be a Europe whole and free. But that means America must act as a European power, not simply as a power in Europe. And it means Europeans must invest their energies in addressing the realities of a new era rather than vainly trying to recapture one that has passed.

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George H.W. Bush

"A Whole Europe, A Free Europe"

Delivered on 31 May 1989
Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany

Thank you, Chancellor Kohl. At the outset, let me tell you that—lest you think that he has forgotten his home State because he is the Chancellor of the Federal Republic—I will only tell you that in the last 24 hours Chancellor Kohl has been convincing me that when I came to this State and to Mainz, I would be coming to heaven. And having gotten here, I think he may just about be right, I'll tell you. Thank you all very much.

Dr. Wagner and Lord Mayor, distinguished hosts, I want to also thank these two bands, West German and American, for that stirring music. And Chancellor Kohl, I especially want to thank you again for inviting me to this beautiful and ancient city on my first Presidential trip to the Republic of Germany—the Federal Republic. And Herr Kohl and I have concluded now our deliberations at the NATO summit in Brussels, an excellent start to our working partnership as Chancellor and President.

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And here in Mainz, by the banks of the Rhine, it's often said that this heartland of mountain vineyards and villages embodies the very soul of Germany. So, Mainz provides a fitting forum for an American President to address the German people.

Today, I come to speak not just of our mutual defense but of our shared values. I come to speak not just of the matters of the mind but of the deeper aspirations of the heart.

Just this morning, Barbara and I were charmed with the experiences we had. I met with a group—a small group—of German students, bright young men and women who studied in the United States. Their knowledge of our country and the world was impressive, to say the least. But sadly, too many in the West, Americans and Europeans alike, seem to have forgotten the lessons of our common heritage and how the world we know came to be. And that should not be, and that cannot be. We must recall that the generation coming into its own in America and Western Europe is heir to gifts greater than those bestowed to any generation in history: peace, freedom, and prosperity.

This inheritance is possible because 40 years ago the nations of the West joined in that noble, common cause called NATO. And first, there was the vision, the concept of free peoples in North America and Europe working to protect their values. And second, there was the practical sharing of risks and burdens and a realistic recognition of Soviet expansionism. And finally, there was the determination to look beyond old animosities. The NATO alliance did nothing less than provide a way for Western Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, to begin an era of reconciliation and restoration. It has been, in fact, a second Renaissance of Europe.

As you know best, this is not just the 40th birthday of the alliance, it's also the 40th birthday of the Federal Republic—a republic born in hope, tempered by challenge. And at the height of the Berlin crisis in 1948, Ernst Reuter called on Germans to stand firm and confident, and you did—courageously, magnificently.

And the historic genius of the German people has flourished in this age of peace, and your nation has become a leader in technology—the fourth-largest economy on Earth. But more important, you have inspired the world by forcefully promoting the principles of human rights, democracy,

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and freedom. The United States and the Federal Republic have always been firm friends and allies. But today we share an added role: partners in leadership.

Of course, leadership has a constant companion: responsibility. And our responsibility is to look ahead and grasp the promise of the future. I said recently that we're at the end of one era and at the beginning of another. And I noted that in regard to the Soviet Union, our policy is to move beyond containment. For 40 years, the seeds of democracy in Eastern Europe lay dormant, buried under the frozen tundra of the Cold War. And for 40 years, the world has waited for the Cold War to end. And decade after decade, time after time, the flowering human spirit withered from the chill of conflict and oppression. And again, the world waited. But the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free.

To the founders of the alliance, this aspiration was a distant dream, and now it's the new mission of NATO. If ancient rivals like Britain and France, or France and Germany, can reconcile, then why not the nations of the East and West? In the East, brave men and women are showing us the way. Look at Poland, where Solidarity, Solidarnosc, and the Catholic Church have won legal status. The forces of freedom are putting the Soviet status quo on the defensive. And in the West, we have succeeded because we've been faithful to our values and our vision. But, on the other side of the rusting Iron Curtain, their vision failed.

The Cold War began with the division of Europe. It can only end when Europe is whole. Today, it is this very concept of a divided Europe that is under siege. And that's why our hopes run especially high, because the division of Europe is under siege not by armies but by the spread of ideas that began here, right here. It was a son of Mainz, Johannes Gutenberg, who liberated the mind of man through the power of the printed word. And that same liberating power is unleashed today in a hundred new forms. The Voice of America, *Deutsche Welle*, allow us to enlighten millions deep within Eastern Europe and throughout the world. Television satellites allow us to bear witness from the shipyards of Gdansk to Tiananmen Square. But the momentum for freedom does not just come from the printed word or

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the transistor or the television screen. It comes from a single powerful idea: democracy.

This one idea—this one idea—is sweeping across Eurasia. This one idea is why the communist world, from Budapest to Beijing, is in ferment. And of course, for the leaders of the East it's not just freedom for freedom's sake. But whatever their motivation, they are unleashing a force they will find difficult to channel or control: the hunger for liberty of oppressed peoples who've tasted freedom.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Eastern Europe, the birthplace of the Cold War. In Poland, at the end of World War II, the Soviet Army prevented the free elections promised by Stalin at Yalta. And today, Poles are taking the first steps toward real elections, so long promised, so long deferred. And in Hungary, at last we see a chance for multiparty competition at the ballot box.

And as President, I will continue to do all I can to help open the closed societies of the East. We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe. And we will not relax, and we must not waver. Again, the world has waited long enough.

But democracy's journey East is not easy. Intellectuals, like the great Czech playwright Vaclav Havel still work under the shadow of coercion. And repression still menaces too many peoples of Eastern Europe. Barriers and barbed wire still fence in nations. So, when I visit Poland and Hungary this summer, I will deliver this message: There cannot be a common European home until all within it are free to move from room to room. And I'll take another message: The path of freedom leads to a larger home, a home where West meets East, a democratic home, the commonwealth of free nations.

And I said that positive steps by the Soviets would be met by steps of our own. And this is why I announced on May 12th a readiness to consider granting to the Soviets a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions, if they liberalize emigration. And this is also why I announced on Monday that the United States is prepared to drop the "no exceptions" standard that has guided our approach to controlling the export of technology to the Soviet Union, lifting a sanction enacted in response to their invasion of Afghanistan.

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And in this same spirit, I set forth four proposals to heal Europe's tragic division, to help Europe become whole and free.

First, I propose we strengthen and broaden the Helsinki process to promote free elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe. As the forces of freedom and democracy rise in the East, so should our expectations. And weaving together the slender threads of freedom in the East will require much from the Western democracies.

In particular, the great political parties of the West must assume an historic responsibility to lend counsel and support to those brave men and women who are trying to form the first truly representative political parties in the East, to advance freedom and democracy, to part the Iron Curtain.

In fact, it's already begun to part. The frontier of barbed wire and minefields between Hungary and Austria is being removed, foot by foot, mile by mile. Just as the barriers are coming down in Hungary, so must they fall throughout all of Eastern Europe. Let Berlin be next. Let Berlin be next!

Nowhere is the division between East and West seen more clearly than in Berlin. And there this brutal wall cuts neighbor from neighbor, brother from brother. And that wall stands as a monument to the failure of communism. It must come down!

Now, "glasnost" may be a Russian word, but openness is a Western concept. West Berlin has always enjoyed the openness of a free city, and our proposal would make all Berlin a center of commerce between East and West—a place of cooperation, not a point of confrontation. And we rededicate ourselves to the 1987 Allied initiative to strengthen freedom and security in that divided city. And this, then, is my second proposal: Bring glasnost to East Berlin.

My generation remembers a Europe ravaged by war. And of course, Europe has long since rebuilt its proud cities and restored its majestic cathedrals. But what a tragedy it would be if your continent was again spoiled, this time by a more subtle and insidious danger—Chancellor referred to—that of poisoned rivers and acid rain.

America's faced an environmental tragedy in Alaska. Countries from France to Finland suffered after Chernobyl. West Germany is struggling to save the Black Forest today. And throughout, we have all learned a terrible lesson: Environmental destruction respects no borders.

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So, my third proposal is to work together on these environmental problems, with the United States and Western Europe, extending a hand to the East. Since much remains to be done in both East and West, we ask Eastern Europe to join us in this common struggle. We can offer technical training and assistance in drafting laws and regulations and new technologies for tackling these awesome problems. And I invite the environmentalists and engineers of the East to visit the West, to share knowledge so we can succeed in this great cause.

My fourth proposal, actually a set of proposals, concerns a less militarized Europe, the most heavily armed continent in the world. Nowhere is this more important than in the two Germanys. And that's why our quest to safely reduce armament has a special significance for the German people.

To those who are impatient with our measured pace in arms reductions, I respectfully suggest that history teaches us a lesson: that unity and strength are the catalyst and prerequisite to arms control. We've always believed that a strong Western defense is the best road to peace. Forty years of experience have proven us right. But we've done more than just keep the peace. By standing together, we have convinced the Soviets that their arms buildup has been costly and pointless. Let us not give them incentives to return to the policies of the past. Let us give them every reason to abandon the arms race for the sake of the human race.

In this era of both negotiation and armed camps, America understands that West Germany bears a special burden. Of course, in this nuclear age, every nation is on the front line, but not all free nations are called to endure the tension of regular military activity or the constant presence of foreign military forces. We are sensitive to these special conditions that this needed presence imposes.

To significantly ease the burden of armed camps in Europe, we must be aggressive in our pursuit of solid, verifiable agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On Monday, with my NATO colleagues in Brussels, I shared my great hope for the future of conventional arms negotiations in Europe. I shared with them a proposal for achieving significant reductions in the near future.

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And as you know, the Warsaw Pact has now accepted major elements of our Western approach to the new conventional arms negotiations in Vienna. The Eastern bloc acknowledges that a substantial imbalance exists between the conventional forces of the two alliances, and they've moved closer to NATO's position by accepting most elements of our initial conventional arms proposal. These encouraging steps have produced the opportunity for creative and decisive action, and we shall not let that opportunity pass.

Our proposal has several key initiatives. I propose that we lock in the Eastern agreement to Western-proposed ceilings on tanks and armored troop carriers. We should also seek an agreement on common numerical ceilings for artillery in the range between NATO's and that of the Warsaw Pact, provided these definitional problems can be solved. And the weapons we remove must be destroyed.

We should expand our current offer to include all land-based combat aircraft and helicopters by proposing that both sides reduce in these categories to a level 15 percent below the current NATO totals. Given the Warsaw Pact's advantage in numbers, the Pact would have to make far deeper reductions than NATO to establish parity at those lower levels. Again, the weapons we remove must be destroyed.

I propose a 20-percent cut in combat manpower in U.S.-stationed forces and a resulting ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, at approximately 275,000 each. This reduction to parity—a fair and balanced level of strength—would compel the Soviets to reduce their 600,000-strong Red Army in Eastern Europe by 325,000. And these withdrawn forces must be demobilized.

And finally, I call on President Gorbachev to accelerate the timetable for reaching these agreements. There is no reason why the five- to six-year timetable as suggested by Moscow is necessary. I propose a much more ambitious schedule. And we should aim to reach an agreement within six months to a year and accomplish reductions by 1992, or 1993 at the latest.

In addition to my conventional arms proposals, I believe that we ought to strive to improve the openness with which we and the Soviets conduct our military activities. And therefore, I want to reiterate my support for

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greater transparency. I renew my proposal that the Soviet Union and its allies open their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aerial surveillance flights, conducted on short notice, to watch military activities. Satellites are a very important way to verify arms control agreements, but they do not provide constant coverage of the Soviet Union. An open skies policy would move both sides closer to a total continuity of coverage while symbolizing greater openness between East and West.

These are my proposals to achieve a less militarized Europe. A short time ago they would have been considered too revolutionary to consider, and yet today we may well be on the verge of a more ambitious agreement in Europe than anyone considered possible.

But we're also challenged by developments outside of NATO's traditional areas of concern. Every Western nation still faces the global proliferation of lethal technologies, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. We must collectively control the spread of these growing threats. So, we should begin as soon as possible with a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.

Growing political freedom in the East, a Berlin without barriers, a cleaner environment, a less militarized Europe—each is a noble goal. And taken together, they are the foundation of our larger vision: a Europe that is free and at peace with itself. So, let the Soviets know that our goal is not to undermine their legitimate security interests. Our goal is to convince them, step by step, that their definition of security is obsolete, that their deepest fears are unfounded.

When Western Europe takes its giant step in 1992, it will institutionalize what's been true for years: borders open to people, commerce, and ideas. No shadow of suspicion, no sinister fear is cast between you. The very prospect of war within the West is unthinkable to our citizens. But such a peaceful integration of nations into a world community does not mean that any nation must relinquish its culture, much less its sovereignty.

This process of integration, a subtle weaving of shared interests, which is so nearly complete in Western Europe, has now finally begun in the East. We want to help the nations of Eastern Europe realize what we, the nations of Western Europe, learned long ago: The foundation of lasting security comes not from tanks, troops, or barbed wire; it is built on shared values and agreements that link free peoples.

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The nations of Eastern Europe are rediscovering the glories of their national heritage. So, let the colors and hues of national color culture return to these gray societies of the East. Let Europe forgo a peace of tension for a peace of trust, one in which the peoples of the East and West can rejoice—a continent that is diverse yet whole.

Forty years of Cold War have tested Western resolve and the strength of our values. NATO's first mission is now nearly complete. But if we are to fulfill our vision—our European vision—the challenges of the next 40 years will ask no less of us. Together, we shall answer the call. The world has waited long enough.

Thank you for inviting me to Mainz. May God bless you all. Long live the friendship between Germany and the United States. Thank you, and God bless you.

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About the Authors

Ian Bond is the Director of foreign policy at the Centre for European Reform since April 2013. Prior to that, he was a member of the British diplomatic service for 28 years.

His last appointment was as the Political Counsellor and joint Head of the foreign and security policy group in the British embassy, Washington (2007–2012), where he focused on U.S. foreign policy towards Europe, the former Soviet Union, Asia, and Africa. He was British Ambassador to Latvia from 2005–2007. He was posted in Vienna as Deputy Head of the UK delegation to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) from 2000 to 2004, working on human rights and democracy in the OSCE area, and on conflict prevention and resolution in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. His earlier career included postings in Moscow (1993–1996) and at NATO HQ (1987–1990), and working in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on issues related to the former Soviet Union, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and NATO and UK defence policy.

Like George H.W. Bush, he is an alumnus of Phillips Andover Academy in Massachusetts (U.S.).

Heinrich Brauss is the former Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning on 4 October 2013, having joined the International Staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in September 2007 as Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Policy and Planning.

Prior to joining NATO, he served at the EU, first in the European Union Military Staff as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations and Exercises Division, and then as the Director of the Civilian/Military Cell and the EU Operations Centre.

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In 2001, he assumed command of an armoured brigade in Potsdam/ Germany. He also deployed for operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina where he served as Chief of Staff in the headquarters of the stabilisation force (SFOR). Other appointments included Chief of Staff of a mechanised infantry brigade and Commander of an armoured artillery battalion.

He first gained international experience as a member of the Staff of the German Military Representative in the Military Committee of NATO and EU/WEU in Brussels, where his responsibilities covered NATO strategy, enlargement, and force planning. He also served as Branch Chief in the Planning and Advisory Staff to the former German Minister of Defence, Volker Rühe, in Bonn, Germany.

Heinrich Brauss retired on 31 July 2018, after 46 years of service in the German Armed Forces. He holds the rank of Lieutenant General (ret.).

James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges, an accomplished historian and teacher, as well as a prolific writer and researcher. He currently serves as The Heritage Foundation's Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, assuming responsibility for Heritage's entire defence and foreign policy team. He is also an E.W. Richardson Fellow and the Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies.

Carafano is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and served 25 years in the U.S. Army, retiring as a Lt. Colonel. He served in Europe, Korea, and the United States. His assignments included head speechwriter for the Army Chief of Staff, the service's highest-ranking officer. Before retiring, Carafano was executive editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*, the Defense Department's premiere professional military journal.

From 2012 to 2014, he served on the Homeland Security Advisory Council convened by the secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. He formerly was a senior fellow at George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute. He also previously served on the congressionally-mandated Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of Civil Authorities, the National Academy's Board on Army Science and Technology, and the Department of the Army Historical Advisory Committee.

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His recent research has focused on developing the national security required to secure the long-term interests of the United States—protecting the public, providing for economic growth, and preserving civil liberties.

Michael Carpenter is Senior Director at the Penn Biden Center for Diplomacy and Global Engagement and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. He also serves on the board of directors of the Jamestown Foundation and the advisory board of Lithuania's National Defence Foundation. Dr. Carpenter served in the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense with responsibility for Russia, Eastern Europe, and Conventional Arms Control. He also served in the White House as a foreign policy advisor to Vice President Joe Biden as well as on the National Security Council as Director for Russia. Prior to his White House appointments, Dr. Carpenter was a career Foreign Service Officer with the State Department. He holds an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California at Berkeley and a B.A. in International Relations from Stanford University. Carpenter received fellowships for his academic work from the MacArthur Foundation, IREX, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Fulbright Foundation. Dr. Carpenter regularly appears as a commentator on foreign affairs for BBC, MSNBC, CNN, Sky News, and Voice of America, among other media outlets.

Heather A. Conley is Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and Director of the Europe Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS as a Senior Fellow and Director for Europe in 2009, Conley served four years as Executive Director of the Office of the Chairman of the Board at the American National Red Cross. From 2001 to 2005, she was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for U.S. bilateral relations with the countries of Northern and Central Europe. From 1994 to 2001, she was a senior associate with an international consulting firm led by former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage.

Heather Conley began her career in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. She was selected to serve as Special Assistant to the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the Newly

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Independent States of the former Soviet Union and she has received two State Department Meritorious Honor Awards. She is frequently featured as a foreign policy analyst and Europe expert on CNN, MSNBC, BBC, NPR, and PBS, among other prominent media outlets. She received her B.A. in International Studies from West Virginia Wesleyan College and her M.A. in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Sławomir Dębski is the Director of PISM. He has a Ph.D. in History and is a foreign policy expert and has been an advisor to all of Poland's governments since 2000, as well as a team leader, institution builder and interagency communication expert. He joined the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) in 2000 as a Russia foreign policy analyst, then served as the Eastern Europe research coordinator, followed by Head of the Research Office (2002–2007), Deputy Director, and then Director (2007–2010). In 2008, he was nominated to the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters (2008–2016). In 2010, he became a special appointee of the Minister of Culture and National Heritage for the establishment of the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDiP), responsible for drafting an act of parliament and legislation procedures. In September 2011, he was appointed Director of CPRDiP. In February 2016 he was appointed Director od PISM for teh second time. In this capacity, he was the Head of the organisation team of the NATO Warsaw Summit Experts' Forum 2017, combining different domestic and international stakeholders. He has been the Editor-in-Chief of *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny* [Polish Diplomatic Review] (since 2016 and in 2007–2010) and *Europe*, the Russian language quarterly (2001–2010), and is the author of one of the most acclaimed monographs about the Soviet-German Alliance of 1939 to 1941, with two editions in Poland, and one in Russia (2018). He also has been the editor of a few volumes of diplomatic documents, dozens of foreign policy studies, and essays.

Stephen J. Flanagan is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation in Washington. His research interests include U.S. defence strategy, alliance and partnership relations in Europe/Eurasia, strategic

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deterrence, and outer-space security. Flanagan served in several senior positions in the U.S. government over the past four decades including at the National Security Council staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy (2013–2015) and for Central and Eastern Europe (1997–1999); National Intelligence Officer for Europe; Associate Director and Member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff; and Professional Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He also held senior research and faculty positions at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, National Defense University, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He served as the lead advisor to former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in her capacity as Chair of the Group of Experts that developed the foundation for NATO's Strategic Concept. Flanagan has published six books and many reports and journal articles and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He earned an A.B. from Columbia University and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School, Tufts Univ.

Justyna Gotkowska is the Coordinator of the Security and Defence in Northern Europe programme at the Warsaw-based Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), where she has worked since 2008. There, she focuses on regional and European security and defence issues with a focus on Northern and Central Europe. At OSW, she has been following security and defence policy and armed forces' development in Germany and the Nordic and Baltic states. In recent years, she has also been writing about NATO's defence and deterrence posture on the Eastern Flank and researched EU security and defence policy from a Central European perspective. She has conducted projects for the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on bilateral and multilateral military cooperation in Central Europe, security and defence cooperation between Poland and Germany, and the implications of CSDP development for Polish security policy, among others. She also has been involved in projects with the Tallinn-based International Centre for Defence Studies (ICDS) focused on Polish-Baltic defence cooperation. In 2018, she took part in the International Visitor Leadership Program organised by the U.S. Department of State. Justyna Gotkowska has

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authored multiple publications and is a security policy commentator for Polish and foreign media.

Michael Haltzel is Chairman of the Transatlantic Leadership Network and a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University SAIS. From 1994 to 2005, Dr. Haltzel served as Democratic Staff Director, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and advisor to then-Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. In 2009–2010, he headed U.S. government delegations to three multi-week OSCE review conferences in Warsaw, Copenhagen, and Vienna.

His other previous positions include Chief of the European Division of the Library of Congress, Director of West European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Vice President-Academic Affairs at Longwood University, and, Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute Berlin.

The author of *Der Abbau der deutschen ständischen Selbstverwaltung in den Ostseeprovinzen Russlands 1855-1905* (Marburg, 1977), Dr. Haltzel has been the co-author or editor of nine other books and the author of dozens of refereed scholarly journal articles. His op-eds have appeared in the *New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, POLITICO, Huffington Post,* and *U.S. News & World Report.* Haltzel is a frequent commentator on U.S. and European electronic media.

He received a B.A. *magna cum laude* from Yale, and an M.A. and Ph.D., both from Harvard. Dr. Haltzel is the recipient of state decorations from seven EU members: Austria, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Sweden.

Daniel S. Hamilton is the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Professor and directs the Foreign Policy Institute's "The United States, Europe, and World Order" programme at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He serves as President of the Transatlantic Leadership Network, a nonpartisan international network of practitioners, private sector leaders, and policy analysts dedicated to strengthening and reorienting transatlantic relations to the rapidly changing dynamics of a globalising world. He was the Founding Director of the SAIS Center for Transatlantic Relations and

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served for 15 years as Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies.

He has held a variety of senior diplomatic positions, including Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, U.S. Special Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization, Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff for two U.S. Secretaries of State, and Director for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs. He testifies regularly before the U.S. Congress and European parliaments, is a regular commentator for European and U.S. media, has served on advisory boards for a dozen foundations, research institutes and business associations, and has authored more than 100 books and articles on contemporary international affairs, most recently *Open Door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic Security After the Cold War*, and *Exiting the Cold War, Entering a New World* (both with Kristina Spohr, eds., 2019)

He has been presented with Germany's Cross of the Federal Order of Merit (*Bundesverdienstkreuz*); France's Knighthood of the *Ordre des Palmes Académiques*; and Sweden's Knighthood of the Royal Order of the Polar Star. He has a Ph.D. and M.A. with distinction from Johns Hopkins SAIS.

François Heisbourg is Senior Adviser for Europe of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Special Advisor of the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS).

He has served in government (foreign ministry's Policy Planning Staff, International Security Advisor to the Minister of Defence), industry (Vice-President of Thomson-CSF, today's Thales; Senior Vice President at Matra Défense Espace, now part of Airbus), and academia (Professor of the world politics course at Sciences-Po Paris, Director of the IISS). He is a member of the International Council of CNRS (the French Scientific Research Council), and has sat on national and international blue-ribbon bodies, notably the French government's White Paper "La France face au terrorisme" (2006) and the Defence and national security White Papers (under President Sarkozy in 2007–2008 and President Hollande in 2012–2013); the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; the International Commission on the Balkans; the EU Commission's group of personalities on security research and development).

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He was Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies from 2002 to 2018, and from 1998 to 2018, he chaired the Foundation Council of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. In 2015–2017, he was a Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow at the Bosch Academy in Berlin.

François Heisbourg dealt with defence and national security issues as part of Emmanuel Macron's presidential campaign.

He has written extensively on defence and security questions and is a frequent contributor to specialist and mainstream media. His latest book is *Comment perdre la guerre contre le terrorisme* (2016, Paris, éditions Stock).

Vladimir V. Kara-Murza is a Russian democracy activist, author, and filmmaker. He was a long-time colleague of Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov and chairs the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom. He is a former deputy leader of the People's Freedom Party and was a candidate for the Russian State Duma. He has testified before parliaments in Europe and North America and played a key role in the passage of Magnitsky legislation in the U.S., Canada, the UK, and several EU countries that imposed targeted sanctions on Russian human-rights violators. U.S. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) called Vladimir Kara-Murza "one of the most passionate and effective advocates" for the law; U.S. Senator Ben Cardin (D-Md.) commended him as "a courageous advocate for the democratic process and fundamental universal human rights". Twice, in 2015 and 2017, he was poisoned with an unknown substance and left in a coma; the attempts on his life were widely viewed as politically motivated. He is a contributing writer to the *Washington Post* and has previously worked for the BBC, RTVi, *Ekho Moskvy*, *Kommersant*, and other media outlets. He directed two documentary films, *They Chose Freedom* and *Nemtsov*, and is the author of *Reform or Revolution: The Quest for Responsible Government in the First Russian State Duma* and a contributor to *Russia's Choices: The Duma Elections and After*, *Russian Liberalism: Ideas and People*, *Why Europe Needs a Magnitsky Law*, and *Boris Nemtsov and Russian Politics: Power and Resistance*.

Vladimir Kara-Murza led international efforts to commemorate Nemtsov, including with street designations in Washington D.C. and Vilnius. He is a co-founder of the Open Russia movement, a board member at the Free Russia Foundation, and a senior fellow at the Raoul Wallenberg

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Centre for Human Rights; and has been a visiting fellow at the University of Chicago, leading a seminar course on contemporary Russia. He has been profiled on CBS's *60 Minutes* and *NBC Nightly News* and has appeared on CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, and the BBC's *Newsnight*. He is a recipient of the Magnitsky Human Rights Award, the Sakharov Prize for Journalism as an Act of Conscience, the Geneva Summit Courage Award, the Train Foundation's Civil Courage Prize, and the Oxi Courage Award. He holds an M.A. (Cantab.) in History from Cambridge.

Jana Kobzova is a chief foreign policy expert in the Office of the President of Slovakia. Until summer 2019, she worked as the Policy Director at Rasmussen Global (RG), where she oversaw international policy and advocacy projects.

Before joining RG, she worked for the Brussels-based European Endowment for Democracy, where she developed and oversaw EED grant-making in the Eastern Partnership with a focus on Ukraine and Georgia. Prior to that, she was a policy fellow and coordinator of the Wider Europe programme at the London office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, writing analyses and managing ECFR advocacy efforts on Eastern Europe. Before that, Jana Kobzova led the Belarus democratisation programme at the Pontis Foundation in Slovakia. She has co-authored several books and reports on Eastern Europe, democratisation and the post-Soviet space.

Andrey Kortunov is the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. He graduated from Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1979 and completed his postgraduate studies at the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1982. He holds a Ph.D. in History. Dr. Kortunov completed internships at the Soviet embassies in London and Washington, and at the Permanent Delegation of the USSR to the UN.

In 1982–1995, Dr. Kortunov held various positions in the Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, including Deputy Director. He taught at universities around the world, including the University of California at Berkeley. In

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addition, he led several public organisations involved in higher education, social sciences, and social development.

Since 2011, Dr. Kortunov has been the Director General of RIAC. He is a member of expert and supervisory committees and boards of trustees of several Russian and international organisations. His academic interests include contemporary international relations and Russian foreign policy.

Robert Kupiecki is a career diplomat since 1993, as the former Undersecretary of National Defence (from 2012 until November 2015), Ambassador to the U.S., the Commonwealth of Bahamas, and observer to the Organisation of American States (2008-2012), Director of Security Policy Department, MFA (2004-2008), and Deputy Ambassador to NATO (1999-2004). He also held a number of other foreign service positions. In the 1990s, he participated in Poland's accession process to NATO. In 2013–2014, he led an interagency strategy group tasked with drafting the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (adopted by the President in November 2014).

Ambassador Kupiecki graduated with distinction from the Faculty of History at the University of Warsaw (1991) and the National School of Public Administration (1994). He was a visiting scholar at the L.B.J. School of Public Administration (University of Texas, Austin), and an international fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He holds a Ph.D. in international relations (University of Warsaw). In 2011, he received his habilitation from the Institute of Political Sciences, the Polish Academy of Sciences. He is an Associate Professor at the University of Warsaw (the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies).

Robert Kupiecki has authored or co-authored books and articles on contemporary history and international relations, including his most recent: *Through the Eyes of a Strategist and Diplomat: The Polish-American Relations post-1918* (ed. 2019), *Poland and NATO after the Cold War* (2019), *Organizacja Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego* [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] (2016), *Siła i solidarność. Strategia NATO 1949–1989* [Power and Solidarity: NATO Strategy 1949–1989] (two editions, 2009; 2012), *Transatlantic Relations in a Changing Security Environment* (co-edited with A.A. Michta, 2015), *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego RP. Pierwsze 25 lat* [The National Security

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Strategy of Poland: The First 25 Years] (2015), and *Obrona przeciwrakietowa w polskiej perspektywie* [Missile Defense: The Polish Perspective] (2015).

Hryhoriy Nemyria is a former Chairman of the Committee on Human Rights, National Minorities and Interethnic Relations of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and Deputy Chairman of the Batkivshchyna Party. In the previous Rada convocation, Dr. Nemyria chaired the Committee on European Integration. He served as Deputy Prime Minister responsible for European and international integration in the government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (2007–2010). Prior to this, he was a BYuT Member of Parliament, where he chaired the Subcommittee on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. He also assumed the position of the Deputy Head of the BYuT Faction. From 2006 to 2007, Dr. Nemyria was the Deputy Head of the Permanent Parliamentary Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the Ukrainian delegation to the Committee on Parliamentary Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. In Tymoshenko's first government (2005), he served as her Foreign Policy and European Integration Advisor. Dr. Nemyria comes from Donetsk, where he began his academic career. He has an M.A. in History from Donetsk State University and a Ph.D. from Kyiv Taras Shevchenko University. He became Vice-Rector of the National University of Kyiv's Mohyla Academy and chaired the Board of the International Renaissance Foundation. He is also a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

Robin Niblett CMG is the Director of Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) in 2007. From 2001 to 2006, he was the Executive Vice President and COO of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Dr. Niblett is an expert on UK foreign policy, European political and economic security, and transatlantic relations.

He is a Non-Executive Director of Fidelity European Values Investment Trust and a member of the World Economic Forum Europe Policy Group. He was a Special Adviser to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2015–2017) and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Future Council on International Security (2016). He was Chairman of the Experts

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Group for the 2014 NATO Summit; Chairman of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on Europe (2012–2013) and Chair of the British Academy Steering Committee of Languages for Security Project (2013).

Oana Popescu-Zamfir is a former State Secretary for EU Affairs and current Director of the GlobalFocus Center, an independent foreign policy think-tank. She served as a Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Romanian Senate, Programmes Director of the Aspen Institute Romania, and Senior Editor of the Romanian edition of *Foreign Policy* magazine, after being a foreign affairs reporter and editor. Her expertise covers mainly geopolitics and security in the EU/NATO neighbourhood, transatlantic relations, global political risk and strategic analysis, EU affairs, migration, development, democratisation and human rights, asymmetric threats (cyber, hybrid, stratcom, terrorism), and shifting models of governance. Oana is an international consultant and media commentator, as well as writer and lecturer. She coordinates international research, public and expert strategy events, and is Managing Editor of an international affairs quarterly with a regional focus. Oana was a Fulbright scholar at Yale University, with executive studies at Harvard and St Andrew's.

Her most recent work has centred on internal and external threats to democracy, as well as the malign influence of third-party actors in Europe, as well as shifts in the global order and the impact of technology on society and politics. She has co-edited a widely acclaimed study, “Propaganda Made-to-Measure: How Our Vulnerabilities Facilitate Russian Influence”, assessing the permeability of propaganda and subversion in the Black Sea region based on an original methodology, also replicated by the GlobalFocus Center in the Western Balkans.

Adam Daniel Rotfeld is former Poland's Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005) and former Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (1991–2002); Member of the United Nations Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters in 2006–2011 (chaired the ABDM in 2008); and the NATO Group of Experts (Wisemen Group) on a new Strategic Concept of Alliance (2009-2010). Co-Chairman of the Polish-Russian Group on Difficult Matters (2008-2015) and member of the OSCE

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Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project who produced the report "Back to Diplomacy" (2015).

He is a Member of the Polish Academy of Sciences Committee of the Political Sciences and has published more than 20 monographs and about 450 articles and studies. He is a researcher focused on the theory and practice of international security and human rights, conflict resolution, arms control, and disarmament. His most recent books include the *International Order* (The Polish Guild of Gutenberg Knights, Warsaw 2017) and *In Search of Strategy* (in Polish, BOSZ, Olszanica 2018).

He is currently a Professor with the Warsaw University Faculty "Artes Liberales".

Sven Sakkov is the Director of the ICDS International Centre for Defence and Security, a foreign affairs and defence think tank based in Tallinn, Estonia. Besides conducting wide-ranging research, ICDS also organises the Lennart Meri Conference and Annual Baltic Conference on Defence (ABCD), publishes the monthly *Diplomaatia* magazine, and runs the Estonian National Defence Course.

Before joining ICDS, he served for two years as the Director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCDCOOE), an international knowledge hub specialising in research, training and exercises in the areas of technology, strategy, operations, and law.

Between 2008 and 2015, he served as Undersecretary for Defence Policy (policy director) of the Ministry of Defence of Estonia. During his tenure as a policy director, he was responsible for policy planning, threat assessments, NATO and EU policy, international cooperation, and arms control. He was an Estonian representative to NATO's Senior Officials' Group and High Level Group.

Previously, Sven Sakkov served at the Estonian embassy in Washington and Estonian mission to NATO, as national security and defence advisor to the President of Estonia and as the Director of Policy Planning at MOD.

He studied at the Royal College of Defence Studies (course in 2011–2012), University of Cambridge (M.Phil. in international relations), and University of Tartu (B.A. cum laude in history).

He is a member of NATO's CCDCOE Advisory Board.

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Kori Schake is the Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. She is a contributing editor at *The Atlantic*, the author of *Safe Passage: the Transition from British to American Hegemony* (Harvard, 2017) and editor with Jim Mattis of *Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Hoover Institution, 2016). She has worked as the Director for Defense strategy and requirements on the National Security Council staff, as Deputy Director of policy planning in the State Department, and in both the military and civilian staffs in the Pentagon. In 2008, she was senior policy advisor on the McCain-Palin presidential campaign. She teaches in War Studies at King's College London and has previously taught at Stanford University, the United States Military Academy, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and the University of Maryland.

Daniela Schwarzer is the Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) since 2017, after leading its Research Institute (Nov. 2016 to June 2017). Until October 2016, she was Senior Director of Research and Director of the Europe Programme at the Berlin office of GMF. From 2005 to 2013, Schwarzer worked with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. She headed the European Integration Division as of 2008 and was a Senior Fellow from 2005 to 2008. From 1999 to 2005, she was editorialist and France correspondent of *FT Deutschland*.

Lilia Shevtsova is an Associate Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, member of the boards of the Free Russia Foundation (U.S.), Finnish Centre for Excellence in Russian Studies, Andrei Sakharov Centre on Democratic Development (Lithuania), and Liberal Mission Foundation (Moscow); member of the Editorial Boards of the journals *American Interest*, *Journal of Democracy*, and *New Eastern Europe*; and, has an honorary doctorate from St. Gallen University (Switzerland). She was awarded the Estonian state order of the Cross Pro Terra Mariana for her participation in democracy promotion.

She was Senior Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, founding Chair of the Davos World Economic Forum Council on Russia's Future, and a Reagan-

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Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. She served as Chair of the Program on Eurasia and Eastern Europe, SSRC (Washington) and as a member of the Social Council for Central and Eastern European Studies.

Lilia Shevtsova is the author of *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality*; *Putin's Russia*; *Russia –Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies*; *Lonely Power*; *We: Life in a Time of No Time* (in Russian); and, *Change and Decay. Russia's Dilemma and the West's Response* (with Andrew Wood).

Julie Smith is Reader in European Politics and Director of the European Centre at the Department of Politics and International Studies, Cambridge University, and a Fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge. She previously ran the European Programme at Chatham House. As Baroness Smith of Newnham, she sits in the House of Lords, where she is the Liberal Democrat Spokesperson on Defence. She has served on the House of Lords' International Relations Committee since its creation in 2016.

Dr. Smith's main research interests are in the history and politics of the EU. Her work focuses on the UK's relations with the EU; democracy in Europe, including elections to the European Parliament, national parliaments, and the EU; and parliaments and budgetary politics. She is currently editing the *Palgrave Handbook on European Referendums* (due out in 2019). Recent publications include *The UK's Journeys Into and Out of the EU: Destinations Unknown* (London: Routledge, 2017; paperback edition May 2018).

Ulrich Speck is a Senior Visiting Fellow at The German Marshall Fund of the United States in Berlin. His work focuses on German foreign policy, the EU, transatlantic relations, and the global order. From 2015 to 2016, he was a Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy at GMF in Washington, DC. He was previously a Visiting Scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, an Associate Fellow at the Spanish think tank FRIDE, and the Editor of the *Global Europe Morning Brief*, a subscriber-only newsletter on EU foreign policy. From 2007 to 2009, Speck worked in different positions for RFE/RL in Prague and Brussels. His articles have appeared in the *New York Times*, *Financial Times*, *Guardian*, *Moscow Times*, on CNN.com, in the *American*

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Interest, and the *Berlin Policy Journal*, in *FAZ*, *SZ*, *Tagesspiegel* and elsewhere. Speck is a foreign policy columnist for Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ). He holds a Ph.D. in Modern History from the University of Frankfurt/Main.

Krzysztof Szczerski is the Chief of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Poland since April 2016. Has a master's degree in political science from Jagiellonian University (1997) and a Ph.D. from the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of Jagiellonian University (2001). His 2010 postdoctoral dissertation, "The dynamics of the European system," won a prize from the Prime Minister. Since 2013, he has been an Associate Professor at Jagiellonian University in Krakow and became a Professor of Social Sciences in 2018.

He has worked with the Office of the Prime Minister (1998-2001) and served as an Advisor to the Minister of Health in the fields of European integration, regional health policy, and healthcare systems (1999-2000). In 2007-2008, he was Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Office of the Committee for European Integration. He was a member of the Civil Service Council to the Prime Minister (2009-2010) and a Deputy to the Sejm (2011-2015). In January 2015, he became the representative of the Polish Parliament in PACE.

In August 2015, he became the Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland, and since April 2016,

He is also a lecturer at the Diplomatic Academy of Warsaw and a member of the Council of the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

Bruno Tertrais is a Deputy Director of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research, FRS), the main French think-tank on international security issues, since 2017.

His areas of expertise include geopolitics and international relations, strategic and military affairs, nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation, U.S. policy and transatlantic relations, and security in the Middle East and in Asia.

He was previously a Senior Research Fellow at FRS (2001–2016), a Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the Ministry of

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Defense (1993–2001), and Director of the Civilian Affairs Committee at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (1990–1993).

In 1995–1996, he was Visiting Fellow at the RAND Corporation. In 2007–2008, he was a member of the Commission on the White Paper on Defence and National Security appointed by President Sarkozy and of the Commission on Foreign and European Policy appointed by Minister Alain Juppé. In 2012-2013, he was a member of the new Commission on the White Paper on Defence and National Security appointed by President Hollande.

Bruno Tertrais is a member of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation Preparatory Commission; a member of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament; a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; a member of the editorial board of *The Washington Quarterly*; a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses*; a member the scientific advisory board of Champs de Mars; and, a member of the scientific advisory board of the Chaire Economie & Géopolitique of the Paris School of Business.

In 2010, he received the Vauban Prize for his distinguished career. In 2013, he was awarded the Grand Prix de l'impertinence et des bonnes nouvelles for an essay entitled "Un monde de catastrophes? Mythes et réalités du progress". In 2014, he was awarded the Legion of Honour. In 2016, he was the co-recipient of the Brienne Prize for his book *Le Président et la Bombe*. In 2017, he was the co-recipient of the Georges Erhard Prize for his book *L'Atlas des frontières*. His latest book is *La Revanche de l'Histoire. Quand le passé change le monde* (Editions Odile Jacob, 2017).

Vygaudas Ušackas is he former Minister of Foreign Affairs (2008–2010). Between October 2017 and October 2018, Ambassador Vygaudas Ušackas led the Institute of Europe at Kaunas University of Technology. He served as Ambassador of the European Union to the Russian Federation from September 2013 to October 2017, and from 2010 to 2013, he was the European Union Special Representative and Head of the European Union Delegation in Afghanistan.

After obtaining his Law Degree from Vilnius University and completing his post-graduate education in Political Sciences in Denmark and

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Norway in 1991, he joined the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, he served as Counsellor to the Lithuanian Mission to both the EU and NATO from 1992 to 1996; Political Director of the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1996 to 1999; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania and Chief Negotiator for Lithuania's Accession to the European Union from 1999 to 2001; Lithuanian Ambassador to the United States of America and United Mexican States from 2001 to 2006; Ambassador of Lithuania to the Court of St. James from 2006 to 2008.

During the course of his career, he has received numerous awards, including the Order of Merits to Lithuania, Commander's Cross, state awards from Estonia, France, Georgia, Greece, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Ukraine, and an award of merits to the city of Utena, as well as the distinction as a member of honour of the Lithuanian Students' Union. He was awarded honorary citizenship of his hometown, Skuodas, in 2010, and of Ukmergė, in 2013.

Sergey Utkin since 2016 is the Head of the Strategic Assessment Section at the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. From 2016 to June 2018, he also headed the Foreign and Security Policy Department at the Moscow-based Centre for Strategic Research. In 2012–2016, he worked at the Centre for Situation Analysis, Russian Academy of Sciences, now merged with IMEMO. In 2006-2013, he worked at IMEMO, where his last position was Head of Section for Political Aspects of European Integration. He holds a PhD in political science (international relations), which he received at IMEMO in 2006 for his thesis on Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. In 2002, he graduated from the Moscow Pedagogical State University, School of History. His research is focused on foreign and security policy of the EU, the EU's relations with Russia and the U.S., Russia's foreign policy in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Tomáš Valášek is the Director of Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on security and defence, transatlantic relations, and Central Europe.

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Previously, he served as the permanent representative of the Slovak Republic to NATO for nearly four years. Before that, he was President of the Central European Policy Institute in Bratislava (2012–2013), Director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform in London (2007–2012), and founder and Director of the Brussels office of the World Security Institute (2002–2006). In 2006–2007, he served as acting Political Director and Head of the security and defence policy division at the Slovak Ministry of Defence.

He is the author of numerous articles in newspapers and journals, including in the *International New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Financial Times*. He has advised Slovak defence and foreign ministers, the UK House of Lords, and the Group of Experts on the new NATO Strategic Concept.

Kurt Volker is Executive Director of The McCain Institute for International Leadership, a part of Arizona State University based in Washington, DC. Is a leading expert in U.S. foreign and national security policy with some 30 years of experience in a variety of government, academic, and private-sector capacities. He is also a Senior Advisor at the Atlantic Council, a Trustee of IAU College in Aix-en-Provence, France, and a member of the International Advisory Board of USIP. He is a consultant to international business, a member of the Board of Directors of CG Funds Trust, and has previously served as Managing Director, International, for the BGR Group. He has taught Transatlantic Relations at The George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs and is a member of the School's Board of Advisors. In July 2017, Ambassador Volker served as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations (2017–2019).

Anna Wieslander is Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council and concurrently serves as Secretary General of the Swedish Defence Association. She is also the Chairman of the Institute for Security and Development Policy (ISDP) in Stockholm. She was previously Deputy Director at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Anna Wieslander has held positions as Head of the Speaker's Office in the Swedish Parliament, Secretary of the Swedish Defence Commission and

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Deputy Director of the Swedish Defence Ministry. She has also served as Communications Director in the private sector. She holds an I.B. exam from United World College of the American West (1987), a B.A. in journalism from Gothenburg University (1990), and an M.A. in political science from Lund University (1995). She is a Ph.D. candidate in international relations at Lund University and has pursued doctoral studies at the University of California at Berkeley. She is a 2015 alumna of the Georgetown University Leadership Seminar. Her expertise is in security and defence policy, Baltic sea security, NATO and partnerships, the transatlantic link, and issues affecting the defence industry.

Thomas Wright is Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior Fellow in International Order and Strategy at The Brookings Institution. His book *All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power* was published by Yale University Press in 2017. Tom has a Ph.D. from Georgetown University, an M.Phil. from Cambridge University, and a B.A. and M.A. from University College Dublin. He currently writes on U.S. President Donald Trump's foreign policy, strategic competition in the 21st century, transatlantic relations, and the future of European integration.

Ernest Wyciszkiewicz is a Director of the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding since 2016 and political scientist. Before that, he was the Deputy Director of the Centre, Head of the International Economy and Energy Security Programme and Senior Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Managing Editor of *Evropa*, a Russian-language quarterly on European affairs (2003–2009). He is the Editor-in-Chief of the "Intersection Project."

Dov S. Zakheim is a Senior Fellow at CNA Corp. and a Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Previously, he was Senior Vice President of Booz Allen Hamilton. Dr. Zakheim served as Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and DoD Chief Financial Officer (2001–2004) and as DOD coordinator of civilian programmes in Afghanistan (2002–2004). From 1985 to 1987, he was Deputy Under

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Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources. He is an Executive Advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations. He has served on Congressionally-mandated government commissions, the Defense Business Board, which he helped create, and chaired the National Intelligence Council's International Business Practices Advisory Panel. He sits on several corporate boards and is Vice Chairman of both the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Center for the National Interest. He earned his B.A. from Columbia and his doctorate from Oxford. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Chatham House and is a Fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of Military Sciences. He appears frequently in media and is a regular contributor to *The Hill* and the *National Interest*.

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